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Dutch Abstract 
Naar aanleiding van conclusies van Beck (1967, 1976) en Beck, Emery, 
en Greenberg (1985) focussen de cognitieve modellen van angst en depressie zich 
in het bijzonder op interpretatie processen. Deze processen spelen een centrale rol 
voor de psychopathologie. Stoornisspecifieke modellen voor paniek, sociale fobie 
en depressie gaan ervan uit dat de patiënten de wereld op een vertekende, 
vooringenomen manier waarnemen, zij hebben een “bias”. Op grond van deze bias 
(een “automatische reactie”) interpreteren zij ambigue informatie op een negatieve, 
bedreigende en zelfs catastrofale manier. Onderzoek dat bij patiënten verricht wordt 
concentreert zich daarom vaak op het nader bestuderen van deze bias. Het afnemen 
van vragenlijsten en het opzetten van sorteer procedures worden gebruikt om de 
preferenties van de patiënten in kaart te brengen. Echter, dit soort onderzoek is niet 
geschikt om causale verbanden te onderzoeken. Er zijn wel enkele experimentele 
studies, maar ook deze hebben hun methodologische beperkingen. Een gevolg 
hiervan is dat er tot op heden nog veel onduidelijkheid heerst over de rol van 
interpretatie biases bij angststoornissen en depressie.  
Het doel van dit proefschrift was te onderzoeken of mensen met een 
paniek stoornis, sociale fobie of depressie een interpretatie bias voor negatieve 
informatie hebben. Als dit het geval zou zijn zou aansluitend onderzocht worden of 
deze bias een algemeen of stoornisspecifiek karakter heeft. Om een antwoord op 
deze vragen te krijgen werden twee studies uitgevoerd. Een daarvan werd 
afgenomen in het Engels. Hierbij werden 18 patiënten met sociale fobie, 18 paniek 
patiënten en 21 gezonde controlepatiënten met elkaar vergeleken. De studie die in 
het Duits afgenomen werd vergeleek 29 depressieve patiënten, 36 patiënten met een 
sociale fobie en 55 gezonde controlepatiënten. Beide studies gebruikten 
vragenlijsten als ook experimentele gedeeltes. Binnen het vragenlijst gedeelte 
werden symptoom en cognitieve metingen toegepast, samen met de interpretatie 
vragenlijst van Butler en Mathews (1983). Wat betreft het experimentele onderzoek 
werd het RSVP-paradigma van MacLeod and Cohen (1993) gebruikt. Hierbij 
moesten patiënten ambigue karakterschetsen lezen die zin voor zin op de computer 
gepresenteerd werden.  
De gevonden resultaten lijken tegen de voorspellingen van de recente 
cognitieve modellen in te gaan. Paniek patiënten, patiënten met sociale fobie en 
depressieve patiënten tonen blijkbaar geen interpretatie bias, maar zijn echter niet in 
staat een negatieve interpretatie van een ambigu scenario te negeren. Binnen het 
experimentele gedeelte was het paradigma van MacLeod en Cohen (1993) zodanig 
aangepast dat de stoornis specifieke interpretatie processen onderzocht konden 
worden. Hoewel het stimulus materiaal niet zelfrelevant was konden MacLeod en 
Cohen het volgende aantonen: patiënten met een hoge angstpredispositie toonden 
een negatieve interpretatie bias, terwijl de tegenovergestelde bias gevonden werd bij 
patiënten met een lage angstpredispositie. In de experimenten die voor dit 
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proefschrift uitgevoerd werden kon echter geen verschil tussen klinische en gezonde 
controlepatiënten gevonden worden. Het hergroeperen van de steekproef veranderde 
deze conclusie niet. Het maakte geen verschil of mensen met betrekking tot hun 
angstdispositie hoog of laag scoorden, de resultaten van MacLeod en Cohen konden 
niet gerepliceerd worden.  
Echter, voor een bepaalde groep konden resultaten gevonden worden die 
in overeenstemming zijn met de resultaten van de auteurs. Patiënten met een hoge 
angstpredispositie (3de kwartiel op de State-Trait-Anxiety Inventory) toonden de 
neiging algemene scenario’s op een bedreigende manier te interpreteren. Verrassend 
echter waren de resultaten voor de groep met een extreem hoge angstpredispositie 
(4de kwartiel STAI-T). Zij toonden juist de tegenovergestelde bias en 
interpreteerden het scenario op een niet bedreigende manier.  
Met betrekking tot de specificatie van de cognitieve modellen voor paniek 
stoornis, sociale fobie en depressie wordt het volgende voorstel uitgebracht: a) 
cognitieve modellen moeten rekening houden met de aard van de interpretatie bias 
en het aspect “zelfrelevantie” opnemen, b) cognitieve modellen moeten ingaan op 
het feit dat patiënten, vergeleken met gezonde controlepatiënten, geen protectieve 
mechanismen hebben en daardoor een negatieve interpretatie minder snel als 
“onwaarschijnlijk” inschatten. 
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English Abstract 
Since Beck (1967, 1976) and Beck, Emery, and Greenberg (1985), 
cognitive models of anxiety and depression have placed interpretive processes at the 
center of psychopathology.  Disorder-specific models for panic, social phobia and 
depression postulate a bias (a "default option") in patients to interpret ambiguous 
information in a negative, threatening or even catastrophic manner.  Most of the 
existing studies investigating clinical patients administered questionnaires and used 
rank order procedures to assess people’s interpretive preferences.  Even 
experimental studies often have methodical limitations.  Therefore, the nature and 
role of an interpretive bias in anxiety and depression remain unclear.  
The purpose of this thesis was to investigate whether people currently 
suffering from panic disorder, social phobia or depression exhibit an interpretive 
bias for negative information, and if so, if this bias is general or limited to disorder-
specific concerns.  To answer these questions, two studies were conducted, one in 
English comparing 18 panic patients, 18 social phobia patients, and 21 healthy 
controls, and one in German comparing 29 depressed patients, 36 social phobia 
patients, and 55 healthy controls.  Each study consisted of questionnaire and 
experimental sections.  In the questionnaire section, symptom and cognitive 
measures were administered along with an interpretation questionnaire.  
Contrary to the predictions of cognitive models, the results indicated that 
patients suffering from panic, social phobia and depression seem to lack the ability 
to disregard negative interpretations of ambiguous scenarios rather than displaying a 
negative interpretive bias.  In the experimental section, MacLeod and Cohen’s 
(1993) paradigm was modified to allow for a disorder-specific investigation of 
interpretive processes.  Although this material was not self-referent, MacLeod and 
Cohen were able to show a negative interpretive bias for subjects with high trait 
anxiety and the opposite bias for those with low trait anxiety.  In the experiments 
conducted for this thesis, no differences between clinical and control groups 
emerged.  Moreover, after regrouping participants based on their level of trait 
anxiety, MacLeod and Cohen’s findings could not be replicated.  In accordance 
with the authors' results, high trait anxious subjects (3rd quartile on the State-Trait-
Anxiety Inventory) displayed a tendency to interpret general scenarios in a 
threatening manner.  Surprisingly, this bias reversed in extremely high trait anxious 
subjects (4th quartile on the STAI-T) to become a non-threatening interpretation.  It 
is proposed that cognitive models of panic disorder, social phobia and depression 
need to be specified to include a) the possible self-referent nature of an interpretive 
bias, and b) the absence of a protective mechanism present in healthy controls that 
disregards negative interpretations as "unlikely." 
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Chapter 1:   Introduction – statement of the problem  
Interpretation is one of the fundamental processes of everyday life.  We 
try to make sense of things.  We create meaning.  We explain.  Through these 
mental actions each person creates his or her own reality.  Without interpretation 
there would be no understanding.  At the root of interpretation lies ambiguity.  The 
word "ambiguity" is generally used to describe a situation that can be understood 
from more than one point of view.  Our perceptions of reality are ambiguous.  
"Most of us respond to ambiguities and cubist paintings in the same way.  We don’t 
understand them, so we retreat from them.  But it would seem that the more 
ambiguity there is, the more accurate the description of reality can be.  We should, 
therefore, if we really want to understand the world around us, embrace ambiguity 
and always try to see a situation from as many different points of view as possible" 
(Langdon, 1992, pp. 20-21). 
Generally, however, people view a situation from only one point of view.  
If this point is fixed even across different situations, if it is always located in a 
negative spectrum, would it not make us ill?  In her book about "Mindfulness," 
Ellen J. Langer (1989) stresses the importance of context and interpretation on our 
health and general well-being.  "Take the fear we feel when a doctor orders a biopsy 
as a cancer-screening measure.  In some cases, a tiny breast lump or a mole requires 
an incision no larger than is needed to remove a bad splinter.  But our fear is based 
upon our interpretation of what the doctor is doing, not simply the procedure.  Our 
thoughts create the context which determines our feelings" (p. 176).  Langer further 
explains that our perceptions and interpretations influence the way our bodies 
respond: "When the "mind" is in a context, the "body" is necessarily also in that 
context"  (p. 177).  Continuing this thought of line, the way we view a situation 
determines the way we "feel" about it, our physiological reaction to it, and 
consequently, our behavior. 
In addition, the act of interpretation is essential to forming memory 
representations because interpretations provide meaningful connections with long-
term memory content.  Our interpretations of the world around us also guide 
attentional processes: we selectively look for and assimilate what we expect and 
filter out stimuli that don't fit our assumptions.  The material world is matter, not 
meaning.  Thus, any meaning is brought forth by the human mind.  Different minds 
create different meaning.  Is there any regularity in all of this?  Do some people 
favor one interpretation over the other, for example, does the preference for 
negative interpretations color the world of pessimists while optimists tend to place 
more positive meaning onto their view of the world?  Do overly anxious people 
interpret the world around them in a threatening or even catastrophic manner, thus 
inducing worries, anxieties, and fears where calm, balanced, confident people 
would not find any reason for anxiety? 
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Since Beck (1967, 1976), cognitive models of anxiety and depression have 
postulated biased information processes as crucial factors in the maintenance and 
even the etiology of anxiety and affective disorders (Beck & Clark, 1997; Beck, 
Emery, & Greenberg, 1985; Eysenck, 1992, 1997; Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1988; 1997).  Information processing is conceptualized as the process by 
which individuals perceive, attend to, encode, store, and retrieve information.  As 
interpretation processes seem to underlie other cognitive processes like attention 
and memory, cognitive models of anxiety and depression accentuate interpretive 
processes (e.g., Clark, 1986; Clark & Wells, 1995; Ehlers & Margraf, 1989; Rapee 
& Heimberg, 1997).  Thus, therapeutic intervention that directly targets the way we 
interpret situations should be particularly helpful in treating depression and anxiety 
disorders, which has proven to be the case in studies comparing Beck’s Cognitive 
Therapy with other treatment approaches (for a review see Beck, 1991).  Over the 
past 15 years, there has been an abundance of research designed to examine 
information processes.  Unfortunately, compared to attention and memory research, 
interpretation processes have been somewhat neglected.  Most of the existing 
studies investigating interpretive processes in clinical patients used questionnaires 
to assess patients’ interpretation of ambiguous situations.  Experimental studies 
were largely performed with students and allow for alternative explanations due to 
methodological limitations (e.g., experimenter demand effects or selection bias).  
Therefore, the existence and role of an interpretive bias in anxiety and depression 
remain unclear.  
This thesis was designed and executed to systematically and directly 
compare results from prototypical and common anxiety disorders (panic disorder 
and social phobia), the most common affective disorder (major depressive disorder) 
and healthy control subjects obtained with an established questionnaire method, as 
well as a more refined experimental design.  Chapters 2 to 4 provide the theoretical 
background of this research.  Chapter 2 describes the nature and diagnostic criteria 
of the disorders under investigation, provides epidemiological information, and 
explains why these specific disorders were chosen.  Chapter 3 introduces influential 
cognitive models and describes specifications that were mainly derived from Beck's 
schema theory for the disorders under investigation.  Chapter 4 gives a detailed 
review of the literature about interpretive processes up to date.  This review is 
divided into a section about questionnaire studies and a section about experimental 
studies relevant to this thesis.  The limitations of the existing literature are 
discussed.  Chapters 5 to 8 cover the method and result sections of this thesis.  In 
chapter 5, the research questions are derived and hypotheses are formulated.  
Chapter 6 describes the first study, executed in English at Harvard University in 
Boston, Massachusetts.  It explains in detail the construction of the interpretation 
questionnaire as well as the experimental material.  Chapter 6 also illustrates the 
characteristics of MacLeod and Cohen's paradigm and explains how comprehension 
latencies were analyzed.  Results from both the questionnaire and the experimental 
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part of the first study are described, along with a discussion of these findings.  
Chapter 7 delineates the second study that took place at Dresden University of 
Technology in German with larger group numbers and much stricter exclusion 
criteria to control for possible error variance due to comorbid disorders.  Again, 
method as well as results are presented and discussed.  Chapter 8 brings together 
comparable results of both studies, reports numerous results with both data sets 
merged, and reports psychometric properties of the interpretation questionnaires in 
more detail.  The final chapter 9 is a general discussion of the research conducted in 
this thesis.  Conclusions are drawn, limitations of the studies are examined, and the 
findings are connected to the existing literature.  Modifications of the cognitive 
models of anxiety and depression are proposed, implications of the results 
characterizing emotional disorders in general are summarized, and possible 
directions for further investigation are discussed. 
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Chapter 2:   Description and classification of disorders 
Anxiety is an evolutionarily highly important and beneficial response to 
danger.  The emotional aspect is accompanied by specific physiological reactions 
aimed to prepare our body for fight or escape.  Consequently, aggressive reactions 
or responses of escape are much more likely in anxiety provoking situations than 
approach behavior.  These highly automatic processes have been important for our 
survival and serve to protect us.  Similarly, sadness and depressed feelings are a 
useful response to experiences of loss.  People withdraw and re-evaluate their 
experience and situation temporarily.  This way they focus and conserve their 
energy and reflect on their resources.  But when do anxiety and depression turn into 
a problem?  When do they qualify as a "disorder"?  In general, anxiety and sadness 
are thought of as continua.  It remains controversial, however, whether anxiety 
disorders and depressive disorders constitute a new quality altogether rather than 
just a quantitative difference in these common emotions. 
 
2.1   Anxiety Disorders 
Anxiety is one of the most common negative emotions and is experienced 
by most individuals almost daily.  It is an appropriate response to danger.  Low and 
moderate states of anxiety increase performance.  Too much anxiety, however, 
interferes with effective functioning and thereby inhibits performance (Yerkes-
Dodson law).  Anxiety also accompanies many psychological disorders, either as a 
defining feature (in the case of anxiety disorders) or as a by-product of another 
mental disorder (e.g., depression, somatoform disorders, eating disorders, psychotic 
disorder).  Because anxiety plays such an important role and is so prevalent in 
people’s lives, research has to be aimed at an understanding of its mechanisms. 
Anxiety, as well as emotions in general, can be described on different 
levels: 1) subjective experience, 2) cognitive appraisal, 3) physiological change, 4) 
motivational tendencies, 5) expressive behavior, and 6) instrumental behavior (see 
Kleinginna & Kleinginna, 1981; Schmidt-Atzert, 1996).  However, these levels 
usually do not correlate highly and it is unclear how many of these components 
have to be simultaneously present in order to speak of an "emotion." Nevertheless, 
it is helpful to conceptualize different levels and thus many descriptions of anxiety 
use this approach.  Anxiety is commonly defined as a negative, aversive affect 
accompanied by body sensations of tension and activation.  Unlike other aversive 
emotions like sadness or anger, anxiety is future-oriented and directed at 
expectations of dangerous or aversive situations. 
Anxiety becomes pathological if it interferes with an individual’s 
functioning in one or more areas of life and if it is stronger or more frequent than 
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necessary or reasonable.  Therefore, anxiety disorders are defined by the subjective 
distress or dysfunction a person experiences and by the excessiveness of the 
negative emotion.  The individual fears situations that are objectively not 
dangerous.  There are different types of anxiety disorders.  The three most common 
types are unspecific anxiety (either chronic or as sudden attacks), phobias (anxiety 
is elicited by specific situations), and obsessions.  In addition, posttraumatic stress 
disorder is also classified as an anxiety disorder.  Modern classification of anxiety 
disorders is based on Marks (1970).  The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (DSM) 
is the most widely used classification system of mental disorders.  Table 2.1 
provides an overview of the anxiety disorders described in the DSM-IV, including 
their classification code.  The following descriptions of the specific anxiety 
disorders panic disorder and social phobia are also based on this classification 
system.  
The classification of anxiety disorders and their differentiation from other 
disorders remain somewhat controversial.  High comorbidity rates and anxiety as a 
by-product of many other disorders compound the issue.  In the multi-center study 
of the World Health Organization (WHO) about mental illness in general health 
care, 24% of all patients fulfilled diagnostic criteria (based on the ICD-10; WHO, 
1989) for at least one mental disorder (Üstün & Sartorius, 1995).  Over one third of 
these patients displayed comorbid structures by receiving more than one diagnosis.  
In almost all participating health care centers, anxiety and depression were the two 
most frequently associated disorders.  Therefore, a new diagnostic category was 
introduced as "research diagnosis" in DSM-IV: mixed anxiety-depression 
(American Psychiatric Association (APA), 1994, Appendix B, pp. 723-725).  In 
addition, anxiety disorders are also often associated with each other (Brown & 
Barlow, 1992).  
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Table 2.1:  Classification of anxiety disorders based on the DSM-IV (APA, 1994; Saß, 
                        Wittchen, & Zaudig, 1996) 
 
Code 
DSM-IV 
Code 
ICD-101 
Name of the disorder 
293.89 F06.4 Anxiety disorder due to a general medical condition 
300.00 F41.9; F40.9 Anxiety disorder not otherwise specified 
300.01 F41.0 Panic disorder without agoraphobia 
300.21 F40.01 Panic disorder with agoraphobia 
300.22 F40.00 Agoraphobia without history of panic disorder 
300.02 F41.1 Generalized anxiety disorder 
300.23 F40.1 Social phobia (Social anxiety disorder) 
300.29 F40.2 Specific phobia 
300.3 F42.x Obsessive-compulsive disorder 
308.3 F43.0 Acute stress disorder 
309.81 F43.1 Posttraumatic stress disorder 
1 International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision, World Health Organization, 1989 
 
Despite ongoing discussions regarding the validity of individual diagnoses 
or specific diagnostic criteria, there is clear evidence for differences among various 
anxiety disorders (e.g., Zinbarg & Barlow, 1996).  Therefore, differential diagnoses 
and differential research are indicated.  Table 2.2 provides an overview of important 
clinical features of anxiety disorders.  Based on these broad characteristics, 
similarities and differences between individual disorders can be illustrated. 
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Table 2.2:  Important clinical features of selected anxiety disorders (Modified after  
  Marks, 1987) 
 
Anxiety disorder diffuse/ 
focal1 
Avoi-
dance 
Panic 
attacks2 
Remarks 
Panic disorder 
 
diffuse -(+) ++ approx. 65% have both disorders,  
30 % pure panic, 
Agoraphobia 
 
both ++  5% pure agoraphobia 
Social phobia 
 
both ++  often, insufficient social competence 
and excessive anxiety together 
Specific phobia 
 
focal ++   
Generalized anxiety 
disorder 
diffuse -(+) − high comorbidity 
Obsessive-compulsive 
disorder 
both ++ − approx. 50% washing/cleaning rituals, 
35% control rituals, 15% thoughts 
without rituals 
Posttraumatic stress 
disorder 
both + rarely  
1  Do the central problems involve narrow, specific areas or situations (focal) or are they widely 
spread and involve multiple areas and situations (diffuse)? 
2  This row refers to "spontaneous" panic attacks only.  By definition, nearly all severe phobics 
(>85% of all patients) experience situational panic attacks. 
Symbols: − "neglectable amount"; + "frequent"; ++ "very common"  
 
 
Table 2.2 differentiates whether the anxiety experienced within a disorder 
is diffuse, meaning not elicited by a specific stimulus or situation, or if anxiety is 
focal, i.e., specific to certain stimuli and situations.  Most anxiety disorders are 
accompanied by both diffuse and focal anxiety.  Barlow (1988, 1991, 2002) and 
Barlow and DiNardo (1991) suggested that generalized (diffuse) anxiety and worry 
"is fundamentally a presenting characteristic of all anxiety disorders with the 
possible exception of simple phobia" (Barlow & DiNardo, 1991, p. 115).  
Avoidance is also a typical feature of all anxiety disorders.  Its existence even in 
panic disorder and generalized anxiety disorder constitutes a relatively recent 
finding.  In panic disorder without agoraphobia and in generalized anxiety disorder, 
avoidance is neither a central nor an easily noticeable feature.  Nevertheless, subtle 
avoidance (e.g., cognitively or as safety signals) maintains anxiety in these 
disorders as well.  Whereas only patients with panic disorder experience 
spontaneous panic attacks, situational panic attacks elicited by the presence of a 
feared stimulus or situation are common in most anxiety disorders.  The only 
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exception to this rule is generalized anxiety disorder.  Patients’ excessive fear or 
anxiety of objectively non-harmful, non-dangerous objects or situations, and the 
distress caused by this fear and anxiety, are the most common features of all anxiety 
disorders. Extensive epidemiological studies of the past two decades using 
sophisticated assessment techniques have shown that mental disorders are quite 
common and put a huge burden on the health care system.  Prevalence rates among 
the general population vary between 10% and 20% (Bebbington, Hurry, Tennant, 
Sturt, & Wing, 1981; Dilling, Weyerer, & Castell, 1984; Eaton & Kessler, 1985; 
Murphy, Olivier, Sobol, Monson, & Leighton, 1986; Wittchen & von Zerssen, 
1988).  Anxiety disorders and depression together with substance abuse are the 
most common mental disorders in the industrialized countries.  In the next two 
sections, panic disorder and social phobia are described in more detail because these 
disorders, together with depression, will be focus of this thesis research. 
 
2.1.1 Panic disorder and agoraphobia 
Panic Disorder 
Panic disorder is a debilitating and relatively frequent disorder that is 
marked by a fluctuating and often chronic course (Breier, Charney, & Heninger, 
1986).  The essential feature is the presence of recurrent, unexpected panic attacks 
followed by at least 1 month of persistent concern about having another panic 
attack, worry about the possible implications or consequences of the panic attacks, 
or a significant behavioral change related to the attacks.  An unexpected 
(spontaneous, uncued) panic attack is defined as one that is not associated with a 
situational trigger (i.e., it occurs "out of the blue").  Therefore, panic disorder is 
representative of state anxiety but not of phobias.  A panic attack is associated with 
a number of physical and psychological symptoms and a feeling of impending 
doom.  It takes a maximum of 10 minutes until at least four symptoms have 
appeared.  A panic attack usually lasts for about 30 minutes.  However, duration 
may vary widely.  The most common physical symptoms are shortness of breath, 
heart palpitations or accelerated heart beats, chest pain, sweating, faintness, 
dizziness, nausea or abdominal distress, trembling or shaking, feelings of 
derealization and depersonalization (see Table 2.3).  In addition, individuals with 
panic disorder display characteristic concerns or attributions about the implications 
or consequences of the panic attacks (e.g., cardiac disease, seizure disorder, "going 
crazy," losing control, dying).  The majority of people with recurrent panic attacks 
significantly change their behavior (e.g., quit a job, stop exercising, avoid certain 
places where they experienced a panic attack before).  
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Table 2.3:  List of DSM-IV panic symptoms 
 
 
1) palpitations, pounding heart, or accelerated heart rate 
2) sweating 
3) trembling or shaking 
4) sensations of shortness of breath or smothering 
5) feeling of choking 
6) chest pain or discomfort 
7) nausea or abdominal distress 
8) feeling dizzy, unsteady, lightheaded, or faint 
9) derealization (feelings of unreality) or depersonalization (being detached from 
oneself) 
10) fear of losing control or going crazy 
11) fear of dying 
12) paresthesias (numbness or tingling sensations) 
13) chills or hot flashes 
 
 
 
Individuals with panic disorder often suffer severe social costs and are at 
an elevated risk for financial dependence, emergency room visits, and suicidality 
(Leon, Portera, & Weissman, 1995; Weissman, Klerman, Markowitz, & Ouellette, 
1989).  Patients experience the somatic symptoms elicited by the sympathetic 
nervous system as extremely threatening (Barlow, 1985; Cameron, Thyer, Nesse, & 
Curtis, 1986; Margraf, Taylor, Ehlers, Roth, & Agras, 1987; Taylor, Sheikh, Agras, 
Roth, Margraf, et al., 1986) and attach characteristic catastrophic concerns like 
dying, losing control, or "going crazy." 
In the case of intense panic attacks, individuals frequently escape the 
situation or seek help.  Help may depend on situational characteristics as well as 
thought content and may go as far as going to the emergency room.  In DSM-IV, 
panic attacks are operationalized using the number of symptoms (at least 4 of the 13 
symptoms from Table 2.3 have to be present) and their duration of onset (at least 4 
symptoms have to be develop within 10 minutes).  At least some of the panic 
attacks have to be spontaneous, i.e., develop without the presence of any real danger 
or phobic situation.  However, research has shown that such "out of the blue" 
attacks are the result of interoceptive conditioning and thus are elicited by internal 
triggers (Ehlers, 1993).  Such triggers are physical sensations that have gotten 
associated with an impending physical or psychological catastrophe.  However, the 
individual may not be aware of this association anymore.  Less frequently, thoughts 
and images can also trigger a panic attack.  Table 2.4 displays the diagnostic criteria 
for panic disorder according to the DSM-IV.  Differential diagnosis is crucial and 
sometimes difficult.  Organic causes for panic attacks (e.g., hyperthyroidism) have 
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to be ruled out and attacks must not be limited to phobic situations or occur solely 
within another mental disorder. 
 
Table 2.4: DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for panic disorder without agoraphobia 
 
A.   Both (1) and (2): 
(1)   recurrent unexpected panic attacks (discrete periods of intense fear or discomfort, 
in which four (or more) symptoms develop abruptly and reach a peak within 10 
min.) 
(2)   at least one of the attacks has been followed by 1 month (or more) of one (or 
more) of the following: 
(a)   persistent concern about having additional attacks 
(b)   worry about the implications of the attack or its consequences (e.g., losing 
control, having a heart attack, "going crazy") 
(c)   a significant change in behavior related to the attacks 
B.   Absence of agoraphobia. 
C.   The panic attacks are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e.g., a 
drug of abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition (e.g., hyperthyroidism). 
D.  The panic attacks are not better accounted for by another mental disorder. 
 
Of all the patients with a mental disorder, panic patients seek professional 
help most frequently.  They run up high costs for the health care system because 
they repeatedly consult specialists and require extensive, often repeated differential 
laboratory tests (Boyd, 1986).  
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Agoraphobia 
When "fear of fear," the central feature of panic disorder (Chambless, 
Caputo, Bright, & Gallapher, 1984; Westphal, 1871), increases and persists, 
significant behavioral change occurs.  Patients avoid situations where having a 
panic attack seems especially dangerous or unpleasant.  These patients develop 
"agoraphobia," literally translated as "fear of the marketplace." Today, agoraphobia 
means the avoidance of specific places and situations out of fear of having a panic 
attack or fear of its dreaded negative consequences.  In the DSM-IV, agoraphobia 
(within the panic syndrome) is defined as anxiety about being in places or situations 
from which escape might be difficult (or embarrassing) or in which help may not be 
available in the event of having a panic attack or panic-like symptoms.  Avoided 
situations may include being alone outside the home or being home alone; being in 
a crowd of people; traveling in an automobile, bus, or airplane; or being on a bridge 
or in an elevator (see Table 2.5).  Some individuals are able to expose themselves to 
the feared situations but endure these experiences with considerable dread.  Often 
an individual is better able to confront a feared situation when accompanied by a 
companion.  According to Barlow (2002), and Craske and Barlow (1988, 2001), 
agoraphobic avoidance behavior is simply one complication of severe unexpected 
panic attacks. There are a number of typical anxiety triggers in agoraphobia.  
Distance to a "safe" place or person and a decrease in mobility are possible 
dimensions of classification (Fiegenbaum, 1986; Marks, 1987; Mathews, Gelder, & 
Johnston, 1981; Thorpe & Burns, 1983).  Numerous researchers have used the term 
"trapped" to describe typical agoraphobic situations (Beck, Emery, & Greenberg, 
1985; Goldstein & Chambless, 1978).  Usually, it is easier for patients to confront a 
feared situation when accompanied by a companion, most frequently an adult the 
patient trusts in, such as the partner, but sometimes even a small child or a pet.  
Table 2.5 lists a number of typical agoraphobic situations. 
 
Table 2.5: Typical agoraphobic situations (Adopted from Barlow & Durand, 2002) 
 
Shopping malls 
Supermarkets 
Stores 
Waiting in line 
(Movie) Theaters 
Restaurants 
Crowds 
Buses 
Trains 
Subways 
Cars (as driver or passenger) 
Planes 
Traveling 
Being far from home 
Staying at home alone 
Elevators 
Escalators 
Towers 
Bridges  
Wide streets 
Tunnels 
Secluded areas 
Narrow, closed rooms 
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Distinguishing agoraphobia from specific phobia or social phobia may be 
difficult.  Table 2.6 lists the diagnostic criteria for agoraphobia according to the 
DSM-IV.  Note that agoraphobia is not a codable disorder.  The specific disorder in 
which the agoraphobia occurs (panic disorder with agoraphobia or agoraphobia 
without history of panic disorder) has to be coded. 
 
Table 2.6: DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for agoraphobia  
 
A. Anxiety about being in places or situations from which escape might be difficult (or 
embarrassing) or in which help may not be available in the event of having an 
unexpected or situationally predisposed panic attack or panic-like symptoms.  
Agoraphobic fears typically involve characteristic clusters of situations that include 
being outside the home alone; being in a crowd or standing in line; being on a bridge; 
and traveling in a bus, train, or automobile. 
Note: Consider the diagnosis of specific phobia if the avoidance is limited to one or 
only a few specific situations, or social phobia if the avoidance is limited to social 
situations. 
B. The situations are avoided (e.g., travel is restricted) or else are endured with marked 
distress or with anxiety about having a panic attack or panic-like symptoms, or 
require the presence of a companion. 
C. The anxiety or phobic avoidance is not better accounted for by another mental 
disorder, such as social phobia (e.g., avoidance limited to social situations because of 
fear of embarrassment), specific phobia (e.g., avoidance limited to a single situation 
like elevators), obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g., avoidance of dirt by someone 
with an obsession about contamination), posttraumatic stress disorder (e.g., 
avoidance of stimuli associated with a severe stressor), or separation anxiety disorder 
(e.g., avoidance of leaving home or relatives). 
 
 
 13
2.1.2 Social phobia 
According to numerous surveys, 20% to 50% of college students describe 
themselves as "shy." However, social phobia is more than exaggerated shyness 
(Schneier, Liebowitz, Beidel, Fyer, et al., 1996).  Social phobia is an anxiety 
disorder characterized by intense anxiety and avoidance of social situations due to 
fear of being embarrassed, humiliated, or otherwise negatively evaluated by others.  
Typically, individuals with social phobia display anxious anticipation of 
encountering social or performance situations.  Exposure to the feared situation 
almost invariably provokes an immediate anxiety response.  This response may take 
the form of a situationally predisposed panic attack.  Therefore, contrary to panic 
disorder, pathological social anxiety is considered a phobia and not state anxiety.  
Descriptions of social anxiety have a long history, dating back at least to 
the writings of Hippocrates (Marks, 1985).  Early in this century, Janet (1903) 
described patients who became extremely anxious in performance situations.  
Despite early clinical descriptions, neither the first nor the second edition of the 
DSM (APA, 1952, 1968) recognized social phobia as a distinct clinical entity.  
Marks and Gelder (1966) first described the syndrome of social phobia in its 
contemporary version.  Recognition of the disorder was furthered in 1985 when 
Michael Liebowitz and colleagues wrote a review entitling social phobia a 
"neglected anxiety disorder" (Liebowitz, Gorman, Fyer, & Klein, 1985).  Interest in 
the study and treatment of social phobia has risen dramatically in the past 15 years. 
Individuals with social phobia experience marked and persistent fear of 
one or more social or performance situations.  They are concerned about 
embarrassment and are afraid that others will judge them to be anxious, weak, 
"crazy," or stupid.  In some cases, feared situations include any in which the person 
might have to interact with people.  Individuals with performance anxiety, on the 
other hand, usually have no difficulty with social interaction, but when they must do 
something in front of other people, anxiety takes over.  The most common type of 
performance phobia, to which most people can relate, is public speaking.  
Individuals may fear public speaking because of concerns that others will notice 
their trembling hands or voice.  Other individuals are concerned that they may 
experience extreme anxiety when conversing with others because of fear that they 
will appear inarticulate.  Additional common situations are eating in front of others, 
signing a paper while someone is watching, or urinating in a public restroom.  Table 
2.7 displays a list of common situations invoking social phobia.  What these 
situations have in common is that the individual is required to do something while 
others are watching and, to some extent, evaluating the behavior.  This is truly a 
social phobia because these people have no difficulty eating, writing, or urinating in 
private.  Only when others are watching does the behavior deteriorate.  
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Table 2.7:  Common situations invoking social phobias (From Jefferys, 1997) 
 
Performance situations Interaction situations 
public speaking 
eating in front of others 
writing in front of others 
speaking in a group 
drinking in front of others 
entering a room while others are seated 
using public toilets 
interacting with others 
conversing on the telephone 
speaking with strangers 
dating 
interacting with the opposite sex 
attending social gatherings 
dealing with authority figures 
negotiating with others  
 
The person with social phobia typically will avoid the feared situations.  
Less commonly, the person forces him- or herself to endure the social or 
performance situation, but experiences it with intense anxiety.  Marked anticipatory 
anxiety may also occur far in advance of upcoming social situations (e.g., worrying 
every day for several weeks before attending a social event).  There may be a 
vicious cycle of anticipatory anxiety leading to fearful cognition and anxiety 
symptoms in the real situation, which leads to actual or perceived poor performance 
in the feared situation, which leads to embarrassment and increased anticipatory 
anxiety about the feared situation, and so on.  Fears of being embarrassed in social 
situations are common, but usually the degree of distress or impairment is 
insufficient to warrant a diagnosis of social phobia.  Social phobia is associated with 
serious impairment in social and vocational functioning and increased risk of 
comorbid psychopathology. 
To warrant the diagnosis of social phobia it is sufficient if the individual 
fears or avoids one type of situation only (e.g., public speaking) as long as all other 
diagnostic criteria are fulfilled (see Table 2.8).  A generalization to most social 
situations is not necessary but constitutes a specifier (social phobia, generalized 
subtype).  Otherwise, diagnostic criteria parallels the criteria for other phobias.  
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Table 2.8:  DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for social phobia  
 
A.    A marked and persistent fear of one or more social or performance situations in 
which the person is exposed to unfamiliar people or to possible scrutiny by others.  
The individual fears that he or she will act in a way (or show anxiety symptoms) that 
will be humiliating or embarrassing.  
B. Exposure to the feared social situation almost invariably provokes anxiety, which 
may take the form of a situationally bound or situationally predisposed panic attack.  
C. The person recognizes that the fear is excessive or unreasonable. 
D. The feared social or performance situations are avoided or else are endured with 
intense anxiety or distress. 
E. The avoidance, anxious anticipation, or distress in the feared social or performance 
situation(s) interferes significantly with the person’s normal routine, occupational 
(academic) functioning, or social activities or relationships, or there is marked 
distress about having the phobia. 
F. In individuals under age 18 years, the duration is at least 6 months. 
G. The fear or avoidance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance 
(e.g., a drug abuse, a medication) or a general medical condition and is not better 
accounted for by another mental disorder. 
H. If a general medical condition or another mental disorder is present, the fear in 
Criterion A is unrelated to it, e.g., the fear is not of stuttering, trembling in 
Parkinson’s disease, or exhibiting abnormal eating behavior in anorexia nervosa or 
bulimia nervosa. 
 
In general, differential diagnosis to other disorders is relatively clear.  
Exceptions are panic disorder with agoraphobia and agoraphobia without history of 
a panic disorder.  Individuals with both panic attacks and social avoidance 
sometimes present a potentially difficult diagnostic problem.  Prototypically, panic 
disorder with agoraphobia is characterized by the initial onset of unexpected panic 
attacks and the subsequent avoidance of multiple situations thought to be likely 
triggers of the panic attacks.  The diagnosis of social phobia is not made when the 
only social fear is of being seen while having a panic attack.  Prototypically, social 
phobia is characterized by the avoidance of social situations in the absence of 
recurrent unexpected panic attacks.  The situations avoided in social phobia are 
limited to those involving possible scrutiny by other people.  Agoraphobia typically 
involves characteristic clusters of situations that may or may not involve scrutiny by 
others (e.g., being alone outside the home or being home alone).  Table 2.8 lists the 
diagnostic criteria for social phobia. 
Eighty-one percent of those with social phobia have a further psychiatric 
diagnosis that developed after its onset (Magee, Eaton, Wittchen, McGonagle, & 
Kessler, 1996).  The anxiety disorders are the most common secondary diagnoses.  
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In a study conducted by Davidson and colleagues (Davidson, Hughes, George, & 
Blazer, 1993), 60% of individuals suffering from social phobia also reported 
specific phobia, 45% agoraphobia, 26% generalized anxiety disorder, 18% 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, and 11.6% panic disorder.  Lifetime rates of 
depression and dysthymia in social phobia are also high.  Most individuals will 
experience a major depressive episode sometime during the course of their illness 
(Magee et al., 1996; Schneier, Johnson, Hornig, Liebowitz, & Weissman, 1992). 
 
2.2   Depression 
Sadness, similar to anxiety, is a basic human emotion that is part of 
everyone’s life.  Experiences of loss are typically accompanied by feelings of 
dejection that can last from minutes to several hours or even days.  In fact, if a 
loved one dies, a depressive response that lasts up to four weeks is still considered 
"normal." The term "depression" or "depressive" is widely used to describe such 
transient periods of low mood.  However, depression that constitutes a mental 
disorder has a different quality.  Inflicted individuals feel empty and hopeless.  
They typically experience the depression as a dark hole, accompanied by energy 
loss, an inability to continue their daily activities, and a lack of any color in their 
lives.  
"The experience of depression is like falling into a deep, dark hole that 
you cannot climb out of.  You scream as you fall, but it seems like no one hears 
you.  Some days you float upward without even trying; on other days, you wish that 
you would hit bottom so that you would never fall again.  Depression effects the 
way you interpret events.  It influences the way you see yourself and the way you 
see other people.  I remember looking into the mirror and thinking that I was the 
ugliest creature in the world." (From Barlow & Durand, 2002, p. 191). 
To suffer from a major depressive episode, the most commonly diagnosed 
and most severe type of depression, is extremely distressing for patients themselves 
but also for their relatives and friends who are frequently unable to understand the 
patient.  Sometimes the disorder appears even paradoxical: a mother gets depressed 
after the birth of her child; a businessman suffers from a depressive episode after 
receiving a promotion.  Our Western civilization assumes that people have control 
over their emotions.  Thus individuals suffering from depression may be blamed for 
their "weakness" and may face expectations to "snap out of it." They often think so 
themselves and believe that they should be able to handle their mood swings.  Like 
all emotions, depression can be described on numerous levels.  First, there is the 
affective side, typically marked by sadness, dejection, and feelings of emptiness.  
However, in some cases, irritability and anger dominate the affective spectrum.  
Instead of dejection, loss of interest in most activities and an inability to experience 
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any excitement or joy may predominate.  At the cognitive level, individuals 
suffering from depression "see black." They experience themselves as helpless and 
have a very pessimistic and hopeless outlook on the world and their own future.  
They ruminate over their own guilt and punishment, failure and uselessness.  In 
addition, cognitive processes like concentration, decisiveness, and memory are 
impaired.  At the physiological level, a lack of energy, sleep disturbance, and a 
change of appetite are characteristic for depression.  Behaviorally, depressed 
individuals usually withdraw from most social activities and isolate themselves 
from friends and family.  Often, psychomotor agitation or retardation can be 
observed as well.  In the DSM-IV, depression is grouped under the heading "mood 
disorder" (APA, 1994).  Mood disorders can be divided into unipolar and bipolar.  
Individuals who experience either depression or mania are said to suffer from a 
unipolar mood disorder, because their mood remains at one pole of the usual 
depression-mania continuum (see Table 2.9). 
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Table 2.9:  Classification of unipolar mood disorders based on the  
DSM-IV (APA, 1994) 
 
Code 
DSM-IV 
Code 
ICD-102 
Name of the disorder 
296.2x F32.x Major depressive disorder, single episode 
Specify (for current or most recent episode): 
severity (mild, moderate, severe)/psychotic (with, without 
psychotic features)/remission (partial, full) specifiers 
chronic 
with catatonic features 
with melancholic features 
with atypical features 
with postpartum onset 
296.3x F33.x Major depressive disorder, recurrent 
Specify (for current or most recent episode): 
severity (mild, moderate, severe)/psychotic (with, without 
psychotic features)/remission (partial, full) specifiers 
chronic 
with catatonic features 
with melancholic features 
with atypical features 
with postpartum onset 
Specify: 
longitudinal course specifiers (with and without interepisode 
recovery) 
with seasonal pattern 
300.4 F34.1 Dysthymic disorder 
Specify if: 
early onset: if onset is before age 21 years 
late onset: if onset is age 21 years or older 
Specify (for most recent 2 years of dysthymic disorder): 
with atypical features 
1 International Classification of Diseases, 10th Revision, World Health Organization, 1989 
 
Major depressive disorder 
Major depressive disorder is characterized by one or more major 
depressive episodes.  The essential feature of a major depressive episode is a period 
of at least two weeks during which there is either clinically depressed mood or the 
loss of interest or pleasure in nearly all activities or both.  The mood is often 
 19
described by the person as depressed, sad, hopeless, discouraged, or "down in the 
dumps." In some individuals who complain of feeling "blah," having no feelings, or 
feeling anxious; the presence of a depressed mood can be inferred from the person’s 
facial expression and demeanor.  The depressed mood cannot be explained by 
external circumstances or far exceeds normal reactions of sadness to an experienced 
loss.  Some individuals emphasize somatic complaints (e.g., bodily aches and pains) 
rather than reporting feelings of sadness.  Many individuals report or exhibit 
increased irritability.  Loss of interest or pleasure is nearly always present, at least 
to some degree.  A person may report feeling less interested in hobbies, "not caring 
anymore," or not feeling any enjoyment in activities that were previously 
considered pleasurable.  Social withdrawal or neglect of pleasurable activities can 
be observed.  
The individual must also experience at least four additional symptoms 
drawn from a list of nine (see Table 2.10).  Appetite is usually diminished and many 
individuals feel that they have to force themselves to eat.  Other individuals may 
have increased appetite and may crave sweets or carbohydrates.  If these changes in 
appetite are severe, significant weight loss or weight gain may follow.  Sleep 
disturbance is another important symptom of depression, presenting itself most 
frequently as insomnia.  Individuals typically wake up in the middle of the night 
and have difficulty returning to sleep or they wake too early in the morning and are 
unable to sleep again.  Initial insomnia may also occur.  Less frequently, individuals 
experience oversleeping in the form of prolonged sleep episodes at night or 
increased daytime sleep.  Psychomotor changes include agitation (e.g., inability to 
sit still, pacing, hand-wringing) or retardation (e.g., slowed speech, thinking, and 
body movements).  These psychomotor changes have to be severe enough to be 
observable by others.  Decreased energy, tiredness, and fatigue are common.  Even 
the smallest tasks seem to require substantial effort.  A major depressive episode 
often is also accompanied by a sense of worthlessness or guilt that may include 
unrealistic negative evaluations of one’s worth or guilty preoccupations or 
ruminations over minor past failings.  Individuals misinterpret neutral or trivial day-
to-day events as evidence of personal defects and have an exaggerated sense of 
responsibility.  Many individuals also report impaired ability to think, concentrate, 
or make decisions.  They may appear easily distracted or complain of memory 
difficulties.  Frequently, depressed individuals harbor thoughts of death, suicidal 
ideation, or suicide attempts.  These thoughts range from a belief that others would 
be better off if the person were dead, to transient but recurrent thoughts of 
committing suicide, to actual specific plans of how to commit suicide.  The 
frequency, intensity, and lethality of these thoughts vary.  A diagnosis of a major 
depressive disorder is not made if the symptoms meet criteria for a mixed episode, 
where both manic and depressive symptoms occur together for at least one week.  
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Table 2.10: DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for major depressive episode  
 
A.       Five (or more) of the following symptoms have been present during the same 2-
week period and represent a change from previous functioning; at least one of the 
symptoms is either (1) depressed mood or (2) loss of interest or pleasure.  
Note: Do not include symptoms that are clearly due to a general medical condition, 
or mood-incongruent delusion or hallucinations. 
(1)   depressed mood most of the day, nearly every day, as indicated by either 
subjective report (e.g., feels sad or empty) or observation made by others (e.g., 
appears tearful) 
(2)   markedly diminished interest or pleasure in all, or almost all, activities most of 
the day, nearly every day (as indicated by either subjective account or 
observation made by others) 
(3)   significant weight loss when not dieting or weight gain (e.g., a change of more 
than 5% of body weight in a month), or decrease or increase in appetite nearly 
every day. 
(4) insomnia or hypersomnia nearly every day 
(5) psychomotor agitation or retardation nearly every day (observable by others, not 
merely subjective feelings of restlessness or being slowed down) 
(6) fatigue or loss of energy nearly every day 
(7) feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt (which may be 
delusional) nearly every day (not merely self-reproach or guilt about being sick) 
(8) diminished ability to think or concentrate, or indecisiveness, nearly every day 
(either by subjective account or as observed by others) 
(9) recurrent thoughts of death (not just fear of dying), recurrent suicidal ideation 
without a specific plan, or a suicide attempt or a specific plan for committing 
suicide  
B. The symptoms do not meet criteria for a mixed episode. 
C. The symptoms cause clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning. 
D. The symptoms are not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance or a 
general medical condition. 
E. The symptoms are not better accounted for by bereavement, i.e., after the loss of a 
loved one, the symptoms persist for longer than two months or are characterized by 
marked functional impairment, morbid preoccupation with worthlessness, suicidal 
ideation, psychotic symptoms, or psychomotor retardation. 
 
The degree of impairment associated with a major depressive episode 
varies, but even in mild cases there must be either clinically significant distress or 
some interference in social, occupational, or other important areas of functioning.  
If impairment is severe, the person may lose the ability to function socially or 
occupationally.  In extreme cases, the person may be unable to perform minimal 
self-care (e.g., feeding or clothing self) or to maintain minimal personal hygiene.  In 
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severe cases, psychotic features like hallucinations or delusions can accompany the 
depressive episode.  The diagnosis of major depressive disorder is reached in 
several steps.  First, past or current prevalence of a major depressive episode has to 
be clarified.  Diagnostic criteria for a major depressive episode are listed in Table 
2.10.  
Two different diagnoses of major depressive disorder are possible if a 
patient fulfills criteria A through E for a major depressive episode: single episode 
and recurrent.  Table 2.11 lists diagnostic criteria for both disorders.  However, the 
occurrence of just one isolated depressive episode in a lifetime is rare (Angst & 
Preisig, 1995).  As many as 85% of single-episode cases later experience a second 
episode and thus meet criteria for major depressive disorder, recurrent (Judd, 1997; 
Keller, Lavori, Mueller, Endicott, Coryell, et al., 1992; Mueller, Leon, Keller, 
Solomon, Endicott, et al., 1999; Solomon, Keller, Leon, Mueller, Lavori, et al., 
2000).  The median lifetime number of major depressive episodes is four.  To 
diagnose a major depressive disorder, the depressive episode has to occur outside a 
schizoaffective or schizophrenic disorder and must not occur in combination with a 
manic or hypomanic episode.  If manic or hypomanic episodes exist, a bipolar 
disorder may be prevalent. 
 
Table 2.11: DSM-IV diagnostic criteria for major depressive disorders  
 
Major depressive disorder, single episode 
A.     Presence of a single major depressive episode. 
B.     The major depressive episode is not better accounted for by schizoaffective disorder and is not 
superimposed on schizophrenia, schizophreniform disorder, delusional disorder, or psychotic disorder 
not otherwise specified. 
C.     There has never been a manic episode, a mixed episode, or a hypomanic episode. 
Major depressive disorder, recurrent 
A.     Presence of two or more major depressive episodes. 
Note: To be considered separate episodes, there must be an interval of at least 2 consecutive months in which 
criteria are not met for a major depressive episode.  
B.     The major depressive episodes are not better accounted for by schizoaffective disorder and are not 
superimposed on schizophrenia, schizophreniform disorder, delusional disorder, or psychotic disorder 
not otherwise specified. 
C.    There has never been a manic episode, a mixed episode, or a hypomanic episode. 
 
The course of major depressive disorder, recurrent, is variable.  Some 
individuals have isolated episodes that are separated by many years without any 
depressive symptoms, whereas others have clusters of episodes, and still others 
have increasingly frequent episodes with increasing age.  Some evidence suggests 
that the periods of remission generally last longer early in the course of the disorder.  
The number of prior episodes predicts the likelihood of developing a subsequent 
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major depressive episode, the more prior episodes the greater the chance.  The 
length of depressive episodes is also variable, with some lasting as little as two 
weeks; in more severe cases, an episode may last for several years.  The average 
duration of the first episode is six to nine months if untreated (Eaton, Anthony, 
Gallo, Cai, Tien, et al., 1997; Tollefson, 1993).  For individuals who have only 
partial remission, there is a greater likelihood of developing additional episodes and 
of continuing the pattern of partial interepisode recovery.  Follow-up naturalistic 
studies suggest that one year after diagnosing a major depressive episode, 40% of 
individuals still have symptoms that are sufficiently severe to meet criteria for a full 
major depressive episode, roughly 20% continue to have some symptoms that no 
longer meet full criteria for a major depressive episode, and 40% have no mood 
disorder anymore (APA, 1994).  The severity of the initial episode appears to 
predict persistence.  Chronic general medical conditions are also a risk factor for 
more persistent episodes. 
 
2.3   Epidemiology 
Two large studies that were conducted in the U.S.A. pioneered modern-
day epidemiological research assessing large representative populations, adopting 
structured interviews and employing clear diagnostic criteria according to the DSM: 
the Epidemiologic Catchment Area (ECA) study survey and the National 
Comorbidity Survey (NCS) study.  Many other studies all over the world have 
followed since.  Tables 2.12a-b provide an overview of prevalence rates for panic 
disorder, social phobia, and major depressive disorder from selected 
epidemiological studies. Prevalence rates for agoraphobia are also reported because 
panic disorder is often associated with agoraphobia (see 2.1.1 Panic disorder and 
agoraphobia).  However, some studies provided prevalence rates for agoraphobia 
without panic disorder only.  A note indicates these studies.  Tables are organized 
by type of prevalence (12-month and lifetime prevalence).  Within each table, 
studies are listed chronologically, with the oldest studies being cited first.  
Major studies were selected that used DSM-III-R, DSM-IV or ICD-10 
diagnostic criteria (the ECA study is an exception) and included at least one of the 
three disorders of interest to this thesis.  Smaller studies that explicitly reported 
prevalence rates for young adults were also chosen.  The following studies were 
included in the review: 
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1. ECA:  Epidemiologic Catchment Area Study, DSM-III (Robins, Helzer, 
Weissman, Orvaschel, Gruenberg, et al., 1984; Schneier et al., 1992) 
2. NCS: National Comorbidity Survey study, DSM-III-R (Kessler, McGonagle, 
Zaho, Nelson, Hughes, et al., 1994; Magee, Eaton, Wittchen, McGonagle, 
& Kessler, 1996) 
3. USHSS-FU: US-high school students, assessed twice (t=13.8 months), DSM-III-R 
(Lewinsohn, Rohde, Seeley, & Fischer, 1993) 
4. Ontario: Mental Health Supplement to The Ontario Health Survey, DSM-III-R 
(Offord, Boyle, Campbell, Goering, Lin, et al., 1996) 
5. NEMESIS: Netherlands Mental Health Survey and Incidence Study, DSM-III-R 
(Bijl, Ravelli, & van Zessen, 1998) 
6. FINHCS: Finnish Health Care Survey '96, DSM-III-R (Haarasilta, Marttunen, 
Kaprio, & Aro, 2001; Lindeman, Hämäläinen, Isometsä, Kaprio, 
Poikolainen, et al., 2000) 
7. EDSP: Early Developmental Stages of Psychopathology, DSM-IV (Oldehinkel, 
Wittchen, & Schuster, 1999; Wittchen, Nelson, & Lachner, 1998; 
Wittchen, Perkonigg, Lachner, & Nelson, 1998) 
8. PDS: Study assessing panic disorder in the Swedish general population, 
DSM-IV (Carlbring, Gustafsson, Ekselius, & Andersson, 2002) 
9. NSMHWB: Australian National Survey of Mental Health and Well-Being, DSM-
IV and ICD-10 (Lampe, Slade, Issakidis, & Andrews, 2003; Wilhelm, 
Mitchell, Slade, Brownhill, & Andrews, 2003). 
10. TACOS:  Transitions in Alcohol Consumption and Smoking, DSM-IV (Meyer, 
Rumpf, Hapke, Dilling, & John, 2000) 
 Table 2.12a: 12-month prevalence rates for panic disorder, agoraphobia, social phobia, and major depressive disorder in percent 
 
Study Age in 
years 
Sample size Panic disorder Agoraphobia Social phobia Major depressive 
disorder 
  nf nm F M Total F M Total F M Total F M Total 
NCS (Kessler et al., 1994) 15-54 4251 3847 3.2 1.3 2.3 3.82 1.72 2.82 9.1 6.6 7.9 12.9 7.7 10.3 
Ontario (Offord et al., 1996) ≥15 5438 4515 --3 --3  --3 --3  12.7 8.2 6.7 6.5 --3  
NEMESIS (Bijl et al., 1998) 18-64 n.r. n.r. 3.4 1.1 2.2 2.22 0.92 1.62 6.1 3.5 4.8 7.5 4.1 5.8 
EDSP (Wittchen, Nelson, et al., 
1998) 
Follow-up (Oldehinkel et al., 1999) 
14-24 
15-18 
1488
609 
1533
619 
2.0 0.4 1.2 2.6 0.6 1.6 7.24 3.24 5.24 4.7 
8.9 
2.4 
4.7 
3.6 
6.8 
FINHCS (Lindeman et al., 2000) 
subsample (Haarasilta et al., 2001) 
15-75 
20-24 
3347
224 
2646
209 
         11.0 
10.7 
7.2 
8.1 
9.3 
9.4 
PDS (Carlbring et al., 2002) 16-79 310 281 5.6 1.0 2.2          
NSMHWB (Lampe et al., 2003) ≥18 
18-24 
25-34 
n.r. n.r.       0.9 
2.6 
2.8 
0.9 
2.9 
2.1 
0.9 
2.7 
2.5 
   
Notes: 1 "major depressive episode," 2 "agoraphobia without panic," 3 "numbers are too small to be reported," 4 "Including subthreshold and threshold diagnoses," 5 
   "           Total figure reported for 18 to 24-year-old individuals," 6 "single episode of depression," F = Females, M = Males, n.r. = not reported
 Table 2.12b: Lifetime prevalence rates for panic disorder, agoraphobia, social phobia, and major depressive disorder in percentage 
 
Study Age 
in 
years
Sample size Panic disorder Agoraphobia Social phobia Major depressive 
disorder 
  nf nm F M Total F M Total F M Total F M Total 
ECA (Robins et al., 1984; Schneier et 
al., 1992) 
Conneticut 
Baltimore 
St. Louis 
≥18  
1766 
2159 
1802 
 
1292 
1322 
1202 
 
2.1 
1.6 
2.0 
 
0.6 
1.2 
0.9 
 
0.75 
1.25 
0.95 
 
5.3 
12.5 
6.4 
 
1.5 
5.2 
1.5 
 
3.55 
7.95 
4.35 
  2.4  
8.76 
4.96 
8.16 
 
4.46 
2.36 
2.56 
 
7.56 
4.16 
4.56 
NCS (Kessler et al., 1994) 
subsample (Magee et al., 1996) 
15-54 
15-24 
4251 
n.r. 
3847 
n.r. 
5.0 
 
2.0 3.5 7.02 
10.2 
3.52 
5.4 
3.82 
7.7 
15.5 
17.3 
11.1 
12.7 
13.3 
14.9 
21.3 12.7 17.1 
USHSS-FU (Lewinsohn et al., 
1993) 
m =18 810 698 1.7 0.6 1.2 1.0 0.1 0.6 2.4 0.4 1.5 31.6 15.2 24.0 
NEMESIS (Bijl et al., 1998) 18-64 n.r. n.r. 5.7 1.9 3.8 4.92 1.92 3.42 9.7 5.9 7.8 20.1 10.9 15.4 
EDSP (Wittchen, Nelson, et al., 
1998) 
Follow-up (Oldehinkel et al., 1999) 
14-24 
15-18 
1488 
609 
1533 
619 
2.4 0.8 1.6 4.2 1.0 2.6 9.54 4.94 7.34 10.94 
15.4 
7.34 
9.1 
9.34 
12.2 
TACOS (Meyer et al., 2000) 18-64 2030 2045 1.2 0.7 0.9 2.0 0.6 1.3 2.5 1.3 1.9 14.3 5.7 10.0 
Notes: 1 "major depressive episode," 2 "agoraphobia without panic," 3 "numbers are too small to be reported," 4 "Including subthreshold and threshold diagnoses", 5 "Total figure 
               reported for 18 to 24-year-old individuals," 6 "single episode of depression," F = Females, M = Males, n.r. = not reported
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Age of onset 
Panic disorder usually begins in early adult life, from mid-teens to about 
40 years of age.  The mean age of onset lies between 25 and 29 years (Craske & 
Barlow, 2001; Öst, 1987).  There may be a bimodal distribution, with one peak in 
late adolescence and a second smaller peak in the mid-30s.  Even younger children 
have been known to experience unexpected panic attacks and occasionally panic 
disorder, although this is rather rare (Albano, Chorpita, & Barlow, 1996; Kearney, 
Albano, Eisen, Allan, & Barlow, 1997; Moreau & Weissman, 1992).  Most initial 
panic attacks begin at or shortly after puberty, which seems to be a better predictor 
of unexpected panic attacks than age.  Higher rates of panic attacks are found in 
girls after puberty compared to before puberty (Hayward, Killen, Hammer, Litt, 
Wilson, et al., 1992).  In the elderly, agoraphobia with a late onset (after age 50) 
was found to be the primary phobia by Lindesay (1991) who studied 60 confirmed 
cases of phobic disorders.  Onset was often related to a very stressful life event, 
usually an illness or injury.  In general, panic disorder seems less pervasive among 
the elderly (e.g., Beck & Stanley, 1997). 
Social phobia usually has an earlier onset than panic disorder.  It generally 
starts during adolescence, with a peak at about 15 years (Beidel, 1998), sometimes 
emerging out of a childhood history of social inhibition or shyness (Kagan, 1994, 
1997; Kagan & Snidman, 1991, 1999).  Consistently across all epidemiological 
studies only a few cases have been identified that reported an onset of the condition 
after the age of 21 years.  Social phobia also tends to be more prevalent in people 
who are young (18-29 years), undereducated, single, and of low socioeconomic 
class.  The number of young people with social phobia seems to be increasing 
somewhat (Magee et al., 1996).  Prevalence declines slightly among the elderly 
(Magee et al., 1996; Sheikh, 1992).  
The mean age of onset for major depressive disorder is 25 years in 
community samples (Burke, Burke, Regier, & Rae, 1990), which is similar to the 
mean age of onset for panic disorder.  Epidemiological data suggest that the average 
age of onset is decreasing for those individuals born more recently (Weissman, 
Bruce, Leaf, Florio, & Holzer, 1991).  The incidence of depression and consequent 
suicide appear to be steadily increasing (Cross-National Collaborative Group, 1992; 
Lewinsohn et al., 1993). 
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2.4   Anxiety and depression 
2.4.1 Comorbidity 
The concept of comorbidity was introduced by Feinstein in 1970 and 
adopted to psychiatry, where it describes the coexistence of symptoms, syndromes, 
or diagnoses.  Contemporary studies suggest that moderate anxiety symptoms occur 
in more than 75% of individuals with major depressive disorder (Hamilton, 1989), 
that significant anxiety without panic attacks is reported in 35% of depressed 
outpatients (Kayser, Robinson, Yingling, Howard, Corcella et al., 1988), and that it 
is possible to differentiate between nonspecific anxiety symptoms and recurrent 
panic attacks (Barlow, DiNardo, Vermilyea, Vermilyea, & Blanchard, 1986).  In the 
National Comorbidity Survey (Kessler et al., 1994), 58% of the individuals with 
lifetime depression had an anxiety disorder.  The most frequently reported comorbid 
lifetime anxiety disorders were social phobia, simple phobia, and posttraumatic 
stress disorder (Kessler, Nelson, McGonagle, Liu, Swartz, et al., 1996).  Anxiety 
disorders are the most common primary disorders associated with secondary major 
depression and the ones with the greatest risk of subsequent secondary major 
depression. 
Studies of clinical samples suggest that panic disorder is present in 30% to 
40% of patients with either major depressive disorder or dysthymic disorder.  A 
similar percentage of patients with panic disorder or agoraphobia currently suffer 
from, have a history of, or develop major depressive disorder during follow-up 
(Barlow et al., 1986; Bowen & Kohuj, 1984; Coryell, Endicott, Andreasen, Keller, 
Clayton, et al., 1988).  In the Epidemiologic Catchment Area (ECA) study, the 
lifetime prevalence of panic disorder was 13% and social phobia was 13.6% among 
individuals with major depressive disorder (Regier, Rae, Narrow, Kaelber, & 
Schatzberg, 1998).  Table 2.13 shows the lifetime prevalence of all anxiety 
disorders among individuals with major depressive disorder.  Melartin and 
colleagues (Melartin, Rytsälä, Leskelä, Lestelä-Mielonen, Sokero, et al., 2002) 
present an overview of current Axis I comorbidity of major depressive disorder in 
psychiatric settings.  They cite numerous studies that used semi-structured or 
standardized diagnostic interviews for both major depressive disorder and comorbid 
disorders.  They report prevalence rates between 7% and 34% for panic disorder 
and between 13% and 33% for social phobia among patients with major depressive 
disorder.  In contrast, social phobia is more frequently associated with secondary 
depression (22.4%) than any other anxiety disorder (Kessler et al., 1994). 
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Table 2.13: Lifetime prevalence of various anxiety disorders among persons with 
                        major depression (Regier et al., 1998) 
 
Anxiety disorder In percent (standard error) 
Any anxiety disorder 47.2 (2.3) 
Simple phobia 25.6 (1.8) 
Agoraphobia 20.4 (1.7) 
Social phobia 13.6 (1.6) 
Panic disorder 13.0 (1.4) 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder 14.4 (1.5) 
 
Comorbidity of anxiety disorders with depression is associated with 
functional impairment and greater severity in presentation of the overall illness 
(Hecht, von Zerssen, & Wittchen, 1990).  In addition, the comorbid condition is 
associated with more severe depressive symptomatology (Coryell et al., 1988), 
greater chronicity and recurrence of depressive episodes (Coryell, Endicott, & 
Winokur, 1992; Hecht et al., 1990), and increased resistance to treatment.  There is 
controversy over whether anxious depression is a subset of the mood disorders or 
the anxiety disorders. 
 
2.4.2 Similarities and differences between anxiety and depression 
Anxiety and depression often co-occur, as has been discussed in the 
previous section.  They also share many common features.  For decades, much 
research has been directed toward identifying the shared and unique characteristics 
of these disorders (for reviews, see Barlow & Campbell, 2000; Breier, Charney, & 
Heninger, 1985; Clark & Watson, 1991; Derogatis, Klerman, & Lipman, 1972; 
Kendall & Watson, 1989; Levine, Cole, Chengappa, & Gershon, 2001; Stavrakaki 
& Vargo, 1986).  Clark and Watson (1991) provided the most comprehensive work 
on this topic.  They analyzed the literature on anxiety and depression in order to 
clarify the relationship between these syndromes.  In their meta-analysis of 
questionnaire results, they included clinical as well as non-clinical populations.  
Most data are based on cross-sectional studies.  However, results from longitudinal 
studies were also consulted.  Clark and Watson found three groups of anxiety and 
depression symptoms: nonspecific ones of general distress, manifestations of 
anhedonia and low positive affect specific to depression, and symptoms of somatic 
arousal characteristic of anxiety.  Based on the results of their analysis, Clark and 
Watson (1991) proposed the "Tripartite model of anxiety and depression." Many 
studies followed to test this model (e.g., Burns & Eidelson, 1998; Clark, Steer, & 
Beck, 1994; Laurent & Ettelson, 2001).  
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The tripartite model posits the existence of an unspecific stress factor, 
negative affect, that exists in anxiety as well as depression.  This factor reflects the 
shared features of anxiety and depression.  Clark and Watson (1991) differentiate 
between state negative affect at the symptom level and trait negative affect at the 
syndromal level.  Negative affect includes symptoms like stress, demoralization, 
irritability, mild sleep disturbance, loss of appetite, distractibility, unspecific 
somatic complaints, and low self-esteem.  Negative affect constitutes an important 
and inseparable factor of anxiety and depressive disorders.  It is explicitly included 
in the different diagnostic systems, e.g., the DSM-IV, as described above (see 
previous sections).  However, anxiety and depression can be separated by one 
specific factor for each syndrome.  Anxious individuals suffer from somatic (hyper) 
arousal characterized by nervous tension, increased heartbeat, sweating and other 
symptoms of the autonomic nervous system.  Depressed individuals, on the other 
hand, exhibit anhedonia and low positive affect manifest in loss of interest, apathy, 
hopelessness, extreme fatigue, lack of energy, and psychomotor retardation.  This 
depression-specific factor also includes elements connected to negative affect, like 
depressed mood, whereas unspecific symptoms like low self-esteem reflect the 
general factor shared by both anxiety and depression.  Table 2.14 provides an 
overview of the three factors. 
 
Table 2.14: The Tripartite model of anxiety and depression (Based on Clark & 
Watson, 1991) 
 
Anxiety Depression 
Autonomic hyperarousal Anhedonia 
Hypervigilance Loss of interest or pleasure 
Physical tension Hopelessness 
Anticipated danger, fear Apathy 
Cognitive worry Lethargy 
Phobic avoidance Psychomotor retardation 
Shared features of anxiety and depression 
Anxious mood 
Sleep disturbance 
Concentration difficulties 
Irritability 
Fatigue 
Vegetative symptoms 
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2.5   Summary 
Anxiety and depression (sadness) are very common negative feelings 
experienced by all individuals.  Every fourth to fifth person either develops an 
anxiety disorder, a unipolar disorder, or both, at some point in their life.  Up to three 
times more women are affected by these disorders than men.  Panic disorder, social 
phobia, and major depressive disorder are specifically frequent and distressing 
disorders that start in adolescence to young adulthood.  Their course is generally 
chronic.  They greatly interfere with people’s general functioning and raise the cost 
for health care considerably.  There appear to be clear cohort effects with younger 
people showing greater prevalence rates, a decreasing age of onset for more recently 
born individuals, and an increase in the cumulative risk for later cohorts to develop 
one of these mental disorders. 
Anxiety and depression seem to be characterized by distinct symptom 
patterns despite a large overlap in features.  Because of the symptom overlap, high 
comorbidity rates and similarities in treatment approaches, shared vulnerability 
factors have been discussed for anxiety and depressive disorders (e.g., Kendler, 
Prescott, Myers, & Neale, 2003; Kendler, Walters, Neale, Kessler, Heath, et al., 
1995).  In addition, anxiety may function as an engine for the development of 
further psychological disorders.  Up to date, symptom descriptions, biological, 
genetic and environmental risk factors, and treatment studies have dominated 
research about anxiety and depression.  Very little is known about the 
accompanying or underlying cognitive factors.  Because of the high, possibly even 
growing prevalence of these disorders and the negative impact they have on 
people's lives, it is highly important to further our understanding of the underlying 
mechanisms, development, and maintenance of these disorders.  A careful review of 
the literature reveals that cognitive mechanisms require special attention because 
very little is known about their impact.  Increased knowledge of the cognitive 
mechanisms underlying anxiety and depressive disorders can be used to develop 
and refine treatment and thus improve many people’s quality of life. 
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Chapter 3:   Etiology - Models of mental disorders 
3.1   The Diathesis-Stress Model 
To claim that psychopathology results from a single factor, e.g., our genes, 
a physical abnormality, or conditioning, is to accept a linear or one-dimensional 
model, which attempts to trace the origins of behavior to a single cause.  In the early 
stages of psychopathological research, such linear explanations were attempted.  
The biggest controversy in this area may have been the nature/nurture debate.  With 
the increasing sophistication of scientific tools, and new knowledge from cognitive 
science, behavioral science, and neuroscience, it became evident that no 
contribution to mental disorders ever occurs in isolation.  Therefore, in 
contemporary psychology, human behavior is seen as a product of the continual 
interaction of psychological, biological, and social influences.  
A useful way to explain how multiple risk factors may interact to produce 
a mental disorder is the diathesis-stress model (e.g., Brown & Harris, 1978; 
Eysenck, 1977).  A diathesis is a predisposition toward developing a disorder, e.g., 
an inherited tendency toward depression.  Such predispositions can be genetic, 
biological and/or psychosocial factors.  A stress is a difficult life experience, such 
as the loss of a loved one, or the accumulation of numerous smaller obstacles (daily 
hassles).  Episodes of major depressive disorder, for instance, often follow a severe 
psychosocial stressor (Brown & Harris, 1982; Hautzinger, 1984).  The diathesis-
stress model proposes that mental disorders develop only when a stress (functioning 
as triggering event) is added on top of predisposing factors; neither the diathesis nor 
the stress alone is sufficient to cause the disorder.  In most circumstances, many risk 
factors are involved in the disorder's etiology.  However, in some cases, a diathesis 
or a stress alone may be so powerful that a single risk factor produces the disorder. 
Extensive research in the area of psychopathology has discovered a large number of 
risk factors and their interaction in the etiology and maintenance of mental 
disorders.  Margraf (2001) tried to summarize and visualize the research findings to 
date in his general model of psychopathology (Figure 3.1).  
Individual and environmental factors contribute to the development of a 
mental disorder.  Social support, income, and socioeconomic status are important 
environmental factors.  They mediate psychopathology.  Meyer et al. (2000) 
reported a tendency of lower psychiatric morbidity in individuals with higher 
education, higher income, who are married and live in rural areas.  Lindeman et al. 
(2000) found urban residency to be associated with depression and Wilhelm et al. 
(2003) found that being unemployed is another factor.  
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Figure 3.1:  A general model of psychopathology (Margraf, 2001) 
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Individual risk factors can be categorized into three areas: genetics, 
biology, and learning (modeling and reinforcement).  First-degree relatives of 
individuals with panic disorder have a four to seven times greater chance of 
developing panic disorder (Goldstein, Wickramaratne, Horwath, & Weissman, 
1997; Horwath, Adams, Wickramaratne, Pine, & Weissman, 1997; Weissman, Fyer, 
Haghighi, Heiman, Deng, et al., 2000).  Studies of twins indicate a genetic 
contribution to the development of panic disorder (Kendler et al., 1995; Skre, 
Onstad, Torgersen, Lygren, & Kringlen, 1993).  Similarly, several studies have 
demonstrated that social phobia runs in families, with both genetic and 
environmental contributions (Beidel, 1998; Fyer, Mannuzza, Chapman, Liebowitz, 
& Klein, 1993; Fyer, Mannuzza, Chapman, Martin, & Klein, 1995; Reich & Yates, 
1988).  Studies of female twins suggest concordance of 24.4% between 
monozygotic twins and 15.3% between bizygotic twins (Kendler, Neale, Kessler, 
Heath, & Eaves, 1992).  Major depressive disorder is 1.5 to 3 times more common 
among first-degree biological relatives of persons with this disorder than among the 
general population (Katz & McGuffin, 1993).  In a Danish study, concordance rates 
for unipolar disorders were reported to be 54% between monozygotic twins and 
24% between bizygotic twins (Bertelson, Harvald, & Hauge, 1977). 
A biological factor that may contribute to the development of panic 
disorder is a selective hypersensitivity toward certain bodily sensations.  In patients 
with panic disorder, the central nervous system seems to trigger a "suffocation 
alarm" more easily than in other individuals (Klein, 1993).  Some individuals with 
panic disorder show signs of compensated respiratory alkalosis (i.e., decreased 
carbon dioxide and decreased bicarbonate levels with an almost normal pH).  Panic 
attacks in response to sodium lactate infusion or carbon dioxide inhalation are more 
common in panic disorder than in other anxiety disorders (Holsboer, 1993).  
Deficits in neurotransmitter regulation and heightened activity in the hypothalamic-
pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis that regulates cortisol levels have also been discussed 
(for a review, see Bandelow, 2003, chapter 2).  In social phobia, selective serotonin 
reuptake inhibitors (SSRI) and monoamine oxidase (MAO) inhibitors improve 
symptomatology.  Therefore, dysfunctions in serotonin and noradrenalin systems 
may be involved (Potts, Book, & Davidson, 1996).  In depression, the 
catecholamine hypothesis (decrease in the levels of brain catecholamines, especially 
norepinephrine; Bunney & Davis, 1965) and the indolamine hypothesis (decrease in 
the neurotransmitter serotonin; Coppen, 1967) initially received much attention.  
However, progress in psychopharmacology and neuroscience has led to a 
modification of the original hypotheses.  Current theories place a greater emphasis 
on the interactive effects of several neurotransmitter systems, including dopamine 
(Depue & Iacono, 1989; Kapur & Mann, 1993) as well as serotonin, 
norepinephrine, and neuropeptides.  These theories propose that postsynaptic 
receptors are denser as well as more sensitive in depressed patients (Charney, 
Delgado, Price, & Heninger, 1991; McNeal & Cimbolic, 1986; Potter, Grossman, & 
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Rudorfer, 1993).  However, other biological and neurological mechanisms have 
also been discussed, such as a dysfunction of the neuroendocrine system and the 
HPA axis (Checkley, 1992; Friedman, Clark, & Gershon, 1992; Whybrow, Akiskal, 
& McKinney, 1984). 
Finally, learning processes play a major role in the etiology of mental 
disorders, especially model learning and reinforcement (classical and operant 
conditioning).  In their well-known experiment with Little Albert, Watson and 
Rosalie Rayner (1920) used classical conditioning to induce the fear of a rat in an 
11-month-old boy by pairing the sight of the rat with a loud noise.  Similarly, panic 
patients may experience an initial panic attack and associate aversive symptoms and 
the situation where they occurred.  Consequently, they display anxiety in 
expectation of entering the same or a similar situation again.  They leave or avoid 
the situation where panic attacks occur.  This behavior gets positively reinforced 
because they no longer experience the negative symptoms of anxiety.  However, 
they also deprive themselves of the experience of being able to manage the situation 
even in the presence of anxiety symptoms.  This circulus virtuosis of fear and 
avoidance generalizes to an ever larger number of situations, until anxiety interferes 
significantly with an individual's life (Marks, 1987).  Similar learning mechanisms 
play a role in social phobia.  In addition, social phobia patients often report that 
their parents over-emphasized other people's opinions, tended to isolate their 
children, and judged social competence as less important (Bruch & Heimberg, 
1989; 1994).  In depression, the theory of learned helplessness that originated in 
animal research has been very influential (Seligman, 1975).  If an animal 
experiences no control over aversive environmental conditions, it develops helpless 
behavior.  Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978) further developed this theory 
to account for depression in humans.  Their central hypotheses are: if subjectively 
important events are uncontrollable, individuals learn that their behavior and its 
consequences in the environment are independent of each other.  They learn 
helplessness that leads to motivational, cognitive, and emotional deficits as well as 
physiological and vegetative changes.  The crucial factor, according to this theory, 
is the learned expectation that the individual will have no control over future events 
as well.   
The general model of psychopathology (Figure 3.1) finally suggests an 
interaction among the different predisposing, triggering, and maintaining factors to 
account for the development and manifestation of mental disorders.  For instance, in 
a study by Maciejewski and colleagues, women were three times more likely than 
men to experience a major depression in response to any stressful life event, 
whereas the sexes did not differ in risk for depression associated with the death of a 
spouse or child, marital problems, divorce, or acute financial or legal problems 
(Maciejewski, Prigerson, & Mazure, 2001).  
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This thesis attempts to contribute to the knowledge about cognitive 
factors.  Therefore, influential cognitive models of psychopathology will be 
described next. 
 
3.2   General cognitive models of psychopathology 
The development of cognitive models of psychopathology has always 
been influenced by information processing paradigms from cognitive psychology.  
Spreading activation of semantic processes (e.g., Collins & Loftus, 1975), schemata 
and prototypical knowledge structures (e.g., Alba & Hasher, 1983; Bower, Black, & 
Turner, 1979; Schank & Abelson, 1977), associative priming (e.g., Meyer & 
Schvaneveldt, 1971), and encoding specificity (e.g., Tulving & Thomson, 1973) are 
reflected in the applications of information processing paradigms to anxiety, 
depression, and other mental disorders.  In this section, four of the most influential 
cognitive models of information processing in clinical psychology will be 
described: attribution theory (Heider, 1958; Kelley, 1967, 1972, 1973; Weiner, 
1979, 1985, 1986) and its advancement into appraisal theory (Lazarus, 1991; 
Lazarus, Kanner, & Folkman, 1980), Beck’s schema theory (Beck, 1967; 1976; 
Beck, Emery, & Greenberg 1985), Bower’s associative network model (Bower, 
1981), and the integrative model of cognition and emotion proposed by Williams et 
al. (1988; 1997). 
 
3.3.1 Attribution theory and appraisal theory 
Fritz Heider (1958) is considered to be the founder of attribution theory.  
Harold H. Kelley (1967, 1972, 1973) has also strongly influenced its further 
development by suggesting a co-variation principle for causal attributions.  There 
are three central assumptions common to almost all attribution models: (1) causal 
cognitions play a central role in behavior, affect, and experiences.  (2) Individuals 
are inherently motivated to seek a rational causal explanation for events in their 
physical and social environment.  (3) It is assumed that a causal understanding 
serves the function of attaining personal goals (Weiner, 1985, 1986) and ensuring 
survival.  Kelley assumes that the effect will be attributed to the cause with which it 
co-varies.  
Theories and studies dealing with questions as to how lay people arrive at 
causal judgments are called attribution research, while attributional research 
analyzes the behavioral and emotional consequences of causal ascriptions (see 
Kelley & Michela, 1980).  Attribution research in the area of clinical psychology 
has focused on the antecedents and consequences as well as the characteristics of 
attributions.  Such causal attributions are frequently answers to "why" questions 
(e.g., Why did I lose my job? – Because I wasn't good enough).  Attribution theory 
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as a cognitive theory assumes that behavior (R = reaction) is not directly influenced 
by situations or stimuli (S), but rather the intervening thought or cognition (C) (S –> 
C –> R) and thus is closely related to other cognitive theories in clinical 
psychology, such as Albert Ellis' Rational-Emotive Therapy (Ellis, 1962; Ellis & 
Grieger, 1977), Beck's cognitive theory of depression (Beck, 1976), as well as 
Mahoney's (1974, 1977) and Meichenbaum's (1977) approach to cognitive therapy.  
However, the models that underlie cognitive therapies differ from attribution 
approaches in their focus on the consequences of cognitions (C Æ R) rather than the 
antecedents of those cognitions (S Æ C) that lead to dysfunctional reactions 
(Försterling, 1988, p. 14).  Attribution approaches assume that individuals generally 
attempt to develop a realistic concept of causality with regard to the events in their 
lives.  Attribution theory has mainly been advanced in the area of general 
psychology, specifically social and achievement motivation. 
The first studies that applied attribution principles to clinical psychology 
were influenced by Schachter and Singer's (1962) two-factor theory of emotion.  
This theory proposes that an individual's appraisal of a situation may lead to 
physiological arousal (e.g., increasing heart rate) and an interacting cognition (e.g., 
"the situation is dangerous").  As a result, the individual experiences a specific 
emotional state whose quality is thought to be determined by the cognition and its 
intensity by the amount of arousal.  Thus, the same physiological arousal can give 
rise to quite different feelings (e.g., joy or anxiety).  Clinical applications of this 
theory provide individuals with "non-emotional" or rational explanations for their 
arousal in emotional situations (see Reisenzein, 1983).  In the treatment of panic 
disorder, for instance, hyperventilation is suggested to patients as an alternative 
explanation to their catastrophic explanations (e.g., having a heart attack) for 
symptoms of physiological arousal.  In this context, it becomes clear that the terms 
"attribution" and "interpretation" are sometimes used interchangeably, although the 
term "attribution" denotes a narrower content (the cause of an event) than the term 
"interpretation" (meaning and implications of an event).  
A second prominent approach to causal attribution was developed by 
Bernard Weiner.  He assumes that success and failure in achievement situations 
give rise to a search for causal attributions.  Weiner (1979) proposed three main 
dimensions along which an individual is thought to judge causality: (1) locus of 
control (internal vs. external), (2) stability across time (stable vs. variable) and (3) 
controllability (high vs. low).  Abramson et al. (1978; see also Chapter 3.1 The 
Diathesis-Stress-Model) introduced a fourth dimension within their attributional 
analysis of depression and helplessness: generality (global vs. specific).  Finally, 
Weiner suspects an additional dimension of intentionality (intentional vs. 
unintentional).  The combination of these different dimensions results in different 
emotions and motivation for future behavior.  Locus of control, for instance, is 
related to self-esteem, and perceived stability across time influences expectancy of 
future behavioral outcome.  The theory of learned helplessness (Seligman, 1972; 
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1975) and its reformulation (Abramson et al., 1978) is an application of attribution 
theory to clinical psychology, specifically depression.  
The main criticism of attribution theory pertains to its neglect of people's 
prevailing needs and desires.  This shortcoming was addressed in appraisal theory 
(Lazarus et al., 1980).  Appraisal theory postulates that a person judges an event not 
only in regard to its causes but also in relation to its consequences for the 
individual's well-being.  This latter judgment was termed "appraisal" by Richard S. 
Lazarus.  He differentiates two kinds of appraisal: primary and secondary.  
"Primary appraisal concerns whether something of relevance to the person's well-
being has occurred.  Secondary appraisal concerns coping options – that is, whether 
any given action might prevent harm, ameliorate it, or produce additional harm or 
benefit" (Lazarus, 1991, p.133).  Primary appraisal includes goal relevance, goal 
congruence or incongruence, and type of ego-involvement, while secondary 
appraisal is concerned with blame or credit, coping potential, and future 
expectations.  Continuous feedback from the environment or one's own responses 
necessitates ongoing information processing and re-evaluation.  This process is 
called reappraisal (Lazarus, 1966).  Thus appraisal is responsive to feedback and 
serves an adaptive function.  Every emotion is defined by a specific appraisal 
pattern and a basic theme.  It includes a motivational tendency (e.g., avoidance in 
anxiety, attack in anger) that can be suppressed by coping mechanisms, and has a 
distinct pattern of physiological changes that are partly a result of the motivational 
tendency (e.g., preparation for flight or fight).  Beside Lazarus' theory, a number of 
other appraisal theories have developed (e.g., Frijda, 1987; Ortony, Clore, & 
Collins, 1988; Scherer, 1990, 1999; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).  However, none of 
these theories is concerned with psychopathology and none have stimulated any 
research in the clinical area.  
 
3.3.2 Schema theory by Aaron T. Beck 
As early as 1963, Beck postulated the existence of cognitive structures 
called schemas to account for the repetitiveness of the same type of thinking in any 
particular individual from one depressed episode to another and for the similarities 
of the nature of thinking patterns from one depressed individual to another (Beck, 
1963).  According to his view, information processing can be viewed as dependent 
on the operation of functional units, labeled schemas (Beck, 1964, 1967).  "Schemas 
are functional structures of relatively enduring representations of prior knowledge 
and experience" (Beck, 1967, p. 283).  In his theory, the author suggested that a 
specific cognitive set or bias influences information processing from the early 
stages of perception through working memory, interpretation, recall, and long-term 
memory.  Idiosyncratic schemas determine the biases in information processing and 
shape the interpretations of experience and expectations, and ultimately, through 
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this mechanism, the depressed feelings.  In addition, depressives’ perceptions are 
mainly "schema-driven" rather than "data-driven" as in healthy individuals.  
According to Beck, schemas have a conditional content like "If I fail, I am 
worthless" or "If people don’t like me, I am nothing" and become activated and 
operative when the conditional event occurs.  These schemas shape the 
conceptualizations of a particular experience and in turn are reinforced by these 
biased interpretations.  At the deepest level, the conditional beginning phrases are 
dropped out of the rule, and the "core schemas" consisting of an absolute concept, 
such as "I am nothing," mold the interpretations of situations.  These core schemas 
are thought to develop at an early age, and their effect on self-concept is apparent 
only at the deeper levels of depression (Beck, 1967).  
Behavioral changes during depressive episodes are mediated by negative 
cognitive schemas that generalize to many different areas of life (work, play, 
interpersonal relations).  Depressed individuals are characterized by the depressive 
triad – negative, demeaning views of the self, the world, and the future.  These 
negative views represent direct manifestations of fundamental cognitive distortions, 
errors, and biases.  The content of the schemas is represented by negative attitudes.  
Continuous activation of these schemas, reflected in the nihilistic attitudes and the 
sense of hopelessness in depressed individuals, can account for the loss of interest, 
sadness, and chronic inactivity.  Negative attitudes such as "Nothing will work out" 
promote loss of initiative, or "My whole life is empty and meaningless" leads to 
apathy.  Because depressed individuals no longer engage in meaningful activities 
and therefore lack positive reinforcement, their affect is consistent with their 
cognitive appraisal.  When sadness, frustration, or apathy emerges when 
constructive action is contemplated or undertaken by the depressed person, these 
negative affects enhance the negative expectations.   
Beck further developed his schema theory to apply to the anxiety disorders 
(Beck, 1985; Beck et al., 1985).  The authors considered the threatening 
interpretation of neutral or ambiguous stimuli to be the core feature of anxiety 
disorders.  These cognitions, a result of faulty information processing, elicit the 
emotional response of anxiety.  From this viewpoint, the individual's cognitive 
appraisal of the situation is the most important step (e.g., Lazarus, 1966; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984; Spielberger, 1972).  Further developing the ideas of Lazarus and 
his colleagues, Beck suggested that anxious individuals move through three stages 
when they perceive danger in their environment.  In the primary appraisal stage, 
the detection of threatening stimuli activates an "emergency response." According 
to Beck et al. (1985), stimuli that elicit this response in anxious individuals do not 
necessarily signify danger to most people in general.  Instead, the authors postulated 
that individuals with an anxiety disorder view their environment through a distorted 
cognitive set biased toward the detection of threat.  They tend to make appraisals of 
threat based on little data, and their first impression is not modified easily in later 
  
39
information processing stages.  After the primary appraisal, anxious individuals 
enter into a mode of secondary appraisal in which they assess their resources for 
dealing with the perceived threat.  In most cases, anxious individuals will decide 
that they lack the necessary resources to successfully handle the threatening 
stimulus.  Finally, anxious individuals engage in a dynamic process of estimating 
danger that is influenced by factors such as their temperament, previous learning, 
and memories of cognitive, emotional, and physiological responses to related 
threatening experiences. 
According to the schema theory for anxiety disorders, the cognitive 
consequences of this maladaptive information processing sequence include sensory-
perceptual symptoms like hypervigilance, thinking difficulties such as poor 
concentration, and conceptual symptoms such as catastrophic thinking and negative 
automatic thoughts.  Moreover, similar to the model for depression, these 
maladaptive cognitive patterns are thought to create a negative feedback cycle in 
which performance is affected negatively by anxiety, which in turn provides more 
danger cues and exacerbates the experience of subjective distress.  This feedback 
mechanism ultimately culminates in a massive sympathetic response to the 
perceived threat. 
In summary, according to Beck, both in anxiety and depression 
experiences are perceived in relation to a person’s schemas.  Perceptions, 
interpretations, and memory are likely to be distorted in order to be consistent with 
these schemas.  The main difference between anxiety and depression lies in the 
different type of schemas involved: in depression, schemas are about a negative 
view of the self, the world, and the future; in anxiety, schemas are about 
vulnerability and danger. 
 
3.3.3 The associative network model by Gordon H. Bower 
Bower’s (1981) theory of mood-congruent memory served as the impetus 
to link emotion-based psychopathology with biases in memory and other stages of 
information processing.  The author reported results from several experiments 
suggesting that individuals tend to better recall personal memories reflecting an 
emotional valence similar to their current mood and that individuals recall more 
stimuli retrieved in the same emotional state in which they were encoded.  He 
labeled this phenomenon a mood-state-dependent effect.  To account for these 
findings, Bower proposed an associative network theory of memory and emotion 
(see Figure 3.2).  He postulated that events are represented in memory in the form 
of propositions, which are the basic units of thought.  
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Figure 3.2:  Small fragment of the connections surrounding a specific emotion node or 
unit. Bidirectional arrows refer to mutual exchange of activation between 
nodes. An inhibitory pathway from Emotion 1 to Emotion 2 is also shown. 
(Adopted from Bower, 1981, p. 135) 
 
 
When an event from memory is activated, relevant propositions are 
primed and in turn activate other propositions, where there are associative linkages.  
Emotions are stored in memory in units called nodes, and these propositions have 
associative linkages with representations of related behaviors (e.g., leaving the 
situation), physiological reactions (e.g., accelerated heartbeat), cognitions (e.g., 
threatening interpretations), and descriptions of standard evocative situations.  Also 
included are the verbal labels commonly assigned to a particular emotion.  Some of 
these linkages are innate, while others are learned and elaborated throughout life.  
When an individual experiences a particular emotion, it increases the probability 
that a memory encoded in a similar emotional state will also be activated.  
In addition to their effect on memory, Bower demonstrated that emotions 
influence associative processes such as semantic elaboration, selective attention, 
and the interpretation of ambiguous material.  Bower’s findings were applied most 
directly to the effects of depression on memory (e.g., Clark & Teasdale, 1982).  
Other authors, for instance Mathews, Mogg, May, and Eysenck (1989), or Mogg, 
Mathews, and Weinman (1987) used his theory as the basis for investigating the 
relationship between anxiety and information processing. 
 
 
EMOTION 1 
(e.g., Fear) 
EMOTION 2 
(e.g., Joy) 
INHIBITS 
AUTONOMIC  
PATTERNS 
EXPRESSIVE 
BEHAVIORS 
   Event A VERBAL 
LABELS 
EVOKING 
APPRAISALS 
ACTORS 
ACTIONS 
TIME 
PLACE 
  
41
3.3.4 Integrative model of cognitive processes in the emotional disorders by 
Williams et al. 
Williams and his colleagues (1988; 1997) attempted to account for 
empirical investigations showing that anxiety is characterized by an attentional, but 
not a memory bias, whereas depression is characterized by a memory, but not an 
attentional bias.  The authors proposed an integrative model of cognitive processes 
in the emotional disorders that considers four dimensions of information processing: 
priming, elaboration, preattentive processing, and resource allocation (see Figure 
3.3).  Their theory suggests that encoding and retrieval of information involves both 
automatic and controlled processes, and a bias in one type of processing does not 
necessitate that an individual will demonstrate a bias in the other type of processing.  
According to the authors, individuals with anxiety disorders display an 
attentional bias toward threatening stimuli, yet they show a memory bias toward 
threat only under specific conditions.  That is, individuals with anxiety disorders are 
expected to show enhanced priming, or enhanced implicit memory for threatening 
stimuli, but they should avoid elaborate processing and thus be biased against 
elaborate processing of threatening stimuli, which is required for successful 
completion of explicit memory paradigms.  On the other hand, according to the 
integrative model, depressed individuals should show no attentional bias but a bias 
for elaborate processing of mood-congruent, negative information and thus produce 
enhanced results in explicit memory tests.  However, time and again studies were 
not able to verify the proposed differences between anxiety and depression, nor the 
distinct postulated biases in attention and memory (for a review see Williams et al., 
1997, pp. 283-289; Rinck & Becker, 2005).  
William et al.'s integrative model only covers attentional and memory 
processes but says nothing about interpretation processes. In their book, the authors 
merely mention an interpretive bias in the chapter on judgment and conclude: 
"...emotional disorders seem to be associated with a range of judgmental biases: a 
tendency to be more sensitive to negative contingencies in their environment, or to 
perceive them even if they do not really exist; an inflated view of the risk of future 
negative events; and a tendency to view ambiguous stimuli as having a threatening 
meaning" (1997, p. 207). Tversky and Kahneman (1973, 1974) noted that people 
assess the probability of uncertain events by relying on heuristic principles 
(representativeness, availability, anchoring, and adjustment), which reduce 
complexity and probability assessments to simpler judgmental operations.  
However, these heuristics also produce specific judgmental errors.  Of these 
principles, the availability heuristic, used to judge the likelihood or frequency of 
events, is most relevant to interpretive biases in anxiety and depression.  People 
tend to  be  biased by information that is easier to recall ( salient, well-publicized, or  
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Figure 3.3:  Preferred resource allocation to emotionally relevant material at different stages of information processing in depressed 
individuals (dark boxes) and anxious individuals (light boxes) according to the integrative model by Williams et al. (1988) 
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recent) and by examples they can easily retrieve (e.g., that are activated by 
their emotional state).  They also correlate events that occur close together.  As 
anxious and depressed people are mainly schema-driven (see Beck, 1967; Beck et 
al., 1985), their judgments should be negatively biased in accordance with their 
schemata.  
In summary, of the general cognitive models introduced above, only 
Beck and his colleagues (Beck, 1967; 1976; Beck, Emery, & Greenberg 1985) 
formulated specific hypotheses regarding anxious and depressed patients' 
interpretation.  Bower (1981) focused on memory processes and Williams et al. 
(1988; 1997) also only incorporated attentional and memory processes into their 
model.  The neglect of interpretation in these influential cognitive models is also 
reflected in the fact that attentional and memory processes have been much better 
researched than interpretive processes.  Interpretation processes have been studied 
the least, particularly among participants with diagnosed mental disorders (see 
chapter 4 Review of the literature on interpretation processes).  
Attribution and appraisal theories are only marginally relevant to the topic 
of interpretation because they deal with a narrower view of an individual's "search 
for meaning": causal judgment.  In addition, research in this area has usually 
identified individuals with specific symptoms (e.g., anger, alcoholism, loneliness, 
test anxiety) and analyzed differences in their attributions using questionnaires or 
interviews (e.g., Anderson, Horowitz, & French, 1983; Arkin, Detchon, & 
Maruyama, 1982; McHugh, Beckman, & Frieze, 1979; Peplau, Russell, & Heim, 
1979).  Since most of these studies are correlational, it is unclear whether the 
attributions associated with a specific pathology (e.g., anger or anxiety) are causes 
or consequences.  In addition, the relevant research has not analyzed whether 
differences in causal attributions reflect an accurate assessment of antecedent 
information or errors and biases. 
 
3.4   Disorder-specific cognitive models 
Beck’s schema theory has been most influential in the development and 
formulation of specific cognitive models for panic disorder, social phobia, and 
depressive disorder.  In this section, the prevalent cognitive model for each of these 
three disorders will be described with an emphasis on interpretive processes. 
 
3.4.1 A cognitive model of panic disorder 
D. M. Clark presented his cognitive model of panic disorder in 1986.  In 
this model, he applied Beck et al.’s (1985) schema theory of anxiety disorders to the 
specific fears of panic patients and characterized the core feature of panic disorder 
as a misinterpretation of bodily sensations (Figure 3.4).  According to Clark’s 
model, individuals with panic disorder regard normal anxiety responses as more 
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catastrophic than they really are.  Moreover, any physical sensation present during 
the anxiety response of our autonomous nervous system may be interpreted as 
dangerous by panic patients (e.g., increased heart rate during exercising).  
 
 
Figure 3.4:  A cognitive model of panic (Modified according to Clark, 1986) 
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manner and instigate a response of the sympathetic nervous system.  This anxiety 
response reinforces the physical sensations, which again are interpreted in a 
catastrophic fashion, thus creating a positive feedback loop, which ultimately 
culminates in a panic attack (see Figure 3.4).  Margraf and his colleagues further 
developed this model and used it to progress the treatment of panic disorder (e.g., 
Ehlers & Margraf, 1989; Margraf & Schneider, 1989; Schneider & Margraf, 1998). 
Thus, Clark’s model predicts that individuals with panic disorder will 
experience a panic attack only when they perceive somatic or emotional sensations 
and interpret them in a catastrophic fashion.  It follows from his model that panic 
patients should also exhibit a bias to interpret bodily sensations in a threatening 
manner.  In subsequent chapters, this bias will be called a negative interpretation 
bias. 
 
3.4.2 A cognitive model of social phobia 
David M. Clark and his colleague Lusia Stopa also developed a cognitive 
model for social phobia (Stopa & Clark, 1993).  Like his model for panic disorder, 
this model for social phobia is based on Beck et al.’s (1985) cognitive theory for 
anxiety (Figure 3.5). Clark and Stopa suggested that individuals with social phobia 
experience anxiety when anticipating social or evaluative situations because they 
hold dysfunctional beliefs that they will perform in an undesirable manner.  These 
cognitions initiate a series of anxiety reactions such as blushing and sweating, 
which further confirm the individual’s belief that he or she is not capable of 
functioning adequately.  In addition, the actual performance of individuals with 
social phobia may suffer because they are preoccupied with negative thoughts that 
bind their attention as well as their cognitive resources and cause them to ignore 
relevant social cues.  Finally, the theory suggests that social phobics attend 
selectively to possible threatening cues in their environment, such as the behavior of 
others toward them, and they are quick to interpret others’ behavior as a negative 
evaluation or a rejection.  Clark and Stopa empirically validated their model 
through an experiment in which they videotaped individuals with social phobia and 
non-anxious controls conversing with a confederate.  The results indicated that 
individuals with social phobia performed more poorly, underestimated the quality 
of their performance, and were more likely to report negative self-statements than 
non-anxious controls (Stopa & Clark, 1993).  However, in this study, social phobics 
did not differ from controls in their perception of the confederate’s behavior 
towards them, indicating that they suffer from a selective distortion in the 
perception of their own behavior, rather than a distortion in the perception of social 
behavior in general.  Because social phobia patients are preoccupied with negative 
self-statements, they do not process how others respond to them.  Instead, they hold 
stable negative beliefs (schemas) about how they are viewed by others, which 
consequently lead to a negative view of social situations.  Paralleling the 
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conclusions drawn from the cognitive model for panic disorder, the cognitive model 
for social phobia also predicts a negative interpretive bias prevalent in patients 
suffering from social anxiety.  These patients should interpret ambiguous internal 
and external information in social situations in a threatening fashion, thus 
displaying a negative interpretive bias.  
 
Figure 3.5:  A cognitive model of social phobia (Depicting Stopa & Clark, 1993) 
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Figure 3.6:  A model of the generation and maintenance of anxiety in social evaluative 
situations (Modified after Rapee & Heimberg, 1997, p. 743) 
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phobia patients overestimate the probability and consequences of a negative 
evaluation by the audience.  The predicted negative evaluation further elicits 
anxiety with its physiological, cognitive, and behavioral components, which 
subsequently influence the individual’s mental representation of his/her appearance 
and behavior as seen by the audience, and the cycle is renewed. 
There are many similarities between Clark’s model of panic disorder and 
his model of social phobia.  Both theories suggest that core negative cognitions 
characterize these disorders.  In panic disorder, a salient cognitive feature is a 
misinterpretation of bodily sensations, whereas in social phobia it is an expectation 
of negative evaluations and failure.  Moreover, both models posit that these 
cognitive patterns play a key role in the onset and maintenance of abnormal 
behavior.  That is, the misinterpretation of normal bodily sensations may cause or 
exacerbate a panic attack in individuals with panic disorder.  Similarly, unrealistic 
standards of performance, and the expectation that others are very critical and will 
evaluate them negatively may cause or exacerbate anxiety and a poor performance 
in social situations in individuals with social phobia.  Both models predict that 
cognitive-behavioral therapy will reduce anxious symptomatology significantly. 
 
3.4.3 A cognitive model of depression 
The relevant cognitive model proposed by Beck (1967; 1976) was already 
described in chapter 3.3.1 (Schema theory by Aaron T. Beck).  Here, the role of 
interpretation in the development and maintenance of unipolar disorders will be 
discussed again briefly.  
Beck (1967) presumed that individuals actively construct their reality by 
selecting, transforming, encoding, storing, and retrieving information.  These 
information processes are guided by underlying schemas.  Information consistent 
with existing schemas is elaborated and encoded, while inconsistent or irrelevant 
information is ignored or forgotten.  Beck proposed that in depression, a systematic 
negative bias in information processing is introduced into the system and evident at 
all levels.  Maladaptive, rigid, over-generalized idiosyncratic schemas about the 
self, the world, and the future dominate.  When these schemas are activated by 
appropriate environmental events, they override more functional schemas and result 
in negatively biased information processing.  A major assumption of schema theory 
is that each psychological disorder has a specific cognitive profile evident at all 
levels of cognitive functioning (Beck, 1967, p. 270).  However, interpretation 
processes lie at the heart of this content specificity hypothesis: "The specific content 
of the interpretation of an event leads to a specific emotional response… depending 
on the kind of interpretation a person makes, he will feel glad, sad, scared, or angry 
- or he may have no particular emotional reaction at all." (Beck, 1976, p. 51).  Thus, 
sadness – the typical emotion of depression – stems from the tendency of depressed 
individuals to interpret their experiences in terms of being deprived, deficient, or 
  
49
defeated.  Beck’s theory is an interactional model in which relevant life stressors 
interact with cognitively vulnerable individuals to produce depressed episodes. 
 
3.4.4 Summary 
Cognitive models for panic disorder, social phobia, and depressive 
disorders predict a negative interpretive bias in panic patients, social phobics, and 
depressives.  According to the cognitive model for anxiety by Beck et al. (1985) and 
the integrative theory for cognition and emotion by Williams et al. (1988; 1997), 
panic and social phobia patients should exhibit a general negative interpretive bias 
for ambiguous stimuli.  In addition to this general bias, Clark (1986), Clark and 
Wells (1995), Rapee and Heimberg (1997), and Stopa and Clark (1993) also predict 
a disorder-specific interpretive bias, such that panic disorder patients misinterpret 
bodily sensations and anxiety symptoms in a threatening fashion, whereas social 
phobia patients interpret social cues and ambiguous information about social 
situations in a threatening manner.  Finally, depressed patients, characterized by a 
negative view of the self, the world, and their future (Beck, 1967, 1976) should 
display a generalized negative interpretive bias. 
Moreover, disorder-specific cognitive models view interpretive processes 
as central to the development and maintenance of anxiety and depressive disorders.  
Interpretation is seen as the key process of pathological information processing that 
results in disorder-specific memory biases and selective allocation of attention.  The 
way people interpret events and experiences dictates how they consequently feel, 
what they pay attention to, what they encode in memory, and what they are 
eventually able to recall, or rather, re-create from memory, and vice versa.  
Consequently, research should focus on the fundamental process of interpretation, 
but the opposite has been the case.  Attention and memory processes have been 
studied widely in anxiety and depressive disorders and a number of elaborate 
experimental designs and methods have been developed to do so.  Interpretive 
processes, on the other hand, have been neglected, as will be shown in more detail 
in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 4:   Review of the literature on interpretive processes 
Presenting participants with ambiguous stimuli is the general method of 
studying interpretive processes.  These stimuli can always be interpreted in a 
threatening, i.e., negative as well as in a non-threatening, i.e., positive or neutral, 
manner.  Until very recently, compared to the research about attention and memory 
in anxiety and depression, interpretive processes were somewhat neglected.  Studies 
conducted in this area can be categorized into questionnaire vs. experimental 
approaches at the methodological level, and analogue vs. patient population at the 
subject level.  While reviewing the literature, one notices that questionnaire studies 
have been far more frequently conducted with clinical subjects, whereas 
experimental studies have usually tested student populations.  This chapter will 
focus on studies relevant to panic disorder, social phobia, and depression, and will 
only briefly mention studies that investigated interpretive processes in analogue 
populations. 
 
4.1   Questionnaire studies 
Butler and Mathews (1983) were the first researchers to test the prediction 
of the cognitive theory that people suffering from an anxiety disorder will display a 
bias for threatening interpretations of ambiguous material, will rate aversive events 
as more threatening or costly, and will judge the subjective probability of such 
aversive events higher than non-anxious controls.  To test their predictions, Butler 
and Mathews developed three questionnaires and administered them to 12 patients 
with generalized anxiety disorder, 12 patients suffering from depression, and to 12 
control subjects.  The first questionnaire tested the participants’ tendency to 
interpret information in a threatening manner and consisted of 10 brief, ambiguous 
scenarios (e.g., "You wake with a start in the middle of the night, thinking you 
heard a noise, but all is quiet").  Participants first had to respond to an open-ended 
question (e.g., "What do you think woke you up?") and in the next step, arrange 
three different explanations in the order in which they would most likely come to 
mind in a similar situation.  For each ambiguous situation described, only one of the 
explanations had a threatening character, the other two were either neutral or 
positive.  Results indicated that anxious individuals as well as depressed individuals 
were more likely than controls to produce a threatening answer to the open-ended 
question and to assign a high ranking to the threatening explanation.  The second 
questionnaire, designed to assess the subjective cost of aversive events, consisted of 
20 threatening items to be rated on a 0-8 scale "how bad" the event would be for the 
individual.  Depressed patients rated the subjective cost of aversive events highest, 
followed by anxious patients.  Both groups differed significantly from each other 
and the control group.  Finally, the third questionnaire, with 36 items describing 
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positive and negative events with self- and other-referent orientations, assessed the 
subjective probability on a 0-8 rating scale from "not at all likely" to "extremely 
likely." Although results indicated that there were no group differences in the 
probability estimations for positive events, anxious participants indicated a higher 
probability of aversive events occurring to themselves than non-anxious controls.  
In contrast, there were no differences between groups in the probability estimations 
of negative events happening to others. 
The study has several shortcomings.  First, Butler and Mathews (1983) 
presented disorder-unspecific scenarios in their questionnaires.  The situations 
described therefore may not have been relevant to the GAD-patients, much less to 
depressed patients.  Second, they had a relatively small sample size (n=12) per 
group.  Their experiment may have lacked the power to differentiate between the 
interpretations of anxious and depressed patients.  Third, in the interpretation 
questionnaire, Butler and Mathews (1983) used a rank-order answer format for the 
three provided explanations of each ambiguous scenario.  This procedure artificially 
forces participants to select one specific explanation as the "most likely one." Due 
to this limitation, some information is lost, and there is no way to indicate that all 
three explanations may appear equally plausible to the participants.  
Several studies have attempted to eliminate some of the shortcomings of 
the original study.  They provided conceptual replications of Butler and Mathews' 
(1983) findings using different patient groups.  Studies that include panic patients, 
social phobia patients, or depressed patients are particularly relevant for this thesis 
and will be discussed briefly.   
 
4.1.1  Questionnaire studies with panic disorder patients 
McNally and Foa (1987) modified the three questionnaires developed by 
Butler and Mathews (1983) to test the content-specific hypothesis.  Two types of 
ambiguous events were included: internal stimuli (bodily sensations; e.g., "You 
notice your heart beating quickly and pounding.  Why?"), and external stimuli 
(potentially threatening external events:  see example from Butler & Mathews, 
1983, above).  McNally and Foa found that agoraphobics with panic attacks were 
more likely than controls to interpret ambiguous bodily stimuli as threatening, and 
to exaggerate the probability and cost of unpleasant events related to arousal rather 
than of events unrelated to arousal.  Moreover, the authors were also able to show a 
significant decrease in biased cognitive processes after treatment.  However, there 
was no difference in the interpretive bias between ambiguous internal and external 
events.  This finding is inconsistent with Foa and Kozak’s (1985) hypothesis that 
fear structures vary across anxiety disorders and that agoraphobic patients are 
characterized by an interpretive bias for internal events only.  This may have been 
due to the extremely small sample size of only nine panic patients.  Although 
McNally and Foa (1987) eliminated the first problem of Butler and Mathews' 
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(1983) study by including disorder-specific ambiguous scenarios, the remaining two 
critical points remain (very small sample size of n=9 per group and rank-order 
answer format).  In addition, their study design lacked other anxiety patients.  As 
the rank-order answer format allows for relative comparisons only, it remains 
unclear how disorder-specific their findings really are. 
Harvey, Richards, Dziadosz, and Swindell (1993) tried to answer the last 
question by comparing panic disorder and social phobia patients using the same 
questionnaire as McNally and Foa (1987).  The comparison between panic disorder 
patients and non-patient controls replicated McNally and Foa’s findings of a 
significant difference for both internal and external events.  Again, panic disorder 
patients interpreted ambiguous scenarios as more threatening.  The comparison 
between panic disorder and social phobia patients, on the other hand, pointed to a 
differential portion of the interpretive bias.  There appears to be a general, non-
specific negative interpretive bias in both patient groups for internal, as well as 
external events, separating them from the non-anxious control group.  In addition, 
panic disorder patients were significantly more likely to choose negative 
interpretations of internal events than social phobia patients, thus displaying a 
disorder-specific interpretive bias beyond their disorder-specific bias for internal 
scenarios.  Unfortunately, no disorder-specific social items were included in their 
study.  Therefore, disorder specificity in social phobia remains unclear.  In addition, 
sample size was small again (n=12 per group), and rank-order answer format with 
the loss of information discussed above was used again.  
Clark, Salkovskis, Öst, Breitholtz, Koehler, et al. (1997) developed the 
Body Sensation Interpretation Questionnaire (BSIQ) and a brief version of this 
questionnaire with satisfactory test-retest reliability.  The questionnaire included 
four classes of ambiguous events: panic body sensations, social items, general 
items, and physical symptoms with slow onset, thus not relevant to the cognitive 
theory of panic.  The authors tested panic patients and an anxious control group 
with the BSIQ and showed that panic patients were more likely to interpret 
ambiguous autonomic sensations as signs of immediately impending physical or 
mental disaster and were more likely than other anxiety disorder patients and non-
patients to believe these interpretations.  Similar to Harvey at al. (1993), there also 
was a non-specific bias for threatening interpretations of external events present in 
all anxiety disorder groups.  Although Clark and his colleagues used the most 
advanced study design described so far and even provided some psychometric 
properties for their interpretation questionnaire, some points of criticism remain.  
First, in study 1, their anxious control group was comprised of two different anxiety 
disorders (social phobia and generalized anxiety disorder).  In addition, 
interpretation of the results was complicated by a tendency of the anxious control 
group to score lower on state anxiety.  Clark et al. (1997) followed up their first 
study with a second one wherein they eliminated the two critical points.  Their 
sample size in study 2 was impressive as well (min.=33 (GAD-group); max.=73 
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(social phobia group).  However, the authors continued to use rank-order answer 
format.  Unfortunately, in study 2 they presented participants with a modified, 
abbreviated version of the BSIQ (BBSIQ; 14 instead of 27 items) that summarized 
three social and four general items under "external events," thus not differentiating 
between general and social scenarios anymore.  Therefore, a disorder-specific 
interpretive bias in social phobia was not tested. 
In treatment studies, the disorder-specific negative interpretive bias for 
body sensations was significantly reduced by cognitive-behavioral therapy and 
applied relaxation (Westling & Öst, 1995) as well as by pure cognitive therapy 
(Clark, Salkovskis, Hackmann, Wells, Ludgate, et al., 1999).  Clark and his 
colleagues also demonstrated that change in panic-related cognitions measured with 
the BSIQ was a significant predictor of improvement in pure cognitive and pure 
exposure treatments, suggesting that "the two different psychological procedures 
may have their effects through a common psychological mechanism, change in 
misinterpretations of bodily sensations" (Clark, Salkovskis, Hackmann, Middleton, 
Anastasiades, et al., 1994, p. 767).  Furthermore, using the BSIQ, Richards, Austin, 
and Alvarenga (2001) were able to show that the interpretive cognitive bias for 
ambiguous interoceptive stimuli may be a risk factor for the development of a panic 
disorder.  They administered the BSIQ to non-clinical panickers and showed that 
they did not differ from panic patients in their interpretive bias for bodily 
sensations. 
Kamieniecki, Wade, and Tsourtos (1997) compared panic patients with 
agoraphobia to a control group using two types of questionnaires, the first being a 
measure examining the interpretation of anxiety-like symptoms in the context of 
non-anxious states.  The second questionnaire consisted of internal and external 
stimuli similar to the BSIQ.  However, unlike the BSIQ, patients verbally had to 
provide as many explanations as possible for the described scenarios.  Compared to 
controls, panic patients failed to identify overt explanations for bodily sensations 
caused by non-anxious states or harmless events.  Patients also misinterpreted 
bodily sensations in ambiguous scenarios by providing more anxiety-related initial 
interpretations than controls and being unable to subsequently reinterpret their 
initial anxiety-related interpretation in a benign manner.  There are a number of 
problems with this study.  Again, sample size is relatively small (n=15 per group).  
In addition, Kamieniecki et al. (1997) had no second clinical group in their study.  
Not all the psychopathology questionnaires were administered to both groups.  
Furthermore, participants' responses were not standardized because results were 
based on categorizing verbal answers only.  As the authors themselves noted, they 
defined response categories differently from previous studies (e.g., McNally & Foa, 
1987).  Therefore, results are difficult to compare.  Finally, it remains unclear why 
anxiety patients failed to identify overt causes of physical sensations.  Results are 
not necessarily indicative of an interpretive bias; they could be due to a selection 
bias, differential knowledge, or memory effects.  
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In summary, questionnaire studies to date have demonstrated that 
individuals suffering from panic disorder, and even non-clinical panickers are 
significantly more likely to misinterpret ambiguous bodily sensations with a sudden 
onset in a catastrophic manner than non-anxious controls.  This bias was also found 
in other anxiety disorders.  However, it appears to be stronger in panic patients than 
in other anxiety patients, while clinically anxious individuals do not differ in a 
general negative bias for ambiguous stimuli.  
 
4.1.2  Questionnaire studies with social phobia patients 
Foa, Franklin, Perry, and Herbert (1996) administered a modified version 
of the Probability/Cost Questionnaire (PCQ) derived from Butler and Mathews 
(1983) and from McNally and Foa (1987) consisting of 40 items, 20 non-social 
events (e.g., You will lose your house keys) and 20 negative social events (e.g., 
During a job interview, you will freeze).  Generalized social phobics rated the 
probability and cost of these events happening to them before and after treatment.  
The questionnaire was also administered to a non-anxious control group.  
Consistent with the hypothesis that generalized social phobia patients would show 
specific negative judgment biases, they rated social but not non-social events as 
significantly more probable and more costly than control subjects.  This was true for 
both assessment points, pre and post treatment.  In addition, the magnitude of the 
bias was reduced by treatment, with cost estimate of social events accounting for 
the greatest percentage in improvement for social anxiety.  Unfortunately, this study 
did not administer an interpretation questionnaire, therefore, results cover only a 
small spectrum of judgmental biases.  In addition, no second anxiety disorder group 
was assessed, and sample sizes were small again (n=15 per group). 
Amir, Foa, and Coles (1998b) tested interpretive processes in generalized 
social phobia in more detail.  Participants (generalized social phobia patients, 
obsessive-compulsive-disorder patients, and non-anxious controls) were presented 
with 22 ambiguous scenarios (15 social, 7 nonsocial) each followed by three 
possible interpretations: positive, negative, and neutral.  The authors wanted to test 
whether generalized social phobia patients would choose a negative interpretation 
even if a positive alternative is present, whether the interpretive bias was purely 
self-relevant, and whether it was specific to social anxiety.  Results indicated that 
compared to non-anxious controls and OCD-patients, generalized social phobics 
interpreted ambiguous social but not non-social events as negative even when a 
positive alternative was available, displaying a disorder-specific interpretive bias.  
This bias occurred only when the social scenarios were self-referent.  The authors 
concluded that the observed negative interpretive bias does not reflect deficits in 
retrieval of positive information.  However, there are two possible points of 
criticism regarding Amir et al.'s (1998b) study.  First, attempts to provide an actual 
"positive" explanation to each ambiguous scenario forced researchers to include 
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explanations that were far less plausible than negative or neutral explanations may 
have been.  Second, the applied answer format of rank-ordering poses great 
limitations as discussed above for questionnaire studies with panic disorder patients. 
Stopa and Clark (2000) conducted a similar study that investigated the 
tendency of social anxiety patients to interpret ambiguous social events in a 
negative fashion and mildly negative social events in a catastrophic fashion.  
Patients with generalized social phobia, equally anxious patients with another 
anxiety disorder, and non-patient controls were presented with ambiguous scenarios 
depicting social and non-social events, and with scenarios depicting mildly negative 
social events.  Compared to both control groups, patients with generalized social 
phobia were more likely to interpret ambiguous social events in a negative fashion 
and to choose catastrophic interpretations of mildly negative social events.  In 
addition, both clinical groups ("social phobia" and "other anxiety disorder") ranked 
negative explanations for general scenarios significantly higher than the non-patient 
group.  Thus, social phobia patients, just like panic patients described above, 
displayed a disorder-specific negative interpretive bias on top of a general one.  
However, control situations (n=10) consisted of external or disorder-unspecific 
scenarios (e.g., "A letter marked 'urgent' arrives") as well as internal events (e.g., 
"You have a sudden pain in your stomach"), i.e., bodily sensations possibly 
triggered by anxiety and thus relevant to any anxiety disorder.  This might explain 
why Stopa and Clark (2000) found a general negative interpretive bias in social 
phobia patients, while Amir et al. (1998b) did not.  Refinement of control situations 
is necessary to clarify this issue.  In addition, Stopa and Clark (2000) again 
analyzed open-ended responses and the ranking of the one negative or catastrophic 
explanation for each scenario only.  Thus, the negative interpretive bias in social 
phobia patients demonstrated by the authors is relative to control subjects.  Finally, 
the anxious control group was comprised of very different anxiety disorders with 
varying degrees of social anxiety present.  This makes conclusions about the 
specificity of social interpretive bias in social phobia patients somewhat 
problematic because any such conclusion would have to be based on significant 
differences relative to the other anxiety disorder group. 
Finally, Roth, Antony, and Swinson (2001) studied the interpretations of 
social phobia patients for visible physical symptoms of anxiety.  They developed 
the Symptom Interpretation Scale (SIS; actor and observer version) that asks people 
to rate the extent to which each of eight interpretations (e.g., alcohol, normal 
physical state, normal anxiety, psychiatric condition, intense anxiety) is a likely 
explanation for a number of visible anxiety symptoms.  Compared to non-anxious 
controls, when asked about anxiety symptoms that they themselves exhibited, social 
phobia patients more strongly endorsed the ‘intense anxiety’ and ‘psychiatric 
condition’ interpretations given by others and less strongly the ‘normal physical 
state’ interpretation.  Thus, people with social phobia were more likely than non-
anxious controls to think that others view signs of arousal as being indicative of 
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intense anxiety or a psychiatric condition, and were less likely to think that others 
view these signs as being indicative of some normal physical state.  This negative 
bias is in accord with Stopa and Clark's (1993) as well as Clark and Wells' (1995) 
cognitive model of social phobia.  However, Roth et al.'s (2001) study did not apply 
the typically used interpretation questionnaire based on Butler & Mathews (1983).  
The SIS they administered in their study only covers visible physical symptoms of 
anxiety, leaving out the majority of situations relevant to a possible interpretive bias 
postulated by cognitive models of social phobia (Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee & 
Heimberg, 1997; Stopa & Clark, 1993).  Furthermore, no clinical control group was 
used, e.g., panic disorder patients:  a patient group for which cognitive models 
appoint much more importance to catastrophic misinterpretations of anxiety 
symptoms (Clark, 1986; Ehlers & Margraf, 1989). 
There are also two studies relevant to social anxiety that investigated 
interpretation processes in analogue populations (Chen & Craske, 1998; Constans, 
Penn, Ihen, & Hope, 1999).  Chen and Craske modified Butler and Mathews (1983) 
interpretation and subjective probability questionnaires to describe situations 
relevant to examinations and test anxiety.  They investigated the relation between 
anxiety, as measured by the state version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
(STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) and the Test Anxiety 
Inventory (TAI; Spielberger, Gonzalez, Taylor, Algaze, & Anton, 1978), and 
interpretation/judgment bias over time in freshmen students taking an examination.  
The authors found that changes in anxiety were associated with changes in the 
perception of the risk of negative events immediately after the examination and with 
changes in threatening interpretations of ambiguous examination-related scenarios 
after grades were posted.  In contrast, pre-exam cognitive bias did not predict state 
anxiety immediately after the exam or after grades were received.  It remains 
unclear, however, if results can be generalized to clinical subjects.  Items on the 
Subjective Probability Questionnaire and the eight ambiguous social scenarios 
stemmed from a relatively narrow area of social anxiety only (exam-related).  The 
authors did not report what type of situations the "non-exam related events" were.  
In addition, Chen and Craske (1998) again used the rank-order answer format in 
their interpretation questionnaire. 
Constans et al. (1999) adopted a design similar to Amir et al. (1998b), 
testing socially anxious and low-anxious undergraduate students. They replicated 
Amir et al.’s findings that socially anxious subjects showed more threatening 
interpretations of ambiguous, interpersonal events when compared to low-anxious 
controls.  Again, no group differences emerged in interpretations for non-social 
situations, pointing to content specificity in the interpretive bias associated with 
social anxiety.  However, the absolute ratings of the socially anxious individuals fell 
around 4.0 on a 7-point Likert scale (1= most negative interpretation, 7 = most 
positive interpretation).  Thus, rather than regarding the bias as negative, the authors 
suggested that socially anxious individuals lack the positive interpretations of low-
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anxious individuals in social situations.  However, alternative explanations could be 
advanced.  First, the authors used an ambiguous social vignette depicting a blind 
date between two college-aged students.  Participants’ interpretations of events 
presented in the story were assessed.  There was no instruction that participants 
should picture themselves in this situation.  Therefore, the material was not self-
referent.  Amir et al. (1998b) had not been able to demonstrate an interpretive bias 
for scenarios that were not self-referent.  Second, Constans et al. (1999) noted that 
"…there was a slight positive skew to the vignette making positive interpretations 
more likely and thereby inflating threatening interpretations made by the socially 
anxious subjects" (p. 650).  Third, results are based on five social items and three 
non-social items only.  They have to be replicated using a number of different 
scenarios.  Finally, as the authors examined an analogue student population, it is 
unclear how the effects would compare with a group of social phobia patients. 
In summary, all questionnaire studies with social phobia patients 
univocally demonstrated an interpretive and judgmental bias toward socially 
threatening information.  Compared to non-anxious controls and patients with other 
anxiety disorders, social phobia patients chose a negative interpretation of 
ambiguous social events significantly more frequently, rated mildly negative social 
scenarios as more catastrophic, and judged negative social events as more likely and 
more costly.  Contrary to panic patients, the negative bias in social phobia appears 
to be purely disorder-specific. 
 
4.1.3  Questionnaire studies with depressed patients 
To my knowledge, there are no published studies that modified Butler and 
Mathews’ (1983) questionnaire approach to study disorder-specific interpretive 
processes in depression.  Butler and Mathews (1983) themselves included depressed 
patients as a clinical control group in their original study (see description above) 
and found the same negative interpretive bias in depressed and anxious patients 
relative to non-anxious controls using general and anxiety related ambiguous 
scenarios. 
However, as early as 1979, Krantz and Hammen studied "depressive 
distortion" in students and depressed patients using a self-developed interpretation 
questionnaire.  The questionnaire consisted of six short descriptions of potentially 
problematic situations common to college students (e.g., running for and losing a 
school election) followed by four multiple-choice questions pertaining to the central 
character’s thoughts, feelings, and expectations.  Each question had four response 
options (depressive-distorted, non-depressive-distorted, depressive-non-distorted, 
non-depressive-non-distorted).  The dimension depressed vs. non-depressed tone 
referred to the presence or absence of unhappiness and dysphoria; the distorted vs. 
non-distorted dimension denoted the presence or absence of catastrophic, 
exaggerated, unwarranted negative interpretations.  The authors found strong 
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support for a positive relationship between depression and choice of depressive-
distorted replies in a wide range of samples (students and clinical).  Thus, they were 
able to show that depressed patients prefer exaggerated, catastrophic interpretations 
for self-referent negative events.  Items reflected errors in logical processing of 
information (e.g., arbitrary inference, overgeneralization) and their heterogeneity 
presented a need for theoretical refinement (Krantz & Hammen, 1979, p. 617).  
Therefore, this study did not answer the question of how depressed patients 
interpret ambiguous situations. 
Nunn, Mathews, and Trower (1997) studied "selective interpretative 
processing of emotional information in depression" by means of ambiguous 
scenarios.  The authors wrote 20 three-sentence texts describing a protagonist 
involved in daily situations, 10 focusing on sociotropic and 10 on autonomous 
concerns.  The use of the second person pronoun encouraged participants to identify 
with the protagonist (e.g., You meet up with an old friend that you have not seen for 
a while at a favorite pub).  To assess participants’ interpretation of the ambiguous 
scenarios, each text was followed by four sentences (1 neutral filler, 1 description of 
an emotional state, 1 sociotropic and 1 autonomous target sentence) that had to be 
rated on a 7-point scale in terms of similarity to participants’ own thoughts and 
feelings in the situation described.  Half of the target sentences were positive and 
half were negative.  Depressed patients showed a negative interpretive bias by 
endorsing all negative interpretations of the ambiguous scenarios and rejecting 
positive ones, particularly when autonomy related.  On the other hand, control 
subjects endorsed all positive interpretations, sociotropic and autonomous.  More 
severe levels of depression measured with the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; 
Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) were associated with a stronger 
negative interpretive bias.  STAI-T score predicted rejection of positive 
interpretations over all participants.  However, whether this demonstrates a specific 
effect of anxiety or a general effect of trait-negative emotionality remains unclear 
because no additional anxiety measures were employed.  In addition, no anxious 
control group was included in the study. 
For their master’s thesis, Tzschacksch (1997), Timann (1997), and 
Krampitz (1998) developed, tested and modified an interpretation questionnaire for 
depression based on Butler and Masthews‘ (1983) original method.  They created 
25 vignettes of depression-relevant ambiguous scenarios (e.g., You see an 
acquaintance walk by at the opposite side of the street.  The person does not greet 
you.).  Each ambiguous scenario was followed by the question: "What thoughts 
does this situation elicit in you?" Participants were asked to rate three to five 
statements for each scenario on a 5-point Likert Scale according to how likely it is 
that this particular thought would come to their mind.  For each scenario, 
dysfunctional as well as functional interpretations were provided, with a total of 64 
dysfunctional and 27 functional statements.  Tzschacksch (1997) tested 20 
depressed patients and 20 control subjects.  Timann (1997) administered the BDI to 
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110 psychology students and formed two groups of low depression subjects (BDI < 
5) and higher depression subjects (BDI ≥ 12) consisting of 28 participants each.  
The questionnaire differentiated well between patients and control group and also 
between low and higher depression subjects.  Krampitz (1998) improved the 
questionnaire by standardizing the number of interpretations provided for each 
scenario (2 dysfunctional and 1 functional), choosing interpretations that best 
differentiated between depressed and non-depressed individuals, and eliminating 
two scenarios that had very poor psychometric indices.  The final version of this 
questionnaire has never yet been tested.  In addition, a composite score of 
functional and dysfunctional interpretations was calculated by simple reversion of 
the functional ratings.  This procedure does not appear useful because again it 
eliminates the possibility of analyzing negative and non-negative interpretations 
separately. 
In summary, negative beliefs and dysfunctional attitudes postulated by 
Beck’s (1967; 1976) cognitive theory for depression have been studied intensely 
(e.g., Dobson & Shaw, 1986; Hamilton & Abramson, 1983; Seligman, Abramson, 
Semmel, & Von Baeyer, 1979; Sheppard & Teasdale, 1996; Weissman & Beck, 
1978; for a review see Haaga, Dyck, & Ernst, 1991).  Interpretation processes, on 
the other hand, have been largely neglected, despite their key role in Beck’s schema 
theory.  The two studies with depressed individuals that employed ambiguous 
stimuli (Nunn et al., 1997; Tzschacksch, 1997) were able to demonstrate a negative 
interpretive bias.  
 
4.1.4 Summary of questionnaire studies 
Questionnaire studies with panic, social phobia and depressed patients 
were generally able to demonstrate an interpretive bias toward negative or 
threatening information that appears to be disorder-specific in panic and social 
phobia.  However, all questionnaire studies showed a number of limitations.  Except 
for Clark et al. (1997), sample sizes were small, thus, the studies may have lacked 
power.  In addition, the psychometric properties of the questionnaires were seldom 
reported.  Furthermore, disorder-specific situations usually were supplied only for 
the anxiety disorder of research interest, not for the clinical control groups, or there 
was no anxious control group to begin with.  In depression, none of the studies 
reported above assessed a second clinical group.  Here, an anxiety patient group 
would have been most interesting in order to evaluate the specificity of the negative 
interpretive bias in regard to a) the situational scope and b) differences from other 
clinical patients, particularly anxiety patients.  Thus, the assessment of depressed 
patients with an interpretation questionnaire that contains disorder-related as well as 
other types of scenarios in a study design that also includes an anxiety group seems 
very promising to advance our knowledge about cognitive processes in depression. 
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Often, the questionnaires employed were not specifically designed to 
assess interpretations: only two studies with social phobia patients (Amir et al., 
1998b; Stopa & Clark, 2000) and one study with test-anxious students (Chen & 
Craske, 1998) used a modified version of Butler and Mathews' (1983) interpretation 
questionnaire, the paradigm most commonly employed to study interpretive 
processes in different anxiety disorders.  The remaining studies with social phobia 
patients either assessed a very narrow topic (visible physical anxiety symptoms) or 
contained no ambiguous scenarios at all (Foa et al., 1996).  In depression, no study 
has ever been published using an interpretation questionnaire.  The interpretation 
questionnaire for depression developed by Tzschacksch (1997), Timann (1997), and 
Krampitz (1998) requires further testing and validation. 
The greatest limitation, however, is posed by the answer format of the 
interpretation questionnaires.  Except for Kamieniecki et al. (1997), who used a 
slightly different methodology altogether, and Constans et al. (1999), that did not 
assess patients, all studies had participants first write "the interpretation that you 
first think of" in response to an ambiguous scenario.  This open-ended question 
produced individual answers that had to be categorized.  Studies used different 
categorization criteria and results are therefore difficult to compare.  In a second 
step, three possible explanations to each ambiguous scenario were provided that 
participants had to rank-order according to the likelihood that each explanation 
would come to their mind if they encountered a similar situation.  Of the three 
explanations, one was somewhat "catastrophic," dysfunctional, or clearly negative 
while the other two explanations had a neutral or even positive character.  The rank-
order format forced participants to choose one of the three explanations as the "most 
likely one," then one of the remaining two explanations as the second most likely 
cause, and finally reject the leftover explanation as "least likely." This answer 
format gives participants no option to declare all three answers equally likely.  It 
may therefore have produced artificial results due to the limited information range.  
In addition, the three explanations could not be analyzed independently from each 
other anymore.  The negative interpretive bias in anxiety patients is always only 
relative to non-anxious controls.  The mean rank that panic patients assigned to 
the catastrophic interpretation of bodily sensations, for instance, was significantly 
higher than the mean rank that control subjects assigned to this type of explanation.  
In order to evaluate the absolute nature of any possible interpretive bias – i.e., 
whether panic and social phobia patients consider catastrophic interpretations of 
ambiguous scenarios as more likely than non-catastrophic interpretations, negative 
and non-negative explanations of ambiguous scenarios would have to be analyzed 
separately.  To design appropriate treatment, e.g., to know what type of interpretive 
bias is relevant to patients and needs to be modified by means of cognitive therapy, 
knowledge about the absolute nature of cognitive biases is essential.  Constans et al. 
(1999) provided the first study that employed a rating scale format in their 
interpretation questionnaire rather than the rank-order procedure.  Their findings 
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suggest that the absolute nature of the interpretive bias may be a lack of positivity 
that is found in low-anxious control participants rather than an outright negative 
bias.  However, this hypothesis has not yet been tested with clinical patients. 
Finally, questionnaire studies can never rule out the alternative 
interpretation of the result pattern that patients may simply choose catastrophic or 
negative interpretations more frequently because of familiarity or experimenter 
demand effects rather than actually display an automatic interpretive bias. 
 
4.2   Experimental studies 
Similar to the questionnaire approach, ambiguous stimuli have been used 
to investigate interpretive processes experimentally.  A number of different 
paradigms were developed and employed over the years:  
1)  Homophones (Byrne & Eysenck, 1993 [students]; Eysenck, MacLeod, & Mathews, 
1987 [students]; Mathews, Richards, & Eysenck, 1989 [patients with generalized 
anxiety disorder, current and recovered]; Mogg, Bradbury, & Bradley, 2006 [patients 
with a current diagnosis of unipolar depression]; Mogg, Bradley, Miller, Potts, 
Glenwright, et al., 1994 [students]; Russo, Patterson, Roberson, Stevenson, & Upward, 
1996 [students]), 
2) Lexical decision tasks  
2.1) Homographs (Amir, Foa, & Coles, 1998a [generalized social phobia patients]; 
Amir, Freshman, & Krakowiak, 1999 [individuals with elevated ASI-scores]; Grey 
& Mathews, 2000 [trained unselected volunteers]; Richards & French, 1992 
[students]), 
2.2) Ambiguous sentences (Calvo, Eysenck, & Estevez, 1994 [students]; Hirsch & 
Mathews, 1997 [students]; 2000 [generalized social phobia patients]), 
3)  Recognition tests (Eysenck, Mogg, May, Richards, & Mathews, 1991 [GAD patients]; 
Hitchcock & Mathews, 1992 [students with hypochondrical concerns]) 
4)  Naming tasks (Calvo & Castillo, 1997 [students]; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999 
[students]), 
5)  Sentence stem completion (Sheppard & Teasdale, 1996 [depressed patients]); Stoler & 
McNally, 1991 [panic patients), and  
6)  Self-paced reading (Calvo, Eysenck, & Castillo [students], 1997; MacLeod & Cohen, 
1993 [students]; Mogg et al., 2006 [depressed patients]). 
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The studies listed above yielded considerable evidence for an interpretive 
bias toward threat in anxiety.  However, as indicated in square brackets and 
contrary to the questionnaire studies described above, most experimental studies 
were conducted with analogue student populations.  Typically, the trait or state 
version of the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, & 
Lushene, 1970; Spielberger et al., 1983) was administered and participants were 
divided into low and high trait anxious groups, either via median split or by forming 
"extreme" groups based on the data distribution of the particular student population.  
Results of the high trait anxious group were typically interpreted as applicable to 
the full range of the STAI despite the fact that values of the fourth quartile (based 
on the norms provided by Spielberger et al., 1983) were never included.  The 
current view that a negative interpretive bias correlates with trait anxiety – the 
higher participants’ trait anxiety, the stronger is their negative bias – is based on an 
insufficient data range.  Analogue to the review of studies employing interpretation 
questionnaires, the following review of experimental research will focus on studies 
relevant to panic disorder, social phobia, and depression only. 
 
4.2.1 Experimental studies with panic disorder patients 
Stoler and McNally (1991) investigated interpretation processes in 15 
symptomatic and 15 recovered panic patients with agoraphobia using ambiguous 
sentence stems that participants had to complete (e.g., After trying to avoid being in 
this state, I ...).  The written completions were classified as indicating either a 
biased (i.e. threat-related) or unbiased interpretation of the meaning of the stem.  
Relative to controls, symptomatic and recovered panic patients interpreted 
ambiguous information as threatening when it lent itself to a potentially threatening 
interpretation but not when it did not.  Not surprising, ambiguity alone did not 
evoke a fearful interpretation.  In addition, symptomatic panic patients also 
interpreted unambiguously threatening and neutral information as more threatening 
than controls.  Unfortunately, the pattern of results could relate to a response rather 
than an interpretive bias.  It is possible that panic patients chose the more 
threatening interpretation from a variety of interpretations that came to mind 
because they knew what was being studied, or because they believed that a 
threatening completion was expected of them.  In addition, sample size again was 
relatively small. 
In a still unpublished study with students, Amir et al. (1999) administered 
the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986) to 
select 16 individuals with elevated scores and 16 non-anxious controls.  Research 
suggests that individuals high on measures of anxiety sensitivity are prone to 
develop panic disorder (Reiss, 1991).  The authors modified the paradigm employed 
by Amir et al. (1998a) (see 4.2.2 Experimental studies with social phobia patients).  
Beside sentences with neutral homographs, Amir et al. (1999) created sentences 
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containing panic-relevant homographs (e.g., The car sounds were faint).  After 100 
ms or 850 ms, sentences were followed by a probe word (e.g., pass-out).  
Participants had to decide as quickly as possible if the probe word was related to the 
previously read sentence or not.  Longer response latency while making decisions 
about sentences ending in homographs compared to sentences ending in non-
homographs indicated activation of the inappropriate meaning of the specific 
homograph.  Results suggested that individuals with elevated ASI scores show more 
interference than controls for sentences containing a threat related homograph, but 
only when the interval between the sentence and probe word presentations was 
short.  After 850 ms, interference was present in both groups of participants.  
Although this paradigm avoids the problems of Stoler & McNally (1991), the 
results cannot be generalized to panic disorder patients. 
In summary, no experimental studies have been conducted so far that 
clearly show that panic disorder is associated with a negative interpretive bias.  One 
study suggested that panic patients tend to endorse threatening interpretations of 
incomplete sentences, whether they are ambiguous or not.  There may also be a 
tendency in individuals with elevated ASI scores to activate a threatening 
interpretation when encountering ambiguous stimuli.  More research is necessary to 
answer the question about the nature of interpretive processes in panic disorder. 
 
4.2.2 Experimental studies with social phobia patients 
Hirsch and Mathews (1997; 2000) presented participants with ambiguous 
sentences that had one negative or threatening and one non-threatening meaning.  
Sentences were disambiguated by the last word qualifying as the probe word.  
Participants had to indicate if probe words were "grammatically possible" and 
response latency was analyzed.  In their first study, Hirsch and Mathews (1997) 
demonstrated that individuals with low and moderate anxiety levels about 
interviews were faster to identify probes that were consistent with positive rather 
than threatening inferences, whereas the anxious group responded equally to both 
types of probes.  Thus, anxious participants seemed to lack the positive on-line 
inferential bias that was characteristic of non-anxious controls, but they also failed 
to show a bias favoring threatening inferences.  The authors replicated this finding 
with social phobic patients who showed no evidence of favoring threatening on-line 
inferences, in contrast with socially non-anxious controls who were again clearly 
biased in favor of positive inferences (Hirsch & Mathews, 2000).  The authors 
concluded that non-anxious individuals are characterized by a benign on-line 
inferential bias, but that this seemingly protective mechanism is impaired in people 
with social phobia.  However, the material presented consisted of only one narrow 
topic, i.e., job interviews, and was not self-referent.  It is possible that these stories 
created a situational context that made emotional inferences more difficult for 
anxious participants, rather than reflecting an actual lack of interpretive bias.  
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Because of the paradigm employed that involved a lexical decision and thus a 
physical response, it is also possible that non-anxious controls respond faster to 
positive sentences and anxious individuals are inhibited in their responses rather 
than their emotional interpretation of ambiguous sentences. 
The results of Hirsch and Mathews’ studies contradict the predictions of 
the cognitive model of social phobia to some extent in the same manner as Constans 
et al. (1999) did.  Both research teams demonstrated a protective positive 
interpretive bias in non-anxious subjects that was lacking in socially anxious 
subjects.  
Amir et al. (1998a) created sentences ending in homographs and non-
homographs.  Half of the homographs had a social-threat implication (e.g., She 
wrote down the mean) and half had a non-threat/neutral implication (e.g., He dug 
with a spade).  Individuals with generalized social phobia and non-anxious controls 
had to decide whether a probe word (e.g., unfriendly), presented either after 100 ms 
or after 850 ms, was related to the sentence.  For the shorter interval, results showed 
the same pattern of interference as discussed above for individuals with elevated 
ASI-scores.  However, in contrast with individuals exhibiting elevated ASI scores, 
patients with generalized social phobia inhibited the inappropriate meaning of the 
homograph at 850 ms.  However, there may have been an interaction between the 
negative or threatening probe word and the previously presented homograph that 
accounts for the early activation of the inappropriate meaning.  In this case, results 
could not be generalized to indicate an interpretive bias in social phobia patients.  
In summary, there is some evidence that social phobia patients interpret 
ambiguous stimuli differently from control subjects.  However, the only two 
experimental studies that investigated interpretive processes in social phobia 
yielded opposite results.  Hirsch and Mathews (2000) found positively biased 
interpretation in controls and the lack of such a seemingly protective bias in social 
phobia patients.  Amir et al (1998a), on the other hand, demonstrated differential 
interference in social phobia patients due to early activation of the threatening 
meaning of socially relevant homographs.  Clearly, more research is necessary to 
answer the question about the nature of interpretive processes in social phobia. 
 
4.2.3 Experimental studies with depressed patients 
Hedlund and Rude (1995) tested 20 currently depressed, 15 formerly 
depressed and 18 never depressed individuals with scrambled sentences that 
permitted a positive or negative solution each (e.g., winner born I am loser a).  
Participants were instructed to write down "one meaningful and correct sentence" 
per stimulus.  Depressed individuals formed significantly more negative sentences 
than formerly depressed individuals and controls, thus displaying a bias for negative 
interpretations of ambiguous sentences.  However, results could be attributable to 
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experimenter demand effects, selection or response bias rather than an interpretive 
bias in depression. 
Sheppard and Teasdale (1996) presented incomplete sentences (e.g., If I 
could always be right then others would _____ me) to depressed patients to 
differentiate between increased construct accessibility and changes at a more 
generic level of representation (related to schematic mental models).  Construct 
accessibility hypothesis predicts that depression is associated with more negative 
completions (e.g., "dislike") while the schematic mental model hypothesis predicts 
more positive completions (e.g., "like").  This is because schematic models reflect 
inter-relationships between constructs.  In a depressed state, schematic models are 
activated that imply closer dependence of personal worth or acceptance on success 
and approval than the models activated in the non-depressed state.  Results 
indicated that depressed patients gave significantly more positive completions to 
sentence stems than controls.  Their interpretations were dysfunctional rather than 
negatively biased.  The authors argued "mood-congruous interpretation bias arises 
at the level of affect-related schematic models rather than from changes in the 
accessibility of cognitive constructs" (p. 1050).  This study did not use ambiguous 
stimuli.  It seems to tap a different level than interpretation research does, i.e., 
underlying schemata or underlying fundamental beliefs.  Depressed patients 
responded with dysfunctional, perfectionist sentence completions.  In addition, 
experimenter demand effects and response bias could be alternative explanations for 
the observed results.  
Lawson and MacLeod (1999) studied students scoring low and high on the 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979).  In the test 
stimulus set, 80 ambiguous sentences were paired with two target words, one 
related to a negative interpretation and one to a neutral interpretation of the 
ambiguous sentence.  For half of the ambiguous sentences, the negative 
interpretation was related to loss or failure, forming the depression-linked sentence 
domain (e.g., Carol cried throughout the service), and half to threat or danger (e.g., 
The two men discussed how to blow up the dingy).  Participants were presented with 
these ambiguous sentences and asked to read them out aloud.  Sentences were 
followed by a negative or neutral target word that had to be named as quickly as 
possible.  Results indicated that "individuals with high BDI scores showed a relative 
attenuation in the magnitude of the priming effects they displayed on target words 
related to the more negative interpretations of these ambiguous primes" (p. 472).  
There are a number of problems with this study.  The mean of the "high BDI group" 
was only 9.7.  According to the general guidelines from the Center for Cognitive 
Therapy (CCT) of the University of Pennsylvania Medical School, scores from 0 to 
9 are within normal range (asymptomatic), scores from 10 to18 indicate mild to 
moderate depression, 19 to 29 moderate to severe depression, and 30 to 63 
extremely severe depression.  Therefore, the "high BDI group" is by no means 
"depressed." The authors also found a negative interpretive bias for the low BDI 
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group.  With a mean BDI score as low as 2.5, one also has to wonder how 
"representative" this control group actually was.  Therefore, this study is insufficient 
to make any argument about interpretations imposed on ambiguous sentences by 
depressed patients.  Finally, as in all experimental paradigms investigating 
interpretive processes, the statements were not self-referent. 
Mogg et al. (2006) conducted a study with 24 clinically depressed patients 
currently meeting DSM-IV diagnosis of unipolar depression and a healthy control 
group matched for gender, age, and years of education.  This research was 
conducted at about the same time as my own studies.  It was known to me only after 
its publication in 2006 and the conclusion of my own research.  Mogg et al. applied 
two of the cognitive tasks mentioned above to investigate an interpretive bias in 
clinically depressed individuals: the homophone task and the same text 
comprehension paradigm that I used in my two studies.  Self-description and 
memory bias were also assessed.  The material of the homophone task was similar 
to that used by Mathews, Richards, et al. (1989) for their investigation of GAD 
patients.  The stimuli included 14 homophones (each with a negative and a non-
negative meaning, e.g. die/dye) and 14 neutral filler words presented in a tape-
recorded list.  Participants were asked to listen to each word and write it down.  
Depressed patients chose the negative spelling of the homophone in 80.9% of the 
trials while control subjects chose the negative spelling significantly less frequent in 
only 63.3% of trials.  The authors concluded that depressed patients showed a 
negative interpretive bias in this cognitive task.  In the comprehension task, on the 
other hand, no such bias was found.  80 experimental sentence sets adopted from 
materials used by MacLeod and Cohen (1993) and Lawson and MacLeod (1999), as 
well as additional stimuli created by Mogg et al. (2006) were applied.  The structure 
of the sentence sets was identical to my own material (see the methods section).  
Each sentence set included an ambiguous sentence that had one negative meaning 
and one depression-unrelated meaning.  The negative meanings reflected 
depression-relevant themes of loss, failure, inadequacy, and rejection, e.g., "Carol 
felt emotional throughout the service".  For each ambiguous sentence, there were 
two disambiguating continuation sentences, one depression-relevant and one 
neutral/ depression-unrelated continuation (e.g., "Funerals always made her cry" 
was the depression-relevant continuation of the ambiguous sentence above while 
"Weddings always made her cry" was the neutral continuation.  Just as in MacLeod 
and Cohen (1993) as well as my own studies, three cue conditions were attached to 
each scenario: a depression-relevant, depression-unrelated and a string of question 
marks for the uncued condition.  Results of Mogg et al. (2006) indicated that 
participants showed a bias to interpret ambiguous sentences in a neutral or 
depression-unrelated manner, irrespective of group.  Hence Mogg et al. (2006) 
found a "positive" interpretive bias for ambiguous scenarios in depressed and 
healthy individuals.  The authors discussed this finding and suggested that the non-
self-referential manner of the stimulus material may be the most likely explanation 
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for their inability to detect a negative interpretive bias in clinically depressed 
individuals.  They argue that evidence of cognitive biases in depression were mostly 
found for explicitly self-referenced information or for information presented in an 
unconstrained processing context that may allow spontaneous self-referencing.  The 
authors further suggest that this may be an important difference between 
interpretive biases in anxiety and depression, with self-referencing playing a less 
important role in interpretive biases in the former. 
In summary, there is only weak evidence for a negative interpretive bias 
in depression stemming from a scrambled sentence paradigm.  Results could be due 
to experimenter demand effects, selection or response bias.  One study investigated 
underlying beliefs or schemata rather than interpretation, and a third study was 
conducted with students whose mean BDI score did not even reach the mildly 
depressed range.  Finally, Mogg et al. (2006) demonstrated non-convergent 
evidence for a negative interpretive bias in clinically depressed individuals using 
two different cognitive tasks.  The negative bias in the homophone task may be due 
to a reporting bias rather than an interpretive bias.  However, it is also possible that 
a negative interpretive bias is only present in self-referential material.  The Mogg et 
al. (2006) study was not yet available to me during the developmental process of 
my thesis.  Overall, considerably more research is necessary to answer the question 
about the nature of interpretive processes in depression. 
 
4.3   Choosing a study design 
There are two primary standards to be considered in the design of a 
research study in order to make results interpretable: internal and external validity.  
A study has internal validity if only one cause for the observed effects is plausible.  
If several equally plausible explanations could be advanced to account for the 
findings, the study lacks internal validity.  External validity, on the other hand, 
refers to the generalizability of the results.  Research findings are usually supposed 
to be generalized from the specific experimental groups studied to the larger 
population of, for instance, patients with the same disorder, and beyond the specific 
experimental situation.  Therefore, sample and situation need to be as representative 
as possible.  Research studies have to be designed to maximize both internal and 
external validity. 
 
4.3.1 Research method 
Generally, three main approaches to studying human behavior can be 
utilized: descriptive studies, correlational studies, and experimental studies.  
Descriptive and correlational studies posit limitations regarding internal validity.  
Causal interpretations are not possible.  Therefore, experimental studies are the best 
approach to studying the relationship between interpretive processes and 
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psychopathology.  Experimental studies are conducted in controlled settings.  They 
involve the manipulation of an independent variable and the observation of its 
effects by measuring dependent variables to answer the question of causality.  If a 
controlled change in one variable co-varies with the change in the dependent 
variable, it can be inferred that the manipulation of the independent variable 
produced the results.  However, even in experimental studies, internal validity can 
never be 100%, as other possible explanations always remain.  Interpretations of 
results always include a certain confidentiality level and a possibility of error. 
In practice, various approaches are usually combined due to situational 
limitations, for reasons of effectiveness and efficiency, and to obtain optimal 
results.  Often, studies in abnormal psychology combine experimental and 
correlational approaches in mixed designs.  Neale and Liebert (1973) define a 
mixed design as "one in which participants from two or more discrete and typically 
non-overlapping populations are assigned to different treatments" (Neale & Liebert, 
1973, p. 125).  Any study that involves patient groups (e.g., social phobics vs. panic 
patients vs. depressed patients) and asks if the groups respond differently to the 
manipulation of an independent variable is a mixed design.  
 
4.3.2 Paradigm and operationalization 
Review of the literature about interpretive processes in panic disorder, 
social phobia, and depression evidenced numerous methodological problems.  
Specifically, as noted by MacLeod and Cohen (1993), "the methodologies used 
have commonly introduced the possibility of experimenter demand effects and have 
made it impossible to dissociate a genuine interpretative bias from possible 
response selection bias effects" (p. 238).  First, participants could have responded in 
the expected manner because of the demands of the experimental setting.  That is, 
the purpose of the studies described above may have been transparent to the 
participants, and those anxious or depressed may have responded accordingly.  
Second, anxious individuals may have rated experimental material as threatening 
because they have a response bias toward threatening information.  In other words, 
their interpretations of the material may have been no different than those of non-
anxious individuals, but they may have selected threatening responses at a higher 
rate.  
MacLeod and Cohen concluded that critical dependent measures have to 
be taken indirectly, without participants’ awareness of what is being tested.  They 
modified an experimental technique from general psychology, the RSVP (Rapid 
Serial Visual Presentation) paradigm, which has been used to investigate on-line 
text comprehension processes (e.g, Garrod & Sanford, 1977; Lorch, Lorch, & 
Mathews, 1985; Murphy, 1985; 1990).  Rapid Serial Visual Presentation, RSVP, 
dynamically presents text that is chunked into one or a few words at a time at a 
single visual location.  MacLeod and Cohen presented 16 high and 16 low trait 
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anxious students with brief prose scenarios.  Each scenario consisted of a cue word, 
one ambiguous sentence, one disambiguating sentence, and a yes/no question 
concerning the content of the scenario.  All participants read the same 80 
ambiguous sentences (e.g., The doctor examined little Emily’s growth).  The 
disambiguating sentence that followed could be either threatening (Her tumor had 
changed very little since the last visit) or non-threatening (Her height had changed 
very little since the last visit).  Sentences were shown on a computer screen one at a 
time, and participants proceeded to the next sentence by pressing a key.  
Comprehension latency for the disambiguating continuation was the dependent 
measure in this study.  A cue word that primed the scenario either toward a 
threatening or a non-threatening interpretation preceded the ambiguous sentence.  
There was also a no-cue condition that left participants unprimed.  This condition 
was supposed to reflect the participants’ inherent interpretive style.  Cue condition 
(threatening, neutral, or no cue) and type of continuation (threatening or neutral) 
were fully combined yielding six different versions of each scenario.  The explicitly 
cued passages were incorporated into the design in order to test the sensitivity of 
each scenario and the paradigm as a whole.  The authors reasoned that the extent to 
which a sentence is related logically to its preceding sentence should be correlated 
inversely with the comprehension latency of this sentence.  For instance, if anxious 
individuals expect a passage to be threatening, then they will spend a shorter 
amount of time reading the disambiguating threat continuation that concurs with 
their prior expectation than reading the inconsistent neutral continuation.  
Participants in this study were instructed to read the passages after forming a clear 
expectation using the cue in order to answer the following question as quickly and 
correctly as possible.  Therefore, this paradigm is an intelligent method of assessing 
participants’ interpretations indirectly.  It is also more ecologically valid than 
paradigms using single homographs or homophones.  In this paradigm, little day-to-
day scenarios to which the participants can relate are described.  
Results of MacLeod and Cohen’s (1993) study indicated that high trait 
anxious subjects read disambiguating continuations under the no cue condition the 
same way as under the threat cue condition.  Low trait anxious subjects, on the 
other hand, interpreted unprimed ambiguous scenarios like neutrally primed ones.  
The authors concluded that anxious individuals have a tendency to interpret 
ambiguous information in the same manner as they interpret material that is clearly 
threatening, whereas non-anxious individuals interpret ambiguous information in 
the same manner as they interpret material that is clearly benign. 
This paradigm appears to be the "state of the art" for studying interpretive 
processes.  However, there are several shortcomings of MacLeod and Cohen’s 
(1993) study.  First, the authors used an analogue population with the problems 
discussed at the beginning of this chapter.  Second, scenario content was mixed and 
not categorized: some scenarios were related to loss, some to danger, some were 
based on everyday experience, others were rare occurrences etc..  Therefore, 
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disorder specificity cannot be tested with their material.  Third, the only anxiety 
measures incorporated were the state and trait version of the STAI (Spielberger et 
al., 1983), and depression (measured by the BDI) was virtually non-existent in their 
population.  MacLeod and Cohen’s study does not address a disorder-specific 
hypothesis.  
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Chapter 5:   Deduction of the research problem 
Epidemiological studies have time and again identified anxiety disorders 
and depression as very frequent, debilitating, and costly mental disorders (e.g., 
Bebbington et al., 1981; Dilling et al., 1984; Eaton & Kessler, 1985; Leon et al., 
1995; Murphy, Olivier, Sobol, Monson, & Leighton, 1986; Weissman et al., 1989; 
Wittchen & von Zerssen, 1988).  Thus, I decided to contribute to the existing body 
of knowledge about these disorders by choosing three prototypical agents: (1) panic 
disorder as an example for free-floating anxiety, (2) social phobia as an example for 
phobic anxiety, and (3) major depressive disorder as an example for depressive 
disorders.  Furthermore, epidemiological research has demonstrated that panic 
disorder, social phobia, and major depression often either co-occur or develop at 
different time periods in a person’s life.  Therefore, direct comparisons among these 
three disorders would be very useful to advance treatment and possibly prevent co-
occurrence and comorbidity.  Unfortunately, so far there has been no study 
assessing interpretive processes that applied the same paradigm to all three 
disorders, which makes direct comparisons difficult, if not impossible.  
Epidemiological research also indicates that women are more frequently and 
sometimes even more strongly affected by anxiety as well as depressive disorders 
(see Chapter 2.3 Epidemiology).  With this information in mind, I focused on 
female participants, rather than including both genders in my studies, to eliminate 
possible gender effects as alternative explanation for any results I would find.  
My goal was to investigate interpretive processes in panic disorder, social 
phobia, and major depressive disorder within one single study design, using the 
same methodology, i.e., applying equivalent, yet particularly relevant to each 
disorder, symptom measures and cognitive measures.  A review of the literature 
yielded some evidence for a negative interpretive bias in all three patient groups.  
However, the specific nature of this bias – negative vs. not positive, and the 
situations it presents itself in – general vs. disorder-specific, remain unclear.  
Consistent support for an interpretive bias in panic disorder, social phobia, 
and possibly even depression has been found in questionnaire studies.  The 
interpretation questionnaire appears to be a well-tested paradigm for assessing 
people's explanations for ambiguous situations.  There are a number of advantages 
to using this method: (1) results can be compared to similar studies; (2) there is a 
pool of scenarios with known psychometric properties to choose from; (3) scenarios 
are self-referent; and (4) the method is economical and easy to apply and does not 
require any technical equipment that may influence participants.  However, the 
questionnaire method also has disadvantages.  (1) it is a self-report measure with all 
the associated problems (social desirability, differential understanding of the rating 
scale points by different participants, etc.); (2) causality inferences cannot be drawn, 
it is only a correlational measure; and (3) alternative explanations for the results 
obtained can be advanced (e.g., selection bias, experimenter demand effects, see 
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MacLeod & Cohen, 1993).  Thus, support for an interpretive bias in anxiety and 
depression has to be provided by quasi-experimental studies.  Only an experimental 
design allows causal interpretations.  This is the biggest advantage of experimental 
studies.  MacLeod and Cohen’s (1993) methodology appears best suitable for this 
purpose: (1) it is an elegant paradigm that avoids experimenter demand effects and 
selection bias; (2) assessment is relatively pleasant for participants; (3) two priming 
conditions (negative and non-negative cues) allow for an evaluation of the quality 
of each scenario within the same population (the un-cued condition is analyzed 
based on these two primed conditions); and (4) the paradigm has proven successful 
before (MacLeod & Cohen, 1993).  The biggest disadvantage of this method is that 
it is not self-referent.  Some studies point to the possibility that a negative 
interpretive bias is self-referent only (e.g., Amir et al., 1998b).  In addition, in the 
original paradigm, homonyms created ambiguous situations.  In the modification 
necessary for my own research, ambiguity was created by the situational 
description, not by use of a single homonym.  This, however, leaves the possibility 
that alternative interpretations of the ambiguous scenario come to mind.  
In order to combine and maximize the advantages of both questionnaire 
and experimental approaches, I applied both of them (Butler & Mathews, 1983; 
MacLeod & Cohen, 1993) within a single study.  This allows for replication and 
extension of existing findings.  In the interpretation questionnaire, I created 
disorder-specific scenarios for all three patient groups as well as general scenarios 
with possible daily events.  In addition, instead of the rank-order answer format, I 
provided a Likert-scale (five-point rating scale) for the three explanations of each 
ambiguous scenario.  This answer format enables me to analyze negative and non-
negative explanations of ambiguous scenarios independently, and therefore test the 
absolute nature of an interpretive bias in anxiety and depression.  I further 
eliminated open-ended responses following Clark et al. (1997): "Open-ended 
responses were not scored, as the results of Study 1 indicated that the time-
consuming, 'blind' classification of these responses did not significantly add to the 
information obtained from the ranking" (p. 208).  For the experimental section of 
my studies, I modified MacLeod & Cohen's (1993) material to test for disorder-
specificity of an interpretive bias by creating specific scenarios for panic, social 
phobia, and depression.  In order to replicate MacLeod and Cohen’s findings, 
general scenarios stemming directly from their original material were also included.  
In addition, state and trait versions of the STAI (Spielberger et al., 1983) were 
administered to participants.  
Moreover, disorder-specific symptom measures and cognitive 
questionnaires of panic disorder, social phobia, depression, as well as 
questionnaires assessing general affect were included to control for different levels 
of anxiety and depression.  Finally, I tested two anxiety disorders and anxiety vs. 
depression within a single study.  These improvements of existing studies make my 
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research unique and should allow me to contribute to our understanding of 
maintenance factors in anxiety and depression. 
 
5.1   Research questions 
Do panic patients, social phobia patients, and patients suffering from 
depression favor negative, threatening or dysfunctional explanations over neutral or 
positive ones for ambiguous scenarios presented in a questionnaire? 
Do panic patients selectively favor threatening over non-threatening 
explanations for ambiguous panic-specific scenarios presented in a questionnaire? 
Do social phobia patients selectively favor threatening over non-
threatening explanations for ambiguous social scenarios presented in a 
questionnaire? 
Do depressed patients selectively favor dysfunctional over functional 
explanations for ambiguous scenarios typical for depression presented in a 
questionnaire? 
Do panic patients, social phobia patients, and patients suffering from 
depression favor negative or threatening over neutral or positive interpretations for 
ambiguous scenarios in an indirect measure? 
Do panic patients selectively favor threatening over non-threatening 
explanations for ambiguous panic-specific scenarios in an indirect measure? 
Do social phobia patients selectively favor threatening over non-
threatening explanations for ambiguous social scenarios in an indirect measure? 
Do depressed patients selectively favor dysfunctional over functional 
explanations for ambiguous scenarios typical for depression presented in an indirect 
measure? 
 
5.2   Hypotheses 
In order to answer the nine questions posted above, the following 
hypotheses were derived from literature and tested empirically: 
 
5.2.1 Interpretation questionnaire 
Panic patients will rate threatening explanations for ambiguous panic-
specific scenarios as more likely than non-threatening explanations.  Their rating for 
threatening interpretations of ambiguous panic-specific scenarios will differ 
significantly from all other groups. 
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Relative to control subjects, panic patients will rate threatening 
explanations for ambiguous health-related concerns, social, and general scenarios as 
more likely.  However, for these scenario types, panic patients will not favor 
negative over neutral or positive explanations. 
Social phobia patients will rate threatening explanations for ambiguous 
social scenarios as more likely than non-threatening explanations.  Their rating for 
threatening interpretations of ambiguous social scenarios will differ significantly 
from all other groups. 
Relative to control subjects, social phobia patients will rate threatening 
and dysfunctional explanations for ambiguous health-related concerns, panic-
specific, depression, and general scenarios as more likely.  However, for these 
scenario types, social phobia patients will not favor negative over neutral or positive 
explanations.  
Depressed patients will rate dysfunctional explanations for ambiguous 
scenarios typical for depression as more likely than functional explanations.  Their 
rating for dysfunctional interpretations of ambiguous depression scenarios will 
differ significantly from all other groups. 
Depressed patients will rate threatening explanations for ambiguous 
general and social scenarios as more likely than non-threatening explanations.  
Their rating for threatening interpretations of ambiguous general and social 
scenarios will differ significantly from the control group. 
 
5.2.2 Interpretation Experiment 
When left unprimed, panic patients will take longer to comprehend non-
threatening continuations of ambiguous panic-specific scenarios than threatening 
continuations. 
When left unprimed, there will be no difference in comprehension latency 
of non-threatening and threatening continuations of ambiguous unspecific and 
social scenarios for panic patients. 
When left unprimed, social phobia patients will take longer to 
comprehend non-threatening continuations of ambiguous social scenarios than 
threatening continuations. 
When left unprimed, there will be no difference in comprehension latency 
of non-threatening and threatening continuations of ambiguous unspecific, panic-
specific, and depression-related scenarios for social phobia patients. 
When left unprimed, depressed patients will take longer to comprehend 
non-threatening or neutral continuations of ambiguous scenarios than threatening 
continuations.  This should be true for all scenario types. 
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Chapter 6:   Study 1 
6.1   Method 
6.1.1 General Procedure 
To avoid unnecessary rejection upon arrival at the test site, potential 
participants were initially screened by phone using the screening section of the 
Structured Clinical Interview for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders, Patient Edition (SCID-
I/P; First, Spitzer, Gibbon, & Williams, 1995) and the social phobia and panic 
disorder section of the “International Diagnostic Check Lists for DSM-IV” (IDCL; 
Hiller, Zauding, & Mombour, 1997), in a translation from German by the author of 
this thesis.  Participants who were native English speakers and either fulfilled 
diagnostic criteria for either panic disorder or social phobia, or did not indicate any 
current psychological problem were invited individually to the experimental 
session. Upon arrival at the test site, participants were informed about the general 
aims and procedure of the experimental session and their consent was obtained 
(General Instruction and Consent Form, see Appendices II and III, respectively).  
Next, basic socio-demographic data was gathered.  All invited participants were 
then interviewed using the “International Diagnostic Check Lists for DSM-IV” 
(IDCL; Hiller et al., 1997), in a translation from German by the author of this thesis.  
After the interview, they received contact information for two renowned cognitive 
behavioral therapy centers in Boston (Center for Anxiety and Related Disorders at 
Boston University and Behavior Therapy Unit at Massachusetts General Hospital) 
should they be interested in treatment.  Participants fulfilling the criteria for the 
panic disorder group, the social phobia group, or the healthy control group were 
administered the state version of the State-Trait-Anxiety Inventory.  Next, 
participants completed the interpretation experiment.  The Shipley Vocabulary Test 
(Zachary, 1986) concluded the first half of the session and participants were 
encouraged to take a five to10 minute break.  The second half of the experimental 
session was started by administering the Interpretation Questionnaire for Panic 
Disorder and Social Phobia and the remaining symptom and cognitive 
questionnaires (see section 6.1.3).  At the end of the experimental session, 
participants again rated their current mood, received a small compensation for their 
participation and were fully debriefed about the experiment.  Each session was 
documented using the Protocol of the Experimental Session (see Appendix I).  
Sessions lasted 70 to 90 minutes. 
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6.1.2  Test of verbal intelligence 
Shipley Vocabulary Test (Shipley, 1940; Zachary, 1986) 
The Shipley Institute of Living Scale (SILS) was designed to assess 
general intellectual functioning in adults and adolescents.  This measure of 
intellectual ability and impairment is used with individuals 14 years of age and 
older.  The scale consists of two subsets of which the 40-item vocabulary test was 
employed in Study 1.  This test requires the respondent to choose which of four 
listed words “means the same or nearly the same” as a specified target word.  
Administration time for the subtest is 10 minutes.  The Vocabulary subtest relies on 
verbal skills that include reading ability, verbal comprehension, acquired 
knowledge, long-term memory, and concept formation, thus measuring verbal 
intelligence.  The SILS is based on clinical and research findings that suggest that 
intellectual impairment differentially affects various cognitive abilities of which 
vocabulary has proven relatively resistant to change.  It has acceptable 
psychometric properties.  Test-retest reliabilities with intervals of 4 to 16 weeks 
(median 12 weeks) from four studies which consisted of undergraduates and female 
student nurses ranged from .31 to .77 (median = .60). 
The mean score of the population tested in Study 1 on the verbal subscale 
was 62.2 (SD=5.4), with a minimum of 49 and a maximum of 73.  Kurtosis was -
.272 and Skewness -.404. 
 
6.1.3 Symptom and Cognition Questionnaires 
Eight established questionnaires were administered to all participants in 
Study 1, five symptom and three cognition questionnaires. 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck et al., 1979) 
The revised Beck Depression Inventory is a 21-item instrument designed 
to assess the severity of depression in adolescents and adults.  Each item is 
comprised of four statements that reflect different intensity levels of a particular 
depressive symptom.  Participants indicate the statement that best corresponds to 
the way they have felt for the past week.  Individual statements are scored from 0 to 
3.  The total score is obtained by summing participant's responses, and it ranges 
from 0-63.  The instrument has good psychometric properties (Beck, Steer, & 
Garbin, 1988).  Reviewing the literature, they found alpha reliability coefficients 
typically above .90 in a variety of populations.  Coles, Gibb, and Heimberg (2001) 
reported an internal consistency of .89 and a test-retest reliability of .84 (after 32 
days). 
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Body Sensations Questionnaire (BSQ; Chambless et al., 1984)  
The BSQ is a 17 (+ 1 open) item scale that assesses the intensity of fear of 
sensations associated with autonomic arousal.  It lists body sensations that may 
occur when a person is nervous or in a feared situation.  Each item is rated on a 5-
point scale, ranging from not frightened or worried by this sensation (1) to 
extremely frightened or worried by this sensation (5), which indicates how anxiety 
provoking each sensation is for a person.  Sample items include heart palpitations, 
dizziness, and feeling short of breath.  The total score is computed by averaging 
responses across the individual item ratings.  
The BSQ is among the most popular and well-researched instruments for 
assessing panic disorder and agoraphobia.  The mean score in a group of outpatients 
with agoraphobia was 3.05 (SD=0.86; Chambless et al., 1984); the mean score in a 
community sample was 1.80 (SD=0.59).  In a sample of outpatients with 
agoraphobia, Cronbach’s alpha was .87, suggesting good internal consistency.  In 
addition, the BSQ has been found to have adequate stability and test-retest 
reliability (Arrindell, 1993; Chambless et al., 1984).  There is published evidence of 
construct validity, concurrent validity and predictive validity.  The BSQ has been 
shown to discriminate between individuals with panic disorder and agoraphobia, 
individuals with other anxiety disorders, and non-anxious controls (Chambless & 
Gracely, 1989). 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987) 
The LSAS, a 24 item rating scale, was designed to assess the range of 
social interaction and performance situations that individuals with social phobia 
may fear or avoid.  The questionnaire is comprised of two subscales, a social 
interaction subscale that includes 11 items and a performance subscale with 13 
items.  Fear and avoidance during the past week are rated on two Likert-type scales 
ranging from 0 to 3.  Up to six subscale scores can be computed: (1) total fear, (2) 
fear of social interaction, (3) fear of performance, (4) total avoidance, (5) avoidance 
of social interaction, and (6) avoidance of performance.  In addition, an overall 
score is often calculated by summing the total fear and total avoidance scores.  This 
index has been most commonly employed in studies of the pharmacotherapy of 
social phobia.  Heimberg and his colleagues (Heimberg, Horner, Juster, Safren, 
Brown, et al., 1999) found good psychometric properties: good internal consistency 
(Cronbach's Alpha; .96 (total), .92 (fear), .92 (avoidance), .81-.89 for subscales); 
good convergent validity (all correlations between LSAS scores and measures of 
social anxiety and avoidance highly significant (p<.001), between .49 and .73 for 
LSAS total score); and responsiveness to change. 
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State-Trait-Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S & STAI-T; Spielberger et al., 1970; 1983).  
The STAI consists of two 20-item self-report measures that assess state 
and trait levels of anxiety.  An emotional state exists at a given moment in time and 
at a particular level of intensity.  Anxiety states are characterized by subjective 
feelings of tension, apprehension, nervousness, and worry, and by activation or 
arousal of the nervous system.  In the STAI-S, respondents indicate how much each 
of 20 statements reflects how they feel right now, at this moment on a 4-point 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 (very much), with half the 
statements comprising anxiety-absent items.  Positively poled statements need to be 
recoded before the sum score is computed, which ranges from 20 to 80.  Sample 
items include “I feel frightened” and “I feel pleasant.” 
STAI-T measures anxiety as a personality trait asking people to rate how 
they generally feel on a 4-point Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (almost never) to 4 
(almost always).  Again, 9 statements are positively phrased and 11 statements 
negatively.  After recoding, a sum score is calculated ranging from 20 to 80.  
Sample items include “I wish I could be as happy as others seem to be,” “I am a 
steady person,” and “I have disturbing thoughts.” In contrast to the transitory nature 
of emotional states, personality traits can be conceptualized as relatively enduring 
differences among people in specifiable tendencies to perceive the world in a 
certain way and in a disposition to react or behave in a specified manner with 
predictable regularity.  Trait anxiety as a conceptual personality dimension reflects 
individual differences in the predisposition to experience (and report) negative 
affect (Watson & Clark, 1984).  Trait anxiety refers to differences between people 
in the tendency to perceive stressful situations as dangerous or threatening and to 
respond with elevations in the intensity of state anxiety scores.  Trait anxiety is the 
shared component of general affective distress that accounts for the large overlap 
between anxiety and depression (Clark & Watson, 1991). 
There is a comprehensive manual with sample means for working adults 
age 25 to 69 as well as norms and percentile rankings for normal adults age 19 to 
69.  Oei, Evans, & Crook (1990) found mean STAI-T scores for individuals 
diagnosed with panic disorder with agoraphobia ranging from 51 to 54 and for 
panic disorder without agoraphobia ranging from 44 to 46.  The manual reports 
good to excellent internal consistency for both scales (Cronbach’s alphas between 
.86 and .95) in adult, college, high school students, and military recruit samples.  
Adequate 30-day test-retest reliability was found with high school students (rs .71 
and .75).  The questionnaires also demonstrated good convergent validity in a 
number of different studies. 
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Agoraphobic Cognitions Questionnaire (ACQ; Chambless et al., 1984)  
The fear of fear, a characteristic feature of panic disorder, includes 
maladaptive cognitions concerned with the potential harm that will befall the 
agoraphobic individual because of anxiety (e.g., "I'll die or go crazy").  The ACQ is 
a 14 (+ 1 open) item scale that comprises thoughts concerning negative 
consequences of experiencing anxiety.  Each item is rated on a 5-point scale, 
ranging from thought never occurs (1) to thought always occurs (5), of the 
frequency with which each thought occurs when the person is nervous or 
frightened.  Sample items include "I will have a heart attack" and "I am going to act 
foolish." The total score is computed by averaging responses across the individual 
items.  The ACQ is among the most popular and well-researched instruments for 
assessing panic disorder and agoraphobia.  Chambless et al. (1984) reported a mean 
score of 2.32 (SD=0.66) for outpatients with agoraphobia.  In a sample of 
outpatients with agoraphobia, Cronbach’s alpha was .80, suggesting good internal 
consistency.  In addition, the ACQ has been found to have adequate stability and 
test-retest reliability (Arrindell, 1993; Chambless et al., 1984).  There is published 
evidence of construct validity, concurrent validity and predictive validity.  The 
ACQ has been shown to discriminate between individuals with panic disorder and 
agoraphobia, individuals with other anxiety disorders, and non-anxious controls 
(Chambless & Gracely, 1989). 
Anxiety Sensitivity Index  (ASI; Reiss et al, 1986) 
Anxiety sensitivity is the fear of anxiety-related sensations arising from 
beliefs that these situations have harmful physical, psychological, or social 
consequences.  The ASI is a 16-item self-report questionnaire that measures the fear 
of anxiety.  Each item expresses a belief or concern about a possible negative, 
aversive consequence of anxiety symptoms, hence tapping a cognitive aspect of 
anxiety specifically relevant to panic patients.  Items are rated on a 5-point Likert 
scale, with total scores ranging from 0 to 64.  The total score is calculated by 
summing responses to each item.  A 5-point rating scale ranging from "very little" 
to "very much" is employed to mark the response that best represents the extent to 
which a participant agrees with a particular statement (e.g., "It is important to me 
not to appear nervous.").  The ASI showed excellent psychometric properties in 
both clinical and non-clinical samples (Peterson & Reiss, 1992).  Test-retest 
reliability ranged from 0.71 to 0.75 and there were no gender differences.  Patients 
with panic disorder with or without agoraphobia typically score in the mid-thirties 
(McNally, Foa & Donnell, 1989). 
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Fear of Negative Evaluation, short version (FNE-S; Leary, 1983a). 
The FNE quantifies a person's degree of concern over being negatively 
evaluated by others and is one of the most frequently employed measures in studies 
of social anxiety in normal populations.  People who score high on the FNE scale 
tend to avoid the prospect of being evaluated unfavorably, e.g., compared to 
subjects low in FNE, high FNE subjects work harder on boring tasks when they 
believe their work will be explicitly approved by others (Watson & Friend, 1969), 
they avoid potentially threatening social comparison information to a greater degree 
(Friend & Gilbert, 1973), and indicate they feel worse about receiving negative 
evaluations (Smith & Sarason, 1975).  High FNE individuals are more concerned 
with making good impressions on others and try harder to do so during face-to-face 
conversations (Leary, 1980).  High FNEs tend to be more socially anxious than low 
FNEs (Leary, 1983b; Watson & Friend, 1969).  The original version of the FNE 
was developed by Watson and Friend (1969).  Leary (1983a) created a short version 
with only 12 items (FNE-S) that he selected from the original version.  Selected 
items correlated at least .50 with the scale total.  The author also changed the 
response format from true/false to a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 4 
(extremely) characteristic of the person.  The short version showed good 
psychometric properties.  The correlation between long and short versions was .96 
(N=150), internal consistency (Cronbach's Alpha) was .90 (N=150) and test-retest 
reliability was .75 (N=85).  The FNE-S has an acceptable convergent validity.  
Significant correlations with other social anxiety measures were between .19 and 
.35 (p<.05). 
Table 6.1 gives an overview of the descriptives mean, standard deviation, 
minimum, maximum, kurtosis and skewness of the eight questionnaires in the 
subject population of Study 1.  Table 6.1 also lists Cronbach’s alphas obtained in 
Study 1.  As can be seen, all questionnaires showed excellent internal consistency 
between .87 and .97, with the majority of questionnaires reaching ≥ .94.  
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Table 6.1:  Descriptives and reliability of the symptom and cognitive questionnaires in  
  the subject population of Study 1 
 
Questionnaire Mean 
(Std dev) 
Minimum Maximum Kurtosis Skewness Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
BDI 10.93 
(8.84) 
.00 35.00 -.183 .851 .90 
BSQ 2.50  
(.87) 
1.18 4.29 -1.225 .138 .94 
LSAS 44.80 
(30.27) 
6.00 105.00 -.984 .561 .97 
LSAS-Anxiety  24.71 
(15.26) 
1.00 54.00 -1.098 .438 .95 
LSAS-
Avoidance  
20.09 
(15.53) 
.00 54.00 -.770 .644 .95 
STAI-S 36.68 
(11.42) 
20.00 64.00 -.405 .486 .94 
STAI-T 45.67 
(14.82) 
24.00 71.00 -1.339 .095 .97 
ACQ 1.90  
(.67) 
1.00 3.64 -.223 .615 .87 
ASI 22.93 
(12.21) 
3.00 48.00 -1.212 .130 .90 
FNE-S 40.16 
(13.74) 
18.00 60.00 -1.521 -.019 .96 
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6.1.4 Participants 
Twenty-one panic disorder participants, 23 generalized social phobia 
participants, and 28 healthy control participants were tested at Harvard University, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, Department of Psychology, under the supervision of 
Prof. Richard J. McNally.  All participants were females.  They received a small 
"thank you" gift of cosmetic samples or chocolate for their participation and their 
name was entered into a lottery for a chance to win $150, $100, or $50.  Participants 
were recruited by advertisements in local newspapers, written announcements 
posted on campus, at stores, community boards, hospitals, and other universities in 
the Boston area, and from the Harvard University Psych 1 study pool.  Several 
potential participants were excluded according to the following criteria: 
posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), bipolar disorder, and past or current psychotic 
episodes.  The most frequent exclusion was due to comorbid PTSD.  Participants 
with both panic disorder and social phobia were also excluded.  The remaining 
participants were divided into three groups: participants with a current diagnosis of 
panic disorder, participants with a current diagnosis of generalized social phobia, 
and healthy control participants.  Three participants from the panic disorder group 
and five participants from the social phobia group were excluded because their 
disorder was not severe enough (impairment < 3; n = 4), they had comorbid PTSD 
(n = 1), their diagnosis was unclear (n = 2), or due to experimental error (their data 
was not saved by the computer; n = 1).  Seven participants from the control group 
were also excluded because results from clinical interview and self-report 
questionnaires were contradictory (they had unusually high scores in anxiety 
questionnaires; n = 5) or because they were currently in psychotherapy (n = 2).  
Thus, empirical data from 18 panic disorder participants, 18 social phobia 
participants, and 21 control participants entered into final analyses.  The three 
groups did not differ in verbal intelligence as measured by the Shipley Vocabulary 
Test (Zachary, 1986), their total years of education, their highest degree, current 
status, or in their race, and differed only minimally in age (see Table 6.2).   
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Table 6.2: Demographic data for the three participant groups of Study 1 
 
 Panic 
group (P) 
Social 
phobia 
group (SP)
Control 
group (C) 
P vs. SP P vs. C SP vs. C 
Age (years) 27.6 (8.5) 31.6 (9.5) 25.0 (6.1) n.s. n.s. p<.05 
Verbal intelligence 60.8 (4.9) 62.7 (5.4) 62.9 (5.9) n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Total years of 
education 
16.3 (2.1) 17.1 (2.2) 16.7 (1.9) n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Highest degree    χ2 (8) = 8.3; n.s. 
High school n=6 n=5 n=7    
College n=1  n=1    
Bachelor n=6 n=11 n=12    
Masters n=3 n=2 n=1    
Specific degree n=2      
Current status    χ2 (4) = 5.4; n.s. 
Student n=11 n=5 n=13    
Professional n=5 n=10 n=6    
Transition/Jobbing n=2 n=2 n=2    
Race    χ2 (6) = 4.4; n.s. 
African-American n=1 n=1 n=2    
Asian  n=2 n=2    
Caucasian n=16 n=15 n=17    
Chinese-American n=1      
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Half of the panic disorder participants (n=9) had panic disorder with 
agoraphobia, the other half had panic disorder without agoraphobia.  In addition, 
clinical subjects fulfilled up to two current additional Axis I diagnoses.  Five panic 
disorder subjects and two social phobia subjects were in treatment or counseling at 
the time of their participation.  None of them received cognitive-behavioral therapy.  
Table 6.3 provides an overview of comorbid conditions prevalent among clinical 
subjects. 
 
Table 6.3:  Comorbid disorders among the clinical groups of Study 1 
 
Name of disorder Panic group Social phobia group 
Agoraphobia without panic disorder  n=1 
Specific phobia n=1 n=5 
Generalized anxiety disorder n=5 n=4 
Obsessive-compulsive disorder n=1  
Major depressive disorder  n=3 
Dysthymic disorder  n=1 
Hypochondriasis n=1  
Anorexia nervosa  n=1 
Bulimia nervosa  n=1 
 
As Table 6.4 shows, the three groups differed on the majority of the 
questionnaires.  As expected, both clinical groups scored significantly higher than 
the control group on all symptom and cognitive measures.  Thus, the questionnaire 
results support the clear psychopathology of the two clinical groups as assessed 
with the diagnostic interview.   
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Table 6.4:  Mean questionnaire scores (with standard deviations) for the three  
  participant groups of Study 1 
 
Questionnaire Panic 
group (P) 
Social 
phobia 
group (SP)
Control 
group (C) 
P vs. SP P vs. C SP vs. C
BDI 14.3 (9.2) 15.9 (8.0) 3.8 (2.6) n.s. p<.001 p<.001 
BSQ 3.2 (0.6) 2.8 (0.6) 1.6 (0.3) n.s. p<.001 p<.001 
LSAS 41.4 (15.9) 81.5 (16.6) 16.3 (6.3) p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 
LSAS-Anxiety  23.6 (7.9) 43.1 (7.6) 9.9(4.1) p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 
LSAS-Avoidance  17.7 (9.0) 38.4 (9.9) 6.4 (4.1) p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 
STAI-S 38.5 (8.6) 46.7 (9.5) 26.5 (5.0) p=.01 p<.001 p<.001 
STAI-T 51.6 (11.2) 57.8 (9.0) 30.2 (4.9) n.s. p<.001 p<.001 
ACQ 2.4 (0.6) 2.1 (0.4) 1.2 (0.2) n.s. p<.001 p<.001 
ASI 32.4 (9.7) 28.7 (6.5) 9.9 (3.4) n.s. p<.001 p<.001 
FNE-S 41.7 (11.5) 54.1 (5.6) 26.9 (5.2) p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 
 
Panic patients and social phobia patients also differed significantly on all 
social phobia questionnaires (LSAS total score and subscales, FNE-S).  Finally, the 
fear of performance situations typical for social phobia patients was reflected in a 
significantly higher state anxiety during the experimental session as measured with 
the STAI-S.  The two clinical groups did not differ in their level of depression as 
measured by the BDI, their level of trait anxiety and negative affect as measured by 
the STAI-T, nor in their fear and sensitivity of physical sensations that accompany 
anxiety as measured by the BCQ, ACQ, and the ASI.  This latter result could be 
explained by the phobic character of the two disorders: both clinical groups 
experience strong physical reactions and they experience them as very unpleasant, 
even though for different reasons.  While panic patients believe that physical 
sensations are harmful to their health, social phobia patients often believe that 
physical sensations can be seen by others and are interpreted by observers as 
weakness or "craziness." The mean scores in the panic group on the BSQ and the 
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ACQ are comparable to those reported by Chambless et al. (1984) for outpatients 
with agoraphobia.  
 
6.1.5 Interpretation Questionnaire 
Besides symptom and cognition questionnaires, Study 1 used an 
experimental interpretation questionnaire based on the original interpretation 
questionnaire by Butler and Mathews (1983) (see chapter 4.1) to detect the 
hypothesized interpretive bias in panic and social phobia patients.  This 
experimental questionnaire consists of a total of 34 ambiguous scenarios: seven 
panic scenarios (sudden body sensations), seven health concerns (physical 
symptoms with slow onset), ten social phobia scenarios, and ten unspecific 
scenarios.  Panic and health concern items were taken from the Body Sensation 
Interpretation Questionnaire (BSIQ; Clark et al., 1997) provided by the first author, 
David M. Clark.  To construct the unspecific and social phobia items, existing 
interpretation questionnaires for anxiety (IFA; Ebert, 1993), somatization (IFS; 
Lieb, 1996), and social phobia (Röder, 1994; Stopa, 1995) were reviewed.  Items 
that had demonstrated good item characteristics were selected and partially 
modified, and additional items were created by the author.  All items were then 
translated into English and given to a native English speaker and clinical 
psychology professor at Harvard University, Richard J. McNally, to check for 
appropriateness.  The resulting 34 scenarios of the Interpretation Questionnaire for 
Panic Disorder and Social Phobia (IQPS) are phrased in a self-referential way.  
Each scenario provides three different interpretations of the described situation, one 
negative or threatening and two neutral or positive explanations, totaling 102 items.  
Interpretations are presented as "thoughts that the described situation could evoke in 
a person."  Participants are instructed to rate each interpretation independently on a 
5-point Likert scale indicating how likely it is that the thought would come to mind 
if they encountered the described situation.  Questionnaire instruction and sample 
items are provided in Figure 6.1; for the entire questionnaire, see Appendix IV.  
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Figure 6.1:  Instruction and sample items of the Interpretation Questionnaire for Panic 
Disorder and Social Phobia (IQPS) used in Study 1 
________________________________________________________________________ 
This questionnaire describes a variety of situations.  These situations might mean different 
things to different people.  Please try to imagine yourself in each situation and think about 
the associations the specific situation would evoke in you.  After this, please indicate for 
EACH of the three thoughts connected to the situation how likely it is that it would come to 
your mind under similar circumstances.  Rank each thought from 0 to 4 where 0 means "very 
unlikely" and 4 "very likely" that this thought would occur when you are involved in such a 
situation. 
Some situations might not be very common or typical for you.  Please try to picture yourself 
in them anyway and indicate the probability that each of the three ideas would come to your 
mind. 
There are no right or wrong answers.  We are only interested in your personal opinion.  
Please do not think too hard about the rating before you decide on it.  Your first impression 
is important to us. 
 
 
The scale is as follows: 
This  0 1  2 3 4 
thought is: very unlikely unlikely  possible  likely  very likely 
 
 Panic relevant scenario: How likely is it that this 
thought occurs to you? 
  You notice that your heart is beating quickly and 
pounding. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) It is a result from physical activity. 
b) I am very excited. 
c) There must be something wrong with my heart. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
 
Health concern scenario: How likely is it that this 
thought occurs to you? 
  You have developed a small spot on the back of your 
hand. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I have a mild allergy.  It must have been something I ate. 
b) I am developing skin cancer. 
c) I was bitten by an insect. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
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Figure 6.1 continued: 
 
Social phobia scenario: How likely is it that this 
thought occurs to you? 
   Some people that you know are looking in your direction 
and talking to each other. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) They are saying something bad about me. 
b) They want me to join them. 
c) They just happen to be looking my way. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
 
Unspecific scenario: How likely is it that this 
thought occurs to you? 
  You reach for your wallet/pocketbook and cannot find it. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I left it at home. 
b) It was stolen. 
c) It must be in another pocket. 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Figure 6.1 provides one sample scenario for each of the four scenario 
types.  In the panic relevant scenario, item a) and b) offer non-threatening 
interpretations for the situation described, while item c) is the threatening 
interpretation of this scenario.  In the health concern scenario, item b) constitutes 
the threatening interpretation, in the social phobia scenario item a) and in the 
unspecific scenario item b).  Combining number of scenario types (4) and type of 
interpretation (2), the IQPS yields a total of eight subscales: (1) panic-threatening (7 
items), (2) panic-non-threatening (14 items), (3) health-threatening (7 items), (4) 
health-non-threatening (14 items), (5) social-threatening (10 items), (6) social-non-
threatening (20 items), (7) unspecific-threatening (10 items) and (8) unspecific-non-
threatening (20 items).  Subscale scores are means, calculated by adding all relevant 
ratings and dividing the resulting sum by number of items.  Table 6.5 gives an 
overview of the descriptives mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, 
kurtosis and skewness of the eight subscales in the subject population of Study 1.  It 
also lists Cronbach’s alphas obtained in Study 1.  As can be seen, all subscales 
showed good internal consistency between .75 and .90, with threatening 
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interpretations always providing better internal consistency than the corresponding 
non-threatening alternatives.  
 
Table 6.5:  Descriptives and reliability of the Interpretation Questionnaire for Panic  
  Disorder and Social Phobia (IQPS), separately calculated for each subscale 
 
Subscale Mean 
(Std dev) 
Minimum Maximum Kurtosis Skewness Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
panic-
threatening 
1.42  
(.94) 
.00 4.00 -.014 .742 .86 
panic-non-
threatening 
2.40  
(.55) 
1.29 3.50 -.342 -.185 .76 
health-
threatening 
1.32  
(.87) 
.00 3.57 .358 .628 .84 
health-non-
threatening 
2.56  
(.52) 
1.29 3.57 -.205 -.171 .75 
social-
threatening 
1.83  
(.90) 
.20 3.70 -.873 .265 .90 
social-non-
threatening 
2.30  
(.50) 
1.15 3.40 -.276 .299 .79 
unspecific-
threatening 
2.10  
(.76) 
.20 3.40 -.338 -.220 .84 
unspecific-non-
threatening 
2.46 
(.53) 
1.20 3.90 .120 .340 .83 
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6.1.6 Interpretation Experiment 
To address the possibility that participants' ratings in the interpretation 
questionnaire were influenced by experimenter demand and response selection bias, 
an experimental paradigm was chosen in which the critical measure indicating 
participants' interpretation was assessed indirectly (without participants' awareness) 
and participants did not have to endorse alternative response options.  MacLeod and 
Cohen's (1993) experimental paradigm fulfilled these two methodological 
requirements.  In addition, it had proven successful in demonstrating an 
interpretation bias (see Chapter 4.3.2. Paradigm and operationalization).  However, 
in order to be able to answer disorder-specific research questions, MacLeod and 
Cohen's (1993) material had to be modified.  First, the original scenarios were 
reviewed and 18 scenarios were chosen that had no disorder-specific content (i.e., 
no association with social anxiety, panic or depression).  These 18 scenarios 
described more or less typical every-day situations (e.g., The man put the box 
outside the door and left quickly; The bank clerk handed the money over to the 
man).  Scenarios were modified to fulfill the following requirements: (1) cue word 
and disambiguating noun had to have a different word stem.  (2) The two 
disambiguating continuations (threatening and neutral interpretation) of the same 
scenario had to have an identical number of syllables.  Where this was not possible, 
the difference had to be no more than one syllable.  (3) The correct answer to 
comprehension questions had to be "Yes" for half of the scenarios and "No" for the 
other half.  In addition, questions had to deal with the content of the ambiguous 
scenario only.  See Figure 6.2 for an example. 
Next, 20 scenarios describing situations typical for social anxiety were 
created.  Ideas were taken from MacLeod and Cohen's (1993) original scenarios, 
from ambiguous scenarios of interpretation questionnaires (Röder & Margraf, 1995; 
Stopa, 1995), from symptom lists and diagnostic criteria of the disorder, and from 
disorder descriptions.  Disorder specific cue words were chosen from word lists 
typically presented to social phobia subjects in attention and memory tasks.  
Scenarios were evaluated by a number of fellow psychologists.  For each 
disambiguating continuation, they had to rate how likely the interpretation seemed 
to them.  Continuations scoring lower 50% were modified.  Finally, the 18 best 
scenarios were chosen and translated into English.  
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Figure 6.2:  Sample scenarios of the Interpretation Experiment employed in Study 1 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Unspecific scenario: 
Cue word: 
threat cue: terrorist non-threat cue: birthday no cue: ????? 
Ambiguous sentence: 
The man put the box outside the door and left quickly.  
Disambiguating continuation: 
threat: The bomb went unnoticed for several hours 
before being found. 
non-threat: The gift went unnoticed for several hours 
before being found. 
Comprehension question: 
Was the box discovered right away? Correct answer: No 
Social scenario: 
Cue word: 
threat cue: fear non-threat cue: cold no cue: ????? 
Ambiguous sentence: 
At the barbecue Amy's hands trembled so much she almost spilled her drink. 
Disambiguating continuation: 
threat: She was afraid of the unfamiliar people at the 
party. 
non-threat: She had forgotten her jacket back home 
and was freezing now. 
Comprehension question: 
Did Amy spoil her dress with a stain? Correct answer: No 
Panic scenario: 
Cue word: 
threat cue: suffocate non-threat cue: exercise no cue: ????? 
Ambiguous sentence: 
Evelyn fought hard to catch her breath. 
Disambiguating continuation: 
threat:  She had the feeling she was smothering. non-threat: She had been running fast for a full mile. 
Comprehension question: 
Did Evelyn have trouble breathing? Correct answer: Yes 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Disorder-specific scenarios for panic were created in a very similar way.  
Ideas were again taken from an interpretation questionnaire (Clark et al., 1997), 
from diagnostic criteria, and from disorder descriptions.  Disorder-specific cue 
words were chosen from panic word lists.  Scenarios were then discussed with a 
specialist in panic research, Prof. Richard J. McNally, and improved where 
necessary.  Figure 6.2 shows one sample scenario for each situational type.  It also 
indicates the different experimental conditions for each scenario. 
As can be seen in the sample scenarios, while the two disambiguating 
conditions of unspecific situations differed in only one (or a few) words, this was 
not possible for disorder-specific scenarios.  Specifically, while MacLeod and 
Cohen (1993) used homonyms such as punch (hit=threat, drink=non-threat), growth 
(cancer=threat, height=non-threat), attack (riot=threat, argue=non-threat) to create 
ambiguity, no homonyms depicting social or panic relevant fears exist.  Therefore, 
ambiguity of disorder specific scenarios had to be created by the situational 
description.  Consequently, disambiguating sentences of unspecific scenarios 
differed in most cases only in the disambiguating synonyms of the homonym while 
disambiguating continuations of social and panic scenarios often described 
completely different situations.  This, however, may also have allowed for more 
possible interpretations of the ambiguous disorder-specific sentences than the two 
interpretations presented to participants.  Material tests with co-workers and 
students were supposed to minimize this problem.  In addition, disambiguating 
continuations were matched for syllables and wording was approximated as much 
as possible.  In the end, we chose quality over quantity: only sound scenarios that 
made the two disambiguating continuations most likely were used as experimental 
material, leaving 54 scenarios.  Therefore, the number of scenarios is smaller than 
the number MacLeod and Cohen (1993) used.  Figure 6.3 gives an overview of the 
different experimental conditions of the interpretation experiment.  
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Figure 6.3:  Summary of the experimental design of the Interpretation Experiment 
                        employed in Study 1 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
3 situational types x     3 cue conditions x    2 disambiguating continuations 
unspecific scenarios threat cue threat continuation 
social scenarios non-threat cue non-threat continuation 
panic scenarios no cue  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
As can be inferred from Figure 6.3, the interpretation experiment 
consisted of 18 conditions.  Each participant read three scenarios in each 
experimental condition.  The relevant dependent variable was comprehension time 
(RT) of the disambiguating sentence.  For analysis, the mean RT of the three 
sentences under each experimental condition was calculated for each participant and 
entered in a mixed-factor ANOVA including the between-subjects factor 
"participant group" (panic disorder subjects, social phobia subjects, control 
subjects), and the within-subjects factors "situational type" (unspecific situations, 
panic situations, social situations), "cue condition" (threat cue, non-threat cue, no 
cue) and "sentence continuation" (threat vs. non-threat).  This yielded a 3x3x3x2 
design.  
Six material sets were created and scenarios were shuffled to fulfill the 
following criteria: (1) no more than two scenarios of the same situational type 
(unspecific, panic-specific, social anxiety-specific) followed each other; (2) similar 
topics (e.g., speaking in front of other people) had to be separated by at least 3 
scenarios; (3) cue words must not be associable with the previous situation; and (4) 
no more than 3 "yes" or three "no" answers followed each other.  All 54 scenarios 
plus three practice scenarios (see Appendix V) were prepared for presentation on 
the computer using RSVP 4.0.5 (Williams & Tarr).  RSVP is an experimental 
control package for Macintosh and Macintosh-compatible computers.  Participants 
were presented with the experimental scenarios, sentence by sentence, at a self-
paced rate.  Participants read the following instructions presented on the computer 
screen at the beginning of the experiment:  
During this part of the study we will present 57 short scenarios to you.  
Each scenario consists of a headline followed by two sentences.  Based on the 
headline, we want you to form a clear anticipation of the passage topic.  In some of 
the scenarios there won't be a headline.  Instead, you will see a string of question 
marks.  In this case, we don't expect you to form any anticipations.  After reading 
the headline and anticipating the upcoming scene, please press the long space bar on 
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the computer keyboard.  After you press the space bar, you will see the first 
sentence of the scenario.  Read this sentence carefully until you understand the 
meaning.  After you understand the meaning, press the space bar again.  Then the 
second sentence will appear on the computer screen in front of you.  Again, read the 
sentence until you fully understand the meaning and press the space bar.  Read 
carefully but at normal speed.  We don't want you to try to memorize each sentence.  
After each pair of sentences there will be a simple question regarding the 
information you just read.  To answer the question, simply press one of the keys 
marked with either a 'Y' or an 'N'.  'Y' stands for 'Yes, this is correct' and 'N' stands 
for 'No, this is not correct'.  The computer will indicate a wrong answer with a 
warning tone.  In addition, the computer will count your mistakes.  Please answer 
the questions as quickly and as accurately as possible.  We are interested in how the 
headline might affect your ability to answer these questions.  We will practice this 
procedure now with two practice scenarios.  Please report any difficulties or 
questions you have during the practice task to the experimenter. 
  
6.2   Results 
6.2.1 Interpretation Questionnaire 
For every participant, eight mean scores were calculated, one for each 
subscale of the Interpretation Questionnaire for Panic Disorder and Social Phobia 
(IQPS).  In addition, an interpretation bias score for each scenario type was 
calculated by subtracting the mean score of the threatening subscale from the mean 
score of the non-threatening subscale.  Thus, a negative sign in the resulting bias 
score would indicate a person's tendency to endorse threatening interpretations for 
ambiguous scenarios over non-threatening interpretations.  Table 6.6 presents 
subscale means and standard deviations of the IQPS for the three participant groups 
of Study 1.  The verbal description of the Likert-scale corresponding to each mean 
is provided underneath the subscale means.  Below the bias scores, results of 
within-group comparisons of threatening and non-threatening subscale means are 
indicated. 
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Table 6.6:  Mean questionnaire scores (with standard deviations) of the Interpretation  
  Questionnaire for Panic Disorder and Social Phobia (IQPS) 
 
Subscale Panic 
group (P) 
Social 
phobia 
group 
(SP) 
Control 
group (C)
P vs. SP P vs. C SP vs. C 
panic-
threatening 
2.2 (1.0) 
(possible) 
1.5 (0.6) 
(unlikely-
possible) 
0.7 (0.5) 
(unlikely) 
p<.05 p<.001 p<.001 
panic-non-
threatening 
2.3 (0.5) 
(possible) 
2.2 (0.6) 
(possible) 
2.6 (0.5) 
(likely) 
n.s. n.s. p<.05 
panic bias 0.1 (1.2) 
n.s. 
0.7 (1.0) 
p=.003 
1.9 (0.7) 
p<.001 
n.s. p<.001 p<.001 
health-
threatening 
1.7 (1.1) 
(possible) 
1.4 (0.6) 
(unlikely) 
0.9 (0.5) 
(unlikely) 
n.s. p=.006 p=.004 
health-non-
threatening 
2.5 (0.5) 
(possible-
likely) 
2.4 (0.5) 
(possible) 
2.8 (0.5) 
(likely) 
n.s. p=.053 p<.05 
health bias 0.7 (1.3) 
p<.05 
1.0 (1.0) 
p<.001 
1.9 (0.7) 
p<.001 
n.s. p=.002 p=.001 
social-
threatening 
1.8 (0.6) 
(possible) 
2.8 (0.5) 
(likely) 
1.0 (0.5) 
(unlikely) 
p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 
social-non-
threatening 
2.2 (0.4) 
(possible) 
2.0 (0.4) 
(possible) 
2.6 (0.5) 
(likely) 
n.s. p=.003 p<.001 
social bias 0.4 (0.6) 
p<.05 
-0.8 (0.7) 
p<.001* 
1.6 (0.6) 
p<.001 
p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 
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Table 6.6 continued: 
 
Subscale Panic 
group (P) 
Social 
phobia 
group 
(SP) 
Control 
group (C)
P vs. SP P vs. C SP vs. C 
unspecific-
threatening 
2.4 (0.8) 
(possible) 
2.4 (0.5) 
(possible) 
1.5 (0.5) 
(unlikely-
possible) 
n.s. p<.001 p<.001 
unspecific-non-
threatening 
2.2 (0.4) 
(possible) 
2.3 (0.5) 
(possible) 
2.8 (0.5) 
(likely) 
n.s. p<.001 p=.002 
unspecific bias -0.2 (0.7) 
n.s. 
-0.1 (0.8) 
n.s. 
1.3 (0.7) 
p<.001 
n.s. p<.001 p<.001 
* For values indicated in bold, the corresponding subject group endorsed threatening interpretations 
for ambiguous scenarios over non-threatening interpretations.  
 
As can be seen in the table above, clinical subjects always rated the 
probability that a threatening interpretation of an ambiguous, self-referential 
scenario would come to their mind significantly higher than control subjects.  
Correspondingly, clinical subjects rated non-threatening interpretations as 
significantly less likely than control subjects.  However, the hypothesized disorder-
specific negative interpretation bias was prevalent only in the social phobia group 
(indicated in bold).  Social phobia subjects endorsed threatening interpretations of 
social scenarios as likely (mean=2.8), non-threatening interpretations only as 
possible (mean=2.0), yielding a negative interpretive bias for social situations 
(mean social bias =-0.8).  Panic patients also rated disorder-specific threatening 
interpretations of panic-relevant scenarios as significantly more likely than social 
phobia patients and control subjects.  However, they endorsed non-threatening 
interpretations of panic-relevant scenarios with comparable probability, as can be 
seen by the non-significant difference between the two subscale means.  Thus, no 
disorder-specific negative bias could be found in panic patients.  The two clinical 
groups also showed no bias in their interpretation of unspecific scenarios (both 
within-group comparisons were not significant).  Finally, control subjects were 
characterized by a strong bias for non-threatening interpretations in all four scenario 
types.  This positive interpretive bias was always highly significantly different from 
clinical subjects.  Clinical subjects, too, indicated a slight positive bias toward non-
threatening interpretations of other-disorder-relevant scenarios (panic patients in 
health and social scenarios, social phobia patients in health and panic scenarios).   
To judge convergent and divergent validity of the Interpretation 
Questionnaire for Panic Disorder and Social Phobia (IQPS), Table 6.7 provides 
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Pearson correlation coefficients (r) of the eight subscales and four bias scores with 
symptom and cognition questionnaires.  Correlations ≥ .69 between subscales and 
their corresponding symptom and cognition measures are indicated in bold, all other 
correlations ≥ .69 are indicated in italics.  As expected, threatening subscales were 
highly correlated with their corresponding questionnaires: the closest relation 
existed between the social-threatening subscale and the symptom measure for social 
anxiety, the Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; r=.87).  The cognitive measure 
for social anxiety administered in Study 1, the short version of the Fear of Negative 
Evaluation (FNE-S), was also strongly correlated with the social-threatening 
subscale (r=.81).  The panic-threatening subscale was closest related to the Body 
Sensation Questionnaire (BSQ; r=.71), the symptom measure of panic disorder, as 
well as to the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; r=.70) and the Anxiety Cognition 
Questionnaire (ACQ; r=.69), both cognitive measures of panic disorder.  Panic and 
social-threatening subscales correlated much lower with other-disorder measures 
(BDI, LSAS, and FNE-S for panic-threatening subscale, and BDI, BSQ, ACQ, and 
ASI for social-threatening subscale).  Finally, intermediate correlations were 
reached with STAI-S and STAI-T, relatively unspecific questionnaires for anxiety 
and negative affect prevalent in all anxiety disorders.  Therefore, the disorder-
specific threatening subscales for panic and social phobia showed excellent 
convergent and divergent validity.  
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Table 6.7:  Pearson correlation coefficients r (with significances) of the Interpretation  
Questionnaire for Panic Disorder and Social Phobia (IQPS) with the  
symptom and cognition questionnaires administered in Study 1 
 
IQPS subscale BDI BSQ LSAS STAI-S STAI-T ACQ ASI FNE-S 
panic-threatening .37 
(p<.05) 
.71* 
(p<.001) 
.30 
(p<.05) 
.47 
(p<.001)
.45 
(p<.001)
.69*  
(p<.001) 
.70*  
(p<.001) 
.32 
(p<.05) 
panic-non-
threatening 
-.32 
(p<.05) 
-.16 
(n.s.) 
-.25 
(n.s.) 
-.26 
(p<.05) 
-.37 
(p=.005)
-.25 
(n.s.) 
-.24 
(n.s.) 
-.25 
(n.s.) 
panic bias -.37 
(p=.005) 
-.65  
(p<.001) 
-.36 
(p=.006)
-.50 
(p<.001)
-.54 
(p<.001)
-.68 
(p<.001) 
-.67  
(p<.001) 
-.38 
(p=.004)
health-threatening .35 
(p=.007) 
.56  
(p<.001) 
.30 
(p<.05) 
.38 
(p=.003)
.43 
(p=.001)
.56 
(p<.001) 
.59 
(p<.001) 
.41 
(p=.001)
health-non-
threatening 
-.32 
(p<.05) 
-.26 
(n.s.) 
-.21 
(n.s.) 
-.21 
(n.s.) 
-.35 
(p=.007)
-.33 
(p<.05) 
-.30 
(p<.05) 
-.29 
(p<.05) 
health bias -.42 
(p=.001) 
-.55  
(p<.001) 
-.33 
(p<.05) 
-.39 
(p=.002)
-.50 
(p<.001)
-.59  
(p<.001) 
-.60  
(p<.001) 
-.45 
(p<.001)
social-threatening .56 
(p<.001) 
.58 
(p<.001) 
.87*  
(p<.001)
.73** 
(p<.001)
.73** 
(p<.001)
.56 
(p<.001) 
.60 
(p<.001) 
.81*  
(p<.001)
social-non-
threatening 
 -.45 
(p=.001) 
-.40 
(p=.002) 
-.50 
(p<.001)
-44 
(p=.001)
-.55 
(p<.001)
-.47 
(p<.001) 
-.42 
(p=.001) 
-.47 
(p<.001)
social bias -.62 
(p<.001) 
-.61 
(p<.001) 
-.87*  
(p<.001)
-.74** 
(p<.001)
-.79*  
(p<.001)
-.63 
(p<.001) 
-.63 
(p<.001) 
-.81*  
(p<.001)
unspecific-
threatening 
.46 
(p<.001) 
.66 
(p<.001) 
.51 
(p<.001)
.54 
(p<.001)
.57 
(p<.001)
.68 
(p<.001) 
.64 
(p<.001) 
.57 
(p<.001)
unspecific-non-
threatening 
-.48 
(p<.001) 
-.39 
(p=.002) 
-.36 
(p=.006)
-.31 
(p<.05) 
-.47 
(p<.001)
-.46 
(p<.001) 
-.48 
(p<.001) 
-.38 
(p=.003)
unspecific bias -.61 
(p<.001) 
-.72**  
(p<.001) 
-.58 
(p<.001)
-.58 
(p<.001)
-.69**  
(p<.001)
-.76**  
(p<.001) 
-.74**  
(p<.001) 
-.64 
(p<.001)
* Correlations ≥.69 between subscales and their corresponding questionnaires are indicated 
   in bold. 
** Correlations ≥.69 between subscales and other questionnaires are indicated in italics. 
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The unspecific-threatening subscale showed little variation in its 
correlation with other questionnaires.  This pattern underlines the intended 
unspecific threat character of this subscale.  Finally, the threatening subscale of 
health concerns correlated generally low with symptom and cognition 
questionnaires administered in Study 1 as these measures have little to do with 
health anxiety.  The convergent and divergent pattern, however, mirrored the 
pattern of the panic-threatening subscale on a lower relational level. The correlation 
pattern of the bias scores was almost identical to the correlation pattern of the 
threatening subscales, just with negative sign, except for the strong relationship 
between social bias and STAI-T (r=-.79).  Social subscales correlated generally 
higher with all other questionnaires than panic, health, and unspecific subscales did. 
Non-threatening subscales showed a relatively weak relation with the symptom and 
cognition questionnaires of Study 1.  This relation was always negative and often 
not significant.  Participants' ratings of non-threatening interpretations of social and 
unspecific scenarios correlated stronger with symptom and cognitive measures than 
their ratings of non-threatening interpretations of panic and health concern 
scenarios.  
Table 6.8 lists intercorrelations between the eight subscales and four bias 
scores of the IQPS.  Just as expected, the interpretation bias scores correlated 
highest with their corresponding threat scale (-.85≤r≤-.92; indicated in bold) 
because it was computed from it.  Of course, the bias scores also correlated highly 
with their corresponding non-threate-ning subscale (.61≤r≤.71).  Non-threatening 
subscales also intercorrelated significantly (.70≤r≤.82; indicated in italics).  The 
close relation between panic and health subscales and scores may originate in panic 
patients' attention focus on their body.  Finally, the unspecific threatening subscale 
correlated strongly with all other threatening subscales (.63≤r≤.74; indicated in 
italics) just as the unspecific bias did with all other biases (.68≤r≤.76; indicated in 
italics), underlining the unspecific character of these scenarios. 
In summary, the IQPS appears to be a reliable, sound instrument capable 
of measuring general as well as disorder-specific tendencies of people to interpret 
ambiguous scenarios in a biased fashion.  The computation of bias scores is a good 
way to include threatening as well as non-threatening interpretations of a person 
into one number without the information loss of ranking prevalent in other 
interpretation questionnaires (see 4.1.4 Summary of questionnaire studies). 
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Table 6.8:  Pearson correlation coefficients r (with significances) for the 12 subscales of the Interpretation Questionnaire for Panic Disorder and  
  Social Phobia (IQPS)  
 
 panic-
threat 
panic-
non-threat 
panic-bias health-
threat 
health-
non-threat
health-
bias 
social-
threat 
social-
non-threat
social-
bias 
unspecif.-
threat 
unspecif.-
non-threat
unspecif.-
bias 
panic-
threatening 1.00 
           
panic-non-
threatening 
-.17   
(n.s.) 1.00 
          
panic bias -.89* 
(p<.001) 
.61 
(p<.001) 1.00 
         
health-
threatening 
.71**  
(p<.001) 
-.13   
(n.s.) 
-.64 
(p<.001) 1.00 
        
health-non-
threatening 
-.22   
(n.s.) 
.77** 
(p<.001) 
.53 
(p<.001) 
-.26 
(p<.05) 1.00 
       
health bias -.65 
(p<.001) 
.46 
(p<.001) 
.74** 
(p<.001) 
-.90* 
(p<.001) 
.67 
(p<.001) 1.00 
      
* Correlations ≥.70 between threat and bias subscales of the same situational type are indicated in bold. 
** Correlations ≥.70 between subscales of the same interpretational direction (threat–threat, non-threat–non-threat) or between different biases are indicated in 
italics. For more details see the section immediately above Table 6.8 where results are discussed 
  
Table 6.8 continued: 
 
 panic-
threat 
panic-
non-threat 
panic-bias health-
threat 
health-
non-threat
health-
bias 
social-
threat 
social-
non-threat
social-
bias 
unspecif.-
threat 
unspecif.-
non-threat
unspecif.-
bias 
social-
threatening 
.39 
(p=.003) 
-.20   
(n.s.) 
-.41 
(p=.002) 
.44 
(p=.001) 
-.13   
(n.s.) 
-.40 
(p=.002) 1.00 
     
social-non-
threatening 
-.15    
(n.s.) 
.70** 
(p<.001) 
-.45 
(p<.001) 
-.10   
(n.s.) 
.76** 
(p<.001) 
.42 
(p=.001) 
-.38 
(p=.003) 1.00 
    
social bias -.36 
(p=.006) 
.44 
(p=.001) 
.50 
(p<.001) 
-.38 
(p=.004) 
.42 
(p=.001) 
.49 
(p<.001) 
-.92* 
(p<.001) 
.71 
(p<.001) 1.00 
   
unspecific-
threatening 
-.70** 
(p<.001) 
-.06   
(n.s.) 
-.59 
(p<.001) 
.74** 
(p<.001) 
-.05   
(n.s.) 
-.60 
(p<.001) 
.63 
(p<.001) 
-.12    
(n.s.) 
-.53 
(p<.001) 1.00 
  
unspecific-
non-
threatening 
-.29 
(p<.05) 
.73** 
(p<.001) 
.57 
(p<.001) 
-.19    
(n.s.) 
.82** 
(p<.001) 
.52 
(p<.001) 
-.24   
(n.s.) 
.80** 
(p<.001) 
.52 
(p<.001) 
-.15   
(n.s.) 1.00 
 
unspecific 
bias 
-.69 
(p<.001) 
.44 
(p=.001) 
.76** 
(p<.001) 
-.67 
(p<.001) 
.48 
(p<.001) 
.74** 
(p<.001) 
-.61 
(p<.001) 
.53 
(p<.001) 
.68 
(p<.001) 
-.85* 
(p<.001) 
.66 
(p<.001) 1.00 
* Correlations ≥.70 between threat and bias subscales of the same situational type are indicated in bold. 
** Correlations ≥.70 between subscales of the same interpretational direction (threat–threat, non-threat–non-threat) or between different biases  
     are indicated in italics.  For more details see the section immediately above Table 6.8 where results are discussed.
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6.2.2 Interpretation Experiment 
The experimental software recorded the comprehension latencies (RTs) of 
the continuation sentences.  To prepare these latencies for analysis, an outlier 
correction procedure was first employed, using participants' median comprehension 
latency, replacing 5% RTs with corresponding medians (see Rinck, 1994).  Mean 
comprehension latencies of disambiguating continuation sentences were analyzed in 
a mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) involving one between-subjects and 
three repeated measures factors.  The between-subjects variable was "participant 
group" (panic disorder subjects, social phobia subjects, control subjects), and the 
within-subjects factors were "situational type" (unspecific situations, panic 
situations, social situations), "cue condition" (threat cue, non-threat cue, no cue) and 
"sentence continuation" (threat vs. non-threat). The general sensitivity of the 
interpretation paradigm was confirmed by the presence of a highly significant two-
way interaction involving cue condition and sentence continuation, F(2,108)=10.61; 
p<.001.  This interaction confirms the assumption that the relative comprehension 
latencies shown across the two continuation conditions were influenced by the 
interpretation imposed on the ambiguous sentence.  Therefore, this experimental 
paradigm should have been able to detect differences in participants' interpretation 
of ambiguous situations, if they exist.  However, all interactions involving the 
between-subjects factor "participant group" were non-significant.  The three 
participant groups did not differ in the interpretation they imposed on ambiguous 
situations.  
 
Manipulation check 
A manipulation check was carried out using the mean comprehension 
latency of all 57 participants under the primed conditions (threat cue, non-threat 
cue).  One unspecific, five panic, and one social scenario had to be excluded from 
further analysis because under both prime conditions, mean RT of the mismatched 
continuation (threat continuation following non-threat cue and non-threat 
continuation following threat cue) was shorter than mean RT of the matched 
continuation (threat continuation following threat cue and non-threat continuation 
following non-threat cue).  Thus, all the results reported below are based on the data 
of 17 unspecific, 13 panic, and 17 social scenarios.  Next, for each participant and 
each experimental condition, the mean RT was calculated.  These latency data for 
all three participant groups are presented in Table 6.9.  
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Table 6.9:  Mean comprehension latency data (with standard deviation) of con- 
  tinuation sentences from the Interpretation Experiment in Study 1 
 
  Panic Disorder Subjects 
 Unspecific scenarios Panic scenarios Social Scenarios 
Condition Threat 
continuation 
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat 
continuation
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat 
continuation 
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat cue 2,296  
(701) 
2,621  
(820) 
1,697  
(439) 
2,306 
(1,147) 
2,150  
(539) 
2,347  
(793) 
Non-threat 
cue 
2,722 
(1,116) 
2,417  
(799) 
2,006  
(558) 
1,820  
(855) 
2,420  
(727) 
2,225  
(653) 
No cue 2,207  
(622) 
2,213  
(594) 
2,031  
(616) 
2,100  
(630) 
2,481  
(970) 
2,245  
(851) 
Social Phobia Subjects 
 Unspecific scenarios Panic scenarios Social Scenarios 
Condition Threat 
continuation 
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat 
continuation
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat 
continuation 
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat cue 2,331 
(1,285) 
2,994 
(1,180) 
1,863  
(768) 
2,190 
(1,300) 
2,197 
(1,009) 
2,582 
(1,186) 
Non-threat 
cue 
2,667 
(1,206) 
2,422 
(1,092) 
1,940 
(1,025) 
2,056  
(854) 
2,417 
(1,447) 
2,302 
(1,024) 
No cue 2,552 
(1,098) 
2,240 
(1,131) 
1,950 
(1,171) 
2,483 
(1,621) 
2,493   
(931) 
2,298 
(1,176) 
Control Subjects 
 Unspecific scenarios Panic scenarios Social Scenarios 
Condition Threat 
continuation 
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat 
continuation
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat 
continuation 
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat cue 2,553 
(1,108) 
3,000 
(1,272) 
2,105  
(867) 
2,389  
(828) 
2,476 
(1,079) 
2,497  
(956) 
Non-threat 
cue 
2,977 
(1,284) 
2,749 
(1,107) 
2,065  
(847) 
2,226  
(915) 
2,642 
(1,042) 
2,431  
(996) 
No cue 2,429  
(962) 
2,447 
(1,046) 
2,310 
(1,085) 
2,402 
(1,023) 
2,576  
(983) 
2,461  
(900) 
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Main analysis 
To determine participants' interpretation tendency under different cue 
conditions, comprehension latencies shown on threat and on non-threat 
continuations had to be compared.  For each participant group and each situational 
type, the relative speeding on threat continuations was calculated by subtracting 
RTs of threat continuations from RTs of non-threat continuations.  These difference 
scores are presented in Table 6.11.  According to the initial hypotheses of this 
thesis, the following result pattern was expected to emerge: 
 
Table 6.10: Result pattern of the Interpretation Experiment of Study 1 deducted  
from hypotheses  
 
Cue Condition Difference (RT non-threat continuation minus RT 
threat continuation) 
Threat cue Positive (deceleration) 
Non-threat cue Negative (acceleration) 
No cue Determined by participants' initial interpretation: 
• Negative for control subjects in all three 
scenario types 
• Positive for social phobia patients at least in 
social scenarios 
• Positive for panic patients at least in panic 
relevant scenarios 
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Table 6.11:  Difference scores (with standard deviation) of continuation sentences  
  under the three cue conditions of the Interpretation Experiment in Study 1 
 
  Panic Disorder Subjects 
Condition Unspecific scenarios Panic scenarios Social Scenarios 
Threat cue 325 (848) 609 (936) 197 (556) 
Non-threat cue -306 (937) -186 (719) -195 (736) 
No cue 6 (871) 69 (530) -236 (881) 
  Social Phobia Subjects 
Condition Unspecific scenarios Panic scenarios Social Scenarios 
Threat cue 662 (791) 327 (689) 385 (670) 
Non-threat cue -245 (775) *117 (544) -115 (759) 
No cue -312 (532) 533 (839) -196 (966) 
  Control Subjects 
Condition Unspecific scenarios Panic scenarios Social Scenarios 
Threat cue 447 (693) 285 (689) 21 (808) 
Non-threat cue -228 (947) *161 (784) -211 (728) 
No cue 18 (940) 92 (630) -115 (472) 
* The necessary assumption that the initial threat cue and non-threat cue imposed different in-
terpretations on panic-relevant continuation sentences was not fulfilled.  The expected 
acceleration under the non-threat cue condition was not found with social phobia and  
control subjects. 
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Unspecific scenarios 
For unspecific scenarios, control subjects were expected to interpret 
uncued scenarios similar to non-threat cued scenarios, thus revealing a bias toward 
non-threatening interpretations.  This hypothesis was derived from the results of the 
low trait anxious group of MacLeod and Cohen (1993).  Panic and social phobia 
subjects were expected to show no interpretive bias at all (see Figure 6.4).  The 
actual results can be seen in Figure 6.5.  
 
Figure 6.4: Prediction of result pattern for difference scores of continuation sentences  
  for unspecific scenarios in Study 1 
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Figure 6.5: Relative speeding on threat continuation sentences of unspecific scenarios 
                        for panic disorder, social phobia, and control subjects in Study 1 
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Contrary to the predictions, the two-way interaction of the factors "group" 
and "cue condition" did not reach statistical significance (F(4,108)<1; n.s.), neither 
did the main factor "group" (F(2,54)<1; n.s.).  There was a main effect of the factor 
"cue condition" (F(2,108)=11.66; p<.001).  Within-group comparisons between the 
difference scores further supported the assumption that all three groups interpreted 
continuation sentences under "threat cue" and "non-threat cue" conditions 
significantly different (all p<.05).  The difference score for panic disorder and 
control subjects under the "no-cue condition" lay equidistant between the two cued 
conditions: none of the t-tests reached statistical significance.  Social phobia 
subjects, on the other hand, interpreted uncued ambiguous unspecific scenarios 
similarly to non-threat cued ambiguous unspecific scenarios.  This was reflected in 
the significant difference between "threat cue condition" and "no cue condition" 
(t(17)=4.16; p=.001).  This result pattern was expected for control subjects.  
Contrast analyses supported no specific interpretation bias for unspecific scenarios.  
The models for "no bias" and for "non-threat bias" fit the data equally well (all 
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t≥1.87; p<.05; r>.41).  This justifies the overall interpretation that no experimental 
group revealed any reliable interpretive bias for unspecific scenarios. 
Panic scenarios 
For panic scenarios, control subjects were again expected to interpret 
uncued scenarios similarly to non-threat cued scenarios, thus revealing a bias 
toward non-threatening interpretations.  Panic disorder subjects were expected to 
show a bias toward threatening interpretations of panic-relevant scenarios.  Social 
phobia subjects were expected to show no interpretive bias (see Figure 6.6).  The 
actual results can be seen in Figure 6.7.  
 
Figure 6.6: Prediction of result pattern for difference scores of continuation sentences 
for panic scenarios in Study 1 
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Figure 6.7: Relative speeding on threat continuation sentences of panic scenarios for  
  panic disorder, social phobia, and control subjects in Study 1 
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Just as with unspecific scenarios, the main factor "group" did not reach 
statistical significance (F(2,54)=1.10; n.s.).  The main effect of the factor "cue 
condition" was significant (F(2,108)=3.53; p=.033).  However, as mentioned above, 
the necessary assumption that continuation sentences are interpreted differently 
under the cue conditions "threat" and "non-threat" did not apply to social phobia 
and control subjects.  Within-group comparisons between the difference scores 
were significant only for panic patients (t(17)=2.69; p=.015).  However, panic 
disorder subjects interpreted uncued ambiguous panic scenarios more like non-
threat-cued panic scenarios (t(17)=1.24; n.s.) than like threat-cued panic scenarios 
(t(17)=2.12; p=.049), but the two-way interaction of "group" and "cue condition" 
was again not significant (F(4,108)=1.81; n.s.).  Contrast analyses for the panic 
disorder group supported no specific interpretation bias for panic scenarios.  The 
models for "no bias," "threat bias" and "non-threat bias" fit the data equally well (all 
t≥2.39; p<.05; r≥.50).  
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Social scenarios 
For social scenarios, control subjects were also expected to interpret 
uncued scenarios similarly to non-threat cued scenarios.  Social phobia subjects 
were expected to show a bias toward threatening interpretations of social scenarios.  
Panic disorder subjects were expected to show no interpretive bias (see Figure 6.8).  
The actual results can be seen in Figure 6.9.  
 
Figure 6.8: Prediction of result pattern for difference scores of continuation sentences 
                        for social scenarios in Study 1 
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Figure 6.9: Relative speeding on threat continuation sentences of social scenarios for 
                        panic disorder, social phobia, and control subjects in Study 1 
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For the third time, neither the two-way interaction of "group" and "cue 
condition," nor the main factor "group" reached statistical significance (both F<1; 
n.s.).  The main effect of the factor "cue condition" was significant (F(2,108)=4.73; 
p=.011).  Unfortunately, similar to panic scenarios, within-group comparisons 
between the difference scores for threat and non-threat-cued conditions were not 
significant for all three experimental groups (all t≤2.08; p>.05).  Therefore, results 
cannot further be interpreted.  Contrast analyses were significant only for panic and 
social phobia subjects.  For social phobia subjects, the models for "no bias" and 
"non-threat bias" fit the data equally well (both t≥2.08; p<.05; r≥.45).  For panic 
patients, the best data fit was achieved with the model for a non-threat bias (t=2.41; 
p<.025; r=.50). 
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It appears to be very difficult to create disorder-specific ambiguous 
scenarios.  The paradigm developed by MacLeod and Cohen (1993) seems of 
limited value for further exploring interpretive processes in clinical subjects.  
Results obtained in Study 1 are difficult to interpret.  In a last step, a replication of 
MacLeod and Cohen's findings was attempted.  The authors had formed their 
groups (low vs. high trait anxious subjects) based on their scores on the trait section 
of the State-Trait-Anxiety-Inventory, gathered during a mass testing session several 
weeks prior to the actual experiment.  The subjects invited to participate had scored 
between 25 and 35 (low trait anxiety group) or between 45 and 55 (high trait 
anxiety group).  
 
Table 6.12: STAI-T questionnaire and difference scores (with standard deviation) of  
continuation sentences for unspecific scenarios after regrouping 
of subjects from Study 1 
 
Group Low trait anxiety High trait anxiety 
Range of STAI-T sum 
score (SS) 
24 < SS < 36 44 < SS < 56 
Mean (with standard 
deviation) of STAI-T 
30.6 (3.0) 
27* 
51.0 (2.1) 
46* 
Minimum — Maximum 25 — 35 48 — 54 
Number of subjects 13 
16* 
9 
16* 
Threat cue condition 306 (710) 
545* 
563 (599) 
35* 
Non-threat cue condition -121 (843) 
-142* 
-351 (726) 
-307* 
No cue condition 16 (778) 
-75* 
22 (797) 
63* 
* Where possible, for ease of comparison, numbers from the study by MacLeod and Cohen 
(1993) are provided in italics underneath the data from Study 1 
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The State-Trait-Anxiety-Inventory had also been administered in Study 1 
of this thesis.  For unspecific scenarios, data of all subjects from Study 1 who fit 
one of the two MacLeod and Cohen groups (low vs. high trait anxiety) were 
analyzed again.  Table 6.12 presents means and standard deviations of the STAI-T 
questionnaire and the difference scores for the two newly formed groups.  Figure 
6.10 illustrates the original results of MacLeod and Cohen (1993), Figure 6.11 
presents the actual results of Study 1. 
 
Figure 6.10: Relative speeding on threat continuation sentences by MacLeod and 
                        Cohen (1993) for low and high trait anxious groups 
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Figure 6.11: Relative speeding on threat continuation sentences of unspecific scenarios 
                        for low and high trait anxious groups in Study 1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be seen, a replication of MacLeod and Cohen's (1993) findings did 
not occur.  Again, neither the main factor "group" nor the interaction of "group" and 
"cue condition" reached statistical significance (both F<1; n.s.).  The main factor 
"cue condition" was significant (F(2,40)=4.33; p=.02), supporting the sensitivity of 
the materials once again.  However, within-group t-tests were significant only in the 
high trait anxious group for "threat cue" vs. "non-threat cue" (t(8)=3.89; p=.005).  
These results are based on very small post-hoc group sizes (n=13 and n=9) and a 
relatively small number of selected scenarios (n=17) while MacLeod and Cohen 
(1993) presented n=80 scenarios to 32 (2x16) participants.  In addition, the original 
groups covered only a relatively small range of trait anxiety.  The State-Trait-
Anxiety-Inventory is equipped with a comprehensive manual that includes norms 
and percentile rankings for normal adults (Spielberger et al., 1970; 1983).  In order 
to cover the full range of the STAI-T scale and take advantage of the entire sample 
of Study 1, the percentile rankings were used to recode the three experimental 
groups of Study 1 into four Quartile groups based on their sum score in the STAI-T.  
Table 6.13 presents means and standard deviations of the STAI-T questionnaire and 
  
115
the difference scores for the four Quartile groups.  Figure 6.12 illustrates the 
difference scores. 
 
Table 6.13: STAI-T questionnaire and difference scores (with standard deviation)  
of continuation sentences for unspecific scenarios for Quartile  
groups of Study 1 
 
Group 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
Range of STAI-T sum 
score (SS) 
SS < 30 29 < SS < 35 34 < SS < 42 SS > 41 
Mean (with standard 
deviation) of STAI-T 
25.8 (2.2) 32.1 (1.5) 37.6 (2.2) 57.5 (8.3) 
Minimum — Maximum 24 — 29 30 — 34 35 — 41 42 — 71 
Number of subjects 10 7 9 31 
Threat cue condition 538 (586) 421 (908) 656 (729) 417 (832) 
Non-threat cue condition -339 (1.022) -55 (987) -428 (941) -229 (819) 
No cue condition -114 (879) -153 (793) 208 (901) -154 (785) 
  
 
Analysis of unspecific scenarios was repeated with these four new groups 
because unspecific scenarios were part of the original materials used by MacLeod 
and Cohen (1993).  Results are presented in Figure 6.12.  Unfortunately, resulting 
group sizes were too small to gain enough power for statistical significance.  
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Figure 6.12: Relative speeding on threat continuation sentences of unspecific scenarios 
                        after recoding subjects of Study 1 into four STAI-T groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Neither the main factor "group" nor the two-way interaction of "group" 
and "cue condition" were significant (both F<1; n.s.).  On the other hand, even with 
the few remaining scenarios (n=17), the sensitivity of the paradigm was highly 
significant (main factor "cue condition": F(2,106)=8.77; p<.001).  Within-group 
comparisons of the difference scores under the cued conditions also supported the 
necessary assumption that "threat" and "non-threat conditions" were interpreted 
differently by three of the four groups (1st, 3rd, and 4th Quartile: all t≥2.34; p<.05).  
Only for the 2nd Quartile, this point comparison was not significant (t(6)<1, n.s.), 
probably because of the very small group size.  However, the 4th Quartile includes 
subjects comparable to MacLeod and Cohen's "high trait anxious group." In 
addition, subjects with even larger sum scores are present.  There, sample size of 
n=31 should be large enough for statistical significance, yet the predicted difference 
between "no cue" and "non-threat cue condition" again did not appear.  Quite the 
opposite occurred: the within-group point comparison of the conditions "no cue" 
and "threat cue" was significant (t(30)=2.87 ; p=.007), suggesting that very high 
trait anxious subjects interpreted ambiguous unspecific scenarios in a non-
threatening way.  Once more, the findings of MacLeod and Cohen could not be 
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replicated with the subject sample of Study 1.  Subjects in the 4th Quartile had a 
higher mean trait anxiety score than subjects in MacLeod and Cohen's group (57.5 
vs. 46).  MacLeod and Cohen's findings may be limited to a specific subject 
population (e.g., relatively well-functioning university students) and the unselected 
threatening scenarios the authors used.  Contrast analysis did not differentiate 
among the three models "no bias," "threat bias," and "non-threat bias".  All three 
models fit the data significantly (except for the 2nd Quartile).  
 
6.3   Discussion 
In Study 1, interpretive processes in panic disorder and social phobia were 
investigated, applying equivalent, yet to each disorder particularly relevant, 
symptom and cognitive measures.  Neither the results obtained with the 
interpretation questionnaire nor the findings of the interpretation experiment 
support the initial hypothesis that panic disorder and social phobia subjects display 
a disorder-specific bias toward threatening interpretations.  
Panic patients rated threatening explanations for ambiguous panic-specific 
scenarios in the IQPS just as likely as non-threatening explanations.  For social and 
health scenarios, panic patients favored non-threatening over threatening 
explanations displaying a positive interpretive bias.  No bias occurred for unspecific 
scenarios.  However, panic disorder subjects rated threatening interpretations of 
ambiguous panic-specific scenarios significantly higher than social phobia and 
control subjects.  Thus, panic patients do not selectively favor threatening over non-
threatening explanations for ambiguous panic-specific scenarios presented in a 
questionnaire.  Rather, they differ from healthy control subjects, and, to a lesser 
extent, from social phobia subjects in their inability to reject threatening 
explanations for panic-specific scenarios.  To a lesser extent, this was also true for 
all other types of ambiguous situations (health-related, social, and unspecific).  
Panic patients always differed significantly from control subjects in their probability 
ratings that a threatening explanation for ambiguous scenarios would come to mind.  
In addition, panic patients rated the probability of non-threatening explanations for 
unspecific and social scenarios, but not panic and health-related scenarios, 
significantly lower than control subjects.  Panic patients shared the disorder-
unspecific interpretation tendencies with social phobia patients.  No significant 
differences occurred.  
In the interpretation experiment, a bias toward threatening interpretations 
for panic-specific scenarios could not be found either.  When left unprimed, panic 
patients did not take longer to comprehend non-threatening continuations of 
ambiguous panic-specific scenarios than threatening continuations.  The difference 
score for comprehension latencies under the unprimed condition was rather located 
between the two primed conditions (threat cue and non-threat cue).  Panic patients 
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did not differ significantly from social phobia and control subjects.  However, they 
seemed to be the only experimental group where panic scenarios were a sensitive 
enough measure to begin with.  As predicted, there was no difference in 
comprehension latency of non-threatening and threatening continuations of 
ambiguous unspecific and social scenarios. 
Social phobia patients rated threatening explanations for ambiguous social 
scenarios in the IQPS as significantly more likely than non-threatening 
explanations.  Thus, according to prediction, social phobia patients selectively 
favored threatening over non-threatening explanations for ambiguous social 
scenarios presented in a questionnaire, displaying a negative interpretive bias.  
Their rating for threatening interpretations of ambiguous social scenarios differed 
significantly from panic and control subjects.  For all other types of ambiguous 
situations (panic, health-related, and unspecific), social phobia subjects only 
differed significantly from control subjects in their probability ratings for 
threatening and non-threatening explanations.  For panic and health scenarios, 
social phobia patients favored non-threatening over threatening explanations, thus 
displaying a positive interpretive bias.  No bias occurred for unspecific scenarios.  
In the interpretation experiment, a bias toward threatening interpretations 
for social scenarios could not be found.  When left unprimed, social phobia patients 
did not take longer to comprehend non-threatening continuations of ambiguous 
social scenarios than threatening continuations.  Rather, the difference score for 
comprehension latencies under the unprimed condition was similar to the difference 
score under the non-threat cue condition.  However, just as with panic scenarios, 
results are difficult to interpret because of material characteristics.  Overall, social 
phobia patients did not differ significantly from panic patients and control subjects 
in their interpretation of unspecific, social, and panic scenarios.  In within-group 
comparisons of unspecific scenarios, social phobia patients interpreted unprimed 
similar to non-threat cued unspecific scenarios, reflected in the significant 
difference between "threat cue condition" and "no cue condition".  However, in 
relation to panic disorder and control subjects who did not display any interpretive 
bias in unspecific scenarios, this finding was not supported by a significant two-way 
interaction of "group" and "cue condition." 
Anxiety may arise from a state of doubt or uncertainty about the meaning 
of situations.  Control subjects always rated non-threatening interpretations as 
"likely" and threatening explanations as "unlikely," no matter what situational type 
they were confronted with.  These ratings might reflect confidence in their "good 
fortune" or "the way things work" on the basis of cognitive schemata of "control", 
"non-harm'" and "self-efficacy".  Anxiety patients, on the other hand, are described 
as characterized by cognitive schemata of "loss of control", "danger", and often 
"helplessness" (especially if a comorbid depressive disorder is prevalent) (Beck, 
1976, 1985; Beck et al., 1985).  Anxiety patients seem to fluctuate between 
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threatening and non-threatening interpretations of ambiguous, self-referential 
situations, judging them almost always as "possible", not able to reject or embrace 
one or the other.  This seems to be a general vulnerability factor that may be topped 
by disorder-specific interpretive biases for panic and social phobia patients.  
The interpretation experiment did not provide any evidence for differences 
in interpretation processes of the three experimental groups.  Although the overall 
ANOVA supported the sensitivity of the experimental paradigm, detailed analyses 
revealed situational differences.  As mentioned in the Methods section of this thesis, 
disorder-specific scenarios had to be created differently from the original MacLeod 
and Cohen (1993) material, leaving room for more than the two cued 
interpretations.  Only unspecific scenarios were comparable to the original material.  
Yet even the attempted replication of the original findings with unspecific 
scenarios, regrouping the three experimental groups into two trait anxiety groups 
(low vs. high trait anxious subjects), applying the same cut-off sum scores in the 
State-Trait-Anxiety Inventory as MacLeod and Cohen (1993) had used, was not 
achieved.  This may have been a problem of power because post-hoc group sizes 
and number of scenarios these results are based on were relatively small.  Therefore, 
all subjects of Study 1 were again divided into four STAI-T based quartile groups 
and their difference scores were compared.  Unfortunately, three of the four STAI-
T-groups contained insufficient sample sizes (n≤10).  On the other hand, the 4th 
Quartile that included subjects comparable to MacLeod and Cohen's "high trait 
anxious group", presented a large sample of n=31.  Yet the predicted difference 
between "no cue" and "non-threat cue condition" still did not appear.  Rather, the 
within-group point comparison of the conditions "no cue" and "threat cue" was 
significant (t(30)=2.87; p=.007), suggesting that very high trait anxious subjects of 
Study 1 interpreted ambiguous unspecific scenarios in a non-threatening way.  This 
does not at all support the findings and conclusion of MacLeod and Cohen (1993). 
In summary, neither the questionnaire section nor the experimental 
section of Study 1 provided any evidence for a negative interpretive bias in panic 
disorder.  Panic patients displayed no interpretive preference for panic-relevant 
situations.  An actual negative bias, favoring threatening explanations for 
ambiguous, self-referent situations over non-threatening explanations, could only be 
found for social phobia patients in social situations of the Interpretation 
Questionnaire for Panic Disorder and Social Phobia (IQPS). The IQPS proved to be 
a sound instrument, sensitive enough to measure differences between experimental 
groups and between different situational types.  It also showed excellent convergent 
and divergent validity for social phobia and panic subscales.  The interpretation 
experiment was also sensitive enough to measure different types of interpretations 
imposed on ambiguous sentences by means of a single cue word.  However, if left 
unprimed, clinical and control subjects did not differ in their interpretations of 
ambiguous, non-self-referent scenarios in the interpretation experiment.  
Comprehension latencies of the “uncued” condition lay equidistant between 
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comprehension latencies of the “threat-cue” and “non-threat cue” conditions, 
suggesting no interpretive bias at all. 
Sample characteristics could be one possible explanation why the 
predicted negative interpretation bias could not be found.  Six of the eighteen panic 
disorder subjects and eleven of the eighteen social phobia subjects had at least one 
current additional comorbid diagnosis.  This may have influenced disorder-specific 
interpretation processes.  Also, sample sizes were relatively small.  Therefore, a 
second study was planned.  Inclusion criteria for clinical subjects was much stricter, 
not allowing for current comorbid disorders other than specific phobia.  Instead of 
two anxiety disorder groups, one anxiety disorder group (social phobia) and a 
depression group was chosen for Study 2, in order to maximize the differences 
between the clinical groups and include a very common, typically comorbidly 
existent disorder.  More subjects were recruited.  Additional questionnaires were 
included and additional experimental materials were created. 
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Chapter 7:   Study 2 
7.1   Method  
7.1.1 General procedure 
Potential participants were screened, either by phone using the social 
phobia and major depressive disorder sheets of the "International Diagnostic Check 
Lists for DSM-IV" (IDCL; Hiller et al., 1997), or in classes at Dresden University 
of Technology, administering the Fragebogen zur Depressionsdiagnostik (FDD; 
description see below 7.1.3 Symptom and Cognition Questionnaires) and the LSAS.  
Participants who were native German speakers, and fulfilled diagnostic criteria for 
either major depressive disorder or social phobia, scored either below 6 on the FDD 
and below 14 on the Fear and the Avoidance subscales of the LSAS (control group), 
or above 21 on the FDD (depression group), or above 27 on the LSAS and below 10 
on the FDD (social phobia group), were invited individually to the experimental 
session.  Final participants took part in two 90 to 120-minute sessions and 
completed a set of questionnaires at home between sessions.  The interpretation 
experiment based on MacLeod and Cohen (1993) took place during the first 
session.  Upon arrival, participants' consent for participation in the study was 
obtained (Einwilligungserklärung; see Appendix VII) and relevant socio-
demographic information was assessed (birth date, highest degree, current status).  
Next, participants filled out the FDD and LSAS.  If they met the eligibility criteria, 
they were screened about medication, drug use, sleep, and other factors that could 
influence their performance in the experiment.  Then they completed a 
questionnaire about handedness.  Next, participants were diagnosed using the DSM-
IV checklists for Axis I anxiety disorders, depressive and manic/hypomanic 
episodes, dysthymia, hypochondria, alcohol and drug abuse/dependence, anorexia 
nervosa and bulimia nervosa.  After the diagnostic part, participants’ eligibility 
status was determined.  Those participants who remained in the study were asked to 
fill out two state measures (mood ratings and STAI-S [Laux, Glanzmann, Schaffner, 
& Spielberger, 1981]) before they started the interpretation experiment at the 
computer.  After completion of the interpretation task, they continued with another 
mood rating, completed the word fluency subscale from the WILDE-Intelligence-
Test (Jäger & Althoff, 1994) and an unrelated experiment on attentional processes.  
The first session concluded with a repetition of the mood rating and the STAI-S.  
Participants received a set of questionnaires to complete between sessions.  The 
Interpretation Questionnaire for Social Phobia and Depression (IQSD), the STAI-T, 
the FNE-S, and the Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS) were part of this set and are 
relevant to Study 2.  The second session was unrelated to the research questions 
reported in this thesis.  Each session was documented using the Ablaufprotokoll 
(Flow chart of the experimental session).  Session 1 lasted 90 to120 minutes. 
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7.1.2 Test of verbal intelligence 
WILDE-Intelligence-Test, Word Fluency Subscale (WIT; Jäger & Althoff, 1994) 
The WILDE-Intelligence-Test (WIT) is an intelligence-structure test that 
differentially measures intellectual performance in youth and adult populations 
(representative normative values exist from 14 to 38 years of age).  Test 
construction was based on the multidimensional intelligence model by Thurstone 
(1938).  In Study 2, the long version of the word fluency subscale, one of 15 
subtests of the WIT, was administered to participants (Form 1).  The subscale is 
constructed of one demonstration, one practice, and ten test items.  Each item 
consists of a defined first and last letter (e.g., first letter = L, last letter = E).  
Participants are required to write down in 45 seconds as many words as possible 
that start and end with these letters (e.g., late, locate, literate).  Administration time 
for the subtest (including instruction time) is 18 minutes.  The test has good 
psychometric properties.  Split-half reliability from a study using 150 
representative17-year-old students was .93 (Spearman-Brown).  Test-retest 
reliability with an interval of 12 months (138 professional and high school students, 
mean age = 17.3, SD = 1.2) was .85 (rr; Spearman-Rho).  The subtest correlates .45 
with the total score of the WIT. 
The mean score of the population tested in Study 2 on the word fluency 
subscale was 98.7 (SD=7.6), with a minimum of 81 and a maximum of 117.  
Kurtosis was -.303 and Skewness -.182. 
 
7.1.3 Symptom and cognition questionnaires 
Five established questionnaires were administered to all participants in 
Study 2, three symptom and two cognition questionnaires. 
Inventory to Diagnose Depression (Fragebogen zur Depressionsdiagnostik: FDD; Kühner, 
1997) 
The Fragebogen zur Depressionsdiagnostik nach DSM-IV is a self-report 
scale to diagnose Major Depressive Disorder.  It is the German translation of the 
"Inventory to Diagnose Depression" by Zimmerman, Coryell, Wilson, and 
Corenthal (1986).  It consists of 18 items assessing nine diagnostic criteria 
according to DSM-IV (APA, 1994): mood, interest/pleasure, energy, psychomotor 
status, guilt/self-worth, suicidal ideation, concentration, appetite, and sleep.  Each 
item is comprised of five statements that reflect different intensity levels of a 
particular depressive symptom in the past seven days (0 = symptom not prevalent; 1 
= symptom prevalent in subclinical intensity; 2 – 4 = increasing clinical intensity of 
symptom).  In addition, the duration of each symptom is assessed.  A numerical 
depression score ranging from 0 to 72, indicating severity of depression, can be 
calculated by summing up participants' unweighed responses to the18 items.  The 
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FDD differentiates better than other depression inventories, including the BDI, in 
the sub-threshold area among healthy and subclinically depressed individuals.  In 
addition, the inventory enables the diagnosis of major depressive disorder according 
to DSM-IV.  It is based on a categorical approach to depression.  For each 
individual symptom, a threshold for intensity and duration is provided.  Only items 
surpassing this threshold count toward the diagnosis of depression.  The instrument 
has good psychometric properties with internal consistency and split-half reliability 
ranging from .79 to .92 in depressed patients and student populations (Kühner & 
Viel, 1993).  Compared to the original US version, reliabilities are slightly reduced.  
The FDD is sensitive toward change. 
Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale (LSAS; Liebowitz, 1987) 
The LSAS was designed to assess the range of social interaction and 
performance situations that individuals with social phobia may fear or avoid.  The 
scale was administered in a German translation by Stangier and Heidenreich (2003).  
For a description of the questionnaire see 6.1.3 Symptom and Cognition 
Questionnaires. 
State-Trait-Anxiety Inventory (STAI-S & STAI-T; Laux et al., 1981)  
The STAI consists of two 20-item self-report measures that assess state 
and trait levels of anxiety, respectively (see 6.1.3 Symptom and Cognition 
Questionnaires).  The German version by Laux et al. (1981) was administered to 
participants in Study 2.  Similar to the English version used in Study 1, there is a 
comprehensive German manual with sample means, psychometric properties, 
norms, and percentile rankings for three different age groups (15 – 29 years, 30 – 59 
years, above 60 years), separate for males and females, as well as sample means for 
three student populations.  The manual reports good to excellent internal 
consistency for both scales (Cronbach’s alphas between .81 and .96) in adult, 
college, high school student, military recruit, and clinical samples.  Acceptable 3 to 
6-months test-retest reliability ranging from .68 to .91 was found with male and 
female university students as well as military recruits for the trait measure.  Stability 
was generally greater in female than in male populations.  The state measure is 
sensitive to situational change.  
Dysfunctional Attitude Scale (DAS; Weissmann & Beck, 1978) 
The DAS is a 40-item self-rating scale, designed to assess assumptions 
and beliefs underlying negative cognitive schemata of depression, a central 
construct of Beck's cognitive theory of emotional disorders (Beck, 1967, 1976; 
Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979).  The German version was developed and tested 
by Hautzinger, Luka, and Trautmann (1985), adapting version A of the English 
original.  Items are rated on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from -3 (total 
disagreement) to 0 (neutral) to +3 (total agreement), the scoring direction depending 
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on whether agreement or disagreement with a particular belief is judged to be 
maladaptive.  In Study 2, the short 30-item version (without items 2, 8, 12, 29, 30, 
35, 37-40 because of poor selectivity) was administered to participants.  Items 
include statements about perfectionist performance standards, rigid ideas about the 
world, and concern about the judgments of others.  Sample items are: "My value as 
a person relies greatly on what others think of me," "If I fail at work then I'm a 
failure as a person," and "I am only happy if most people I know admire me..  The 
total score, ranging from 30 to 210, is calculated by first recoding all items (–3=7, 
0=4, +3=1 for items 5,14, 21, and –3=1 to +3=7 for all other items) and summing 
up responses, with higher scores indicating more maladaptive thinking.  The DAS 
has been found to display adequate psychometric properties in college (Weissman, 
1979), unselected adult (Oliver & Baumgart, 1985), and psychiatric samples (Beck, 
Brown, Steer, & Weissman, 1991; Dobson & Breiter, 1983).  Internal consistency is 
generally high: between .80 and .95, and retest-reliability in treated and untreated 
patients was .71 and .76 (Beck et al., 1991).  The DAS shows high positive 
correlations with the BDI, the Hopelessness Scale (HS; Beck, Weissman, Lester, & 
Trexler, 1974), and the STAI.   
Fear of Negative Evaluation, short version (FNE-S; Leary, 1983a). 
The FNE quantifies a person's degree of concern over being negatively 
evaluated by others.  In Study 2, the short version by Leary (1983a; see 6.1.3 
Symptom and Cognition Questionnaires) consisting of 12 items was administered 
again.  It was translated from English to German by the author of this thesis and 
checked for language accuracy by retranslation and comparison to the original 
version by a native English speaker and psychiatrist, Walton T. Roth, M. D., 
Professor of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University School of 
Medicine. 
Table 7.1 gives an overview of the descriptives mean, standard deviation, 
minimum, maximum, kurtosis and skewness of the five questionnaires in the 
subject population of Study 2.  Table 7.1 also lists Cronbach’s alphas obtained in 
Study 2.  As can be seen, all questionnaires showed excellent internal consistency 
between .89 and .97, with the majority of questionnaires reaching ≥ .94.  For the 
LSAS, STAI, and FNE-S, descriptives are comparable to those obtained in Study 1. 
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Table 7.1:  Descriptives and reliability of the symptom and cognitive questionnaires in 
the subject population of Study 2 
 
Questionnaire Mean 
(Std dev) 
Minimum Maximum Kurtosis Skewness Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
FDD 9.84 
(10.75) 
0.00 39.00 -.122 1.049 .94 
LSAS 36.62 
(28.13) 
0.00 124.00 .023 .860 .97 
LSAS-Anxiety  18.83 
(14.78) 
0.00 61.00 -.529 .619 .96 
LSAS-
Avoidance  
17.78 
(14.70) 
.00 53.00 .575 1.016 .95 
STAI-S pre 36.78 
(10.10) 
20.00 67.00 .369 .900 .94 
STAI-S post 37.85 
(9.79) 
20.00 65.00 -.114 .607 .94 
STAI-T 42.73 
(13.30) 
24.00 72.00 -1.201 .322 .96 
DAS 87.94 
(22.94) 
39.00 147.00 -.553 .399 .89 
FNE-S 35.94 
(9.06) 
17.00 57.00 -.876 .177 .92 
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7.1.4 Participants 
One-hundred and twenty female native German language speakers 
participated in Study 2 at Dresden University of Technology.  They took part in a 
larger research project “Thinking processes in anxiety and depression” supported by 
grant Be 2131/1-1 from the German Research Foundation (DFG) to Eni Becker and 
Mike Rinck.  Participants were tested over a two-year period.  Most participants 
were students of the Dresden University of Technology (n=99).  Participants were 
recruited by employing the following methods: (a) advertising and screening (using 
the FDD and LSAS) of students in numerous lectures and seminars at the Dresden 
University of Technology, inviting those who had met screening criteria to 
participate, (b) placing posters around the city of Dresden, (c) printing ads in the 
local event calendar SAX and the University magazine adrem, and (d) from the 
subject pool of a large epidemiological public health project (A4 “Predictors of 
emotional health in young females”).  Participants received a monetary 
compensation of DM 50 ($22) after concluding a total of two 90 to 120-minute 
sessions and filling out a set of questionnaires between sessions.  Several potential 
participants were excluded according to the following criteria: medical illness, 
substance abuse, bipolar disorder, hypochondria, eating disorders, anxiety disorders 
others than specific phobia, and past or current psychotic episodes.  Participants 
with both depression and social phobia were also excluded.  The remaining 
participants were divided into three groups: twenty-nine participants met DSM-IV 
criteria for a current diagnosis of major depressive disorder, 36 participants fulfilled 
diagnostic criteria for generalized social phobia, and 55 healthy participants served 
as control group.  The three groups did not differ in verbal intelligence as measured 
by the word fluency subscale of the WILDE-Intelligence-Test (WIT; Jäger & 
Althoff, 1994) and differed only minimally in age.  According to the normative 
group of 17 to 25-year-old high school graduates listed in the manual (Jäger & 
Althoff, 1994), participants of Study 2 demonstrated above average verbal fluency 
abilities comparable to an Intelligence Quotient between 111 and 130.  Significant 
differences occurred in highest degree of education and current status because, 
compared to the social phobia and control groups, more participants in the 
depression group had left school after 10 years (17.2%) and were employed at the 
time of testing (24.1%).  This is because for the depression group, more participants 
responded to ads in local papers while social phobia and control subjects were 
mostly recruited at university.  An overview of the demographic information of the 
participant groups of Study 2 is provided in Table 7.2.  
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Table 7.2: Demographic data for the three participant groups of Study 2 
 
 Depression 
group (D) 
Social 
phobia 
group (SP)
Control 
group (C) 
D vs. SP D vs. C SP vs. C 
Age (years) 23.5 (4.4) 22.1 (3.1) 21.4 (2.4) n.s. n.s. p<.05 
Verbal intelligence 98.0 (8.1) 99.8 (6.3) 98.3 (8.1) n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Highest degree    χ2 (4) = 10.7; p<.05 
Secondary modern 
school (10th grade) 
n=5 n=1 n=1    
High school n=22 n=35 n=51    
Diploma n=1  n=1    
Current status    χ2 (8) = 21.7; p<.05 
Pupil n=2 n=1     
Student n=18 n=31 n=51    
Apprentice  n=1     
Professional n=7 n=2 n=1    
Unemployed n=1 n=1     
 
Table 7.3 displays mean scores (with standard deviations) of the symptom 
and cognition questionnaires described above for the three participant groups of 
Study 2. 
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Table 7.3:  Mean questionnaire scores (with standard deviations) for the three  
  participant groups of Study 2 
 
Questionnaire Depression 
group (D) 
Social 
phobia 
group (SP)
Control 
group (C) 
D vs. SP D vs. C SP vs. C
FDD 25.3 (7.4) 9.6 (6.5) 1.8 (2.1) p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 
LSAS 52.0 (25.8) 60.3 (23.0) 13.7 (8.4) n.s. p<.001 p<.001 
LSAS-Anxiety  24.5 (13.3) 32.7 (10.3) 6.8 (5.3) p<.01 p<.001 p<.001 
LSAS-
Avoidance  
27.1 (14.8) 27.1 (13.0) 6.8 (4.8) n.s. p<.001 p<.001 
STAI-S pre 45.8 (8.6) 39.7 (9.1) 30.0 (5.2) p<.01 p<.001 p<.001 
STAI-S post 46.1 (9.3) 40.7 (8.3) 31.8 (6.2) p<.05 p<.001 p<.001 
STAI-T 57.7 (6.8) 46.1 (9.9) 31.3 (5.5) p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 
DAS 105.7 (23.3) 96.9 (17.7) 72.8 (14.8) n.s. p<.001 p<.001 
FNE-S 40.2 (7.5) 42.9 (6.1) 29.1 (6.2) n.s. p<.001 p<.001 
 
As Table 7.3 shows, the three groups differed on the majority of the 
questionnaires.  As expected, both clinical groups scored significantly higher than 
the control group on all symptom and cognitive measures.  Thus, just as in Study 1, 
the questionnaire results support the clear psychopathology of the two clinical 
groups as assessed with the diagnostic interview.  Depressed patients and social 
phobia patients also differed significantly on the FDD, the symptom inventory to 
diagnose depression, and the trait as well as state measures of STAI, assessing 
unspecific negative affect more than specific anxiety symptoms.  The phobic fear of 
different performance and interaction situations characteristic for social phobia 
patients is reflected in the significant difference of the two clinical groups on the 
anxiety scale of the LSAS.  
However, there are also similarities between depression and social phobia: 
both disorders typically result in a certain amount of social withdrawal or 
avoidance.  This feature can explain the missing significant differences of the 
clinical groups on the avoidance scale and the total score of the LSAS.  
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Furthermore, depressed as well as socially anxious patients are often characterized 
by perfectionist standards and skewed assumptions of what other people think of 
them.  These cognitive errors are reflected in the significant differences between 
clinical and control groups on the cognitive questionnaires DAS and FNE-S while 
the cognitive similarities between the two disorders resulted in similar mean scores 
on these measures and a lack of statistical significance between the clinical groups. 
 
7.1.5 Experimental Questionnaires 
Interpretation Questionnaire for Social Phobia and Depression (IQSD) 
Just as Study 1 did, Study 2 also used an experimental interpretation 
questionnaire to detect the hypothesized interpretive bias in depressed and social 
phobia patients.  This experimental questionnaire consists of a total of 35 
ambiguous scenarios: fifteen depression scenarios, ten social phobia scenarios, and 
ten unspecific scenarios.  The same social phobia and unspecific items were 
included in the questionnaire as already described and administered in Study 1 (see 
6.1.4 Interpretation Questionnaire).  Depression scenarios were developed by three 
psychology students of Dresden University of Technology within their master’s 
thesis supervised by Eni Becker (Krampitz, 1998; Timann, 1997; Tzschacksch, 
1997).  Tzschacksch (1997) and Timann (1997) developed a preliminary version of 
an Interpretation Questionnaire for Depression (IQD) consisting of 25 scenarios.  
First, they constructed a large item pool, interviewed four clinical professionals 
about the appropriateness of scenarios, and selected the preliminary version of the 
interpretation questionnaire based on interview results.  They then tested 28 
students with a BDI sum score of 12 and more, 28 students with a BDI sum score 
lower than 5, 20 depressed psychiatric patients, and 20 control subjects without 
depression (BDI < 11) using this preliminary questionnaire.  They also administered 
a number of established symptom and cognitive questionnaires.  Correlational 
results indicated good external validity of the IQD.  Krampitz (1998) refined this 
preliminary version, eliminated five scenarios, standardized the answer format, and 
tested 94 psychology students, 15 medical students, and 57 psychiatric and 
psychosomatic patients (20 depressed patients, 21 anxiety patients with comorbid 
depression, and a clinical control group of 17 patients with a variety of chronic 
diseases but no depression) with the new version.  For the final version of the 
Interpretation Questionnaire for Depression used in Study 2, answers were further 
reduced to one functional and two dysfunctional items per ambiguous scenario in 
order to avoid mood induction and answer bias.  Selection of final answer options 
was based on item selectivity and comparisons of item means, as calculated by the 
three students (Krampitz, 1998; Timann, 1997; Tzschacksch, 1997).  In addition, 
five scenarios were eliminated all together.  Two scenarios displayed poor item 
characteristics, and three scenarios were typical social anxiety situations.  For the 
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remaining 15 depression scenarios, dysfunctional interpretations were modified 
where necessary to best fit depressogenic thinking.  
The 35 scenarios of the Interpretation Questionnaire for Social Phobia and 
Depression (IQSD) of Study 2 are again phrased in a self-referential way.  Each 
scenario provides three different interpretations of the described situation, one 
negative or threatening and two neutral or positive explanations for social phobia 
and unspecific scenarios, and two dysfunctional and one functional explanation for 
depression scenarios, totaling 105 items.  Interpretations are presented as "thoughts 
that the described situation could evoke in a person."  Participants are instructed to 
rate each interpretation independently on a 5-point Likert scale indicating how 
likely it is that the thought would come to mind if they encountered the situation 
described.  The same questionnaire instruction was used as in Study 1, presented to 
participants in German language.  Sample items are provided in Figure 7.1; for the 
entire questionnaire, see Appendix VIII. 
 Figure 7.1 provides one sample scenario for each of the three scenario 
types.  In the depression relevant scenario, b) offers a functional interpretation for 
the situation described, while items a) and c) are dysfunctional, depressogenic 
interpretations of this scenario.  In the social phobia scenario, items a) and c) are 
non-threatening interpretations, while item b) is the socially threatening explanation 
of the situation.  In the unspecific scenario, item a) provides the threatening 
interpretation.  Combining number of scenario types (3) and type of interpretation 
(2), the IQSD yields a total of six subscales: (1) depression-dysfunctional (30 
items), (2) depression-functional (15 items), (3) social-threatening (10 items), (4) 
social-non-threatening (20 items), (5) unspecific-threatening (10 items), and (6) 
unspecific-non-threatening (20 items).  Subscale scores are means, calculated by 
adding all relevant ratings and dividing the resulting sum by the number of items.  
Table 7.4 gives an overview of the descriptives mean, standard deviation, 
minimum, maximum, kurtosis and skewness of the six subscales in the subject 
population of Study 2.  It also lists Cronbach’s alphas obtained in Study 2.  As can 
be seen, all subscales showed good to excellent internal consistency: between .75 
and .96, with negative (dysfunctional or threatening) interpretations always 
providing better internal consistency than the corresponding functional and non-
threatening alternatives.  
The IQSD was also tested for its stability over time.  The questionnaire 
was given twice to an unselected student population (n = 118; mean age = 20.9 
(2.9); 13 male and 105 female students), with a time interval of 14 days between 
measurements.   Subscales showed  adequate  retest  reliability  (rr; Spearman-Rho) 
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Figure 7.1:  Sample items of the Interpretation Questionnaire for Social Phobia and 
                        Depression (IQSD) used in Study 2 
________________________________________________________________________ 
The scale is as follows: 
This  0 1  2 3 4 
thought is: very unlikely unlikely  possible  likely  very likely 
 
Depression scenario: How likely is it that this 
thought occurs to you? 
      You lie in bed awake and can't fall asleep. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) This is how it always starts.  Now nothing makes a 
difference anyway. 
b) A lot happened today.  My mind has to process all this. 
c) This is terrible.  I can't stop ruminating. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
 
Social phobia scenario: How likely is it that this 
thought occurs to you? 
   You are in the middle of answering a question at an 
interview. 
   The interviewer interrupts you and asks you another 
question. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) My answer was sufficient. 
b) I must have embarrassed myself. 
c) He is a bad interviewer. 
 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
 
Unspecific scenario: How likely is it that this 
thought occurs to you? 
   Approaching your house you notice that one window is open.
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) Someone broke into my house. 
b) A gust of wind pushed the window open. 
c) I forgot to close the window. 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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between .65 and .87.  Similar to the results for internal consistency (see 
Table 7.4), unspecific as well as non-threatening subscales displayed lower 
reliability (rr = .65 to .76) than disorder-specific threatening or dysfunctional 
subscales (social-threatening rr = .76, depression-dysfunctional rr = .87). 
 
Table 7.4:  Descriptives and reliability of the Interpretation Questionnaire for Social  
  Phobia and Depression (IQSD), separately calculated for each subscale 
 
Subscale Mean 
(Std dev) 
Minimum Maximum Kurtosis Skewness Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
depression-
dysfunctional 
1.13  
(.73) 
.07 3.43 -.030 .729 .96 
depression-
functional 
2.88  
(.62) 
.53 3.87 .849 -.835 .90 
social-
threatening 
1.38  
(.79) 
.00 3.40 -.514 .435 .89 
social-non-
threatening 
2.14  
(.43) 
.70 3.15 1.22 -.501 .73 
unspecific-
threatening 
1.62  
(.62) 
.30 3.10 -.444 .189 .76 
unspecific-non-
threatening 
2.36 
(.43) 
1.10 3.40 .351 -.235 .75 
 
Probability-Cost-Questionnaire (PCQ) 
In addition to the interpretation questionnaire IQSD, Study 2 employed a 
second experimental questionnaire, designed to assess the subjective probability and 
cost of aversive events.  This questionnaire consists of 31 slightly to moderately 
aversive events such as: Your bike was stolen.  You have lost interest in almost all 
your hobbies.  You embarrass yourself in front of somebody.  First, participants are 
asked to rate the subjective probability that each event could occur to them on an 
eleven-point scale (0 = not at all probable; 10 = extremely probable).  Second, 
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participants indicate how bad or stressful the event would be for them on another 
eleven-point scale (0 = not bad/stressful at all; 10 = extremely bad/stressful).  
Mirroring the interpretation questionnaire, negative events can be categorized into 
three groups: (1) situations typical for depression (11 events), (2) situations typical 
for social phobia (10 events), and (3) disorder-unspecific every-day hassles (10 
events).  Social and unspecific situations were largely taken from existing 
questionnaires (Ebert, 1993; Foa, et al., 1996; Röder, 1994).  Items were chosen 
based on their psychometric properties and their representativeness of social 
situations or daily hassles.  Additional items as well as all depression items were 
created by the author of this thesis.  The main selection criteria for these items was 
how prototypical they are of their category and how specific for social phobia or 
depression.  Events are largely based on disorder-specific symptoms and diagnostic 
situations.  A preliminary version, with 12 negative events for each category, was 
evaluated by eight professional colleagues.  Thirty-one items remained in the final 
version.  They were presented in a mixed categorical order.  Instructions and sample 
items are provided in Figure 7.2; for the entire questionnaire, see Appendix IX.  
Combining number of situational types (3) and type of judgment (2), the 
PCQ yields a total of six subscales: (1) depression-probability (11 items), (2) 
depression-cost (11 items), (3) social-probability (10 items), (4) social-cost (10 
items), (5) unspecific-probability (10 items), and (6) unspecific-cost (10 items).  
Subscale scores are means, calculated by adding all relevant ratings and dividing 
the resulting sum by the number of items.  Because threat has sometimes been 
defined as the product of cost and probability (e.g., Carr, 1974), Butler and 
Mathews (1983) proposed a composite threat score, multiplying the scale means of 
probability and cost ratings for each participant.  An event could be judged 
threatening due to either high cost or probability or both.  In the PCQ, this yields 
three additional scores for each participant: composite depression, composite social, 
and composite unspecific. 
Table 7.5 gives an overview of the descriptives mean, standard deviation, 
minimum, maximum, kurtosis and skewness of the six subscales and the three 
composite scores in the subject population of Study 2.  It also lists Cronbach’s 
alphas obtained in Study 2.  As can be seen, all subscales showed good to excellent 
internal consistency: between .80 and .95. 
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Figure 7.2:  Instructions and sample items of the Probability-Cost-Questionnaire 
                        (PCQ) used in Study 2 
________________________________________________________________________ 
First instruction: 
Please indicate how likely it is that the following events will happen to you.  From the scale 
below, select the number that best fits your personal judgment.  The numbers have the following 
meaning: 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 not at all somewhat moderately very extremely 
 likely 
Second instruction: 
Please indicate how bad or stressful the following events would be for you.  From the scale 
below, select the number that best fits your personal judgment.  The numbers have the following 
meaning: 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 not at all somewhat moderately very extremely 
 
 bad/stressful 
Please write the appropriate number for your judgment on the line provided beside each situation! 
1. How likely is it that the following will happen to you: 
2. How bad would it be for you if the following happened: 
 
Depression events:  
1. Seemingly without any reason, you feel like crying. ___ 
2. You can't find any pleasure in your life anymore. ___ 
3. You feel worthless. ___ 
Social phobia events: 
1. At a party, some guests notice that you are very nervous. ___ 
2. You blush while being introduced to a young man. ___ 
3. Speaking in front of a small group, your hands tremble strongly. ___ 
Unspecific events (daily hassles): 
1. Your TV breaks down (if you don't have a TV: your stereo).  ___ 
2. You lose your wallet.  ___ 
3. You strain your ankle.  ___ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
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Table 7.5:  Descriptives and reliability of the Probability-Cost-Questionnaire (PCQ),  
  separately calculated for each subscale 
 
Subscale Mean 
(Std dev) 
Minimum Maximum Kurtosis Skewness Cronbach’s 
Alpha 
depression-
probability 
3.19  
(2.30) 
.00 8.36 -.890 .559 .94 
depression-cost 6.44  
(1.44) 
2.73 9.09 -.657 -.443 .85 
composite 
depression 
22.15 
(18.35) 
.00 65.29 -.645 .752 .93 
social- 
probability 
3.71  
(1.93) 
.40 8.20 -.569 .392 .90 
social-cost 5.01  
(2.03) 
.80 9.00 -1.036 -.033 .93 
composite 
social 
21.42 
(16.83) 
.40 64.80 -.137 .826 .95 
unspecific- 
probability 
3.04  
(1.46) 
.20 7.50 -.013 .378 .82 
unspecific-cost 5.03 
(1.43) 
2.00 8.80 -.415 .039 .80 
composite 
unspecific 
15.86 
(9.81) 
.81 49.50 .969 .961 .83 
 
 
The PCQ was tested for its stability over time with the same student 
population as the IQSD.  However, six students left out an entire page or large 
sections of the PCQ, most likely due to time constraints, reducing the number of 
analyzed data sets to 112 (mean age = 21.0 (3.0); 12 male and 100 female students).  
The time interval between questionnaire administrations was 14 days.  Subscales 
showed adequate retest reliability (rr; Spearman-Rho) between .66 and .85, 
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comparable to the stability measures of the IQSD.  The depression-cost scale 
obtained the lowest retest reliability.  Unspecific scales ranged from .70 to .74, 
social subscales from .80 to .85, and the two remaining depression scales achieved 
also good retest reliabilities (.82 and .85). 
 
7.1.6 Interpretation Experiment 
The same experimental reading paradigm as in Study 1, developed by 
MacLeod and Cohen (1993), was used and modified accordingly in Study 2 (see 
6.1.5 Interpretation Experiment).  The 18 unspecific and 18 social scenarios were 
equivalent to those presented in Study 1, with some minor modifications for 
linguistic improvement (e.g., German first names were used).  The experiment was 
conducted in German.  Construction of the 18 depression scenarios paralleled the 
construction of social scenarios as described above (6.1.5 Interpretation 
Experiment).  Again, scenarios were inspired by MacLeod and Cohen's (1993) 
original materials, by symptom lists and diagnostic criteria of depression, and from 
disorder descriptions.  Disorder specific cue words were chosen from word lists 
typically presented to depressed participants in attention and memory tasks.  
Scenarios were presented to fellow psychologists and rated for quality and fit.  
Continuations scoring lower 50% were modified and the18 best scenarios were 
chosen.  Again, a total of 54 experimental scenarios were presented to participants 
of Study 2.  Figure 7.3 shows one sample scenario for each situational type.  It also 
indicates the different experimental conditions for each scenario. 
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Figure 7.3:  Sample scenarios of the Interpretation Experiment employed in Study 2 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Unspecific scenario: 
Cue word: 
threat cue: caries non-threat cue: workmen no cue: ????? 
Ambiguous sentence: 
The sound of the drill droned on and on. 
Disambiguating continuation: 
threat: The dentist finally stopped working on the 
hole in the tooth. 
non-threat: The bricklayer finally stopped working on 
the hole in the wall. 
Comprehension question: 
Did the drilling continue without stopping? Correct answer: No 
Social scenario: 
Cue word: 
threat cue: stupid non-threat cue: funny no cue: ????? 
Ambiguous sentence: 
When Rebecca gave her presentation, she noticed repressed giggles among her fellow students. 
Disambiguating continuation: 
threat: Her choice of words reflected her dullness. non-threat: Her choice of words reflected her great wit. 
Comprehension question: 
Were Rebecca's classmates amused by her speech? Correct answer: Yes 
Depression scenario: 
Cue word: 
threat cue: worry non-threat cue: hope no cue: ????? 
Ambiguous sentence: 
Bettina thought about her future. 
Disambiguating continuation: 
threat:  She could not believe that her life would 
ever be fulfilled and happy. 
non-threat: She imagined how fulfilled and happy her 
life would be. 
Comprehension question: 
Did Bettina imagine how her future life would be? Correct answer: Yes 
_______________________________________________________________________________________ 
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Due to the translation into German language, the difference between 
unspecific and disorder-specific scenarios in regard to word phrasing of the 
disambiguating sentences was much smaller.  Often it was not possible to translate 
the sentences and keep the homonyms.  Consequently, in only 11 of the 18 
unspecific scenarios were the disambiguating sentences phrased almost identically, 
with just one or a few words exchanged for a new meaning.  Ambiguity of disorder 
specific scenarios as well as of seven unspecific scenarios was created by situational 
description.  Just as in Study 1, disambiguating continuations were matched for 
syllables, and wording was approximated as much as possible.  Figure 7.4 gives an 
overview of the different experimental conditions of the interpretation experiment.  
 
Figure 7.4:  Summary of experimental design of the Interpretation Experiment 
employed in Study 2 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
3 situational types x     3 cue conditions x    2 disambiguating continuations 
unspecific scenarios threat cue threat continuation 
social scenarios non-threat cue non-threat continuation 
depression scenarios no cue  
__________________________________________________________________________ 
 
As in Study 1, the interpretation experiment consisted of 18 conditions.  
However, due to a material construction error, participants read between one and 
five scenarios under each experimental condition.  The relevant dependent variable 
was again comprehension time (RT) of the disambiguating sentence.  For analysis, 
mean RT of the sentences each participant read under each experimental condition 
(one to five) was calculated and entered in a mixed-factor ANOVA including the 
between-subjects factor "participant group" (depression subjects, social phobia 
subjects, control subjects), and the within-subjects factors "situational type" 
(unspecific situations, social situations, depression situations), "cue condition" 
(threat cue, non-threat cue, no cue) and "sentence continuation" (threat vs. non-
threat).  This yielded a 3x3x3x2 design.  Preparation and presentation of the 54 
scenarios plus three practice scenarios (see Appendix XI) were identical to Study 1. 
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7.2   Results 
7.2.1 Interpretation Questionnaire 
Analysis was analogous to the Interpretation Questionnaire for Panic 
Disorder and Social Phobia administered in Study 1.  For every participant, six 
mean scores were calculated, one for each subscale of the Interpretation 
Questionnaire for Social Phobia and Depression (IQSD).  In addition, an 
interpretation bias score for each scenario type was calculated by subtracting the 
mean score of the threatening/dysfunctional subscale from the mean score of the 
non-threatening/functional subscale.  Again, only a negative sign in the resulting 
bias score would indicate a person's tendency to endorse threatening or 
dysfunctional interpretations for ambiguous scenarios over non-threatening or 
functional interpretations.  Table 7.6 presents subscale means and standard 
deviations of the IQSD for the three participant groups of Study 2.  The verbal 
description of the Likert-scale corresponding to each mean is provided underneath 
the subscale means.  Underneath the bias scores, results of within-group 
comparisons of threatening/dysfunctional and non-threatening/functional subscale 
means are indicated. 
As can be seen in the table below, clinical subjects always rated the 
probability that a threatening or dysfunctional interpretation of an ambiguous, self-
referential scenario would come to their mind significantly higher than control 
subjects.  Accordingly, clinical subjects rated non-threatening and functional 
interpretations as significantly less likely than control subjects.  However, contrary 
to Study 1, there was not a single disorder-specific negative interpretation bias, not 
even in social phobia subjects.  Social phobia subjects in Study 2 endorsed 
threatening interpretations of social scenarios (mean=2.0) just as much as non-
threatening interpretations (mean=2.1), yielding no interpretive bias at all for social 
situations (mean social bias = 0.1; n.s.).  
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Table 7.6:  Mean questionnaire scores (with standard deviations) of the Interpretation 
Questionnaire for Social Phobia and Depression (IQSD) 
 
Subscale  Depression 
group (D) 
Social 
phobia 
group (SP)
Control 
group (C) 
D vs. SP D vs. C SP vs. C 
depression-
dysfunctional 
1.8 (0.6) 
(possible) 
1.4 (0.6) 
(unlikely) 
0.6 (0.3) 
(unlikely) 
p<.05 p<.001 p<.001 
depression-
functional 
2.5 (0.7) 
(possible-
likely) 
2.7 (0.6) 
(likely) 
3.2 (0.4) 
(likely) 
n.s. p<.001 p<.001 
depression bias 0.7 (1.1) 
p=.004 
1.2 (1.1) 
p<.001 
2.7 (0.6) 
p<.001 
n.s. p<.001 p<.001 
social-
threatening 
1.8 (0.7) 
(possible) 
2.0 (0.6) 
(possible) 
0.8 (0.4) 
(unlikely) 
n.s. p<.001 p<.001 
social-non-
threatening 
2.0 (0.4) 
(possible) 
2.1 (0.4) 
(possible) 
2.3 (0.4) 
(possible) 
n.s. p=.001 p<.05 
social bias 0.2 (0.7)  
n.s. 
0.1 (0.9)  
n.s. 
1.5 (0.6) 
p<.001 
n.s. p<.001 p<.001 
unspecific-
threatening 
1.8 (0.6) 
(possible) 
1.8 (0.7) 
(possible) 
1.4 (0.5) 
(unlikely) 
n.s. p<.001 p=.001 
unspecific-non-
threatening 
2.2 (0.5) 
(possible) 
2.3 (0.4) 
(possible) 
2.5 (0.4) 
(possible-
likely) 
n.s. p=.001 p<.05 
unspecific bias 0.3 (0.7) 
p<.05 
0.5 (0.9) 
p=.002 
1.1 (0.6) 
p<.001 
n.s. p<.001 p=.001 
 
In addition, Study 2 yielded one significant difference between the two 
clinical groups.  Depressed patients rated disorder-specific dysfunctional 
interpretations of depression-relevant scenarios as significantly more likely than 
social phobia patients and control subjects.  However, just like social phobia 
patients and control subjects, depressed patients endorsed functional interpretations 
of depression-relevant scenarios as significantly more likely than dysfunctional 
interpretations (mean dysfunctional = 1.8; mean functional = 2.5), resulting in a 
positive interpretation bias for depression-relevant situations (depression bias = 
0.7).  Depressed patients also showed a weak yet significant positive interpretive 
bias for unspecific situations and no interpretive bias for social situations.  The 
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same pattern was found for social phobia patients.  Finally and very similarly to 
Study 1, control subjects were characterized by a strong bias for non-threatening 
and functional interpretations in all three scenario types.  This positive interpretive 
bias was again always highly significantly different from clinical subjects.  
To judge the convergent and divergent validity of the Interpretation 
Questionnaire for Social Phobia and Depression (IQSD), Table 7.7 provides 
Pearson correlation coefficients (r) of the six subscales and three bias scores with 
symptom and cognition questionnaires administered in Study 2.  Correlations >.70 
between subscales and their corresponding symptom and cognition measures are 
indicated in bold, other correlations >.70 are indicated in italics.  Paralleling the 
findings of Study 1, the social-threatening subscale and the social bias score highly 
correlated with their corresponding symptom measure LSAS (rthreat/LSAS=.74; 
rbias/LSAS=-.71) and the questionnaire for social cognitions FNE-S (rthreat/FNE-S=.72; 
rbias/FNE-S=-.71).  Correlations were somewhat smaller than in Study 1.  Comparable 
correlations were reached by the depression-dysfunctional subscale and the 
depression bias score with their symptom and cognition questionnaires FDD and 
DAS (rdysf./FDD=.73; rdysf./DAS=.73; rbias/FDD=-.71 rbias/DAS=-.71).  However, the 
depression-dysfunctional subscale and the depression bias score also correlated just 
as strongly with the cognition questionnaire for social anxiety, the FNE-S (rdysf./FNE-
S=.74; rbias/FNE-S=-.73), and even stronger with the state measure of the State-Trait-
Anxiety Inventory (rdysf./STAI-T=.81; rbias/STAI-T=-.81).  Just as in Study 1, unspecific 
subscales showed intermediate correlations and little variations with all symptom 
and cognition questionnaires, underlining the intended unspecific character of the 
situations.  
 
142 
 
Table 7.7:  Pearson correlation coefficients r (with significances) of the Interpretation 
Questionnaire for Social Phobia and Depression (IQSD) with the  
symptom and cognition questionnaires administered in Study 2 
 
IQSD subscale FDD LSAS STAI-S 
pre 
STAI-S 
post 
STAI-T DAS FNE-S 
depression-
dysfunctional 
.73* 
(p<.001) 
.68 
(p<.001) 
.63 
(p<.001) 
.63 
(p<.001) 
.81** 
(p<.001) 
.73* 
(p<.001) 
.74** 
(p<.001) 
depression-
functional 
-.57 
(p<.001) 
-.53 
(p<.001) 
-.58 
(p<.001) 
-.56 
(p<.001) 
-.66 
(p<.001) 
-.56 
(p<.001) 
-.60 
(p<.001) 
depression bias -.71* 
(p<.001) 
-.66 
(p<.001) 
-.66 
(p<.001) 
-.65 
(p<.001) 
-.81** 
(p<.001) 
-.71* 
(p<.001) 
-.73** 
(p=.001) 
social-threatening .53 
(p<.001) 
.74* 
(p<.001) 
.51 
(p<.001) 
.49 
(p<.001) 
.66 
(p<.001) 
.59 
(p<.001) 
.72* 
(p<.001) 
social-non-
threatening 
 -.26 
(p=.004) 
-.25 
(p=.006) 
-32 
(p=.001) 
-.31 
(p=.001) 
-.36 
(p<.001) 
-.16   
(n.s.) 
-.28 
(p=.002) 
social bias -.55 
(p<.001) 
-.71* 
(p<.001) 
-.56 
(p<.001) 
-.54 
(p<.001) 
-.69 
(p<.001) 
-.55 
(p<.001) 
-.71* 
(p<.001) 
unspecific-
threatening 
.35 
(p<.001) 
.46 
(p<.001) 
.39 
(p<.001) 
.45 
(p<.001) 
.41 
(p<.001) 
.42 
(p<.001) 
.43 
(p<.001) 
unspecific-non-
threatening 
-.36 
(p<.001) 
-.31 
(p=.001) 
-.40 
(p<.001) 
-.35 
(p<.001) 
-.42 
(p<.001) 
-.27 
(p=.003) 
-.30 
(p=.001) 
unspecific bias -.47 
(p<.001) 
-.53 
(p<.001) 
-.52 
(p<.001) 
-.55 
(p<.001) 
-.55 
(p<.001) 
-.48 
(p<.001) 
-.50 
(p<.001) 
* Correlations >.70 between subscales and their corresponding questionnaires are indicated 
   in bold. 
** Correlations >.70 between subscales and other questionnaires are indicated in italics. 
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Table 7.8 lists intercorrelations between the six subscales and three bias 
scores of the IQSD.  Just as in Study 1, the interpretation bias scores correlated 
highest with their corresponding threat/dysfunctional scale (depression: rbias/dysf.=-
.93; social: rbias/threat=-.90; unspecific: rbias/threat=-.84; indicated in bold), as expected.  
This is because it was computed from it, and of course, the bias scores also 
correlated highly with their corresponding non-threatening/functional subscale.  
This correlation was especially high for the functional depression subscale 
(rbias/functional=.91; indicated in bold), and much lower for social and unspecific 
subscales (social: rbias/non-threat=.60; unspecific: rbias/non-threat=.62).  High 
intercorrelations were also reached between the depression and social subscales, 
pointing again to the close relationship between the two disorders (.72≤r≤.82; 
indicated in italics).  Like in Study 1, non-threatening and functional subscales 
intercorrelated significantly but lower than in Study 1 (.63≤r≤.72).  Finally, the 
unspecific threatening subscale correlated significantly with the two other 
threatening and dysfunctional subscales (runspec./depr.=.58; runspec./social=.59) just like the 
unspecific bias did with the two other biases (runspec./depr=.64; runspec./social=.61), but 
correlations were again lower than in Study 1. 
In summary, findings from Study 1 for the unspecific and social 
subscales of the interpretation questionnaire were nearly replicated except for the 
negative interpretive bias in social phobia that was not found in Study 2.  The 
Interpretation Questionnaire for Depression also seems to be a sound instrument 
with good psychometric properties.  
 
7.2.2 Probability-Cost-Questionnaire (PCQ) 
For every participant, six mean scores and three composite scores were 
calculated (see the Methods section of Study 2 above).  Table 7.9 presents subscale 
means and standard deviations of the PCQ for the three participant groups of Study 
2.  The verbal description of the numerical results on the 11-point probability and 
cost scales is provided underneath the subscale means. 
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Table 7.8:  Pearson correlation coefficients r (with significances) for the nine subscales of the Interpretation Questionnaire for Social Phobia  
and Depression (IQSD)  
 
 depression-
dysfunctional 
depression-
functional 
depression bias social-threat social-non-
threat 
social bias unspecific-
threat 
unspecific-
non-threat 
unspecific 
bias 
depression-
dysfunctional
1.00         
depression-
functional 
-.69 (p<.001) 1.00        
depression 
bias 
-.93* (p<.001) .91* (p<.001) 1.00       
social-threat .82** (p<.001) -.48 (p<.001) -.72** (p<.001) 1.00      
social-non-
threat 
-.29 (p=.001) .63 (p<.001) .48 (p<.001) -.20 (p<.05) 1.00     
social bias -.79** (p<.001) .67 (p<.001) .80** (p<.001) -.90* (p<.001) .60 (p<.001) 1.00    
unspecific-
threat 
.58 (p<.001) -.26 (p=.003) -.48 (p<.001) .59 (p<.001) .03 (n.s.) -.46 (p<.001) 1.00   
unspecific-
non-threat 
-.29 (p=.001) .64 (p<.001) .50 (p<.001) -.16 (n.s.) .72** (p<.001) .45 (p<.001) -.09 (n.s.) 1.00  
unspecific 
bias 
-.62 (p<.001) .56 (p<.001) .64 (p<.001) -.55 (p<.001) .37 (p<.001) .61 (p<.001) -.84* (p<.001) .62 (p<.001) 1.00 
* Correlations ≥.80 between subscales of the same situational type are indicated in bold. 
** Correlations ≥.70 between different situational types are indicated in italics.  For more details see the section immediately above Table 7.8.
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Table 7.9:  Mean questionnaire scores (with standard deviations) of the Probability- 
  Cost-Questionnaire (PCQ) 
 
Subscale  Depression 
group (D) 
Social 
phobia 
group (SP)
Control 
group (C) 
D vs. SP D vs. C SP vs. C 
depression-
probability 
5.7 (1.6) 
(moderately 
likely) 
3.9 (1.9) 
(moderately 
likely) 
1.4 (0.9) 
(somewhat 
likely) 
p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 
depression-
cost 
7.2 (1.2) 
(very bad) 
6.9 (1.3) 
(very bad) 
5.7 (1.4) 
(moderately 
bad) 
n.s. p<.001 p<.001 
composite 
depression 
42.0 (14.8) 28.0 (15.3) 8.0 (5.9) p<.001 p<.001 p<.001 
social- 
probability 
4.5 (1.5) 
(moderately 
likely) 
5.4 (1.6) 
(moderately 
likely) 
2.2 (1.1) 
(somewhat 
likely) 
p<.05 p<.001 p<.001 
social-cost 5.6 (1.8) 
(moderately 
bad) 
6.7 (1.2) 
(very bad) 
3.6 (1.6) 
(moderately 
bad) 
p=.007 p<.001 p<.001 
composite 
social 
26.5 (14.0) 36.7 (15.0) 8.8 (6.7) p=.007 p<.001 p<.001 
unspecific- 
probability 
3.5 (1.7) 
(somewhat-
moderately 
likely) 
3.3 (1.5) 
(somewhat 
likely) 
2.7 (1.2) 
(somewhat 
likely) 
n.s. p<.05 p<.05 
unspecific-
cost 
5.0 (1.5) 
(moderately 
bad) 
5.5 (1.3) 
(moderately 
bad) 
4.7 (1.4) 
(moderately 
bad) 
n.s. n.s. p=.004 
composite 
unspecific 
18.4 (12.6) 17.9 (9.1) 13.2 (7.9) n.s. p=.05 p=.01 
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As can be seen in the table above, clinical subjects rated the probability 
and cost of aversive events significantly higher than control subjects.  This was true 
for all three situational types (depression-relevant, social, and unspecific events) 
with one exception: daily hassles were worse for social phobia subjects only, there 
was no difference between the cost ratings of control and depressed subjects.  In 
addition, there were also disorder-specific differences between the two clinical 
groups.  Just as hypothesized, depressed subjects rated the probability of aversive 
depression-relevant events highest, even significantly higher than social phobia 
subjects.  Their composite score for aversive depression-relevant events was also 
significantly higher than the composite score of both control and social phobia 
subjects.  However, both clinical groups rated the cost of aversive depression-
relevant events the same (as "very bad"), and even control subjects rated these 
aversive events as "moderately bad." Thus, depression-relevant events were seen as 
most costly by all three experimental groups.  Social events, on the other hand, were 
rated as most probable and most costly by social phobia subjects, just as predicted.  
Consequently, social phobia subjects reached the highest composite score in this 
event category.  Also according to prediction, there was no difference between 
clinical groups in their ratings for unspecific events, nor did they differ in their 
composite score. 
To judge the convergent and divergent validity of the Probability-Cost-
Questionnaire, Table 7.10 provides Pearson correlation coefficients (r) of the six 
subscales and three composite scores with symptom and cognition questionnaires 
administered in Study 2.  The strongest correlations between subscales are indicated 
in bold. Paralleling the findings obtained with the interpretation questionnaire 
IQSD, social subscales highly correlated with their corresponding symptom and 
cognitive measures (LSAS: .69≤r≤.79; FNE-S: .70≤r≤.77).  The closest relationship 
between measures was obtained for the social composite score, supporting the 
validity of this additional score proposed by Butler and Mathews (1983).   
Comparable correlations were reached by the depression-probability 
subscale and the depression composite score with their symptom questionnaire FDD 
(rprob./FDD=.83; rcomp./FDD=.82). Similar to the correlation pattern of the IQSD, the 
strongest correlation of the depression-probability subscale as well as the depression 
composite score was reached with STAI-T (rprob./STAI-T=.89; rcomp./STAI-T=.87), while 
correlations with the cognition measure of depression DAS were lower 
(rprob./DAS=.66; rcomp./DAS=.67). The depression-cost subscale correlated only 
moderately highly with all symptom and cognition questionnaires and showed little 
variation.  The same was true for all unspecific subscales, again supporting the 
theoretically proposed and intended unspecific character of this situational type.  
Similar findings were obtained with the interpretation questionnaires IQPS and 
IQSD in Study 1 and Study 2.  Of course, considering the large subject population 
all findings are based on, most correlations were highly significant.  
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Table 7.10:  Pearson correlation coefficients r (with significances) of the Probability- 
Cost-Questionnaire (PCQ) with the symptom and cognition  
questionnaires administered in Study 2 
 
PCQ subscale FDD LSAS STAI-S 
pre 
STAI-S 
post 
STAI-T DAS FNE-S 
depression-
probability 
.83* 
(p<.001) 
.68 
(p<.001) 
.73** 
(p<.001) 
.65 
(p<.001) 
.89** 
(p<.001) 
.66 
(p<.001) 
.65 
(p<.001) 
depression-cost .42 
(p<.001) 
.41 
(p<.001) 
.37 
(p<.001) 
.44 
(p<.001) 
.48 
(p<.001) 
.42 
(p<.001) 
.37 
(p<.001) 
composite 
depression 
.82* 
(p<.001) 
.68 
(p<.001) 
.70** 
(p<.001) 
.66 
(p<.001) 
.87** 
(p<.001) 
.67 
(p<.001) 
.63 
(p<.001) 
social- probability .50 
(p<.001) 
.76* 
(p<.001) 
.59 
(p<.001) 
.53 
(p<.001) 
.70** 
(p<.001) 
.58 
(p<.001) 
.75* 
(p<.001) 
social-cost .39 
(p<.001) 
.69 
(p<.001) 
.47 
(p<.001) 
.42 
(p<.001) 
.56 
(p<.001) 
.61 
(p<.001) 
.70* 
(p<.001) 
composite social .45 
(p<.001) 
.79* 
(p<.001) 
.56 
(p<.001) 
.48 
(p<.001) 
.66 
(p<.001) 
.61 
(p<.001) 
.77* 
(p<.001) 
unspecific- 
probability 
.26 
(p=.004) 
.24 
(p<.01) 
.41 
(p<.001) 
.44 
(p<.001) 
.32 
(p<.001) 
.28 
(p=.002) 
.29 
(p=.002) 
unspecific-cost .07    
(n.s.) 
.31 
(p=.001) 
.20 
(p<.05) 
.19 
(p<.05) 
.20 
(p<.05) 
.28 
(p=.002) 
.31 
(p=.001) 
composite 
unspecific 
.23 
(p<.05) 
.28 
(p=.002) 
.40 
(p<.001) 
.42 
(p<.001) 
.31 
(p=.001) 
.32 
(p<.001) 
.32 
(p<.001) 
* Correlations ≥.70 between subscales and their corresponding questionnaires are  
   indicated in bold. 
** Correlations ≥.70 between subscales and other questionnaires are indicated in italics. 
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 In summary, the correlation pattern of the PCQ was similar to the 
correlation pattern of the two interpretation questionnaires IQPS and IQSD, with 
good convergent and divergent validity for the clinical subscales and scores.  The 
only exception was the depression-cost subscale that showed little variation in its 
relationship with different symptom and cognition measures.  The correlation 
pattern of the unspecific scales was also as hypothesized.  Selected daily hassles 
appear to be suitable control items.  
Table 7.11 lists intercorrelations between the six subscales and three 
composite scores of the PCQ.  The composite scores always correlated very 
strongly with their corresponding probability scale (depression: rprob./comp.=.97; 
social: rprob./comp=.94; unspecific: rprob./comp=.90), while corresponding cost scales 
showed comparably strong intercorrelations with composite scores only for social 
situations (rcost/comp.=.87), but not for depression and unspecific situations 
(depression: rcost/comp=.63; unspecific: rcost/comp=.60).  Apparently, subjects' 
probability ratings are a better indicator for disorder specific cognitive biases than 
cost ratings.  Paralleling findings with the interpretation questionnaire IQSD, high 
intercorrelations were also reached between depression and social subscales, 
specifically probability subscales and composite scores (.68≤r≤.74).  This again 
underlines the close relationship between the two disorders.  Finally, all social 
subscales intercorrelated strongly (.73≤r≤.94), while depression and unspecific 
subscales showed only low to moderate correlations within the same situation 
beyond the one strong correlation reported above. 
In summary, the Probability-Cost-Questionnaire showed acceptable 
psychometric properties.  Probability ratings seem to be of greater value than cost 
ratings for measuring differences in people’s judgment of negative events.  
However, in comparison to the interpretation questionnaire, the PCQ has some 
disadvantages.  The convergent and divergent validity of the PCQ, specifically of 
the depression subscales, were not quite as expected.  The highest intercorrelations 
were reached with STAI-T (mainly measuring negative affect) rather than with 
FDD and DAS (the corresponding symptom and cognition measures).  The 
depression-cost subscale showed moderate correlations with all administered 
symptom and cognition questionnaires.  Finally, unspecific subscales of the 
interpretation questionnaire better differentiated patients from control subjects than 
unspecific subscales of the PCQ.  Therefore, the interpretation questionnaire seems 
to be more recommendable for measuring cognitive distortions than the PCQ. 
  
Table 7.11:  Pearson correlation coefficients r (with significances) for the nine subscales of the Probability-Cost-Questionnaire (PCQ) 
 
 depression- 
probability 
depression- 
cost 
composite 
depression 
social- 
probability 
social-cost composite 
social 
unspecific- 
probability 
unspecific- 
cost 
composite 
unspecific 
depression-
probability 
1.00         
depression-
cost 
.49 (p<.001) 1.00        
composite 
depression 
.97* (p<.001) .63 (p<.001) 1.00       
social- 
probability 
.74** (p<.001) .44 (p<.001) .71** (p<.001) 1.00      
social-       
cost 
.54 (p<.001) .53 (p<.001) .56 (p<.001) .73* (p<.001) 1.00     
composite 
social 
.69** (p<.001) .47 (p<.001) .68** (p<.001) .94* (p<.001) .87* (p<.001) 1.00    
unspecific- 
probability 
.46 (p<.001) .26 (p=.004) .45 (p<.001) .49 (p<.001) .23 (p<.05) .39 (p<.001) 1.00   
unspecific-
cost 
.18 (p=.05) .36 (p<.001) .22 (p<.05) .34 (p<.001) .41 (p<.001) .34 (p<.001) .27 (p=.003) 1.00  
composite 
unspecific 
.41 (p<.001) .32 (p<.001) .45 (p<.001) .48 (p<.001) .32 (p<.001) .39 (p<.001) .90* (p<.001) .60 (p<.001) 1.00 
* High correlations between subscales of the same situational type are indicated in bold. 
** High correlations between different situational types are indicated in cursive.  For more details see the section immediately above Table 7.11.
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7.2.3 Interpretation Experiment 
Just as in Study 1, the experimental software recorded the comprehension 
latencies (RTs) of the continuation sentences.  Analysis of these data was identical 
to the procedure described above (see 6.2.2 Interpretation Experiment).  Mean 
comprehension latencies of disambiguating continuation sentences were analyzed in 
a mixed-design analysis of variance (ANOVA) involving one between-subjects and 
three repeated measures factors.  The between-subjects variable was "participant 
group" (depressed subjects, social phobia subjects, control subjects), and the within-
subjects factors were "situational type" (unspecific situations, depression-relevant 
situations, social situations), "cue condition" (threat cue, non-threat cue, no cue) and 
"sentence continuation" (threat vs. non-threat).  The general sensitivity of the 
interpretation paradigm was confirmed by the presence of a highly significant two-
way interaction involving cue condition and sentence continuation, F(2,234)=24.61; 
p<.001, comparable to the interaction found in Study 1.  Again, the relative 
comprehension latencies shown across the two continuation conditions were clearly 
influenced by the interpretation imposed on the ambiguous sentence.  The 
experimental paradigm employed in the two studies should have been able to detect 
differences in participants' interpretation of ambiguous situations, if they exist.  
However, despite all efforts taken to improve differences between groups and 
minimize within-group variance, all interactions involving the between-subjects 
factor "participant group" were again non-significant.  The three participant groups 
did not differ in the interpretation they imposed on ambiguous situations.  
 
Manipulation check 
The procedure was identical to Study 1 (see 6.2.2 Interpretation 
Experiment).  Two unspecific, six depression-relevant, and one social scenario had 
to be excluded from further analysis because under both prime conditions, mean RT 
of the mismatching continuation (threat continuation following non-threat cue and 
non-threat continuation following threat cue) was shorter than mean RT of the 
matching continuation (threat continuation following threat cue and non-threat 
continuation following non-threat cue).  Thus, all results reported below are based 
on data from 16 unspecific, 12 depression-relevant, and 17 social scenarios.   
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Table 7.12:  Mean comprehension latency data (with standard deviation) of  
  continuation sentences from the Interpretation Experiment in Study 2 
 
  Depressed Subjects 
 Unspecific scenarios Depression scenarios Social Scenarios 
Condition Threat 
continuation 
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat 
continuation
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat 
continuation 
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat cue 3,385 
(1,034) 
3,817 
(1,100) 
3,577 
(1,183) 
3,593 
(1,029) 
3,444 
(1,086) 
3,589 
(1,082) 
Non-threat 
cue 
3,649  
(908) 
3,555 
(1,041) 
3,524  
(962) 
3,366  
(960) 
3,738 
(1,082) 
3,408 
(1,192) 
No cue 3,515  
(927) 
3,472 
(1,035) 
3,457 
(1,288) 
3,433  
(893) 
3,530  
(988) 
3,621  
(994) 
Social Phobia Subjects 
 Unspecific scenarios Depression scenarios Social Scenarios 
Condition Threat 
continuation 
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat 
continuation
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat 
continuation 
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat cue 3,414 
(1,125) 
3,898 
(1,501) 
3,245 
(1,194) 
3,764 
(1,510) 
3,566 
(1,442) 
3,678 
(1,210) 
Non-threat 
cue 
3,995 
(1,438) 
3,523 
(1,184) 
3,506 
(1,449) 
3,211 
(1,091) 
3,775 
(1,404) 
3,333 
(1,257) 
No cue 3,370 
(1,178) 
3,633 
(1,194) 
3,415 
(1,319) 
3,428 
(1,205) 
3,385 
(1,357) 
3,417 
(1,074) 
Control Subjects 
 Unspecific scenarios Depression scenarios Social Scenarios 
Condition Threat 
continuation 
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat 
continuation
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat 
continuation 
Non-threat 
continuation
Threat cue 3,174  
(887) 
3,662  
(929) 
3,276  
(894) 
3,356  
(913) 
3,169  
(756) 
3,545  
(900) 
Non-threat 
cue 
3,736  
(927) 
3,314  
(780) 
3,374  
(997) 
3,075  
(805) 
3,339  
(989) 
3,248  
(971) 
No cue 3,259  
(799) 
3,292  
(920) 
3,186  
(979) 
3,151  
(850) 
3,261  
(837) 
3,430  
(901) 
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Next, for each participant and each experimental condition, the mean RT 
was calculated.  These latency data for all three participant groups are presented in 
Table 7.12 above.  
 
Main analysis 
To determine participants' interpretation tendencies under different cue 
conditions, comprehension latencies shown on threat and on non-threat 
continuations had to be compared.  For each participant group and each situational 
type, the relative speeding on threat continuations was calculated by subtracting 
RTs of threat continuations from RTs of non-threat continuations.  These difference 
scores are presented in Table 7.14.  According to the initial hypotheses of this 
thesis, the following result pattern was expected to emerge: 
 
Table 7.13: Result pattern of the Interpretation Experiment of Study 2 deducted from  
  hypotheses  
 
Cue Condition Difference (RT non-threat continuation minus 
RT threat continuation) 
Threat cue Positive (deceleration) 
Non-threat cue Negative (acceleration) 
No cue Determined by participants' initial interpretation: 
Negative for control subjects in all three scenario 
types 
Positive for social phobia patients at least in social 
scenarios 
Positive for depressed patients in all three scenario 
types 
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Table 7.14:  Difference scores (with standard deviation) of continuation sentences  
  under the three cue conditions of the Interpretation Experiment in Study 2 
 
  Depressed Subjects 
Condition Unspecific scenarios Depression 
scenarios 
Social Scenarios 
Threat cue 432 (817) 16 (1,073) 145 (673) 
Non-threat cue -94 (708) -158 (892) -329 (942) 
No cue -42 (1,003) -24 (938) 90 (974) 
  Social Phobia Subjects 
Condition Unspecific scenarios Depression 
scenarios 
Social Scenarios 
Threat cue 484 (912) 518 (929) 112 (1,025) 
Non-threat cue -472 (982) -295 (919) -442 (1,086) 
No cue 263 (856) 13 (746) 32 (897) 
  Control Subjects 
Condition Unspecific scenarios Depression 
scenarios 
Social Scenarios 
Threat cue 489 (902) 80 (1,001) 376 (920) 
Non-threat cue -422 (1,017) -299 (980) -90 (799) 
No cue 33 (719) -35 (853) 169 (1,022) 
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Unspecific scenarios 
For control and social phobia subjects, predictions for unspecific scenarios 
were identical to the predictions of Study 1.  Again, control subjects were expected 
to interpret uncued scenarios similar to non-threat-cued scenarios, thus revealing a 
bias toward non-threatening interpretations.  This hypothesis was derived from the 
results of the low trait anxious group of MacLeod and Cohen (1993).  Social phobia 
subjects were expected to show no interpretive bias at all while depressed subjects 
were expected to interpret uncued scenarios similarly to threat cued scenarios, 
revealing a bias toward threatening interpretations (see Figure 7.5).  The actual 
results can be seen in Figure 7.6.  
 
Figure 7.5: Prediction of result pattern for difference scores of continuation sentences 
for unspecific scenarios in Study 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contrary to prediction, the two-way interaction of "group" and "cue 
condition" did not reach statistical significance (F(4,234)=1.25; n.s.), and neither 
did the main factor "group" (F(2,117)<1; n.s.).  There was a main effect of the 
factor "cue condition" (F(2,234)=21.06; p<.001).  Within-group comparisons 
between the difference scores further supported the assumption that all three groups 
interpreted continuation sentences under "threat cue" and "non-threat cue" 
conditions significantly differently (all p<.02). 
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Figure 7.6: Relative speeding on  threat continuation sentences of unspecific scenarios  
  for depression, social phobia, and control subjects in Study 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The difference score for control subjects under the "no-cue condition" lay 
equidistant between the two cued conditions as both t-tests reached statistical 
significance (t(54)≥.2.58; p<.02).  In Study 1, control subjects had also not shown 
any interpretation bias for unspecific scenarios.  Social phobia subjects, on the other 
hand, interpreted uncued ambiguous unspecific scenarios similarly to threat-cued 
ambiguous unspecific scenarios.  This was reflected in the significant difference 
between "non-threat cue condition" and "no cue condition" (t(35)=3.01; p=.005).  
This result pattern was expected for depressed subjects who actually showed no 
interpretive bias at all (both within-group comparisons with the "no cue condition" 
were not significant).  It is the opposite finding to Study 1, where social phobia 
subjects demonstrated an interpretive bias for threatening interpretations of 
ambiguous unspecific scenarios.  However, as the two-way interaction of "group" 
and "cue condition" was again not significant, the conservative view that all three 
participant groups were free of any systematic interpretive bias seems most 
appropriate. 
Just as in Study 1, contrast analyses supported no specific interpretation 
bias for unspecific scenarios.  For control subjects, the models for "no bias," "threat 
bias," and "non-threat bias" fit the data equally well (all t≥4.22; p<.001; r≥.50).  The 
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models for "no bias" and "non-threat bias" best fit the data of depressed subjects 
(both t≥2.63; p<.01; r≥.45).  For social phobia subjects, the models for "no bias" 
and "threat bias" presented the best data fit (both t≥3.89; p<.001; r≥.55).  This 
justifies the overall interpretation already drawn from Study 1 that no experimental 
group revealed any reliable interpretive bias for unspecific scenarios. 
 
Figure 7.7: Prediction of result pattern for difference scores of continuation sentences 
for depression scenarios in Study 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Depression scenarios 
For depression scenarios, control subjects were again expected to interpret 
uncued scenarios similarly to non-threat-cued scenarios, thus revealing a bias 
toward non-threatening interpretations.  Depressed subjects were expected to show 
a bias toward threatening interpretations of depression-relevant scenarios.  Social 
phobia subjects were expected to show no interpretive bias (see Figure 7.7).  The 
actual results can be seen in Figure 7.8.  
Just as with unspecific scenarios, the main factor "group" did not reach 
statistical significance (F(2,117)=1.15; n.s.).  The main effect of the factor "cue 
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condition" was highly significant (F(2,234)=6.44; p=.002).  However, depression-
relevant scenarios of Study 2 revealed problems similar to panic-relevant scenarios 
presented in Study 1.  First, a large number of scenarios (n=6) had to be eliminated 
from further analyses because the intended priming did not work (see the section 
"Manipulation check" above).  Second, within-group comparisons between the 
difference scores under the cue conditions "threat" and "non-threat" were significant 
only for social phobia subjects (t(34)=3.21; p=.003).   
 
Figure 7.8: Relative speeding on threat continuation sentences of depression scenarios 
                        for depression, social phobia, and control subjects in Study 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For depressed and control subjects, difference scores were almost identical 
under all three cue conditions suggesting a very small influence of threat and non-
threat cues on subjects' interpretation.  All within-group comparisons were not 
significant (all t<1.95; n.s.).  Only social phobia subjects seem to have responded to 
the cueing, resulting in a decelerated difference score under the "threat condition." 
Social phobia subjects interpreted uncued ambiguous depression-relevant scenarios 
similarly to non-threat cued ambiguous depression-relevant scenarios.  This was 
reflected in the significant difference between "threat cue condition" and "no cue 
condition" (t(34)=2.59; p=.014).  This result pattern was expected for control 
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subjects.  Again, the two-way interaction of "group" and "cue condition" was not 
significant (F(4,234)=1.13; n.s.) suggesting that none of the three participant groups 
showed any interpretive bias.  Contrast analyses for the social phobia group did not 
support any specific interpretation bias for depression-relevant scenarios either.  
The models for "no bias," "threat bias" and "non-threat bias" fit the data equally 
well (all t≥2.81; p≤.005; r≥.43).  
Social scenarios 
For control and social phobia subjects, predictions for social scenarios 
were identical to the predictions of Study 1.  Control subjects were again expected 
to interpret uncued scenarios similarly to non-threat cued scenarios.  Social phobia 
subjects were expected to show a bias toward threatening interpretations of social 
scenarios, just as depressed subjects (see Figure 7.9).  The actual results can be seen 
in Figure 7.10.  
 
Figure 7.9: Prediction of result pattern for difference scores of continuation sentences  
  for social scenarios in Study 2 
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Figure 7.10: Relative speeding on threat continuation sentences of social scenarios for  
  depression, social phobia, and control subjects in Study 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Just as in Study 1 and for all scenario types, the main factor "group" did 
not reach statistical significance (F(2,117)=2.51; p=.086).  The main effect of the 
factor "cue condition" was highly significant (F(2,234)=8.89; p<.001).  Within-
group comparisons between the difference scores supported the assumption that all 
three groups interpreted continuation sentences under "threat cue" and "non-threat 
cue" conditions differently (all p<.04).  This was different from Study 1 where the 
comparisons had not been significant.  However, the difference scores for all three 
participant groups under the "no-cue condition" lay equidistant between the two 
cued conditions, and no t-test reached statistical significance (all t<1.95; p≥.06).  
Contrast analyses were not able to differentiate between models either.  For control 
and social phobia subjects, all three models fit the data equally well (all t≥1.84; 
p<.05; r≥.28).  For depressed subjects, the models for "no bias" and for "threat bias" 
presented the best data fit (both t≥2.18; p<.025; r≥.38). 
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Just as in Study 1, a replication of MacLeod and Cohen's findings was 
attempted.  Of course, the State-Trait-Anxiety-Inventory had been administered in 
Study 2 as well.  Identical to the procedure described in Study 1, data from 
unspecific scenarios of all subjects from Study 2 who fit one of the two MacLeod 
and Cohen groups (low vs. high trait anxiety) were analyzed again.   
 
Table 7.15: STAI-T questionnaire and difference scores (with standard deviation) of 
continuation sentences for unspecific scenarios after regrouping  
of subjects from Study 2 
 
Group Low trait anxiety High trait anxiety 
Range of STAI-T sum 
score (SS) 
24 < SS < 36 44 < SS < 56 
Mean (with standard 
deviation) of STAI-T 
30.0 (3.2) 
27* 
50.0 (3.2) 
46* 
Minimum — Maximum 25 — 35 45 — 55 
Number of subjects 44 
16* 
24 
16* 
Threat cue condition 541 (1.036) 
545* 
340 (626) 
35* 
Non-threat cue condition -315 (918) 
-142* 
-390 (834) 
-307* 
No cue condition 17 (738) 
-75* 
232 (860) 
63* 
* Where possible, for ease of comparison, numbers from the study by MacLeod and Cohen (1993) are 
provided in italics underneath the data from Study 2 
 
Table 7.15 presents means and standard deviations of the STAI-T 
questionnaire and the difference scores for the two newly formed groups.  Figure 
7.11 illustrates these results of Study 2. 
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Figure 7.11: Relative speeding on threat continuation sentences of unspecific scenarios 
                        for low and high trait anxious groups in Study 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although Figure 7.11 looks fairly similar to the results obtained by 
MacLeod and Cohen (1993), the important interaction of "group" and "cue 
condition" did not reach statistical significance at all (F(2,132)<1; n.s.).  The same 
was true for the main factor "group" (F(1,66)<1; n.s.).  Once again, only the main 
factor "cue condition" was highly significant (F(2,132)=12.21; p<.001).  In both 
groups, within-group t-tests were significant for "threat cue" vs. "non-threat cue" 
(both t>3.12; p≤.005).   
Moreover, within-group comparisons also supported the visual similarity 
between the results of Study 2 and MacLeod and Cohen (1993).  For low trait 
anxious subjects, comparison of difference scores were significant only under the 
cue conditions "threat cue" vs. "no cue" (t(43)=2.70; p=.01), but not "non-threat 
cue" vs. "no cue" (t(43)=1.71; n.s.), suggesting a bias for non-threatening 
interpretations in low trait anxious subjects.  However, contrast analysis did not 
differentiate between the two models "no bias" and "non-threat bias" (both t>3.93; 
p<.001; r≥.52).  For high trait anxious subjects, the opposite was true.  Within-
group comparison of difference scores was significant for "non-threat cue" vs. "no 
cue" (t(23)=2.33; p=.029) but not for "threat cue" vs. "no cue" (t(23)<1; n.s.), 
supporting a bias for threatening interpretations in high trait anxious subjects.  
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Again, contrast analysis did not differentiate between the two models "no bias" and 
"threat bias" (both t>3.02; p≤.005; r≥.53).  Thus, neither Study 1 nor Study 2 was 
able to clearly replicate the original findings.   
Insufficient sample sizes due to post-hoc grouping is not a plausible 
explanation for this dilemma because group sizes were actually much larger in 
Study 2 than in the original study by MacLeod and Cohen (1993) (low and high 
trait anxious subjects: n=44 and n=24 in Study 2 vs. n=2x16 in the original study).  
The small number of scenarios (n=16 entered analysis) may be a factor contributing 
to the non-significance of the expected two-way interaction of "group" and "cue 
condition." However, as criticized above, the two original groups (MacLeod & 
Cohen, 1993) represented only part of the full range of the STAI-T sum score.  
Subjects of Study 2 of this thesis covered the scale range of STAI-T much better.   
Therefore, just as in Study 1, percentile rankings of subjects in Study 2 
were used to recode the three experimental groups of Study 2 into four Quartile 
groups based on their sum score in the STAI-T.  Table 7.16 presents means and 
standard deviations of the STAI-T questionnaire and the difference scores for the 
four Quartile groups.  Figure 7.12 illustrates the difference scores. 
 
Table 7.16: STAI-T questionnaire and difference scores (with standard deviation) of  
  continuation sentences for unspecific scenarios for  
Quartile groups of Study 2 
 
Group 1st Quartile 2nd Quartile 3rd Quartile 4th Quartile 
Range of STAI-T sum 
score (SS) 
SS < 28 27 < SS < 
34 
33 < SS < 
43 
SS > 42 
Mean (with standard 
deviation) of STAI-T 
25.3 (1.0) 30.5 (1.8) 37.3 (2.7) 55.5 (7.2) 
Minimum — Maximum 24 — 27 28 — 33 34 — 42 43 — 72 
Number of subjects 15 25 25 55 
Threat cue condition 469 (751) 536 (1.178) 422 (725) 470 (837) 
Non-threat cue condition -650 (902) -191 (967) -741 (997) -179 (875) 
No cue condition 33 (630) -93 (653) 390 (933) 39 (898) 
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Analysis of unspecific scenarios was repeated with these four new groups.  
Results are presented in Figure 7.12.  Again, in the overall ANOVA, the main factor 
"cue condition" was highly significant (F(2,232)=24.94; p<.001).  The predicted 
two-way interaction of "group" and "cue condition" was only marginally significant 
(F(6,232)=1.98; p=.069).  The main factor "group" was not significant at all 
(F(3,116)=1.13; n.s.).  Within-group comparisons of the difference scores under the 
cued conditions supported the necessary assumption that "threat" and "non-threat 
conditions" were interpreted differently by all four groups (all t≥2.39; p<.025).  
Overall, the results are very similar to Study 1.  As there were larger sample sizes in 
Study 2, the results are more meaningful.  In Study 2, within-group comparisons of 
the difference scores under the conditions "no cue" vs. "threat cue" and "no cue' vs. 
"non-threat cue" revealed the following pattern of interpretation biases: subjects 
with very low trait anxiety (1st Quartile) displayed no interpretive bias at all.  RT 
difference scores under the "no cue" condition lay equidistant between the two cued 
conditions with significances near p=.05 (both t(14) ≥2.07; p≤.057).  Low trait 
anxious subjects (2nd Quartile) displayed a bias for non-threatening interpretations 
("threat cue" vs. "no cue": t(24)=2.12; p=.045; "non-threat cue" vs. "no cue": 
t(24)<1; n.s.), while high trait anxious subjects (3rd Quartile) interpreted ambiguous 
unspecific scenarios in a threatening way ("threat cue" vs. "no cue": t(24)<1; n.s; 
"non-threat cue" vs. "no cue": t(24)=4.25; p<.001).  
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Figure 7.12: Relative speeding on threat continuation sentences of unspecific scenarios 
                        after recoding subjects of Study 2 into four STAI-T groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, very high trait anxious subjects (4th Quartile) of Study 2 displayed 
identical results to very high trait anxious subjects of Study 1.  They interpreted 
ambiguous unspecific scenarios in a non-threatening way ("threat cue" vs. "no cue": 
t(54)=2.50; p=.015; "non-threat cue" vs. "no cue": t(54)=1.24; n.s.).  Hence in Study 
2 with larger sample sizes and much more homogenous clinical groups, findings 
from Study 1 could be replicated and secured.  For the 1st, 2nd and 4th Quartile, 
contrast analysis did not differentiate between the two models "no bias," "non-threat 
bias" (all t≥2.39; p<.01; r≥.44).  For the 3rd Quartile, models for "no bias" and 
"threat bias" fit the data identically (both t(24)≥5.18; p<.001; r=.73). 
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7.3   Discussion 
In Study 2, interpretive processes in depression and social phobia were 
investigated, making an attempt to improve experimental materials, applying 
stricter inclusion criteria for participants, and enlarging sample size.  Just as in 
Study 1, equivalent, yet to each disorder particularly relevant, symptom and 
cognitive measures were presented to participants.  However, replicating most of 
the findings from Study 1, neither the results obtained with the interpretation 
questionnaire nor the findings of the interpretation experiment support the initial 
hypotheses that depressed subjects display a general bias toward negative 
interpretations, and social phobia subjects display a disorder-specific bias toward 
threatening interpretations.  Only in the Probability-Cost-Questionnaire was the 
expected disorder-specific judgmental bias found for social phobia subjects, and to 
some extent for depressed subjects as well. 
Depressed patients rated dysfunctional explanations for ambiguous 
scenarios typical for depression in the IQSD as slightly less likely than functional 
explanations, resulting in a mild positive interpretive bias, rather than the 
hypothesized negative interpretation bias.  Thus, depressed patients do not 
selectively favor dysfunctional over functional explanations for ambiguous 
depression-relevant scenarios presented in a questionnaire.  Rather, they differ from 
healthy control subjects and, to a lesser extent, from social phobia subjects in their 
inability to reject dysfunctional explanations for depression-relevant scenarios.  
Their rating for dysfunctional interpretations of ambiguous depression scenarios 
was still highest and differed significantly from social phobia and control subjects.  
Contrary to the initial hypothesis, they also rated threatening explanations for 
ambiguous general scenarios as slightly less likely than non-threatening 
explanations.  For social scenarios, no interpretive bias was found at all.  
Threatening and non-threatening explanations of ambiguous social situations were 
rated equally likely.  Still, depressed patients rated threatening interpretations of 
ambiguous general and social scenarios significantly higher than the control group.  
In addition, depressed patients rated the probability of functional and non-
threatening explanations for depression-relevant, unspecific, and social scenarios 
significantly lower than control subjects.  Although their functional and non-
threatening ratings were always lowest, there was no significant difference to social 
phobia subjects.  Depressed patients shared the disorder-unspecific interpretation 
tendencies with social phobia patients.  No significant differences occurred.  
Depressed patients displayed a disorder-specific judgmental bias.  Just as 
hypothesized, they rated the probability of aversive depression-relevant events 
significantly higher than control and social phobia subjects.  The same was true for 
the depression-relevant composite score.  However, both clinical groups rated the 
cost of aversive depression-relevant events as "very bad," differing only from 
control subjects who rated these events as "moderately bad." Thus, depression-
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relevant events were seen as most costly by all three experimental groups.  In 
addition, depressed subjects always rated the probability and cost of aversive events 
significantly higher than control subjects, with the exception of daily hassles.  There 
was no difference between the cost ratings of control and depressed subjects. 
In all three scenario types of the interpretation experiment, the 
hypothesized bias toward threatening interpretations could not be found in 
depressed patients.  When left unprimed, depressed patients did not take longer to 
comprehend non-threatening continuations of ambiguous scenarios than threatening 
continuations.  In fact, they showed no interpretive bias at all as the difference score 
for comprehension latencies under the "no cue" condition always lay equidistant 
between the difference scores under the two unprimed conditions (threat cue and 
non-threat cue). 
Different from Study 1, social phobia patients rated threatening 
explanations for ambiguous social scenarios in the IQSD just as likely as non-
threatening explanations.  Contrary to prediction and the findings from Study 1, 
social phobia patients did not display a negative interpretive bias for social 
scenarios.  This could be due to the stricter selection criteria for participants of 
Study 2 that resulted in much more homogenous clinical groups.  Consequently, the 
social phobia group of Study 1 displayed greater pathology than the social phobia 
group of Study 2.  This was reflected in higher questionnaire scores (S1 vs. S2): 
LSAS: 81.5 vs. 60.3; FNE-S: 54.1 vs. 42.9; STAI-T: 57.8 vs. 46.1.  It seems 
plausible that the endorsement of threatening explanations for ambiguous self-
referential social situations and the extent of a negative interpretive bias depend on 
the extent of psychopathology.  High correlations of the social threatening subscale 
and the social bias with the LSAS and the FNE-S (all r>70) further support this 
explanation.  Social phobia patients of Study 2 rated threatening explanations for 
unspecific, social, and depression-relevant situations significantly higher and non-
threatening explanations significantly lower than control subjects.  However, they 
did not differ from depressed subjects in their ratings.  Social phobia subjects 
showed a clear positive interpretive bias for depression-relevant situations, a weak 
yet significant positive interpretive bias for unspecific situations and no interpretive 
bias for social situations. 
Just like depressed patients, social phobia patients displayed a disorder-
specific judgmental bias.  Just as hypothesized, they rated the probability and cost 
of aversive social events significantly higher than control and depressed subjects.  
Consequently, their composite social score was also significantly higher than the 
composite score of both other subject groups.  Social phobia subjects rated the 
probability and cost of daily hassles also significantly higher than control subjects, 
but did not differ from depressed patients.  
In the interpretation experiment, a bias toward threatening interpretations 
for social scenarios could not be found.  When left unprimed, social phobia patients 
  
167
did not take longer to comprehend non-threatening continuations of ambiguous 
social scenarios than threatening continuations.  The difference score for 
comprehension latencies under the unprimed condition lay equidistant between the 
difference scores under the two primed conditions, suggesting no interpretive bias at 
all.  Also contrary to prediction, social phobia subjects displayed an interpretive 
bias for threatening explanations of ambiguous unspecific scenarios and an 
interpretive bias toward non-threatening explanations of ambiguous depression-
relevant scenarios.  However, these findings were not supported by the necessary 
two-way interactions of  "group" and "cue condition," nor by unambiguous results 
of the contrast analyses.  Therefore, the conservative interpretation of results from 
Study 1 that social phobia patients did not differ significantly from control subjects 
and other clinical subjects (panic patients in Study 1, depressed patients in Study 2) 
in their interpretation of unspecific, disorder-specific, and other-disorder scenarios 
(panic-relevant scenarios in Study 1, depression-relevant scenarios in Study 2) 
should also be advanced for Study 2.  
In summary, Study 2 could not provide any evidence for a negative 
interpretive bias in depression or social phobia, neither in the interpretation 
questionnaire nor in the interpretation experiment.  The weak evidence for the 
existence of such a bias in social phobia found with the interpretation questionnaire 
IQS in Study 1 could not be replicated, most likely because of the reduced 
psychopathology of the social phobia group in Study 2.  The Interpretation 
Questionnaire for Social Phobia again proved to be a sound instrument.  
Psychometric properties from Study 1 for the unspecific and social subscales were 
nearly replicated.  The Interpretation Questionnaire for Depression also 
demonstrated good psychometric properties.  There seems to be a disorder-specific 
judgmental bias in depression and social phobia beyond a general bias toward 
higher cost and greater probability of aversive events.  However, whether this bias 
is a vulnerability factor or a cause of the respective disorder remains a question for 
further research.  
Study 2 provided further support for the general view discussed in Study 1 
that anxiety may arise from a state of doubt or uncertainty about the meaning of 
situations.  Similar to Study 1, control subjects always rated non-threatening and 
functional interpretations of ambiguous situations as "possible" to "likely" and 
threatening/ dysfunctional explanations as "unlikely," no matter what situational 
type they were confronted with, displaying much more confidence than clinical 
subjects.  This "state of doubt" appears to exist not only in anxiety disorders but in 
depression as well.  
Contrary to the interpretation questionnaire, the reading paradigm 
developed by MacLeod and Cohen (1993) was not able to differentiate among 
experimental groups.  No reliable and significant differences in the interpretation of 
ambiguous scenarios could be detected although the overall ANOVA supported the 
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sensitivity of the experimental paradigm, just as in Study 1.  Regrouping the three 
experimental groups of Study 2 into the high and low trait anxious groups of the 
original study (MacLeod & Cohen, 1993) and excluding all other subjects produced 
much larger sample sizes than in Study 1 (S1: 9 high/13 low; S2: 24 high/44 low).  
Still, the necessary interaction of the factors "group" and "cue condition" was again 
not found, possibly because of the small number of scenarios.   
In Study 2, resulting graphs looked very similar to the two graphs 
presented by MacLeod and Cohen, and within-group t-tests were significant as well.  
However, the original linear interpretation that low trait anxious subjects display a 
positive interpretive bias and high trait anxious subjects a negative interpretive bias 
could not be supported when the data of all participants of Study 2 were analyzed.  
The same unexpected data pattern as in Study 1 appeared again, this time even more 
clearly: only high trait anxious subjects (3rd STAI-T Quartile) displayed a negative 
bias for threatening interpretations of ambiguous scenarios while very high trait 
anxious subjects (4th Quartile) showed a positive bias, favoring non-threatening 
interpretations of ambiguous scenarios, just as low trait anxious subjects (2nd 
Quartile) did.  Probably due to the small number of scenarios these findings are 
based on, the predicted two-way interaction of "group" and "cue condition" was 
only marginally significant (F(6,232)=1.98; p=.069).  However, as the same pattern 
of results was detected again for the 4th Quartile, it appears to be more than a chance 
finding, suggesting a joint analysis of both samples (Study 1 and 2).  Results of this 
analysis will be presented and discussed in the following section. 
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Chapter 8:   Study 1 and Study 2 
8.1   Comparison of results  
Additional analyses were conducted with data from both studies taken 
together for materials and questionnaires applied in Study 1 as well as in Study 2 
(STAI-S and STAI-T, LSAS, FNE-S, Interpretation Questionnaire for Social 
Phobia, and general and social scenarios of the interpretation experiment).  The 
results will be reported below.  In addition, results from the separate data analyses 
already reported in sections 6.2 and 7.2 will be referred to each other. 
Taken together, both studies yielded comparable results even though they 
were conducted in two different languages with purely language-based material.  
Study 1 compared panic disorder subjects, social phobia subjects, and control 
subjects.  A number of participants from the two clinical groups fulfilled criteria for 
up to two additional current and/or past disorders.  Social phobia subjects were 
about twice as affected from comorbidity than panic disorder subjects (see Table 
6.3).  Study 2 compared social phobia subjects, depressed subjects, and control 
subjects.  In the two clinical groups, only participants without an additional disorder 
(with the exception of a current specific phobia or an emotional disorder more than 
2 years in the past) were included in Study 2.  Therefore, the social phobia group of 
Study 1 displayed the greatest pathology.   
Subjects of the social phobia group from Study 1 scored highest on all 
four questionnaires presented to participants of both studies (LSAS, FNE-S, STAI-
T and STAI-S) as well as on the two subscales of the LSAS (fear and avoidance).  
Their sum scores differed significantly from all common sum scores of the social 
phobia group from Study 2 (all t≥2.6; p≤.011).   
Except for the STAI scores, the social phobia group of Study 1 also 
differed significantly from the depression group of Study 2 (all t≥2.9; p≤.006), and 
from the panic disorder group of Study 1 in the LSAS and its subscales, the FNE-S 
and the STAI-S (all t≥2.7; p≤.01).  In the trait and state versions of the STAI, the 
social phobia group of Study 1 reached scores identical to the depression group of 
Study 2, pointing to the strong negative affect present in the social phobia group of 
Study 1.   
The two control groups, on the other hand, were very much alike.  The 
control subjects of Study 1 and Study 2 only differed significantly on the fear 
subscale of the LSAS (t=2.4; p=.018) where the control group of Study 1 scored 
somewhat higher than the control group of Study 2, and on the STAI-S (t=2.6; 
p=.011), with participants from Study 2 being slightly more fearful than participants 
from Study 1.  
  
170 
The overall pattern of results in the two studies was identical.  The 
findings from the two methods, interpretation questionnaire and interpretation 
experiment, will be discussed separately below. 
 
8.1.1 Interpretation questionnaires 
In the interpretation questionnaires, there was no clear evidence for a 
disorder-specific bias favoring threatening or dysfunctional interpretations over 
non-threatening, functional ones in social phobia, panic disorder or depression.  
Rather, clinical subjects evaluated the probability of threatening/dysfunctional and 
non-threatening/functional interpretations of ambiguous events very much alike, 
while control subjects displayed a clear preference for non-threatening and 
functional interpretations.  With one exception, the difference between the two scale 
means (non-threatening/dysfunctional minus threatening/functional interpretations) 
was always ≤|1| for clinical groups and >1 for control groups.   
Only in the Interpretation Questionnaire for Depression (IQD) did Study 2 
social phobia subjects also achieve a difference >1, displaying a strong bias for 
functional interpretations.  However, this interpretation questionnaire differs to 
some extent from the other interpretation questionnaires for anxiety, making direct 
comparison slightly difficult.  In the IQD, functional interpretations seem more 
likely to all participants, even depressed ones.   
On all scales of the interpretation questionnaires presented in Study 1 and 
Study 2, the only significant bias for threatening interpretations was found in Study 
1 social phobia subjects, displaying the hypothesized disorder-specific negative 
interpretive bias (Mbias=–0.8).  However, as summarized above, the difference of the 
probability ratings between threatening and non-threatening interpretations was 
again <1.   
Pearson bivariate correlation between the LSAS and the social bias of the 
interpretation questionnaire was highly significant (all p<.001; rrStudy 1=–.87; rrStudy 
2=–.71; rrboth=–.78).  Partialling out participants' depression using their BDI or FDD 
score (Study 1 or Study 2 resp.), partial correlation between the social bias and the 
LSAS score were reduced, but remained highly significant (all p<.001; rrStudy 1=–
.79; rrStudy 2=–.59).  Apparently, social phobia patients may display a cognitive bias 
for threatening interpretations of ambiguous social situations if their disorder is 
impairing enough (LSAS>80) while depression only adds to the overall 
psychopathology.  
Compared to control subjects, clinical subjects were significantly more 
likely to think of threatening/dysfunctional interpretations and significantly less 
likely to think of non-threatening/functional interpretations of all types of 
ambiguous situations.  Significant differences between clinical groups only 
appeared on disorder-specific threatening subscales (panic-threatening and social-
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threatening in Study 1, depression-dysfunctional in Study 2).  Thus, beyond a 
general tendency of clinical participants to rate the probability of 
threatening/dysfunctional interpretations higher and of non-threatening/functional 
interpretations lower than healthy control subjects, there is an added disorder-
specific negativity endorsing threatening or dysfunctional interpretations of 
disorder-relevant situations more strongly (as “possible to likely”). 
 
8.1.2 Interpretation Experiment 
In both studies, the interpretation experiment did not provide any evidence 
for differences in interpretive processes of clinical and control groups.  The 
interaction between the two factors “group” and “cue condition” never reached 
statistical significance.  Although there was some variation between groups under 
the different situational conditions (unspecific, panic-relevant, social, and 
depression-relevant scenarios), the conservative view that all experimental groups 
were void of any systematic interpretation bias seems most appropriate.  Generally, 
comprehension time differences under the “no cue” condition lay somewhere 
between the differences under the two cued conditions “threat cue” and “non-threat 
cue.” Contrast analysis usually supported at least two different models for the data, 
with the model “no bias” always being among them.   
In addition, disorder-specific scenarios (panic-relevant, depression-
relevant, social) posed a serious problem.  The necessary assumption that 
continuation sentences were interpreted differently under the cue conditions 
“threat” and ”non-threat” was not fulfilled for at least one of the experimental 
groups.  Therefore, further interpretation of results for disorder-relevant ambiguous 
situations was not possible. 
In order to replicate the results of the original study by MacLeod and 
Cohen (1993) who had developed the comprehension paradigm, participants of 
Study 1 and Study 2 were regrouped into the original STAI-T based high and low 
trait anxious groups, applying the same score limits that the authors had used.  All 
other subjects were excluded from this analysis and only unspecific scenarios were 
reanalyzed.  Unfortunately, this post-hoc procedure resulted in very low subject 
numbers in Study 1 (nlow=13 and nhigh=9).  Overall, results from MacLeod and 
Cohen could not be replicated in either of the two studies.  The interaction between 
the two factors “group” and “cue condition” did not reach statistical significance.  
In Study 1, comprehension time differences under the cue condition “no cue” lay 
about equidistant between comprehension time differences under the two conditions 
“threat cue” and “non-threat cue,” suggesting no interpretive bias at all.   
In Study 2, with sufficient subject numbers (nlow=44 and nhigh=24), within-
group t-tests revealed the expected differences: a bias for non-threatening 
interpretations in low trait anxious subjects and a bias for threatening interpretations 
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in high-trait anxious subjects.  However, analyses of data from both studies 
together, attempting to increase power, still did not provide significant interaction 
between the factors “group” and “cue condition” (F<1; n.s.).  Figure 8.1 shows the 
relative speeding on threat continuation sentences of unspecific scenarios for low 
and high trait anxious subjects based on data from Study 1 and Study 2 analyzed 
together. 
Within-group comparisons of the comprehension time differences under 
the three cue conditions yielded results similar to Study 2: low trait anxious subjects 
displayed a bias for non-threatening interpretations of ambiguous unspecific 
scenarios (“no cue” vs. “threat cue”: t(56)=2.80; p=.007; “no cue” vs. “non-threat 
cue”: t(56)=1.76; n.s.), while high trait anxious subjects were biased toward 
threatening interpretations (“no cue” vs. “threat cue”: t(33)=1.15; n.s.; “no cue” vs. 
“non-threat cue”: t(33)=2.67; p=.012).  Between groups, the differences under the 
“no cue” condition were not significantly different from each other (t(88)<1; n.s.).  
Taken together, the safest and most conservative interpretation of results is the 
absence of a definite interpretive bias in the two original STAI-T groups, possibly 
because analysis was based on too few scenarios. 
 
Figure 8.1: Relative speeding on threat continuation sentences of unspecific scenarios 
                        for low and high trait anxious groups in both studies together 
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Because Study 1 and Study 2 investigated clinical groups while MacLeod 
and Cohen (1993) had only worked with undiagnosed university students, the range 
of the STAI-T sum score was considerably smaller in the original groups.  
Therefore, to extend MacLeod and Cohen's findings, participants in Study 1 and 
Study 2 were divided into four STAI-T based groups, applying percentile limits, 
and unspecific scenarios were analyzed again.  The results of Study 1 and Study 2 
were unexpected, yet almost identical: subjects with very high trait anxiety (4th 
Quartile) displayed a bias for non-threatening interpretations of ambiguous 
unspecific scenarios.  Analysis of both data sets together yielded a significant 
interaction of the two factors ”group” and “cue condition” (F(6,346)=2.31; p=.034).  
Apparently, with enough power, the marginal significance of Study 2 turns into 
significant differences in interpretation among the four STAI-T groups.  Figure 8.2 
shows the relative speeding on threat continuation sentences of unspecific scenarios 
for STAI-T based groups of Study 1 and Study 2 analyzed together. 
 
Figure 8.2: Relative speeding on threat continuation sentences of unspecific scenarios 
                        after recoding subjects of both studies into four STAI-T groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Within-group comparisons consolidated the findings of Study 2: very low 
trait anxious subjects (1st Quartile) displayed no interpretive bias at all, 
comprehension time differences under the “no cue” condition lay equidistant 
between the differences under the two cued conditions  (“no cue” vs. ”threat cue”: 
t(24)=2.53; p=.018; “no cue” vs. “non-threat cue”: t(24)=2.14; p=.043).  Low trait 
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anxious subjects (2nd Quartile) preferred non-threatening interpretations of 
ambiguous unspecific scenarios as they interpreted uncued ambiguous sentences in 
the same way as non-threat-cued ambiguous sentences (“no cue” vs. “threat cue”: 
t(31)=2.41; p=.022; “no cue” vs. “non-threat cue”: t(31)<1; n.s.).  High trait anxious 
subjects (3rd Quartile), on the other hand, showed a strong bias for threatening 
interpretations of ambiguous unspecific scenarios (“no cue” vs. “threat cue”: 
t(33)<1; n.s.; “no cue” vs. “non-threat cue”: t(33)=4.37; p<.001).  Finally, very high 
trait anxious subjects also displayed a strong bias in the opposite direction, they 
comprehended uncued ambiguous unspecific scenarios in the same way as non-
threat-cued ambiguous scenarios (“no cue” vs. “threat cue”: t(85)=3.68; p<.001; “no 
cue” vs. “non-threat cue”: t(85)=1.22; n.s.).  Consequently, significant differences 
between groups were found for comprehension times under the “no cue” condition 
for the 2nd and 4th Quartile vs. the 3rd Quartile (both t≥2.10; p≤.037), underlining the 
opposite interpretational directions of these groups. 
 
8.2   Evaluation of the interpretation questionnaires  
8.2.1 Panic disorder and health concern subscales 
Disorder-specific scenarios and items for panic disorder subjects were 
taken from the Body Sensation Interpretation Questionnaire (BSIQ; Clark et al., 
1997).  All seven items of the panic-threatening subscale displayed the desired item 
difficulty pm between 0.2 and 0.8 and had good discrimination indices (all corrected 
item-total correlation rit >.49).  Only the threatening interpretation of the scenario 
“You're suddenly confused and are having difficulty thinking straight.”, item 19a: 
”I am losing it.  I am going out of my mind.”, had insufficient discriminatory power 
(corrected item-total correlation rit =.37).   
Comparison of item means further supported the discriminatory power of 
all seven panic-threatening items.  All item means of panic disorder subjects were 
significantly higher than item means of control subjects (all t≥2.87; p≤.007).  In 
addition, items 23b (“I am about to stop breathing and suffocate.”) and 26c (”I am 
dangerously ill.”) also differentiated significantly between panic disorder and social 
phobia subjects.  T-Tests between the two clinical groups for the five remaining 
panic-threatening items were not significant on a .05 level.   
Internal consistency of the panic-threatening subscale, calculated with 
Cronbach's Alpha, was also very good (α=.86).  For further application of this scale, 
deleting or reformulating item 19a is suggested.  Internal consistency α of the 
panic-threatening subscale was raised for the panic disorder group from .86 to .90 
and for the entire subject sample of Study 1 from .86 to .87 when this item was 
deleted.   
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The panic-threatening subscale also showed excellent convergent and 
discriminant validity (see table 6.7 above).  It was related most closely to the Body 
Sensation Questionnaire (BSQ; r=.71), the symptom measure of panic disorder, as 
well as to the Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; r=.70) and the Anxiety Cognition 
Questionnaire (ACQ; r=.69), both cognition measures of panic disorder.  The 
subscale correlated much lower with other-disorder measures (BDI, LSAS, and 
FNE-S; all r<.38).   
As can be expected, item characteristics of the panic-non-threatening 
subscale were somewhat poorer because it is an unspecific scale, offering 
interpretations for ambiguous panic-relevant scenarios that are not necessarily 
typical for panic disorder patients.  One item lay outside the desired item difficulty 
(item 7b: pm=.86), it was rated too probable by the subjects of Study 1.  Items 2b 
and 16a showed particularly poor discrimination (rit=.16 and .11 resp.).  Overall, 
corrected item-total correlations rit only varied between .25 and .53, suggesting a 
rather low homogeneity of this subscale.  Only one item (item 2a: quick heartbeat as 
a result of physical activity) differentiated between panic disorder and control 
subjects, and none differentiated between the two clinical groups.  Panic patients 
often avoid physical activity because it elicits typical symptoms of a panic attack 
due to activation of the autonomic nervous system.  Therefore, item 2a can be seen 
as a panic disorder-specific item unlike the rest of the panic-non-threatening items.   
Internal consistency of this scale was also only satisfactory, with α=.76 
for the subject sample of Study 1.   
Intercorrelations with symptom and cognition measures were low, mostly 
not significant, and non-specific. 
The BSIQ also contains seven health concern scenarios that were 
presented to subjects of Study 1 as well.  One item of the health-threatening and 
none of the health-non-threatening subscales displayed insufficient item difficulty 
(item 28a: pm=.16).   
Corrected item-total correlations rit varied between .42 and .70 for the 
threatening, and between .27 and .48 for the non-threatening, subscale with the 
exception of the non-threatening items 3a and 3c, interpretations for the ambiguous 
scenario “You have developed a small spot on the back of your hand.”  They only 
correlated .24 and .09 (3a and 3c respectively) with the corrected total scale mean.  
The threatening interpretation of this ambiguous scenario, however, did not attract 
further attention.   
Four out of the seven threatening items differentiated significantly 
between panic disorder and control subjects (all t≥2.4; p≤.022).   
Internal consistency of the health-threatening subscale was good (α=.84), 
and of the non-threatening subscale, sufficient (α=.75).   
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Intercorrelations with the symptom and cognition measures administered 
in Study 1 resulted in intermediately high correlations between the health-
threatening subscale and the panic disorder-specific questionnaires BSQ, ACQ, and 
ASI (.55<r<.60).  It would be interesting to see if questionnaires of Hypochondria 
or Somatoform Disorders would achieve stronger relations with this subscale.  The 
pattern of convergent and discriminant validity mirrored the pattern of the panic-
threatening subscale on a lower relational level.  This can be explained by the 
attentional focus of panic patients on their bodies and patients' concern with 
physiological abnormalities.   
Intercorrelations of the health-non-threatening subscale with symptom and 
cognition measures were again low, partly not significant, and non-specific. 
 
8.2.2 Interpretation Questionnaire for Social Phobia 
This interpretation questionnaire actually consists of socially relevant and 
unspecific scenarios and is most closely related to the original interpretation 
questionnaire by Butler and Mathews (1983).  For its construction, existing 
interpretation questionnaires for anxiety (IFA; Ebert, 1993), somatization (IFS; 
Lieb, 1996), and social phobia (Röder, 1994; Stopa, 1995) were reviewed.  Items 
that had demonstrated good item characteristics were selected and partially 
modified, and additional items were created by the author.  The resulting 
Interpretation Questionnaire for Social Phobia (IQS) was administered twice, in 
Study 1 and Study 2, with slight modifications to improve item characteristics.  As a 
result of this thesis, a final version of the IQS was constructed and tested twice with 
a large unselected sample of university students (n=118).  This final version can be 
obtained from the author, and a publication is underway.   
In the German version of the IQS, one out of ten items of the social-
threatening subscale lay outside the desired item difficulty (item 4a: pm=.16).  After 
modification, all items of the English version fulfilled the difficulty requirement.   
In both studies, all ten items also had acceptable to good discrimination 
indices (all corrected item-total correlation: .43< rit <.76).  The item with the highest 
corrected item-total correlation was identical in both studies (item 29b: ”I will 
forget what I want to say and look totally foolish.”)  Comparison of item means 
further supported the discriminatory power of all ten social-threatening items in 
both studies.  All item means of social phobia subjects were significantly higher 
than item means of control subjects (all t>3.10; p≤.003).  In addition, items 4c, 24a, 
and 29b as well as items 11b, 20b, and 32a in the English version and 2c plus 20c in 
the German version also differentiated significantly between the clinical groups of 
the two studies (all t≥2.24; p≤.031).  These items are concerned with stuttering, 
foolishness, blushing, and hand trembling observed by other people.   
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Internal consistency of the social-threatening subscale was also very good 
and comparable in both studies (Study 1: α=.90; Study 2: α=.89).   
The social-threatening subscale showed good convergent validity (see 
tables 6.7 and 7.7 above).  In both studies, it correlated highest with the 
corresponding symptom measure for social anxiety, the Liebowitz Social Anxiety 
Scale (LSAS; rStudy 1=.87; rStudy 2=.74).  The cognition measure for social anxiety 
administered in the two studies, the short version of the Fear of Negative Evaluation 
(FNE-S), was also strongly correlated with the social-threatening subscale (rStudy 1 
=.81; rStudy 2=.72).  In addition, the corresponding subscales of the Probability-Cost-
Questionnaire (PCQ), also an experimental cognition measure, were correlated 
highly significantly with the social-threatening subscale of the IQS (rsocial 
probability=.79; rsocial cost=.66).  Not surprisingly, the intercorrelation between the 
social-threatening and social-probability subscale was higher than between the 
social-threatening and social-cost subscale because the former use a probability 
judgment of social events while the social-cost subscale of the PCQ asks 
participants for the impact of negative social events.   
The discriminant validity of the social-threatening subscale was somewhat 
poorer, but still acceptable.  The subscale correlated between .53 and .60 with 
symptom and cognition measures of panic (ACQ, BSQ, ASI) and depression (BDI, 
FDD, DAS).  It was also highly correlated with the depression-probability subscale 
of the PCQ (r=.67).  These relatively high correlations probably have a component 
of arousal and to a certain extent also the fear of (visible) anxiety symptoms 
measured by the BSQ and ASI, while social phobia and depression have avoidance, 
withdrawal and often low self-esteem in common.  Therefore, more unrelated 
questionnaires, for instance of OCD, should be used to judge the discriminant 
validity of the social-threatening subscale of the IQS.   
Item characteristics of the social-non-threatening subscale were 
comparable to the panic-non-threatening subscale.  One item in each study lay 
outside the desired item difficulty (Study 2: item 20b: pm=.18; Study 1: item 11c: 
pm=.86).  Both scenarios were unique for each study.   
Except for items 2a, 4b, 18c, 20b, and 24c in Study 2 (all rit < .17) as well 
as items 4b, 24b, and 24c in Study 1 (all rit < .15), discrimination indices were low 
to intermediate (Study 2: .23≤ rit ≤.55; Study 1: .23≤ rit ≤.64).  Two items even 
correlated negatively with the social-non-threatening subscale (Study 2: item 4b; 
both: item 24c).  Close inspection revealed a socially relevant and negative (even 
embarrassing) character of these two items.  Item 24c (“I am not concentrating.  I 
forgot what I wanted to say.”) even differentiated significantly (Study 1) and 
marginally significantly (Study 2) between clinical groups with social phobia 
subjects rating it higher than other patients.  The same was true for items 18a (“My 
answer [to the interviewer] was sufficient.”) and 29c (”I have not eaten today.  I 
need to eat soon.”) that were rated differently by social phobia subjects compared 
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to the two other clinical groups.  A few more items significantly differentiated 
between social phobia and control subjects in both studies.   
Internal consistency of the social-non-threatening subscale was also only 
satisfactory, with α=.79 in Study 1 but only α=.73 in  Study 2.   
Intercorrelations with symptom and cognition measures were low to 
intermediate, mostly significant, and again non-specific.  Overall, this subscale is 
too homogenous, and psychometric properties are clearly insufficient compared to 
the requirements for a good clinical instrument. 
The IQS also contains ten unspecific scenarios to assess subjects' general 
interpretation tendencies of ambiguous events unrelated to social situations.  In both 
studies, all items of the unspecific-threatening subscale lay within the difficulty 
limits.  One item of the unspecific-non-threatening subscale was too easy in the 
German version (item 27c: pm=.87) and two items in the English version were 
marginally too easy.   
Corrected item-total correlations rit varied between .25 and .59 for the 
threatening and between .22 and .66 for the non-threatening subscale with the 
exception of the threatening item 22b in Study 1 and the non-threatening items 5a in 
Study 2 as well as 31b in both studies.  Also in both studies, six out of the ten 
threatening items significantly differentiated between social phobia and control 
subjects, five items between panic disorder and control subjects, and three items 
between depression and control subjects.  No unspecific-threatening item was able 
to differentiate between clinical groups, but two non-threatening items of the 
German version (items 8a and 12c) did.  Between three and eight unspecific non-
threatening items also significantly differentiated between clinical and control 
subjects.   
Internal consistency of the unspecific-threatening as well as the non-
threatening subscale was sufficient to good (between .75 and .84).   
Intercorrelations of both unspecific subscales with the symptom and 
cognition measures administered in the two studies resulted in moderate 
correlations in Study 2 (.27≤r≤.45), with the unspecific-non-threatening subscale 
correlating negatively with all symptom and cognition questionnaires.  The English 
version of the unspecific-non-threatening subscale displayed comparable 
correlations.   
The unspecific-threatening subscale, on the other hand, reached 
considerably higher correlations in Study 1 (.46≤r≤.68), and closest relations existed 
between the three panic-specific questionnaires and this subscale.  The 
corresponding subscales of the PCQ (unspecific-probability and unspecific-cost) 
correlated lower with the unspecific subscales of the IQS than did the social and 
depression-relevant subscales of the PCQ.  Again, probability subscales correlated 
higher with the unspecific subscales of the IQS than cost subscales (unspecific-
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threatening subscale: between .36 and .49; unspecific-non-threatening subscale: 
between –.20 and –.43).   
Overall, the psychometric properties and homogeneity of unspecific 
scenarios are similar to those of non-threatening subscales in general.  They are 
largely insufficient compared to the requirements for a good clinical test. 
 
8.2.3 Interpretation Questionnaire for Depression 
Depression scenarios were developed by three psychology students at 
Dresden University of Technology within their master’s theses (Krampitz, 1998; 
Timann, 1997; Tzschacksch, 1997).  From these original scenarios, 15 depression-
relevant scenarios were chosen for the IQD and modified where necessary for Study 
2 (for details of the material construction process, see the Method section 7.1.4 
Experimental Questionnaires).   
Six out of the 30 depression-dysfunctional items were too difficult (items 
6c, 7a, 14b, 17c, 23a, and 26a: all pm<.02) with item 23a being borderline.  
However, item means are skewed toward greater item difficulty because of the large 
number of control subjects (n=55) compared to depressed subjects (n=29).  
Consequently, analysis of item means of the depression group only resulted in 
moderate item difficulties (.31≤ pm≤.77) with item 7c (“It is terrible.  I simply can't 
stop ruminating.”) now being slightly too easy (pm=.82).   
Discrimination indices of the depression-dysfunctional subscale were 
acceptable to very good (all corrected item-total correlations: .40< rit <.81).  In 
addition, eight items of this subscale significantly differentiated between the two 
clinical groups of Study 2 (items 6b, 7a, 13b, 14c, 23b, 26c, 28b, 32a), and all 30 
depression-dysfunctional items significantly differentiated between clinical subjects 
and control subjects, except for item 21c, where social phobia and control subjects 
were not significantly different.  Item means of the target group of depressed 
subjects were always significantly higher than item means of the control group (all 
t≥3.25; p≤.002).   
Moreover, the depression-dysfunctional subscale reached an exceptionally 
good internal consistency (Cronbach's Alpha; α=.96).  Internal consistency was 
somewhat lower but still very good in the depression group alone (α=.91).   
The depression-dysfunctional subscale was highly correlated with all 
symptom and cognition questionnaires administered in Study 2 (all r≥.63).  The 
strongest relation was found between this subscale and the STAI-T sum score 
(r=.81) rather than between the two depression measures FDD and DAS (both 
r=.73).  This somewhat insufficient convergent and discriminant validity may be 
explained by the overlap of depression with social phobia (measured with LSAS 
and FNE-S) and general negative affect (measured with STAI-T and STAI-S).  
Therefore, external validity of the depression-dysfunctional subscale seems 
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acceptable.  The strongest intercorrelation existed between the depression-
dysfunctional subscale of the IQD and the depression-probability subscale of the 
PCQ (r=.82), further supporting the external validity of the depression-
dysfunctional subscale of the IQD.  Correlations with the trait version of the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988; 
German version: Krohne, Egloff, Kohlmann, & Tausch, 1996) also provided highly 
significant relations (rpos. affect=–.56; rneg. affect=.70).  Future research should 
administer symptom and cognition questionnaires of disorders more distant to 
depression, e.g., of panic disorder, to be able to judge discriminant validity.   
Different from all other interpretation questionnaires, the functional 
subscale of the IQD had item characteristics almost as good as the dysfunctional 
subscale.  All 15 functional items lay within the desired item difficulty 
(.62≤pm≤.78), although items were generally easy due to the composition of the 
subject sample.   
Corrected item-total correlations rit were also acceptable to good, ranging 
from .47 to .66 with no exclusion.  Although no item significantly differentiated 
between the two clinical groups, all functional items differentiated between 
depressed and control subjects.  Only two depression-functional items were not able 
to significantly differentiate between social phobia and control subjects (items 7b 
and 21a).   
Internal consistency of this subscale was also very good, with α=.90 for 
the subject sample of Study 2.   
Similar to the depression-dysfunctional subscale, intercorrelations of the 
depression-functional subscale with symptom and cognition measures were highly 
significant (all r≥–.53).  The highest correlation was found again between the 
functional subscale and STAI-T(r=–.66).  However, just as for non-threatening 
subscales, intercorrelations were non-specific (i.e., comparable for social and 
depression measures).  The same was true for intercorrelations with the two 
PANAS-Trait subscales (rpos. affect=.55; rneg. affect=–.59).  The only disorder-specific 
intercorrelation that was somewhat stronger was with the depression-probability 
subscale of the PCQ (r=–.66).  Correlation with the depression-cost subscale of the 
PCQ was much lower but still significant (r=–.22).  The depression-functional 
subscale of the IQD was higher correlated with the social-probability and social-
cost as well as the unspecific-probability subscales of the PCQ (–.30<r<–.53).   
Overall, the IQD has good psychometric properties and differentiates well 
between clinical and control subjects.  Its only drawback is the unspecific external 
validity, correlating moderately to highly with depression-relevant, social phobia-
relevant and affectivity measures without a distinct pattern of convergent and 
discriminant validity. 
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Chapter 9:   General Discussion 
9.1   Overview of the thesis 
Background. The present research was designed to investigate 
interpretation processes in panic disorder, social phobia, and major depressive 
disorder.  Cognitive theories of emotional disorders assume that interpretive 
processes play a key role in the development and maintenance of these disorders 
(Beck, 1967, 1976; Beck et al., 1985; Clark, 1986; Stopa & Clark, 1993; Clark & 
Wells, 1995; Rapee & Heimberg, 1997).  They postulate that maladaptive schemas 
maintain and exacerbate anxiety and depression by biasing interpretations of 
ambiguous situations toward threat and negativity.  In addition, these cognitive 
theories posit negative biases in other information processing areas as well, most 
relevantly in attention and memory.  However, compared with research testing 
attentional and memory biases, interpretation processes were examined much less 
frequently, probably because of difficulties with operationalization and paradigm 
development.  An extended review of the available literature revealed five major 
issues: 
 
1) Questionnaire studies, with the known methodological problems of experimenter 
demand effects and possible response selection bias effects, greatly outnumber 
experimental studies.  
2) Clear evidence for the existence of a negative interpretation bias in patients can be 
derived from questionnaire studies; experimental studies were either conducted with 
analogous populations (Stoler & McNally, 1991; Lawson & MacLeod, 1999), yielded 
conflicting results (Hirsch & Mathews, 1997, 2000), or allowed for alternative 
explanations (Amir et al., 1998a; Hedlund & Rude, 1995; Sheppard & Teasdale, 
1996). 
3) Except for Constans et al. (1999), all interpretation questionnaire studies used the 
rank-order procedure rather than employing a rating scale format.  Thus, analyses 
could not be made independently of reference groups. 
4) The nature of a possible interpretation bias in emotional disorders remains unclear.  It 
could be domain-specific, general to all situations, or domain-specific in addition to a 
general bias.  Moreover, even the distinction of negatively biased vs. not positively 
biased has not been demonstrated sufficiently. 
5) To my knowledge, there has been no study assessing interpretive processes that 
applied the same paradigm to social phobia, panic disorder, and depression, allowing 
for a direct comparison of these frequent disorders. 
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Advancement. In an attempt to address all five points of criticism, two 
related studies were designed, the results of which could be compared to a number 
of previous studies.  Each study consisted of a questionnaire section and an 
experimental section.  This multi-method approach has a number of benefits 
compared to single-method studies: (1) The influence of a particular method on 
results can better be judged, (2) advantages of each method can be maximized if 
within-subject comparisons are possible, (3) disadvantages of each method can 
better be compensated for, (4) different methods may tap different facets of the 
research issue, e.g., different levels of information processing, and (5) results can be 
compared to a broader scope of studies.  
The questionnaire method is relatively well established and has provided 
sufficiently consistent support for the existence of an interpretation bias in anxious 
individuals compared to non-anxious controls.  The interpretation questionnaire 
assesses individuals’ explanations for ambiguous situations phrased in a self-
referential way.  For my thesis, development of the Interpretation Questionnaire for 
Social Phobia and the Interpretation Questionnaire for Depression benefited from a 
pool of already existing scenarios and accompanying psychometric data. However, 
unlike most existing interpretation questionnaires, which ask participants to rank-
order the three interpretations provided for each scenario, my questionnaires 
utilized a per-interpretation rating scale answer format.  Allowing participants to 
rate each interpretation independently avoided the information loss inherent in a 
ranking format.  The rating scale format also enables an independent analysis of 
negative and non-negative explanations for ambiguous scenarios, testing the 
absolute (as opposed to relative) nature of an interpretive bias in anxiety and 
depression. 
In addition to the self-reporting aspect of the questionnaire, an 
experimental paradigm was chosen and applied to all participants.  Specifically, I 
chose the comprehension paradigm developed by MacLeod and Cohen (1993) for 
the experimental section.  At the time of planning, this seemed a state-of-the-art 
methodology because (1) it avoids experimenter demand effects and selection bias, 
(2) participants are not aware of the actual assessment process (i.e., the variable of 
interest), (3) scenarios are more ecologically valid than single words, which had 
been used most frequently before, (4) assessment is relatively pleasant for 
participants (just reading little “stories”), (5) a manipulation check is incorporated 
in the design by means of different cue conditions, and (6) the paradigm had already 
proven itself successful in the investigation of an interpretation bias in anxious 
individuals. 
 For my thesis, however, I extended the original paradigm by categorizing 
scenarios into different topics (social phobia-relevant, panic-relevant, depression-
relevant, and unspecific scenarios), enabling the investigation of possible disorder-
specificinterpretation tendencies.  To achieve this, disorder-relevant scenarios had 
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to be developed.  Ambiguity was created within a situational context rather than by 
means of a single homonym.  Scenarios were kept non-self-referential in order to 
test how general a possible interpretation bias might be.  MacLeod and Cohen 
(1993), on the other hand, had very mixed scenarios that only shared the possibility 
of a threatening disambiguation of the ambiguous sentence.  
Applying these questionnaire and experimental paradigms to individuals 
diagnosed with either social phobia, panic disorder, or unipolar depression, I wanted 
to investigate more thoroughly the nature of interpretive processes in prototypical 
representatives of emotional disorders, thereby advancing cognitive theories and 
indirectly cognitive therapy of these disorders.  
Social phobia, panic disorder (with agoraphobia) and unipolar depression 
are among the most frequent mental disorders that have a debilitating effect on 
those afflicted.  It is very rare that these three different clinical groups are tested 
within the same study design.  However, for direct comparison of results, for the 
judgment of commonalities and differences between disorders, for the evaluation of 
disorder-specific versus general phenomena, this is the best research approach.  
Study 1 compared individuals with social phobia and individuals with 
panic disorder who often had other co-morbid diagnoses as well.  Study 2 was 
special to the extent that highly selected groups were created.  By not allowing 
additional Axis-I diagnosis, relatively homogenous groups of social phobia subjects 
and depression subjects were formed, thereby advancing knowledge about the 
specific disorders by isolating disorder-specific influences and reducing alternative 
explanations of results.  In addition, Study 2 tested larger sample sizes than clinical 
studies typically do (nsocial phobia = 36, ndepression = 29).  Finally, because Study 1 was 
conducted in English and Study 2 in German, each can be seen as a partial 
replication of the other.  The results can therefore more readily be generalized to 
different languages and to (slightly) different cultures. 
 
Results. Contrary to predictions that stem from the cognitive models cited 
at the beginning of the thesis, the only bias toward threatening interpretations was 
exhibited by social phobia subjects in the Interpretation Questionnaire of Study 1.  
Social phobia subjects at Harvard University displayed a weak disorder-specific 
bias toward threatening interpretations of socially relevant situations.  However, the 
social phobia group of Study 2 at Dresden University of Technology showed no 
such bias.  In addition, none of the other results obtained with the interpretation 
questionnaire and the interpretation experiment supported a disorder-specific bias 
toward threatening interpretations in social phobia, panic disorder, or depression.  In 
Study 1 and 2, the interpretation experiment did not provide any evidence for 
differences in interpretive processes of the three respective experimental groups.  
Moreover, it was not possible to replicate the original findings by MacLeod and 
Cohen (1993) after regrouping participants into STAI-T-based groups and 
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analyzing only scenarios from the original material (unspecific scenarios).  Finally, 
further analysis after regrouping participants into STAI-T-based Quartiles revealed 
an interpretation pattern in very high anxious subjects (4th Quartile) similar to the 
non-threatening interpretation bias in the low-trait anxious group of the original 
study.  This finding of Study 1 was replicated in Study 2 of this thesis.  Overall, 
Study 1 and Study 2 did not support the predictions of the cognitive models 
described above.  Results and their implications will now be discussed in more 
detail. 
 
Summary. Study 1 comparing social phobia and panic disorder and Study 
2 comparing social phobia and depression, can be seen as almost perfect 
replications of each other.  Hypothesized interpretation biases in panic disorder, 
social phobia, and depression could not be demonstrated.  Rather, in the 
interpretation questionnaires, healthy control subjects demonstrated a bias toward 
non-threatening and functional interpretations while clinical subjects seemed to 
have difficulties accepting or rejecting one or the other type of interpretation.  In the 
comprehension paradigm, neither study clearly replicated MacLeod and Cohen's 
(1993) findings.  Post-hoc created STAI-T groups, based on the original high and 
low trait anxious groups, did not display different interpretation patterns.  The only 
significant interaction between 'group' and 'cue condition' was detected for 
unspecific scenarios after regrouping subjects into STAI-T percentile based groups 
(1st through 4th Quartile).  Unexpectedly, this procedure resulted in a strong bias for 
non-threatening interpretations in very high trait anxious subjects (i.e., members of 
the 4th Quartile).  This subject group comprised all depressed subjects and the 
majority of social phobia and panic disorder subjects from Study 1 and Study 2.  
Only high trait anxious subjects (3rd Quartile) displayed the expected negative 
interpretation bias, favoring threatening interpretations of ambiguous unspecific 
scenarios over non-threatening interpretations. 
 
9.2   Comparison of the two methods 
Study 1 and Study 2 applied two different methods to investigate 
interpretive processes: a questionnaire format with closed answer categories that 
had to be rated on a 5-point Likert scale and an adaptation of the RSVP technique, 
assessing each participant's comprehension latencies for single sentences shown on 
a computer screen.  Both methods are based on ambiguous scenarios that can be 
categorized into panic-relevant, social, depression-relevant and unspecific events.  
Each scenario suggests multiple interpretations of which only up to three were 
chosen as research material.  Ambiguous events in both paradigms were described 
in a single sentence that was phrased self-referentially in the interpretation 
questionnaires and in the third person in the interpretation experiment.  Both 
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methods yielded comparable results to the extent that a definite bias for threatening 
or dysfunctional interpretations of ambiguous disorder-relevant scenarios could not 
be demonstrated in panic disorder, social phobia, or depression.  In the 
interpretation questionnaire, healthy control subjects biased their interpretations of 
all four types of situations strongly toward non-threatening and functional 
explanations for ambiguous self-referential events.  In the interpretation experiment, 
on the other hand, control subjects consistently displayed no interpretation bias at 
all.  Their comprehension time differences under the 'no cue' condition always lay 
equidistant between the comprehension time differences under the conditions 'threat 
cue' and 'non-threat cue'.  
Beside the different foci of reference and general problems associated 
with the questionnaire method compared to the experimental method (social 
desirability, selection bias, experimenter demand effects, differential understanding 
of the rating scale points by different participants, inability to draw causality 
inferences), the interpretation questionnaire and the interpretation experiment differ 
mainly in the amount of choice participants were permitted in interpreting each 
ambiguous event presented.  Participants in the interpretation questionnaire were 
asked to rate the individual probability that three given explanations for each event 
would come to their minds, while participants in the text comprehension study were 
free to think of a number of varying interpretations for each scenario.  However, the 
paradigm only assesses the comprehension latencies of two different 
disambiguating explanations, and this not even within but between subjects.  This 
distinction may account for the different findings in the two methods applied to 
participants of this thesis.  Another explanation could be poor reliability of the 
comprehension method compared to the questionnaire method.  As reported in the 
methods sections above, all interpretation questionnaires showed good internal 
consistency.  In addition, the Interpretation Questionnaire for Social Phobia and 
Depression also demonstrated adequate retest reliability (see 7.1.4 Experimental 
Questionnaires).  On the other hand, it is well known that comprehension time 
measures are not very reliable.  Added to the relatively small number of measures 
from each participant per experimental condition (mean=3), significant results in 
the interpretation experiment may have been impossible.  However, this last 
explanation does not appear to be sufficient since other studies (e.g., Donovan, 
1994; Goggin, 2005; Mogg et al., 2006) used a comprehension paradigm to measure 
differences in interpretation tendencies between clinical and control subjects and 
obtained a larger number of repeated measures for each subject yet were still unable 
to detect group differences. 
For Study 1 and Study 2, Pearson correlations were calculated among (1) 
the threatening/dysfunctional scales, (2) the different bias scores of the 
interpretation questionnaires, (3) the comprehension time differences under the 'no 
cue' condition, and (4) the comprehension bias score (ratio of total distance between 
cued conditions to distance between 'no cue' and 'non-threat cue' conditions).  The 
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only significant correlation surfaced in Study 2 between the general bias of the 
interpretation questionnaire and the general bias of the interpretation experiment 
(rr=–.21; p=.022).  In the interpretation questionnaires, control subjects displayed 
the weakest bias toward non-threatening interpretations for unspecific ambiguous 
scenarios.  Here, the difference score was near 1.  For all other scenario types, their 
positive bias was much stronger.  In addition, unspecific scenarios of the 
comprehension paradigm produced the largest distance between the two cued 
conditions.  These facts were probably responsible for the weak significant 
correlation between the unspecific biases of the two methods in Study 2.  This 
correlation disappeared when both data sets were analyzed together (rr=–.13; 
p=.074). 
In summary, questionnaire and comprehension methods have little to do 
with each other in the two studies of this thesis.  They seem to assess different 
facets of the cognitive process 'interpretation' or tap different levels of processing of 
the meaning of ambiguous events.  Specifically, interpretation questionnaires may 
predominantly assess controlled cognitive processes while automatic cognitive 
processes play a much greater role in the interpretation experiment.  Beck and Clark 
(1997) proposed a three-stage information processing model of anxiety.  According 
to this model, the very act of reading (the basis of the interpretation experiment) 
resembles a kind of highly complex automatic behavior that might typically occur 
in the second stage of their anxiety model (immediate preparation).  This stage 
corresponds with the activation of the primal threat mode that results in a 
coordinated goal-directed strategy aimed at minimizing danger and maximizing 
safety.  It involves a mixture of both automatic and strategic processes, but 
processing at this stage often occurs outside of awareness.  Participants’ responses 
to the interpretation questionnaire, on the other hand, may result from activation of 
the third stage of Beck and Clark’s (1997) information processing model 
(secondary elaboration).  This stage is characterized by full activation of elaborative 
semantic processing, i.e., contextualized processing involving the self-in-relation-
to-the-world.  At the third stage, individuals also evaluate the availability and 
effectiveness of their coping resources.  Beside these differences in levels of 
processing, poor reliability of comprehension time measures may also account for 
the lack of significant results in the interpretation experiment. 
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9.3   Evaluation of the paradigms 
9.3.1 Ambiguous scenarios  
To directly compare the three disorders to each other, and to answer the 
specificity question, the same methodology was used in both studies and for all 
participants.  All participants were presented with equivalent, yet to each disorder 
particularly relevant, symptom and cognition measures.  This was the first challenge 
of this research.  Most studies either compared different anxiety disorders to each 
other (e.g., Harvey et al., 1993; Clark et al., 1997; Amir et al., 1998b; Stopa & 
Clark, 2000) or created disorder-specific experimental material for only one 
disorder (e.g., Amir et al., 1998b; Butler & Mathews, 1983; Harvey et al., 1993).  
The combination of both types of emotional disturbance, anxiety and depression, 
within a single study design, with the goal to differentiate between unspecific and 
disorder-specific situations, was attempted on the basis of situations and criteria that 
were diagnostically relevant to each disorder.  This posed at least three problems:  
 
1) There was still a certain overlap between the disorder-specific situations in the 
interpretation questionnaire and those in the interpretation experiment.  This was 
particularly relevant in Study 2, which compared social phobia and depression.  These 
two disorders share a number of symptoms (avoidance of social situations, often low 
self-esteem, lack of socially based rewards).  Therefore, it was expected that social 
scenarios would also be relevant to depressed subjects.  
2) The situations created may not have been the most relevant situations for each 
disorder, or they may have had varying degrees of importance to participants.  This 
was especially true for depression.  Beck's cognitive triad (Beck, 1963, 1964, 1967) 
postulates negative views of the self, the world, and the future, covering a broad 
spectrum of themes, making the creation of disorder-specific scenarios which are 
relevant to all depressed participants virtually impossible.  Therefore, the separation of 
depression from social anxiety and panic disorder was attempted using the diagnostic 
criteria for a major depressive episode.  Depression-relevant ambiguous scenarios 
describe behaviors that indicate depressed mood, loss of interest, lack of energy, low 
self-esteem, hopelessness, loneliness, and sadness. 
3) The inclusion of three different emotional disorders and the full combination of 
independent variables greatly reduced the number of repeated measures possible 
within an experimental session.  This is particularly relevant in the interpretation 
experiment where results are based on only three repeated measures of any particular 
factor combination.  Moreover, due to an error in counterbalancing in Study 2, mean 
comprehension latencies in Study 2 are based on one to five repeated measures per 
experimental condition.  Therefore, the lack of significant results could in part be a 
problem of statistical power. 
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In addition, each ambiguous scenario may be interpreted in a number of 
different ways.  This applies both to interpretation questionnaire and interpretation 
experiment.  In the case of the questionnaire, participants were able to evaluate each 
proposed interpretation on a Likert-type scale.  Item analyses revealed the most 
difficult items on the dysfunctional depression subscale.  Here, six out of the 30 
dysfunctional interpretations lay outside the limit for desired item difficulty 
between 0.2 and 0.8.  Good items had to have a group mean between 0.8 and 3.2 on 
the 5-point Likert scale.  Six depression-dysfunctional items were too difficult, i.e., 
the likelihood that each thought would come to mind was rated too low by 
participants.  However, these items showed good discrimination indices because 
they correlated ≥0.67 with the total score of the depression-dysfunctional subscale 
(for details see section 8.2 Evaluation of the Interpretation Questionnaires: 
Interpretation Questionnaire for Depression).  The threatening social phobia 
subscale administered in Study 2 also contained two items that were too difficult.  
All other interpretations either fulfilled the requirements of desired item difficulty 
or were chosen too frequently by participants of the two studies, indicating that they 
were plausible interpretations for the respective scenarios.  Overall, results of the 
interpretation questionnaire suggest a feasible selection of possible interpretations 
for each ambiguous scenario.  
In the interpretation experiment, ambiguous scenarios were presented 
differently.  First, they were not self-referent.  Second, only two of a number of 
different possible meanings of each ambiguous scenario were used as 
disambiguating sentences.  Most importantly, however, ambiguity was created on 
the situational rather than the linguistic level because disorder-specific homonyms 
could not be found (for more details see the methods part above and section 9.3.3 
Interpretation Experiment).  Words such as “punch” or “growth,” used by MacLeod 
and Cohen (1993), have only two distinct meanings.  These meanings were clarified 
in the disambiguating sentence following each target sentence.  My Studies 1 and 2, 
in contrast, allowed participants to think of a totally different interpretation of the 
uncued ambiguous target sentence than that suggested by the two disambiguations.  
Overall, results of the interpretation experiment are difficult to judge because (1) 
numerous disorder-specific ambiguous scenarios did not pass the manipulation 
check and (2) within-group comparisons between the different scores under the cue 
conditions 'threat' and 'non-threat' were not significant for all subject groups.  
However, variance analyses supported the sensitivity of the paradigm for each 
individual scenario type. 
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9.3.2 Interpretation Questionnaires  
The interpretation questionnaire paradigm revealed an important 
characteristic of interpretation tendencies of subjects with panic disorder, social 
phobia, and depression.  These subjects did not demonstrate an absolute bias toward 
threatening or dysfunctional interpretations.  
Buhlmann (2002) administered a slightly modified version of the 
Interpretation Questionnaire for Social Phobia of Study 1 along with an 
experimental interpretation questionnaire for body dysmorphic disorder (BDD).  
Her findings are very similar to my own.  BDD subjects differed significantly from 
both control and OCD subjects in the likelihood that they would entertain 
threatening and non-threatening interpretations of BDD-relevant and social 
scenarios.  They rated threatening interpretations to be more likely and non-
threatening interpretations to be less likely than did the other two groups.  For 
unspecific scenarios, the two clinical groups did not differ from each other, but 
BDD subjects again differed from control subjects, in the same direction as before.  
However, BDD subjects rated the likelihood that threatening and non-threatening 
interpretations would come to their mind as equally high, as did subjects with panic 
disorder, social phobia and depression in my own studies. 
Buhlmann (2002) also found no absolute bias for threatening 
interpretations in BDD subjects but did find a positive bias in OCD and control 
subjects.  Taken together, individuals diagnosed with an anxiety disorder or with 
depression seem to lack—at least in their disorder-relevant area, if not in general—
the protective bias toward non-threatening and functional interpretations prevalent 
in healthy controls.  This finding was only possible because the interpretation 
questionnaires administered in our studies had threatening/ dysfunctional as well as 
non-threatening/functional subscales and because interpretations could be rated 
independently of each other on interval-scaled rating scales. 
However, there exists a point of criticism regarding the possible conflation 
of two evaluative processes: (a) judgment of the likelihood that each thought would 
come to an individual’s mind at all and (b) judgement of how much each thought 
appears to an individual to be a valid explanation of the ambiguous situation (a 
meta-cognitive evaluation).  The research team around David M. Clark has 
attempted to separate these two processes by application of a three stage answer 
format: (1) participants had to write down their own reaction to each ambiguous 
scenario in a free-answer format, (2) they had to rank-order three explanations 
provided for each scenario, and (3) they had to rate their belief in each of the three 
explanations on a scale from 0-8 (Clark et al., 1997; Stopa & Clark, 2000).  Stage 
one was meant to incorporate both activation and believability judgment, while 
stages two and three were meant to separate them. 
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 Clark et al. (1997) reported identical results for each of the three 
assessment types in two studies with a panic disorder group, two other anxiety 
disorder control groups, and a non-patient control group.  Stopa and Clark (2000) 
investigated a generalized social phobia group, an anxious control group and a non-
patient control group.  They also found a disorder-specific interpretive bias for 
threatening interpretations in addition to a general bias with all three assessment 
types.  However, the two anxiety groups only differed in their open-ended responses 
and their rank-ordering of the three explanations, not in their belief of the 
threatening interpretations.  Nevertheless, it seems questionable whether 
participants are able to separate, in their questionnaire responses, the two processes 
pointed out above, particularly in stage two when participants are asked to rank-
order thoughts by likelihood that they would come to mind.  
Research in the area of anxiety (especially OCD) has pointed out that 
involuntary negative thoughts, i.e., unpleasant cognitive intrusions, also happen to 
mentally healthy individuals (e.g., Edwards & Dickerson, 1987; Niler & Beck, 
1989; Rachman & de Silva, 1978; Wells & Morrison, 1994).  However, the 
difference between anxious and non-anxious individuals seems to lie in the meta-
cognitive evaluation of such thoughts, e.g., the importance appointed to them, their 
implications, standards of what type of thoughts one should have etc. (Wells, 1997, 
2000; Wells & Mathews, 1994).  In the interpretation questionnaires administered 
in my thesis, it cannot be ruled out that participants may have based their ratings not 
only on judgment (a) (the likelihood that each thought would come to their mind at 
all) but also on the believability of each thought, maybe even to varying degrees for 
different scenarios.  Future research should attempt to separate these two processes 
by applying different methodologies. 
A second point of criticism regards psychometric properties of the 
interpretation questionnaires administered in Study 1 and Study 2.  Only 
threatening/dysfunctional subscales fulfilled the requirements for a good test with 
acceptable psychometric properties, with the exception of the IQD.  However, even 
in the IQD, the dysfunctional subscale had superior psychometric properties and 
item characteristics.  It is therefore suggested that future research should attempt to 
improve non-threatening/functional scales by (1) raising their homogeneity (e.g., 
differentiating between neutral and positive, disorder-relevant and irrelevant 
interpretations), (2) selecting scenarios as typical as possible for each disorder, (3) 
trying to create items independently of each other.  This requires a totally new 
questionnaire format because so far, three items have always been connected by the 
same ambiguous scenario.  This makes item elimination and modification very 
difficult.  Under the economic aspect, clinicians may apply threatening and 
dysfunctional subscales only, because they are sufficient for separating patients 
from non-patients, are also best to discriminate between different disorders, and 
they can reflect (therapeutic) change as well.  For such an application, ambiguous 
scenario and threatening/dysfunctional interpretation should either be phrased in 
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one item, or for each ambiguous scenario, a number of threatening items should be 
formulated as is already the case in the IQD.  However, clinicians need to keep in 
mind the interpretive direction of results: It is NOT that patients favor negative 
interpretations of ambiguous scenarios but rather that non-patients neglect or 
underestimate the possibility of a negative meaning.  In addition, clinical subjects 
think of non-threatening and functional interpretations less frequently or less easily 
compared to healthy controls. 
In Study 2, a second experimental questionnaire, the Probability-Cost-
Questionnaire (PCQ), was administered to participants in order to cover additional 
aspects of the interpretation process: judgments of the likelihood and impact of 
unambiguous negative events.  Results were largely as predicted, with disorder-
specific effects in particular occurring within the probability ratings.  Depressed 
subjects rated the likelihood that depression-relevant negative events will happen to 
them significantly higher than social phobia and control subjects, while social 
phobia subjects rated the probability and cost for negative social events 
significantly higher than depressed and control subjects.  The cost of depression-
relevant negative events was judged equally high by both clinical groups and was 
judged by all subjects to be higher than the two other scenario types (unspecific and 
social).  Overall, the Probability-Cost-Questionnaire showed acceptable 
psychometric properties. 
Probability ratings seem to be of greater value than cost ratings for 
measuring differences in people’s judgment of negative events.  However, in 
comparison to the interpretation questionnaire, the PCQ has some disadvantages.  
Convergent and divergent validity of the PCQ, specifically of the depression 
subscales, were not quite as expected.  Highest intercorrelations were reached with 
STAI-T (mainly measuring negative affect) rather than with FDD and DAS (the 
corresponding symptom and cognition measures).  The depression-cost subscale 
showed moderate correlations with all administered symptom and cognition 
questionnaires.  Finally, unspecific subscales of the interpretation questionnaire 
differentiated patients from control subjects better than unspecific subscales of the 
PCQ.  Therefore, for measuring cognitive distortions, the interpretation 
questionnaire seems to be more recommendable than the PCQ. 
 
9.3.3 Interpretation Experiment  
Particular care was taken in the development of the comprehension 
material.  In the first step, ambiguous scenarios from existing interpretation 
questionnaires and from published studies were selected and categorized.  For the 
different situational types, specialists (Prof. Eni Becker for depression and social 
phobia, and Prof. McNally for panic disorder) were consulted and asked to choose 
the most suggestive answer options to each ambiguous scenario.  Preliminary 
disambiguating sentences were rated again by clinical and research colleagues.  
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Nevertheless, the material sensitivity of disorder-specific scenarios remained 
insufficient for selected experimental groups (compare the result sections from 
Study 1 and Study 2 of this thesis), most likely because each ambiguous scenario 
could be interpreted in many more than the two chosen ways (threat and non-threat 
disambiguating sentences).  
To my knowledge, four additional unpublished theses also applied a 
modified version of the original text comprehension paradigm by MacLeod and 
Cohen (1993) to study interpretive processes in clinical subjects (Buhlmann, 2002; 
Donovan, 1994; Goggin, 2005; Wenzel, 2000).  Except for Buhlmann (2002), 
differences in the pattern of comprehension latencies between groups, indicating 
different interpretation tendencies, could not be found.  These four studies will be 
described now in more detail.  
Donovan (1994) was the first to modify the MacLeod and Cohen (1993) 
paradigm to study disorder-specific processes in clinical (specifically depressed) 
subjects to fulfill requirements for a Master’s thesis at the University of Western 
Australia, home to the two original authors.  Similar to my own approach, Donovan 
selected a few of the original scenarios and added numerous new scenarios 
describing depression-relevant themes of loss and failure (e.g.: “After lunch 
Janine's mother commented that she had not had many dates.”) In doing so, 
Donovan (1994) had to give up the homonym approach and create ambiguity by the 
entire scenario.  Just as I did, she kept a few scenarios with homonyms (see the 
example), but most of her scenarios allowed for more than the two continuations 
she presented to participants of her study.  In the case of the sample sentence, half 
of Donovan's subjects read the negative/depressive continuation “Janine put it down 
to her lack of personality,” and the other half received the neutral continuation 
“Janine put it down to her lack of appetite.” Unfortunately, Donovan only recruited 
10 depressed patients and 10 non-depressed control subjects.  Therefore, her 
inability to find significant differences in the pattern of comprehension latencies for 
the two groups may have been a problem of power.  In any case, depressed subjects 
in this study did not interpret disorder-relevant ambiguous scenarios negatively.  
Because Donovan's study dates 13 years back and was not published, the 
description is taken from a secondary source (Goggin, 2005).  Therefore, I am not 
able to judge her investigation in more detail.  Whether depressed subjects 
demonstrated any interpretive bias at all or both subject groups were void of a 
specific interpretive tendency, as in my own study, is unknown to me.  
Wenzel (2000) also used a modification of the text comprehension 
paradigm to study interpretive processes in social phobia and panic disorder.  She 
extended the paradigm in a similar way to my research, incorporating disorder-
relevant automatic thoughts (ATs), and tried to access schema-based interpretations 
in social phobia and panic patients compared to non-anxious controls.  Her 
participants were presented with 36 stories consisting of five sentences each.  
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Twelve of these stories were social/evaluative, 12 stories involved physical 
sensations/arousal and 12 stories served as control passages.  Unlike MacLeod and 
Cohen (1993) and the interpretation experiment of my own thesis, Wenzel (2000) 
did not prime her participants with a cue at the beginning of each scenario.  Rather, 
she assumed that social phobia and panic patients are characterized by a particular 
mindset that facilitates disorder-specific information (i.e., social and evaluative 
information in social phobia and internal bodily sensations in panic disorder).  
Unfortunately, because of this assumption, she was not able to test the sensitivity of 
her paradigm.  Also contrary to MacLeod and Cohen’s (1993) as well as my 
approach, Wenzel (2000) phrased her stories in the second person, similar to the 
interpretation questionnaire, so that participants could imagine themselves in the 
particular scene.  After the fourth sentence of each story, an AT associated with 
either social phobia, panic disorder, or non-anxious controls was presented, just as 
in my interpretation experiment, fully combined with story type (in Wenzel’s case, 
3 story types by 3 AT types).  Comprehension latency of the AT was the dependent 
measure.  It was expected that disorder-specific ATs would be comprehended 
fastest by the appropriate patient group when combined with the matching story 
type.  However, Wenzel (2000) was also unable to detect any differences in 
comprehension latency between the groups, although participants with social phobia 
comprehended critical sentences in social threat passages faster than in physical 
threat passages.  Her calculations were planned ANOVAs; no significant 
interactions with the factor ”group” emerged.  
Ulrike Buhlmann worked at Harvard University at the same time as I 
conducted my research for Study 1.  Her area of interest was also interpretation, but 
in body dysmorphic disorder (BDD).  She felt inspired by my work and conducted a 
study similar to my studies, comparing a group of 19 subjects diagnosed with BDD, 
a group of 20 subjects diagnosed with OCD, and a group of 22 non-clinical control 
subjects.  She administered symptom and cognition questionnaires as well as an 
experimental interpretation questionnaire for BDD (Study 1), applied the text 
comprehension paradigm with disorder-specific scenarios for BDD along with my 
unspecific and social scenarios (Study 2), and a facial recognition test (Study 3).  In 
her result section of Study 2, she only reports one overall ANOVA with one 
between-subjects variable (“group”) and three repeated measures variables 
(“scenario type,” “cue condition,” and “continuation condition”).  This overall 
analysis supported the sensitivity of the paradigm just as in both of my own studies 
(significant interaction of cue by continuation).  Buhlmann (2002) did no further 
manipulation check.  In addition, she also did not submit each scenario type to an 
analysis of variance.  In the overall ANOVA, no interaction with the factor group 
reached statistical significance.  Buhlmann reports only focused contrasts and states 
that "Results of the contrasts analyses were also confirmed by two-tailed paired t-
tests" (Buhlmann, 2002, p. 72).  However, as I also calculated contrasts, I am aware 
that in most cases, the model for “no bias” fit data just as well as one or even both 
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of the bias models (compare result sections of this thesis).  Therefore, Buhlmann's 
(2002) findings need to be taken with some caution.  Additional ANOVAs should 
be calculated for each scenario type separately and a replication of her findings 
should be attempted. 
The fourth thesis that used a modification of the text comprehension 
paradigm was presented by Leigh Goggin (2005) for the doctoral degree at 
University of Western Australia, still home to the first author of the original study, 
Colin MacLeod.  Goggin conducted two experiments, the text comprehension study 
relevant to my own thesis and an affective modulation of the human eye blink 
reflex.  In his abstract he stated that he chose "two of the most promising objective 
physiological measures of assessing interpretation" (p. 1).  Goggin tested 25 
clinically depressed patients with the diagnosis of major depressive disorder, 
bipolar affective disorder, or dysthymic disorder, and 25 non-depressed subjects 
matched with the experimental group for age and gender.  In his review of the 
existing literature he discussed, among other research, the studies by Donovan 
(1994) and Lawson and MacLeod (1999) (see 4.2.3 Experimental studies with 
depressed patients of this thesis for more details).  Goggin provided three possible 
explanations for Donovan's (1994) and Lawson and MacLeod's (1999) inability to 
detect a negative interpretive bias for ambiguous stimuli in depressed individuals: 
1) non-existence of such a bias in depressed people, 2) lack of statistical power 
(Donovan, 1994) or subclinical student sample (Lawson & MacLeod, 1999), and 3) 
psychomotor agitation and retardation that compromises the sensitivity of reaction-
time based methodologies.  Goggin (2005) designed his experiments very carefully 
to improve the existing methodologies and eliminate competing interpretations.  In 
particular, he recruited a sufficient number of subjects and changed the text 
comprehension paradigm from a between-subjects measure of the independent 
variable of interest (RT of the disambiguating sentence of a particular scenario) to a 
within-subjects measure.  In order to reduce statistical error variance caused by 
increased response variances in depressed individuals, all subjects received both the 
negative and neutral stimuli for each trial.  Furthermore, he altered the manner in 
which participants responded to the sentence-by-sentence presentation to provide an 
explicit measure of comprehension that he then compared to the implicit measure of 
response latency.  His material consisted of 20 sentence sets taken from the 
disorder-relevant material of the Donovan (1994) study that were extended by three 
additional sentence types.  When presented to participants in Goggin's (2005) study, 
each set consisted of five components: 1) an initial ambiguous sentence, 2) a 
concluding sentence with a neutral or slightly positive interpretation, 3) a 
concluding sentence with a negative/depression-linked interpretation, 4) a 
completely unrelated concluding sentence, and 5) a related but incongruous 
concluding sentence.  Unrelated and incongruous continuations made little or no 
sense in relation to the initial sentence.  All 20 sentence sets were presented to all 
participants.  Differently from all other studies using the text comprehension 
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paradigm, Goggin's participants not only had to comprehend the sentences, but 
make a decision whether each of the four concluding sentences was a "logical and 
coherent ending to the initial sentence" (Goggin, 2005, p. 87) by pressing the "yes" 
or "no" key.  Participants were instructed that the four conclusion sentences were 
independent of each other and that they should only be judged in context of the 
initial (ambiguous) sentence.  Goggin analyzed the reaction times between button 
presses ("next" and "yes"/"no") as implicit measure of participants' interpretation of 
the initial ambiguous scenario based on schema activation under the assumption 
that comprehension latency and decision latency are identical (he instructed 
participants to perform the task as quickly as possible but also as accurately as 
possible).  However, the decision process in general and in Goggin's study in 
particular requires a number of additional (and different) behavioral elements not 
inherent in text comprehension (e.g., judgment of answer correctness, choice 
between two buttons (versus just the space bar press in the original text 
comprehension paradigm), awareness of an assessment situation, greater load on 
working memory because of longer activation requirement of the initial ambiguous 
sentence etc.).  Therefore, his results are somewhat difficult to compare to the other 
results reported above.  For instance, Goggin found general group differences that 
nobody else had reported.  His depression group took much longer than his control 
group to respond to all stimuli, probably because of the far more complex 
behavioral requirements of his study.  Nevertheless, he was also unable to detect a 
negative interpretive bias in his depressed participants.  His depression group did 
not respond faster to negative continuation sentences in comparison to positive 
continuation sentences.  Non-depressed controls also did not exhibit any bias in 
their reaction times of negative versus positive continuation sentences.  
Goggin interpreted his results as follows: "The results mirror those of 
Donovan (1994) and Lawson &  MacLeod (1999), which suggest that reaction time 
measures of interpretation may not be appropriate for dysphoric and depressed 
participants.  This may be due to the high level of comorbid anxiety that exists in 
such a population." (Goggin, 2005, p. 106).  He found significant differences in RTs 
of participants with a comorbid diagnosis of social phobia compared to participants 
suffering from a depressive illness alone.  The comorbid group was significantly 
slower to respond to all stimuli then the depression-alone group.  However, this 
may have been to some extent an artifact of the decision and evaluation paradigm 
and may have had little to do with the actual interpretive process.  In Study 2 of my 
own thesis, I controlled for participants' anxiety status and carefully separated 
depression from social anxiety, yet depression and control groups never exhibited 
any interpretive bias either.  
Wenzel (2000) explained her inability to detect a bias toward disorder-
specific threatening interpretations in social phobia and panic disorder as follows: 
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"… All passages in MacLeod and Cohen were clearly neutral, and the 
critical sentence could have been either neutral or threatening.  In contrast, two 
thirds of the passages in the present study contained ambiguous but potentially 
threatening elements (i.e., physical threat passages, social threat passages).  Perhaps 
a negative interpretation of the content of the first four sentences influenced the 
latency to read the critical sentence (i.e., AT) in an unknown manner." (Wenzel, 
2000, p. 178).  
Adding my own results to her findings, I do not agree with Wenzel's 
interpretation.  First, MacLeod and Cohen's passages were also ambiguous, with 
both negative and non-negative (mostly neutral, or even positive) interpretations 
possible.  Otherwise, they could not have served as material open to different 
interpretations.  Instead, the difference between MacLeod and Cohen (1993) and all 
other interpretation experiments lies in the type of material.  MacLeod and Cohen 
achieved ambiguity mostly with homonyms.  Thus, interpretation of the preceding 
passage was clear, once the intended meaning of the homonym was disambiguated 
by the critical sentence.  In all theses utilizing this original paradigm, ambiguous 
scenarios were described that suggested certain interpretations but did not require 
them.  Therefore, participants could have interpreted the passages completely 
different from our expectations, moving the critical, disambiguating sentence into a 
different position, making a "speeding effect" much less likely than in the original 
study.  However, this is not the only critical difference between MacLeod and 
Cohen (1993) on one side and Donovan (1994), Wenzel (2000), Buhlmann (2002), 
Goggin (2005), and my own investigations on the other side.  The latter group of 
researchers created disorder-relevant material while MacLeod and Cohen used 
mostly unspecific scenarios, dictated by the availability of homonyms.  Finally, 
Donovan (1994), Wenzel (2000), Goggin (2005) and I presented the comprehension 
task to diagnosed patients while MacLeod and Cohen only used high-school 
students with mostly no or unknown diagnoses.  Differences between analogous and 
clinical populations have repeatedly been documented and discussed (e.g., 
Bernstein & Paul, 1971, Emmelkamp, Mersch & Vissia, 1985, Rapee, Ancis & 
Barlow, 1988, Sallis, Lichstein & McGlynn, 1980, and Stewart, Knize & Pihl, 1992, 
for anxiety disorders; Bradley, Mogg & Millar, 1996, Coyne & Gotlib, 1983, Depue 
& Monroe, 1978, Gotlib, 1984, and Kwiatkowski & Parkinson, 1994, for 
depression).  The only author that reported a disorder-specific bias for threatening 
interpretations in clinical subjects is Buhlmann (2002).  However, as discussed 
above, she also did not find the predicted interaction with the factor “group” and 
based her interpretations on a different type of analysis (contrast analysis).  My own 
calculations showed that the data of Study 1 and Study 2 fit more than one model in 
numerous cases, which might be true for Buhlmann's comprehension latencies as 
well. 
Taking these major differences between the original study, the theses 
described above, and my own research into account, Donovan's, Wenzel's, Goggin's 
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and my inability to experimentally demonstrate the hypothesized interpretive bias in 
patients with emotional disorders could mean at least four different things: 
 
1) MacLeod and Cohen's (1993) comprehension paradigm is very limited in its 
applicability.  It requires the limited ambiguity of homonyms that may be clarified by 
distinct synonyms.  If this is the case, disorder-specific scenarios cannot be created 
due to the lack of available homonyms.  Because none of the six unpublished studies 
nor the one published study by Mogg et al. (2006) that tried to extend the paradigm to 
apply to four different emotional disorders was able to demonstrate a consistent and 
significant interpretive bias in patients or in healthy control subjects, this conclusion 
seems very likely and somewhat disappointing.  However, it is also possible that there 
was not enough power and too much within-group variance in all of the theses because 
results were based on much fewer scenarios for each scenario type than in the original 
study.  Mogg et al. (2006), who applied a sufficient enough number of scenarios 
(n=80), comparable to MacLeod and Cohen's (1993) study, was at least able to 
replicate the non-negative bias in control subjects.  However, she did not find the 
predicted negative interpretive bias in clinically depressed patients even though a large 
proportion of them had at least one comorbid anxiety disorder and the mean sum score 
of the Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988) of the 
depression group was close to the reported mean sum score of anxiety patients 
(depression group in Mogg et al. [2006]: 22.2; anxiety patients in Beck et al. [1988]: 
25.76).  Unfortunately, Mogg et al. (2006) did not apply the STAI-T to their subjects.  
Post-hoc analysis of results from my two studies, after regrouping subjects into STAI-
T based Quartiles, suggested that there may be a discontinuation in interpretation of 
high trait anxious people compared to very high trait anxious individuals.  MacLeod 
and Cohen's (1993) study suggested a linear relation.  Furthermore, the diagnosis of 
depression may mediate this relation.  Mogg et al. (2006) and my own findings with 
general scenarios (for more details see point three below) seem to suggest that 
depressed individuals may display a non-negative/non-threatening bias in the 
interpretation of ambiguous scenarios, at least if material is non-self-referential and the 
method of analysis is based on group averages rather than idiosyncratic analysis.  
2) Moreover, it is questionable whether the comprehension paradigm in its original 
application form, using homonyms to create disambiguity, actually accesses 
personally relevant schemata postulated by cognitive models of emotional disorders.  I 
want to argue that the comprehension of passages containing homonyms may only 
require representation in the form of a propositional network.  According to the 
construction-integration model of Kintsch (1988; 1998), the process of text 
comprehension takes place on three different levels, creating three mental 
representations: semantic representation, propositional representation, and situational 
representation.  Only on the third level is knowledge about the world from long-term 
memory added to the information provided in text.  To understand the short passages 
in MacLeod and Cohen's (1993) study, it may not even be necessary to create a 
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situational model.  Activation of the two possible meanings of the homonym may be 
sufficient to create a coherent text after representation of the disambiguating sentence.  
In the case of priming, one meaning of the homonym would have been more activated 
than the other, or the second meaning would even have been inhibited.  If the critical 
sentence then disambiguated the previously read ambiguous sentence to the meaning 
of the homonym that was activated to a lesser degree or even inhibited, longer 
comprehension latency reflected activation of the inactivated meaning of the specific 
homonym rather than deactivation of another situation model which would incorporate 
more information from long-term memory and maybe even visual images.  Therefore, 
effects of a positive and negative interpretation bias in low vs. high trait anxious 
subjects, demonstrated by MacLeod and Cohen (1993), may be based on greater 
facilitation of one meaning of the homonym over the other of unknown origin, rather 
than schema-based interpretation of an ambiguous situation.  The paradigm would 
then better serve as a measure of memory effects than of interpretation processes.  One 
could imagine, for instance, that high-trait anxious subjects experience more negative 
emotions, specifically more anxiety, than low-trait anxious subjects, thus the negative 
meaning of a particular homonym is more often activated in high-trait anxious subjects 
due to emotionally congruent associations (based on the associative network theory by 
Bower [1981]).  Low trait anxious subjects, on the other hand, may encounter more 
situations where the neutral meaning of the homonym is activated, thus this meaning 
has been facilitated.  State anxiety may also play a role in the pre-activation status of 
the homonyms (mood-state dependent retrieval; Bower, 1983).  In any case, it seems 
unlikely that students in MacLeod and Cohen's study used higher-level schemata or 
even created an elaborate situation model to interpret the short passages presented to 
them because research in the area of text comprehension suggests that participants 
comprehend text with the least amount of mental effort necessary (Foertsch & 
Gernsbacher, 1994). 
3) This explanation could also be applied to the non-convergent results of Mogg et al. 
(2006) using two different cognitive tasks – the text comprehension paradigm by 
MacLeod and Cohen (1993) and a homophone task (Mathews, Richards, et al., 1989) 
– to investigate whether clinically depressed individuals have a negative bias when 
interpreting information.  Following my argumentation above, these two cognitive 
tasks assess different levels of text comprehension.  For the homophones, semantic 
information may even have been sufficient for processing.  Participants of Mogg et 
al.'s (2006) study wrote down the spelling/meaning of the homophone that had the 
strongest level of pre-activation, possibly determined by their currently activated 
schemata, their current mood state, or the frequency this particular meaning was 
activated in the (more immediate) past.  This definitely does not require higher-level 
processing where "knowledge about the world" is added and situation models are 
formed.  Strictly spoken, it could be seen as a mood-congruent memory effect as 
described by Bower (1981; 1983).  A negative bias in memory has often been reported 
for depression (for recent reviews see Harvey, Watkins, Mansell, & Shafran, 2004; 
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Leppanen, 2006) and was found again by Mogg et al. (2006) in the same study the 
homophone task was used.  The text comprehension task, on the other hand, may on 
average have required the highest level of representation, the situation model, in order 
for each scenario to be fully understood.  It could be interesting to divide the sentence 
sets used by Mogg et al. (2006) into two groups: (a) ambiguity strictly based on 
homonyms and (b) ambiguity created by the entire situational context, and analyze 
data again for these two categories.  A negative bias with uncued ambiguous sentences 
being comprehended like depression-relevant ambiguous sentences should be more 
likely for category (a) than (b). 
4) Clinical populations comprehend ambiguous scenarios differently from analogous 
populations.  The post-hoc analysis of unspecific scenarios only, after regrouping 
subjects of Study 1 and Study 2 into STAI-T based Quartiles, lends some support to 
this interpretation, although these post-hoc results are based on very few scenarios, 
compared to MacLeod and Cohen's (1993) original material.  The interpretation 
pattern of high trait anxious subjects (3rd Quartile) was clearly different from all other 
subjects, resulting in the only significant interaction of the two factors ”group” and 
“cue condition” of the entire thesis.  Analyzing data of participants from both studies 
together, high trait anxious subjects from the 3rd Quartile displayed a strong bias for 
threatening interpretations just as reported by Cohen and MacLeod.  Similarly, low 
trait anxious subjects from the 2nd Quartile displayed a bias for non-threatening 
interpretations of ambiguous unspecific scenarios, again as reported by MacLeod and 
Cohen.  However, participants with very high trait anxiety scores (4th Quartile) 
displayed a bias for non-threatening interpretations of ambiguous unspecific 
scenarios.  The 2nd Quartile group consisted of 32 control subjects, four social phobia 
and one panic disorder subject.  The 3rd Quartile group of this thesis constituted 17 
control subjects, nine social phobia and three panic disorder subjects.  Members of the 
4th Quartile group were characterized by the greatest psychopathology of all 
participants of Study 1 and Study 2.  In both studies, they scored highest on all 
symptom and cognition questionnaires.  All 29 members of the depression group, 17 
(Study 1) and 24 (Study 2) members of the two social phobia groups and 14 members 
of the panic disorder group belonged to the 4th Quartile.  All except for two of the 86 
subjects received at least one or more DSM-IV diagnoses.  Therefore, subjects of the 
4th Quartile can safely be called “clinical.” Results of this thesis reject the hypothesis 
of a linear increase in subjects' tendency to interpret ambiguous situations in a 
threatening way the greater their amount of trait anxiety.  Future research should try to 
replicate these findings with the entire material of MacLeod and Cohen, presenting it 
to different groups of clinical subjects, thus covering the entire spectrum of trait 
anxiety.  It remains completely unclear, however, what constitutes the difference in 
interpretation tendency of ambiguous scenarios between subjects with high and very 
high trait anxiety scores.  A comparison of the comprehension time differences for 
unspecific scenarios of clinical and control subjects from the 3rd Quartile revealed 
identical results.  Both subject groups demonstrated a bias for threatening 
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interpretations, their mean differences under the three cue conditions were nearly 
identical.  Unfortunately, the same comparison was not possible for the 4th Quartile 
because there were only two control subjects.  Dividing subjects of the 4th Quartile 
from Study 1 into two low and high depression groups based on their BDI sum score 
resulted in very similar results as well.  Both subject groups were biased toward non-
threatening interpretations of ambiguous scenarios.  However, dividing subjects of the 
4th Quartile from Study 2 into a group with the diagnosis of depression and a group 
without diagnosed depression, different comprehension latency patterns emerged: the 
depression group showed the reported bias for non-threatening interpretations of 
ambiguous general scenarios, while the comprehension time difference under the “no 
cue” condition of the anxiety group lay equidistant between the two cued conditions.  
However, as in all analyses before, the groups did not differ statistically.  These 
findings are only post-hoc explorations and need to be tested in future studies.  In any 
case, it seems that individuals with a past or current depressive illness respond to 
ambiguous scenarios somewhat differently from anxious subjects. 
5) Cognitive models of anxiety and depression may need to be revised.  People suffering 
from pathological anxiety and/or depression are not generally characterized by 
schemas that lend threatening, dysfunctional or negative interpretations to ambiguous 
perceptions, thereby distorting their views of disorder-relevant situations in a negative 
way via schematic processing.  In schematic processing, information is interpreted so 
as to be consistent with the content of a schema (Ackermann & DeRubeis, 1991; 
Dykman, Abramson, Alloy, & Hartlage, 1989; Markus & Zajonc, 1985; Neisser, 
1976).  Rather, as suggested by results from the interpretation questionnaires, anxious 
and depressed patients may lack the “protective ignorance” of negative interpretations 
present in healthy people who have a “protective belief” in their own self-efficacy and 
good fortune.  Such an interpretation would be in line with the literature on positive 
illusions of, e.g., exaggerated perceptions of control and mastery, and their protective 
role for mental and physical health (Taylor & Brown, 1988; Taylor, Kemeny, Reed, 
Bower, & Gruenewald, 2000).  
6) I do not want to argue against the existence of individual or distinct negative schemas 
in clinical subjects, simply against global negative schemas, even against generally 
negative disorder-specific schemas.  This view is supported by more recent research.  
Schneider and Schulte (2007) applied a modified semantic priming paradigm to test 
whether panic patients more strongly associate catastrophes with anxiety symptoms 
than healthy controls.  Panic patients demonstrated stronger semantic priming effects 
for catastrophes immediately following prime sentences only if priming effects were 
calculated for idiographically selected stimuli.  The two groups did not differ if 
semantic priming effects were calculated by averaging across identical stimuli for all 
subjects, replicating results from Schniering and Rapee (1997).  In my own 
interpretation experiment, I lacked a measure to assess the personal relevance of the 
stimulus material to each participant.  This may be an explanation for my inability to 
detect an interpretation bias.  Therefore, it seems extremely important to identify the 
  
201
nature and content of schemas that discriminate between clinical and control subjects, 
as well as among different psychological disorders in order to address and modify 
these schemas in cognitive psychotherapy.  Taken to the extreme, an idiographic 
approach may be necessary to treat each patient most effectively.  
 
9.4   Implications of results for emotional disorders 
Anxiety may arise from a state of doubt or uncertainty about the meaning 
of situations.  Control subjects of my thesis always rated non-threatening 
interpretations in the interpretation questionnaire paradigm as “likely” and 
threatening explanations as “unlikely,” no matter what situational type they were 
confronted with.  These ratings might reflect confidence in their "good fortune" or 
"the way things work" on the basis of cognitive schemata of “control,” “non-harm,” 
and “self-efficacy.” Anxiety patients, on the other hand, are described to be 
characterized by cognitive schemata of “loss of control,” “danger,” and often 
“helplessness” (especially if a comorbid depressive disorder is prevalent) (Beck, 
1976, 1985; Beck et al., 1985).  Anxiety patients seem to fluctuate between 
threatening and non-threatening interpretations of ambiguous, self-referential 
situations, judging them almost always as “possible,” not able to reject or embrace 
one or the other.  This seems to be a general vulnerability factor that may be topped 
by disorder-specific interpretive biases for panic and social phobia patients.  It 
creates a state of indecision, naturally accompanied by heightened autonomic 
arousal, reflected in the experience of anxiety.  In other words, the possibility of 
danger is worse than actual danger because a person cannot act on possibilities, yet 
possibilities require additional mental capacity and along with it higher arousal.  
The depression group displayed the same pattern of interpretive preferences in the 
interpretation questionnaire as the two anxiety groups.  Except for the depression-
dysfunctional scale, social phobia and depression groups did not differ significantly 
on any of the nine indexes of the IQSD.  Therefore, the above argumentation may 
apply to depressive disorders as well.  Overall, there seem to be more similarities 
between emotional disorders than differences, which was demonstrated again in my 
research.  I agree with Harvey et al. (2004) that a transdiagnostic approach to 
research and treatment of psychological disorders may be more fruitful and 
promising than the strict separation of the disorders carried out in the past decades.  
Therefore, in the final section of my thesis I would like to summarize four points 
connected with the results of my thesis that seem to characterize emotional 
disorders in general. 
 
1) Anxious and depressed individuals seem to lack a protective mechanism against 
catastrophic or dysfunctional interpretations of ambiguous situations.  As 
demonstrated by the interpretation questionnaires, such interpretations of ambiguous 
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situations seem to suggest themselves with a similar likelihood as neutral, non-
threatening or functional interpretations.  Thus, compared to individuals without a 
mental disorder, negative interpretations appear to be more frequently and non-
negative interpretations less frequently activated in anxious and depressed individuals.  
However, the interpretive bias is displayed by healthy individuals because they often 
seem to neglect possible negative meanings of ambiguous situations.  It remains 
unclear, however, whether anxious and depressed individuals are characterized by (a) 
an inability to reject such negative interpretations while mentally healthy individuals 
reject them as soon as they are activated, maybe even pre-consciously, if (b) anxious 
and depressed individuals find them “most believable,” if (c) negative interpretations 
are much less frequently activated in healthy individuals in the first place (i.e., they 
don’t even have them) or if (d) a combination of the above accounts for the results of 
Study 1 and Study 2.  It is possible, for instance, that negative and non-negative 
interpretations of ambiguous situations compete with each other in anxious and 
depressed individuals and an additional meta-cognitive evaluation of the plausibility or 
believability inhibits non-negative interpretations and strengthens negative 
interpretations to some extent.  Much more research is necessary to clarify these 
processes and identify the role of interpretation in emotional disorders. 
2) Anxious and depressed individuals have developed idiosyncratic schemata through 
exposure to different situations and experiences that apply to specific areas of either 
anxiety and/or depression.  This may partly contribute to the development of distinct 
mental disorders.  These schemata should influence all three processing stages of the 
Beck and Clark (1997) model.  These schemata contain, among others, beliefs in the 
personal relevance of a situation, the imminent threat/danger, short- and long-term 
consequences (e.g., injury, loss, rejection), as well as coping resources necessary 
(causality-beliefs) and available to the individual (capacity-beliefs).  In my thesis, 
these idiosyncratic schemata influenced the significant differences between clinical 
groups on the threatening/dysfunctional and non-threatening/functional scales of the 
interpretation questionnaires (e.g., between panic disorder and social phobia subjects 
on the panic-threatening and social-threatening scales and between depression and 
social phobia subjects on the depression-dysfunctional scale) as well as in the 
Probability-Cost-Questionnaire.  Schemata that provoke a fear reaction are 
characterized by (a) high personal relevance of the situation, (b) relatively high 
likelihood of a catastrophic interpretation of the situation (e.g., an increase in heart rate 
could [among others!] mean a heart attack will happen) or the inability to reject a 
catastrophic interpretation, and (c) either the lack of knowledge about coping 
strategies or the belief that the strategies necessary are not available to the person (see 
also Lazarus et al., 1980).  
3) Anxious and depressed individuals hold beliefs about insufficient coping strategies 
(e.g., abilities, resources) in comparison to healthy individuals (e.g., Bandura, 1997; 
Casey, Oei, Newcombe, & Kenardy, 2004; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984).  These beliefs 
are strategic and reflective.  They most likely impact the third stage of Beck and 
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Clark’s (1997) information processing model.  In my thesis, these beliefs may be one 
source of the significant difference between clinical and control subjects on the 
probability scales of the Probability-Cost-Questionnaire.  The relationship between 
different mood states and self-efficacy has been reported previously (e.g., Kavanagh & 
Bower, 1985).  
4) Anxious and depressed individuals may display biases in information processing only 
for personally relevant information.  This may either require self-referential material, 
material presented in an unconstrained processing context (e.g., word lists) that can be 
constrained to personal relevance during processing, or at least material that an 
individual is able to identify with.  An important difference between the questionnaire 
and the experimental method of my thesis is the self-referential nature of the scenarios 
in the interpretation questionnaires compared to the non-self-referential nature of the 
scenarios in the interpretation experiment.  However, Wenzel (2000) phrased her 
stories in the second person, similar to the interpretation questionnaire, in order that 
participants could imagine themselves in that particular scene, yet was still unable to 
detect an interpretive bias in her two anxiety groups.  Therefore, self-reference does 
not seem to be sufficient enough to produce personal relevance.  In addition, automatic 
processes (stages one and to some extent two of Beck and Clark’s processing model) 
are by nature relatively fast processes.  Therefore, personal relevance of a situation as 
a mediating factor may influence experimental data to a greater extent than 
questionnaire responses, as the latter are most likely located on the third stage of Beck 
and Clark's (1997) model.  The involvement of strategic processes results in longer 
response times and thus more robust effects.  Accordingly, the averaging method often 
does not produce statistically significant differences between groups (e.g., Schniering 
& Rapee, 1997; Schneider & Schulte, 2007; the interpretation experiment of my own 
thesis) while an idiosyncratic approach can reveal group differences in automatic 
processes (Kroeze, Van der Does, Spinhoven, Schot, Sterk, et al., 2005; Schneider & 
Schulte, 2007). 
 
The overall message of this thesis may be that, contrary to most cognitive 
models, what makes people mentally ill is not a negatively biased interpretation of 
the world, but rather an inability to reject negative options, trust in benign 
explanations and rely on one's ability to cope. 
 
9.5   Future research in the area of interpretation 
First, it seems important to better define the constructs of “interpretation,” 
“interpretive processes,” and “interpretive bias.” In research literature, the terms 
“interpretation” and “interpretive process” are often used interchangeably, as a label 
either for a subsystem of a hypothetical “information processing system” that 
assigns meaning to (ambiguous) information, or for the product of such a 
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processing system, or both.  Usually, it refers to a kind of thinking that can be put 
into words, thus excluding the ineffable or tacit knowledge, although some of the 
theorizing in the broader area of cognition is also suggestive of unconscious 
processes such as, for example, “automaticity” (McNally, 1995).  Harvey et al. 
(2004) subsumed the interpretation of ambiguous stimuli (i.e., the interpretation 
questionnaire and the interpretation experiment of my thesis) under the chapter 
heading “Reasoning,” also calling it “interpretative reasoning.” Often, judgmental 
processes (measured with the Probability-Cost-Questionnaire) are also subsumed 
under the term “interpretation” (e.g., Heinrichs & Hofmann, 2001; McNally & Foa, 
1987; Stravynski, Bond, & Amado, 2004).  Therefore, it seems very important to 
specify which facets or components belong to the term “interpretation.” An explicit 
definition can guide in the process of paradigm development.  It can also help to 
evaluate existing research as to how much it actually deals with “interpretation.” 
Furthermore, it remains completely unclear what processes of the cognitive 
information processing system are involved.  Do interpretive processes require 
attention and memory processes as prerequisites and thus stand at the end of 
information processing?  Are they only elaborate, higher-level cognitive processes?  
Are they automatic or strategic?  Most likely, as in other cognitive processes, the 
interpretation system incorporates automatic as well as strategic, parallel as well as 
sequential, top down as well as bottom up processes.  Nevertheless, these processes 
require specification.  At the moment, much research seems to “know” what 
interpretation is because said research is mostly concerned with the demonstration 
of “differences between mentally healthy and mentally disordered individuals.” 
However, as long as the involved processes are not defined, it is difficult to truly 
understand the implications of any findings, and harder still to develop strategies for 
treatment.  Certainly, a clear definition of interpretation is not possible at the current 
moment because we are only at the beginning of our understanding.  Nevertheless, 
future research needs to specify what elements, components and processes belong to 
interpretation (versus, e.g., attention and memory), how many different information 
processing levels are involved, what other systems are influenced by the 
information processing (sub)system(s), and how any possible interactions operate.  
Furthermore, researchers must specify what aspect of the complex system of 
information processing they have investigated—and with which specific paradigm.  
At this point, systematization of already existing results may be more important 
than accumulation of additional results.  
Since Beck (1967, 1976), cognitive models generally assume underlying 
schemas that direct people’s attention and provide the frame for sorting and 
interpreting incoming information.  A schema is a cognitive framework or concept 
that helps organize and interpret information.  Schemas are useful in dealing with 
vast amounts of information.  However, these mental frameworks also cause the 
exclusion of pertinent information in favor of information that confirms pre-existing 
beliefs and ideas.  Schemas can contribute to stereotypes and make it difficult to 
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retain new information that does not conform to an individual’s established 
schemas.  Beck (1967, 1976) as well as Markus & Zajonc (1985) point to the 
schema’s heightened influence under conditions of ambiguity.  Schemas are 
structures in memory that incorporate knowledge about the world.  In general, they 
also incorporate self-referential information as they were developed over time based 
on personal experiences.  In any case, schemas are relatively extensive concepts, not 
just single word or phrase entries in memory.  Thus it may be questionable whether 
some of the methods applied do actually study interpretive processes.  This seems 
particularly relevant for the single-word paradigms (homophones, homographs).  
Do they really require schematic processing or do they rather measure memory 
processes and levels of activation?  One may argue that there is no difference.  The 
confusion arises precisely from the lack of definition of what is and is not 
“interpretation” and how can it be separated from research in the area of memory. 
 I want to argue that “interpretation” in its influence on mental health 
should require the assignment of a personally relevant meaning that has the 
potential to be conscious (albeit it may be so automatic that it is not attended to).  It 
should require the highest level of information processing where information input 
is connected with long-term memory content (and not just working memory 
content!) to form a new combined output that may have the form of a mental image 
(comparable with the “situation model” in text research).  Memory, on the other 
hand, deals with activation and inhibition processes and is more circumscribed.  
Unquestionably, the same schemata underlie both processes—memory and 
interpretation—and the source of any “bias” should be found in content and 
operation of idiosyncratic schemata.  Nevertheless, single-word paradigms and even 
text comprehension and questionnaire methods have little ecological validity.  
Second, research paradigms and methods in the area of interpretation need 
to be refined.  Future research must develop and apply more ecologically valid 
material (e.g., faces, video sequences, virtual reality, computer simulations, social 
interactions), assess different types of behavior within a single study design (multi-
method approach), and require responses more relevant and ecologically valid to the 
different mental disorders (e.g., performance in social phobia, self-evaluations in 
depression, symptom inductions in panic disorder).  On the other hand, paradigms 
also have to be developed that are sophisticated enough to exclude demand effects 
and response biases.  There is always a trade-off between external and internal 
validity.  Therefore, a multi-method approach should become state-of-the-art. 
Third, more studies are needed that investigate individuals with diagnosed 
mental disorders rather than analogue populations or induced emotional states.  The 
majority of findings in the area of interpretation still stems from non-patient 
research.  It is unclear, however, how readily results can be generalized.  To be able 
to adequately evaluate the existing body of knowledge and interpret future research 
with non-patient populations, comparative studies with both patients and analogue 
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populations are also very important.  Sample sizes have to be large enough and a 
sufficient amount of repeated measures need to be assessed. 
Fourth, studies in the area of information processing have often shown 
that biases tend to reflect the current concerns of individuals (disorder-specific 
results).  However, specifically in the area of interpretation of ambiguous scenarios, 
differences between control subjects and clinical subjects have repeatedly been 
found for other-disorder concerns in addition to disorder-specific concerns (e.g., in 
the interpretation questionnaires of my thesis).  Future research has to develop a 
better understanding of the nature, scope, and limits of group differences in the way 
people interpret ambiguous information.  What tendencies are shared by all clinical 
subjects?  What tendencies are specific to a particular disorder?  Furthermore, the 
findings of my thesis suggest a protective non-negative interpretive bias in mentally 
healthy individuals rather than a negative bias in clinical subjects.  What 
mechanisms underlie this “protective bias?” Does the lack of it play a causal role or 
is it just a covariate of psychological illness?  In addition, future research should try 
to investigate more personally relevant information for participants (e.g., self-
referential material, idiosyncratic analysis) in order to have a better chance to find 
significant group differences.  Only in a secondary research stage could systematic 
variance between personality traits, features of the disorder, developmental 
historyand interpretative characteristics, etc., be sought.  
Finally, because most studies in the area of interpretation have been self-
report and questionnaire studies, future research should try to advance experimental 
designs to limit alternative explanations of results.  Here, the most promising 
approach appears to be the study of automatic interpretive processes, because these 
processes are least likely to be willfully produced or otherwise manipulated by an 
individual.  They prevent experimenter demand effects and response bias.  In order 
to do this, cooperation with biopsychologists and neuropsychologists may be 
fruitful.  Lawson, MacLeod, and Hammond (2002) developed a new paradigm 
called the “affective modulation experiment” wherein they recorded the blink 
amplitudes of participants startled while performing an imagery task.  Blink 
amplitudes are augmented by stimuli of negative valence and inhibited by stimuli of 
positive valence.  Thus, the affective interpretation of ambiguous stimuli could be 
inferred from the amplitude of the recorded blink response.  This paradigm could be 
further refined to incorporate faces or video clips rather than single words and to 
assess patients rather than analogue populations.  Another approach could be 
assessment via fMRI.  Subjects could read ambiguous vignettes or watch a short 
ambiguous video scene, then the areas of their (greatest) neural activation could be 
recorded.  From this, it could be concluded what brain areas (and hence processes) 
are involved in interpretation.  Furthermore, awareness of hemispheric distribution 
of activation may allow for inferences about the emotionality (negative vs. positive) 
of individuals’ interpretations.  Automatic processes form the basis of follow-up 
strategic behavior.  Thus they may also set the stage and limitations for therapeutic 
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change.  Research in the area of interpretation seems to have only just begun—yet it 
is a promising field, the understanding of which is important for the future treatment 
of mental disorders.  As stated by many great minds throughout history, what 
influences our behavior and our well being is not reality itself but what we make of 
it, not the physical reality but the psychological reality. 
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Appendices 
Appendix I:  Protocol of Study 1 
 
Date: ____________    Time (Start): ____________    Investigator: _______________ 
Task Start End Notes 
Instruction & Consent Form    
Sociodemography    
Diagnostical Interview 
(SCID for DSM-IV) 
  Diagnosis:  yes/no 
 
Therapy addresses    
STAI-S    
Rating    
Comprehension task   Number of errors: 
Shipley Vocabulary Test    
BREAK    
Interpretation questionnaire    
Questionnaires (s. below)    
Rating    
Lottery ticket    
Information    
Time (End): _____________  
 
Questionnaires Completion Notes 
STAI-T   
BSQ   
LSAS   
ACQ   
BDI   
ASI   
FNE-S   
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Appendix II:  General Instruction Provided to Participants of Study 1 
 
This study was designed to investigate basic thinking processes in anxiety.  
Everybody feels afraid from time to time, but some people feel anxious too 
frequently or too strongly and it impairs their enjoyment of life.  Therefore, 
investigating processes that may initiate or maintain anxiety disorders are very 
important both for understanding anxiety and for treating it.   
In the following 70 to 100 minutes we will ask you questions about your 
emotional and physical well-being using a structured interview and a number of 
questionnaires.  Furthermore, you will be asked to perform a simple comprehension 
task presented at the computer and answer easy comprehension questions.  Finally, 
we will give you a variety of different situations in print and request your evaluation 
of them. 
The personal information gathered during the course of the study is strictly 
confidential.  You will be assigned a code-number that makes it impossible to 
identify any specific person with any recorded results.  Data analysis will be based 
on group comparison rather than individual analysis.  Results will be used for 
scientific purposes only.  The study was approved by the Committee on the Use of 
Human Subjects. 
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary.  You can 
terminate the session at any given point in time without the need to provide a reason 
for your termination.  If you complete the study your name will be entered into a 
Lottery and you have a chance of winning either $150, $100, or $50.   
Do you have any questions so far? 
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Appendix III:  Informed Consent Sheet of Study 1 
Study: "Cognitive processes in anxiety" 
 
The study is conducted by: The study is supervised by: 
Dipl.-Psych. Andrea Hähnel Prof. Dr. Richard J. McNally 
Department of Psychology Department of Psychology 
Harvard University Harvard University 
 
This study was designed to investigate basic thinking processes in anxiety.  It involves a 
diagnostic interview, a reading task at the computer, and a number of questionnaires. 
I acknowledge that I have volunteered to be a subject in this study.  Nature and purpose 
of this research have been satisfactorily explained to me.  I was informed that the personal 
information gathered during the course of the study is strictly confidential and data protection is 
guaranteed.  All analyses are for scientific purposes only and will be done anonymously.   
I understand that no risks whatsoever are incurred by my participation, and I will be free 
to cease participation at any time.  Furthermore, I realize that any questions I have about the 
procedure will be answered. 
 
Date:  Cambridge,         
Subject's signature:    
Name (please print):    
Email address:    
Permanent Home Address:    
    
Local Phone:      
Investigator's signature:    
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Appendix IV:  Interpretation Questionnaire for Panic Disorder and Social Phobia (IQPS) 
 
This questionnaire describes a variety of situations.  These situations might mean different things to 
different people.  Please try to imagine yourself in each situation and think about the associations 
the specific situation would evoke in you.  After this, please indicate for EACH of the three 
thoughts connected to the situation how likely it is that it would come to your mind under similar 
circumstances.  Rank each thought from 0 to 4 where 0 means "very unlikely" and 4 "very likely" 
that this thought would occur when you are involved in such a situation. 
Some situations might not be very common or typical for you. Please try to picture yourself in them 
anyway and indicate the probability that each of the three ideas would come to your mind. 
There are no right or wrong answers. We are only interested in your personal opinion. Please do 
not think too hard about the rating before you decide on it. Your first impression is important to us. 
 
 
The scale is as follows: 
This  0 1  2 3 4 
thought is: very unlikely unlikely     possible   likely  very likely 
 
How likely is it that this 
thought occurs to you? 
Sample: You won $5000 in a lottery.  
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) Now I can finally go on my dream vacation. 
b) I will take the money to the bank and invest it. 
c) I will go on an extended shopping trip. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
Did you rate the probability that you would think of going on your dream vacation? Did you also 
indicate how likely it is that you would think of investing the money and how likely you would 
think of a shopping spree? Then you have understood the task perfectly. Please do exactly the 
same with the following 34 scenes. And don't forget: always indicate a probability rating on all 
three thoughts that follow each situation! Thank you for your help.  
 
How likely is it that this 
thought occurs to you? 
1.   You wake with a start in the middle of the night. You 
think you heard a noise, but all is quiet. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I was woken by a dream. 
b) A burglar broke into my apartment. 
c) A door or window rattled in the wind. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
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This  0 1  2 3 4 
thought is: very unlikely unlikely     possible   likely  very likely 
 
How likely is it that this 
thought occurs to you? 
2. You notice that your heart is beating quickly and pounding. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) It is a result from physical activity. 
b) I am very excited. 
c) There must be something wrong with my heart. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
3. You have developed a small spot on the back of your hand. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I have a mild allergy. It must have been something I ate. 
b) I am developing skin cancer. 
c) I was bitten by an insect. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
4. While you are writing a check at the bank, the teller starts to 
frown. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) He is thinking of all the work he has to do. 
b) There is not enough money in my account to cover the check. 
c) He must have noticed my hand trembling. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
5. You reach for your wallet/pocketbook and cannot find it. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I left it at home. 
b) It was stolen. 
c) It must be in another pocket. 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
6. Your boss wants to see you in his office. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) He wants to give me a new assignment. 
b) He is going to tell me what a great job I'm doing. 
c) He will criticize me for the job I have been doing. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
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This  0 1  2 3 4 
thought is: very unlikely unlikely     possible   likely  very likely 
 
How likely is it that this 
thought occurs to you? 
7. You feel light-headed and weak. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I am about to faint. 
b) I need to get something to eat. 
c) I didn't get enough sleep last night. 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
8. While driving, your car makes a strange sound. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) The street surface just changed. 
b) Something fell over in the trunk. 
c) The car is about to break down. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
9. You are having a conversation with some friends.  You say 
something and the conversation stops. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) They are thinking about what I said. 
b) There is nothing more to say on this topic. 
c) I must have said something foolish or insulting. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
10. Your chest feels uncomfortable and tight. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) There is something wrong with my heart. 
b) I have a sore muscle. 
c) I have indigestion. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
11. While you are waiting in a crowded room, you start to 
sweat. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I dressed too warmly for this weather. 
b) People are staring at me. They will notice that I am nervous. 
c) The room is very hot. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
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This  0 1  2 3 4 
thought is: very unlikely unlikely     possible   likely  very likely 
 
How likely is it that this 
thought occurs to you? 
12. You are at home and you smell smoke. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) The building is on fire. 
b) Someone is burning their food. 
c) Someone is burning trash outside. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
13. You have a sudden pain in your stomach. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I am really hungry. 
b) I have indigestion. 
c) I have an appendicitis or an ulcer. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
14. Some people that you know are looking in your direction 
and talking to each other. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) They are saying something bad about me. 
b) They want me to join them. 
c) They just happen to be looking my way. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
15. A member of your family is 30 minutes late. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) They ran into a friend. 
b) They have had a serious accident on the way home. 
c) The traffic must be heavy. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
16. Your vision has become slightly blurred. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I have strained my eyes. 
b) I need (new) glasses. 
c) This is the sign of a serious illness. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
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This  0 1  2 3 4 
thought is: very unlikely unlikely     possible   likely  very likely 
 
How likely is it that this 
thought occurs to you? 
17. You want to take a vacation.  On the way to the airport, you 
get stuck in a traffic jam. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) What a great start, my vacation will be a disaster. 
b) The traffic will start moving soon. I will still make my flight. 
c) If worst comes to worst, I'll catch the next flight. 
 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
18. You are in the middle of answering a question at an interview.  
The interviewer interrupts you and asks you another 
question. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) My answer was sufficient. 
b) I must have embarrassed myself. 
c) He is a bad interviewer. 
 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
19. You're suddenly confused and are having difficulty thinking 
straight. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I am losing it.  I'm going out of my mind. 
b) I am coming down with a cold. 
c) I've been working too hard and need a rest. 
 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
20. A friend overhears your telephone conversation and smiles. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I said something amusing. 
b) I am making a fool out of myself. 
c) They are remembering a funny incident. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
21. You find a lump in your neck. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I have cancer. 
b) The lump belongs there.  I just noticed it for the first time. 
c) My glands are slightly swollen from a cold. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
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This  0 1  2 3 4 
thought is: very unlikely unlikely     possible   likely  very likely 
 
How likely is it that this 
thought occurs to you? 
22. You walk out to your car and notice a piece of paper 
underneath your windshield wiper. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) Probably a political pamphlet. 
b) I got a parking ticket. 
c) Another advertisement. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
23. You feel short of breath. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I am getting the flu. 
b) I am about to stop breathing and suffocate. 
c) I am totally "out of shape". 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
24. In a seminar, everyone is asked for his opinion about a 
specific topic.  A pause occurs when it is your turn.  
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I'm going to stutter.  I'd rather say nothing. 
b) I need a moment to consider the best way to phrase my 
opinion. 
c) I am not concentrating.  I forgot what I wanted to say. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
25. You have a pain in the small of your back. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I pulled a muscle while bending and stretching. 
b) There is something wrong with my spine. 
c) I have been sitting awkwardly. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
26. You notice that your heart is pounding, you feel 
breathless, dizzy, and surreal. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I have overdone it lately and need some sleep. 
b) Something I ate disagreed with me. 
c) I am dangerously ill. 
 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
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This  0 1  2 3 4 
thought is: very unlikely unlikely     possible   likely  very likely 
 
How likely is it that this 
thought occurs to you? 
27. Approaching your house you notice that one window is 
open. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) Someone broke into my house. 
b) A gust of wind pushed the window open. 
c) I forgot to close the window. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
28. You have been eating normally, but have lost some 
weight. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I could have cancer. 
b) It's just a normal weight fluctuation. 
c) I have been running around a lot. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
29. Your hands tremble and your legs buckle when you 
welcome a group of guests. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) I am very weak today.  I must be sick and should go to bed. 
b) I will forget what I want to say and look totally foolish. 
c) I have not eaten today.  I need to eat soon. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
30. Your doctor tells you your headaches are caused by 
tension, but he wants you to see a specialist. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) He probably wants to confirm his diagnosis. 
b) The specialist knows more about how to treat tension 
headaches. 
c) He actually thinks I've got a serious illness. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
31. A letter marked "URGENT" arrives. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) It is probably an ad designed to attract my attention. 
b) I forgot to pay a bill. 
c) Someone I know has died or is ill. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
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This  0 1  2 3 4 
thought is: very unlikely unlikely     possible   likely  very likely 
 
How likely is it that this 
thought occurs to you? 
32. You are in class and are asked to read aloud. When you 
are finished, you notice two people staring at you. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) They think I messed up the passage. 
b) They are looking at the notes written on the board behind me.
c) They liked the way I read the passage. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
33. You are having a routine chest X-ray.  The doctor looks 
carefully at the plates, and asks the nurse to take more 
X-rays. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) He saw a cancerous growth on the X-ray. 
b) I probably moved and the picture is blurry. 
c) The nurse is a trainee and took a bad picture. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
34. You turn the key but your car doesn't start. 
What thoughts occur to you? 
a) The engine is still cold. 
b) I have to give it more gas. 
c) The starter is broken. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  
 
 
Please go back and check again if you always marked three answers per situation.  
Thank you very much! 
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Appendix V:  Interpretation Experiment Textual Stimuli of Study 1 
 
Key: 
0xxx rehearsal scenarios 
1xxx nonspecific scenario 
3xxx social phobic scenario 
4xxx panic scenario 
x01x...x18x running scenario number 
xxx0 no cue 
xxx1 threatening/disorder-relevant cue 
xxx2 neutral/disorder-irrelevant cue 
xxx3 ambiguous sentence 
xxx4 threatening/disorder-relevant continuation 
xxx5 neutral/positive/disorder-irrelevant continuation 
xxx6 question 
xxx7 correct answer 
(xx) number of syllable 
n sentence rather neutral 
p sentence rather positive 
 
0012 invitation (4) 
0013 Lily came home from school with a note for her parents. (13) 
0015 She hung around eager to see how they would react. (13) 
0016 Did Lily wait for her parent's response to the letter? 
0017 Yes 
 
0020 ????? 
0023 Gail's exhibition attracted a lot of attention. (14) 
0025 Nobody had anticipated that she could create such great art. (17) 
0026 Did everyone anticipate such a great exhibition from Gail? 
0027 No 
 
0032 height (1) 
0033 The doctor examined little Theresa's growth. (12) 
0034 Her tumor had changed very little since the last visit. (14) 
0036 Did the doctor find any change since the last visit? 
0037 Yes 
 
1010 ????? 
1011 suture (2) 
1012 fabric (2) 
1013 Ann changed her nightgown after the operation and tore the stitches. (17) 
1014 She bent down to examine the damage to the wound. (13) 
1015 She bent down to examine the damage to the seam. (13) n 
1016 Did Ann ignore the torn stitches? 
1017 No 
 
1020 ????? 
1021 terrorist (3) 
1022 birthday (2) 
1023 The man put the box outside the door and left quickly. (13) 
1024 The bomb went unnoticed for several hours before being found. (17) 
1025 The gift went unnoticed for several hours before being found. (17) p 
1026 Was the box discovered right away? 
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1027 No 
 
1030 ????? 
1031 cavities (3) 
1032 laborer (3) 
1033 The sound of the drill droned on and on. (9) 
1034 The dentist finally stopped to work on the hole in the tooth. (15) 
1035 The construction-worker finally stopped to make so much noise. (15) n 
1036 Did the drilling eventually stop? 
1037 Yes 
 
1040 ????? 
1041 rotten (2) 
1042 exotic (3) 
1043 The meat Mary ate had an unusual flavor. (12) 
1044 The rancid taste lasted long after the meal had ended. (14) 
1045 The spicy taste lasted long after the meal had ended. (14) n 
1046 Did Mary eat meat? 
1047 Yes 
 
1050 ????? 
1051 riot (2) 
1052 argue (2) 
1053 The meeting was attacked by political opponents. (14) 
1054 The violence intensified as the day went on. (13) 
1055 The debate intensified as the day went on. (12) n 
1056 Was the meeting met by opposition? 
1057 Yes 
 
1060 ????? 
1061 complaint (2) 
1062 compliment (3) 
1063 After dinner at the restaurant, the couple called the chef to the table. (19) 
1064 They wanted to blame him for the terrible meal. (12) 
1065 They wanted to thank him for the delicious meal. (12) p 
1066 Did the couple call the chef over to discuss the meal? 
1067 Yes 
 
1070 ????? 
1071 minus (2) 
1072 plus (1) 
1073 Barbara was surprised by the amount in her bank account. (15) 
1074 She had not expected to be so much in debt. (12) 
1075 She had not expected to have so much money. (12) p 
1076 Did Barbara expect the amount stated in her bank account? 
1077 No 
 
1080 ????? 
1081 drowning (2) 
1082 playing (2) 
1083 Oksana did not hear her little son calling for her from the lake. (17) 
1084 Otherwise she would have swum out to rescue him. (17) 
1085 Otherwise she would have swum out to splash with him. (17) n 
1086 Was Oksana called by her little son? 
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1087 Yes 
 
1090 ????? 
1091 burning (2) 
1092 tobacco (3) 
1093 The children were removed from the smoky room. (11) 
1094 They returned when the blaze had been extinguished and the room aired out. (16) 
1095 They returned when the cigar had been extinguished and the room aired out. (17) n 
1096 Did the children return to the room immediately? 
1097 No 
 
1100 ????? 
1101 ignite (2) 
1102 brighten (2) 
1103 It was late night when the building was lit. (10) 
1104 It was not possible to see the fire from a far distance. (16) 
1105 It was not possible to see the lights from a far distance. (15) n 
1106 Was it possible to see that the building was lit from afar? 
1107 No 
 
1110 ????? 
1111 crash (1) 
1112 skate (1) 
1113 Pat slid fast on the icy pond. (8) 
1114 She fell pretty hard beside her best friend Diane. (11) 
1115 She skated well beside her best friend Diane. (11) p 
1116 Was Pat's friend with her on the pond? 
1117 Yes 
 
1120 ????? 
1121 clash (1) 
1122 detour (2) 
1123 Beth made a wrong turn with her Pontiac. (10) 
1124 The inevitable accident resulted in her absence at the seminar. (21)   
1125 The inevitable delay resulted in her absence at the seminar. (20) n 
1126 Did Beth drive a BMW? 
1127 No 
 
1130 ????? 
1131 stealing (2) 
1132 withdrawal (3) 
1133 The bank clerk handed the money over to the man. (13) 
1134 The robber put the money in his plastic bag. (12) 
1135 The costumer put the money in his wallet. (12) n 
1136 Did the man put the money in a suitcase? 
1137 No 
 
1140 ????? 
1141 malignant (3) 
1142 baby (2) 
1143 Carmen was surprised when the doctor informed her about the results. (17) 
1144 She did not expect to have cancer. (9) 
1145 She did not expect to be pregnant. (9) n 
1146 Did Carmen expect the results? 
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1147 No 
 
1150 ????? 
1151 mourning (2) 
1152 Christmas (2) 
1153 It was snowing heavily when the wreath was brought. (12) 
1154 The family watched as it was put on the coffin. (13) 
1155 The family watched as it was attached to the door (13) n 
1156 Did somebody observe how the wreath was placed for decoration? 
1157 Yes 
 
1160 ????? 
1161 repulsion (3) 
1162 attraction (3) 
1163 Brenda found it hard to hide her feelings from Rob. (12) 
1164 She had always hated the way he treated people. (13) 
1165 She had always loved the way he treated people. (12) p 
1166 Did Brenda have difficulties hiding her emotions from Rob? 
1167 Yes 
 
1170 ????? 
1171 surgery (3) 
1172 carpentry (3) 
1173 He decided that the leg was beyond repair. (12) 
1174 After several hours the doctor had to admit defeat. (16) 
1175 After several hours the craftsman had to admit defeat. (16) n 
1176 Was a great effort made to repair the leg? 
1177 Yes 
 
1180 ????? 
1181 refused (2) 
1182 accepted (3) 
1183 Joan received a call from her bank regarding her credit application. (18) 
1184 The bank denied her application. (9)  
1185 The bank approved her application. (9) p 
1186 Did the bank want further information from Joan? 
1187 No 
 
3010 ????? 
3011 shame (1) 
3012 rage (1) 
3013 Kristin felt herself flush when her male colleague spoke to her. (14) 
3014 Her reaction embarrassed her. (8) 
3015 His words infuriated her. (8) n 
3016 Did Kristin have a strong emotional reaction to her male colleague? 
3017 Yes 
 
3020 ????? 
3021 embarrassment (4) 
3022 enthusiasm (4) 
3023 Sandra felt her heart beat rapidly when her attractive neighbor invited her for dinner. (23) 
3024 She was afraid she would make a big fool of herself. (13) 
3025 She was very happy about the invitation. (13) p 
3026 Was Sandra indifferent about the invitation from her neighbor? 
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3027 No 
 
3030 ????? 
3031 frightened (2) 
3032 admired (3) 
3033 When Vera stood up to deliver the poem all her classmates looked at her. (19) 
3034 The attention made her so nervous that she got stuck in her performance. (18) 
3035 The attention made her so proud that her performance was greatly inspired. (19) p 
3036 Was Vera influenced by the attention of her classmates? 
3037 Yes 
 
3040 ????? 
3041 fear (1) 
3042 cold (1) 
3043 At the barbecue Amy's hands trembled so much she almost spilled her drink. (18) 
3044 She was afraid of the unfamiliar people at the party. (16) 
3045 She had forgotten her jacket back home and was freezing now. (15) n 
3046 Did Amy spoil her dress with a stain? 
3047 No 
 
3050 ????? 
3051 stare (1) 
3052 flirt (1) 
3053 In the elevator Dorothy was alone with an attractive young man. (20) 
3054 He observed her and saw how nervous she was. (11) 
3055 He smiled approvingly and winked at her. (10) p 
3056 Did the young man pay any attention to Dorothy? 
3057 Yes 
 
3060 ????? 
3061 lecture (2) 
3062 virus (2) 
3063 Facing the audience, Sabrina's legs were so shaky she had to sit down. (19) 
3064 She was certain she would screw up her presentation. (13) 
3065 She was certain she caught the flu and had a fever. (13) n 
3066 Was Sabrina too weak to stand up because she had not eaten all day? 
3067 No 
 
3070 ????? 
3071 unwelcome (3) 
3072 outfit (2) 
3073 When Miriam appeared at the party the guests fell silent for a moment. (19) 
3074 Miriam feared that nobody was happy to see her there. (15) 
3075 Miriam enjoyed everybody's awe about her new dress. (15) p 
3076 Did Miriam's appearance at the party stay unnoticed? 
3077 No 
 
3080 ????? 
3081 stammer (2) 
3082 err (1) 
3083 A stranger addressed Alexandra on the street. (12) 
3084 She was ashamed that she stuttered when she tried to reply. (14) 
3085 She wondered for what other person he mistook her there. (14) n 
3086 Did Alexandra meet an old friend on the street? 
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3087 No 
 
3090 ????? 
3091 stupid (2) 
3092 funny (2) 
3093 Rebecca's speech made everyone in class giggle. (12) 
3094 Her choice of words reflected her dullness. (10) 
3095 Her choice of words reflected her great wit. (10) p 
3096 Were Rebecca's classmates amused by her speech? 
3097 Yes 
 
3100 ????? 
3101 incompetent (4) 
3102 exceptional (4) 
3103 Susan only guessed what her colleagues thought of her work. (13) 
3104 Their criticisms were never made within her earshot. (14) 
3105 Their honest praises were never made within her earshot. (14) p 
3106 Did Susan have to guess the opinion of her colleagues? 
3107 Yes 
 
3110 ????? 
3111 ridicule (3) 
3112 entertain (3) 
3113 Holly's travel stories made the class laugh. (11) 
3114 She made a lot of silly mistakes in her discription of Italy. (18) 
3115 She made a lot of silly jokes in her description of Italy. (17) p 
3116 Did Holly's travel stories cause great amusement? 
3117 Yes 
 
3120 ????? 
3121 shy (1) 
3122 fun (1) 
3123 Linda's expectations of the party were correct. (13) 
3124 She was too awkward to start a conversation. (12) 
3125 She was so happy to start a conversation. (12) p 
3126 Did Linda find her expectations confirmed? 
3127 Yes 
 
3130 ????? 
3131 upset (2) 
3132 glad (1) 
3133 When Debbie entered the classroom late everyone looked at her. (15) 
3134 She noticed reproach on the faces about her arrival. (15) 
3135 She noticed relief on the faces about her arrival. (15) p 
3136 Did Debbie interpret the facial expressions of her classmates? 
3137 Yes 
 
3140 ????? 
3141 dull (1) 
3142 busy (2) 
3143 Eric called Lucia to cancel the date they had for the evening. (18) 
3144 He did not want to go out with her because she was so boring. (16) 
3145 He really wanted to go out with her but his boss needed him. (16) n 
3146 Did Eric call Lucia to confirm their date? 
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3147 No 
 
3150 ????? 
3151 failure (2) 
3152 success (2) 
3153 Tonya was awaiting the results of her finals. (13) 
3154 She feared that she had flanked her examinations. (12) 
3155 She knew that she had passed her examinations. (12) p 
3156 Had Tonya already been told her examination results? 
3157 No 
 
3160 ????? 
3161 blamed (1) 
3162 praised (1) 
3163 Her boss called Frances into his office. (10) 
3164 He wanted to criticize her for a job she did the previous day. (18) 
3165 He wanted to congratulate her for a job she did the day before. (18) n 
3166 Did Frances receive a raise from her boss? 
3167 No 
 
3170 ????? 
3171 afraid (3) 
3172 dishes (2) 
3173 Bobbie had wet hands when her guests arrived. (10) 
3174 She was sweating anxiously about their arrival. (13) 
3175 She had just rinsed some plates before their arrival. (12) n 
3176 Did Bobbie launder her clothes before the guests appeared? 
3177 No 
 
3180 ????? 
3181 belittled (3) 
3182 interested (4) 
3183 When Rachel entered the restaurant a guest looked at her intensely. (17) 
3184 His gaze revealed how unattractive he found her. (12) 
3185 His gaze revealed how attractive he found her. (11) p 
3186 Was Rachel stared at when she entered the restaurant? 
3187 Yes 
 
4010 ????? 
4011 coronary (4) 
4012 staircase (2) 
4013 Shopping at the mall, Betty felt her heart pound rapidly. (14) 
4014 She had to sit down as she feared it could be a heart attack. (15) 
4015 The escalator didn't work thus she had to walk up two floors. (15) 
4016 Did Betty notice a change in her heart beat when she was at the mall? 
4017 Yes 
 
4020 ????? 
4021 faint (1) 
4022 heat (1) 
4023 Yana felt really dizzy and lightheaded at the beach. (14) 
4024 She feared she was about to collapse. (9) 
4025 She had been in the sun for too long. (9) 
4026 Did Yana feel really good at the beach? 
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4027 No 
 
4030 ????? 
4031 panic (2) 
4032 nightmare (2) 
4033 Iris awoke from her sleep sweating. (9) 
4034 She just had another frightening attack. (11) 
4035 She just had a rather frightening dream. (10) 
4036 Did Iris suddenly wake up? 
4037 Yes 
 
4040 ????? 
4041 frantic (2) 
4042 lost (1) 
4043 On a hike in the forest, Kathrine suddenly panicked. (14) 
4044 She felt desperate and about to completely lose control. (15) 
4045 She had taken the wrong path and had no idea where she was. (15) 
4046 Did Kathrine feel frightened in the forest? 
4047 Yes 
 
4050 ????? 
4051 breathless (2) 
4052 smell (1) 
4053 Emma had a hard time breathing when she rode the bus downtown. (15) 
4054 She loosened her collar because she feared suffocating. (14) 
4055 She opened the window to air out the crowded bus. (13) 
4056 Did Emma ask the bus driver to stop immediately? 
4057 No 
 
4060 ????? 
4061 dying (2) 
4062 training (2) 
4063 Gloria's heartbeat greatly accelerated when she climbed the stairs. (17) 
4064 She thought she was having a heart attack. (10) 
4065 She thought she'd better get in better shape. (10) 
4066 Did Gloria think she was physically fit? 
4067 No 
 
4070 ????? 
4071 mortal (2) 
4072 lover (2) 
4073 Sitting alone in her room, Paula was trembling and her heart was racing. 
4074 She felt she was about to die and called 911. (13) 
4075 She was so excited when she called her new boyfriend. (13) 
4076 Did Paula make a phone call from her room? 
4077 Yes 
 
4080 ????? 
4081 disorder (3) 
4082 menstruation (4) 
4083 Rose was bothered by abdominal distress. (11) 
4084 She thought she had a serious disease. (10) 
4085 She thought it was time for her period. (10) 
4086 Had Rose consulted a doctor? 
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4087 No 
 
4090 ????? 
4091 malfunction (3) 
4092 temperature (4) 
4093 Taking a bath, Nancy was overwhelmed by hot flushes and irregular heart beat. (21) 
4094 She was afraid that her heart could stop beating. (11) 
4095 She stepped into the hot water far too quickly. (12) 
4096 Was Nancy in the bathroom when this occurred? 
4097 Yes 
 
4100 ????? 
4101 unconsciousness (4) 
4102 dehydrated (4) 
4103 During a hike in the mountains, Kimberly became unsteady and had trouble seeing. (22) 
4104 She was about to faint, desperately holding on to a big rock. (17) 
4105 She was very thursty and desperately needed to drink water. (17) 
4106 Did Kimberly take a hike along the beach? 
4107 No 
 
4110 ????? 
4111 cardiac (3) 
4112 stiffness (2) 
4113 Meghan felt a pain in her chest. (8) 
4114 She believed that something was wrong with her heart. (11) 
4115 She had strained a muscle at the gym last night. (11) 
4116 Did Meghan sense a discomfort in her chest? 
4117 Yes 
 
4120 ????? 
4121 collaps (2) 
4122 hungry (2) 
4123 Tamara's legs were shaking and her knees became weak. (13) 
4124 She was sure to become unconscious any moment now. (14) 
4125 She had to get something to eat to restore her energy. (15) 
4126 Was Tamara weak from a virus she had caught? 
4127 No 
 
4130 ????? 
4131 crazy (2) 
4132 sleepy (2) 
4133 Cynthia felt strangely detached from her surroundings. (13) 
4134 She thought she was going out of her mind. (10) 
4135 She knew she did not get much rest last night. (10) 
4136 Did Cynthia feel lightheaded and beside herself? 
4137 Yes 
 
4140 ????? 
4141 ill (1) 
4142 warm (1) 
4143 Jessica was sweating heavily as she sat on the porch. (15) 
4144 She was very concerned about her health and called her doctor. (15) 
4145 She was dressed improperly and changed into lighter clothes. (14) 
4146 Did Jessica have the chills when she sat at her porch? 
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4147 No 
 
4150 ????? 
4151 killing (2) 
4152 sniffles (2) 
4153 Ramona had real difficulties breathing. (11) 
4154 She was frightened she would suffocate. (9) 
4155 She had a cold and her nose was stuffed up. (10) 
4156 Was Ramona strangled by a stranger? 
4157 No 
 
4160 ????? 
4161 insane (2) 
4162 alcohol (3) 
4163 Allison felt giddy and nauseated. (11) 
4164 She thought she was losing control. (8) 
4165 She thought she'd better stop drinking. (8) 
4166 Did Allison feel weird in her head? 
4167 Yes 
 
4170 ????? 
4171 paralyzed (3) 
4172 disrupted (3) 
4173 Lena's left leg suddenly went numb while she was working at her desk. (17) 
4174 She thought she had nerve damage. (7) 
4175 Her leg had fallen asleep. (7) 
4176 Did Lena's right arm go numb on her? 
4177 No 
 
4180 ????? 
4181 suffocate (3) 
4182 exercise (3) 
4183 Evelyn fought hard to catch her breath. (9) 
4184 She had the feeling she was smothering. (10) 
4185 She had been running for a full mile. (9) 
4186 Did Evelyn have trouble breathing? 
4187 Yes 
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Appendix VI:  Debriefing for Participants of Study 1 
 
Information about the purpose of our study 
This study investigates an important thinking process: interpretation.  
Along with other thinking processes like attention and memory, interpretation has 
been proposed to play a crucial role in the etiology and maintenance of anxiety. 
Every day we encounter many situations that are ambiguous.  How we 
feel and act upon them mainly depends on the individual meaning we attach to each 
situation.  For instance, a friend might walk past us on the other side of the street 
and show no sign of recognition.  This could mean he or she does not like us 
anymore or has not noticed us at all.  With the short scenarios presented at the 
computer screen, we tried to evoke ambiguous situations.  For example, 'Lily came 
home from school with a note for her parents' could be interpreted as a positive 
letter or a complaint note.  Only the second sentence of each scenario clarified the 
situation: 'She hung around eager to see how they would react'.  In this case, we 
resolved the ambiguity to mean a positive letter. 
You used the headline to form a certain expectation about the following 
scene.  The headline we presented to you either matched the second sentence of the 
scenario (for our example, if the headline was 'invitation') or not (if it was 
'detention').  With the headline 'detention' you probably expect that the second 
sentence conveys a different meaning of the first, ambiguous sentence.  Namely, 
you may expect that Lily was afraid how her parents would react.  In this case, you 
were a bit puzzled about the second sentence in our example.  Accordingly, we 
expect longer reading times for those second sentences that don't match the 
headline, compared to second sentences that follow the suggested interpretation of 
the headline.  Whenever the headline consisted of five question marks, you had no 
preexisting expectation.  In these cases, reading time for the second sentence is 
supposed to reveal the meaning you automatically attach to a specific type of 
ambiguous situation when nobody "directs" you to expect a certain interpretation.   
One of the questionnaires you filled out also contained ambiguous 
situations and this time we wanted your conscious judgment on the likelihood that a 
specific meaning would come to your mind in such a situation.  We will compare 
the results from the reading part and the questionnaire and see if they are similar or 
if automatic interpretations that pop into your head during reading differ from the 
consciously evaluated once. 
The four short stories you were asked to rate on 5 rating scales investigate 
emotional reasoning as another dimension of interpretation.  Irrational fear may 
persist, even if there is safety information available that disconfirms danger.  With 
the four stories you rated we study one of the processes that may explain the 
persistance of irrational fear, i.e., reasoning.  We investigate if anxious people infer 
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danger not only from objective danger information but also from available 
information about anxiety responses. 
The short vocabulary test assesses people's verbal skills.  As our entire 
study material is comprised of written language, we need a measure for our 
subjects' ability to understand English language and ensure that our three groups do 
not differ in this sense. 
Finally, there were 8 other questionnaires that asked you for sensations 
regularly associated with anxiety and for thoughts and evaluations.  These 
questionnaires are supposed to complement the experimental findings. 
We would like to thank you once again for your participation in this study.  
If you have any further questions regarding the study we will gladly try to answer 
them. 
Questions should be directed to: Andrea Haehnel 
William James Hall, 33 Kirkland Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 
Telephone: (617) 495 8033, email: haehnel@wjh.harvard.edu 
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Appendix VII:  Informed Consent Sheet of Study 2 
 
 
Einwilligungserklärung 
 
 
Untersuchung: 
„Kognitive Prozesse bei Angst und Depression“ 
 
 
Leiter der Untersuchung: 
 
PD Dr.  Mike Rinck     Dr. rer. nat. Eni Becker 
Institut für Psychologie I   Institut für Psychologie II 
TU Dresden     TU Dresden 
 
Bei dieser Studie sollen Denkprozesse bei verschiedenen Personengruppen mit Hilfe von 
Computeraufgaben und Fragebögen untersucht werden. Dazu werden Informationen zur Person 
und Ergebnisse der Aufgaben erhoben. 
 
Mir wurde versichert, daß die Belange des Datenschutzes beachtet werden und eine 
wissenschaftliche Verarbeitung der erhobenen Daten nur in anonymisierter Form erfolgt. 
 
Ich habe diese Einverständniserklärung gelesen und bin mit der freiwilligen Teilnahme an der 
Untersuchung einverstanden. Ich weiß, daß ich die Untersuchung jederzeit ohne Angabe von 
Gründen beenden kann. 
 
 
Dresden, den________________________________ 
 
 
___________________________________________ 
Unterschrift UntersuchungsleiterIn 
 
 
___________________________________________ 
Unterschrift Teilnehmerin 
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Appendix VIII: Interpretation Questionnaire for Social Phobia and Depression (IQSD) 
 
Im folgenden werden Situationen beschrieben, die Auslöser von Gedanken sein können. Es sind 
Situationen, die für verschiedene Personen unterschiedliche Bedeutungen haben können. Bitte versuchen 
Sie, sich in die Situationen hineinzuversetzen, und überlegen Sie, welche Gedanken sie bei Ihnen 
auslösen würden. Geben Sie dann bitte für jeden der folgenden möglichen Gedanken an, wie 
wahrscheinlich es ist, daß er Ihnen durch den Kopf geht. Dabei bedeutet 4 „sehr wahrscheinlich“ und 0 
„unwahrscheinlich“, daß Ihnen dieser Gedanke in der entsprechenden Situation durch den Kopf geht. 
Wenn manche Situationen nicht typisch für Sie sind, versuchen Sie bitte trotzdem, sich vorzustellen, wie 
es wäre, wenn Ihnen etwas derartiges widerfahren würde. 
Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten. Wir sind ausschließlich an Ihrer persönlichen Antwort 
interessiert. Denken Sie nicht zu lange nach, bevor Sie sich entscheiden. Ihr erster Eindruck ist wichtig. 
 
Hier ein Beispiel: 
Dieser  0 1  2 3 4 
Gedanke ist: unwahr- kaum wahr-  etwas wahr- ziemlich  sehr wahr- 
  scheinlich  scheinlich  scheinlich wahrscheinlich  scheinlich 
 
Wie wahrscheinlich sind 
diese Gedanken für Sie? 
Bsp.: Sie haben 5000 DM beim Lotto gewonnen.  
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Jetzt kann ich endlich meine Traumreise unternehmen. 
b) Das Geld werde ich gleich zur Bank schaffen und günstig 
veranlagen. 
c) Ich werde auf jeden Fall einen ausgedehnten Einkaufs-
bummel unternehmen. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
Haben Sie angekreuzt, wie wahrscheinlich der Gedanke, eine Traumreise zu unternehmen, für 
sie ist? Haben Sie ebenfalls angekreuzt, wie wahrscheinlich eine Veranlagung und wie wahr-
scheinlich ein ausgedehnter Einkaufsbummel für Sie sind? Dann haben Sie die Aufgabe ver-
standen und das Beispiel vollständig beantwortet. Bitte gehen Sie jetzt ganz genau so mit den 
folgenden Fragen vor. Und nicht vergessen: Bitte kreuzen Sie immer je eine Zahl bei allen 
drei Gedanken zu jeder Frage an! 
 
Wie wahrscheinlich sind 
diese Gedanken für Sie? 
1. Sie wachen plötzlich mitten in der Nacht auf. Sie glauben, 
daß Sie ein Geräusch gehört haben. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Die Nachbarn sind wohl spät nach Hause gekommen. 
b) Womöglich ist ein Einbrecher in meiner Wohnung. 
c) Sicher hat nur eine Tür oder ein Fenster im Wind geklappert. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
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Dieser  0 1  2 3 4 
Gedanke ist: unwahr- kaum wahr-  etwas wahr- ziemlich  sehr wahr- 
  scheinlich  scheinlich scheinlich  wahrscheinlich  scheinlich 
 
Wie wahrscheinlich sind 
diese Gedanken für Sie? 
2. Sie spüren Ihr Herz bis zum Hals schlagen. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Ich sollte etwas mehr Sport treiben, mein Körper ist 
überhaupt keine Anstrengung mehr gewöhnt. 
b) Ich hätte das Wasser zum Baden nicht so heiß machen sollen, 
das ist nicht gut für den Kreislauf. 
c) Ich habe solche Angst, einen Fehler zu machen und mich vor 
den anderen zu blamieren. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
3. Sie sehen eine Bekannte auf der anderen Straßenseite. Sie 
geht grußlos vorbei. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Sie kann mich nicht leiden. 
b) Sie hat mich sicher nicht gesehen. 
c) Sie hat keine Lust, sich mit mir zu unterhalten, weil ich so 
langweilig bin. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
4. Als Sie in Ihrer Bank ein Überweisungsformular 
unterschreiben, runzelt der Bankangestellte die Stirn. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Meine Hand hat beim Unterschreiben gezittert, das hat er 
bemerkt. 
b) Es ist nicht mehr genug Geld auf dem Konto, um den 
Überweisungsbetrag zu decken. 
c) Ihm fiel wohl gerade ein, welchen Berg von Aufgaben er heute 
noch erledigen muß. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
5. Sie greifen auf dem Weg in die Stadt nach Ihrem 
Portemonnaie und können es nicht finden. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Ich habe es zu Hause liegen lassen. 
b) Jemand hat es mir gestohlen. 
c) Es muß sich in einer anderen Tasche befinden. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
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Dieser  0 1  2 3 4 
Gedanke ist: unwahr- kaum wahr-  etwas wahr- ziemlich  sehr wahr- 
  scheinlich  scheinlich scheinlich  wahrscheinlich  scheinlich 
 
Wie wahrscheinlich sind 
diese Gedanken für Sie? 
6. Ihr Chef bestellt Sie zu einem Gespräch. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Er will mir eine neue Aufgabe erteilen. 
b) Es kann nichts Gutes bedeuten, wenn der Chef mich zu sich 
bestellt. 
c) Ich bin ein Versager, ständig mache ich etwas falsch. 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
7. Sie liegen wach im Bett und können nicht einschlafen. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) So geht es immer los. Jetzt hat sowieso alles keinen Sinn mehr. 
b) Heute war viel los. Das muß ich erstmal verarbeiten. 
c) Es ist furchtbar, ich kann einfach nicht mit dem Grübeln 
aufhören. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
8. Ihr Auto macht während des Fahrens ein neues Geräusch. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Der Straßenbelag hat soeben gewechselt. 
b) Im Kofferaum muß etwas umgefallen sein. 
c) O nein, gleich werde ich eine Panne haben. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
9. Sie unterhalten sich mit einigen Freunden. Nachdem Sie 
etwas gesagt haben, entsteht eine peinlich lange Pause. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Sie denken über das nach, was ich gerade gesagt habe. 
b) Zu diesem Thema fällt ihnen nichts weiter ein. 
c) Ich habe sicher etwas Dummes oder Beleidigendes gesagt. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
10. Sie bemerken, daß Sie sich schlechter als sonst konzentrieren 
können. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Was soll nur aus mir werden, ich schaffe überhaupt nichts. 
b) Ich habe heute schon viel gemacht. Ich brauche eine Pause. 
c) Andere sind immer wach und konzentriert, nur ich nicht. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
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Dieser  0 1  2 3 4 
Gedanke ist: unwahr- kaum wahr-  etwas wahr- ziemlich  sehr wahr- 
  scheinlich  scheinlich scheinlich  wahrscheinlich  scheinlich 
 
Wie wahrscheinlich sind 
diese Gedanken für Sie? 
11. Während Sie in einem vollen Warteraum sitzen, fangen Sie 
an zu schwitzen. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Ich habe mich heute zu warm angezogen, und die Wärme der 
vielen Leute tut sein übriges. 
b) Die Leute im Raum starren mich alle an, hoffentlich bemerken 
sie meinen Zustand nicht. 
c) Der Raum ist wirklich stark überheizt, die Wärme ist ja kaum 
zu ertragen. 
 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
   
  0        1        2        3        4 
12. Sie sind zu Hause und riechen plötzlich Rauch. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Hilfe, in meinem Haus brennt es. 
b) Jemand hat sein Essen anbrennen lassen. 
c) Jemand verbrennt draußen seine Gartenabfälle. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
13. Zwei Freunde unterhalten sich. Ihnen fällt es schwer, dem 
Gespräch zu folgen. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Ich kann einfach nicht so schnell denken. 
b) Sie wollen mit mir nichts zu tun haben. 
c) Ich kann mich ja nicht überall auskennen. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
14. Sie können sich heute zu nichts aufraffen. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Das ist heute nicht mein Tag, morgen sieht die Welt schon 
wieder ganz anders aus. 
b) Ich tauge nichts. 
c) Es ist so und so alles sinnlos. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
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Dieser  0 1  2 3 4 
Gedanke ist: unwahr- kaum wahr-  etwas wahr- ziemlich  sehr wahr- 
  scheinlich  scheinlich scheinlich  wahrscheinlich  scheinlich 
 
Wie wahrscheinlich sind 
diese Gedanken für Sie? 
15. Ein paar Leute, die Sie kennen, sehen zu Ihnen herüber und 
reden. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Sie reden bestimmt schlecht über mich. 
b) Sie wünschen, daß ich ihnen Gesellschaft leiste. 
c) Sie sehen nur zufällig in meine Richtung. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
16. Ein Mitglied Ihrer Familie wollte bereits seit einer halben 
Stunde zu Hause sein. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Auf dem Heimweg muß ihm etwas Ernsthaftes zugestoßen sein. 
b) Er hat vielleicht jemanden getroffen, der ihn aufgehalten hat. 
c) Die Straßen sind so verstopft, daß er länger als sonst für den 
Heimweg benötigt. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
17. Ein Freund sagt eine Verabredung ab. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a)  Ihm kam etwas dazwischen. 
b) Ich bin ihm sowieso egal. 
c) Niemand mag mich richtig. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
18. Sie beantworten gerade eine Frage während eines 
Interviews. Plötzlich werden Sie vom Interviewer 
unterbrochen, indem er Ihnen eine neue Frage stellt. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Ich habe genug zur vorangegangenen Frage erzählt. 
b) Ich muß wohl Unsinn geredet und mich bloßgestellt haben. 
c) Das ist aber ein unhöflicher Interviewer. 
 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
19. Bei einer Feier verhalten Sie sich sehr ruhig. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Ich bin ein totaler Langweiler. 
b) Ich gehöre nicht dazu, weil sich niemand für mich interessiert. 
c) Es ist ganz interessant, mal nur zuzuhören, ich muß ja nicht 
immer aktiv sein. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
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Dieser  0 1  2 3 4 
Gedanke ist: unwahr- kaum wahr-  etwas wahr- ziemlich  sehr wahr- 
  scheinlich  scheinlich scheinlich  wahrscheinlich  scheinlich 
 
Wie wahrscheinlich sind 
diese Gedanken für Sie? 
20. Sie sitzen in der Straßenbahn und merken, wie Ihnen die 
Röte ins Gesicht steigt. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Der junge Mann mir gegenüber findet mich attraktiv, das macht 
mich stets etwas verlegen. 
b) Die Gruppe Jugendlicher benimmt sich unmöglich, für ihr 
Verhalten muß man sich ja schämen. 
c) Ich werde von dem Mann mir gegenüber angestarrt, 
hoffentlich fällt ihm meine Röte nicht auf. 
 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
21. Auf dem Weg zu einer Verabredung stellen Sie fest, daß Sie 
zu spät dran sind. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Das kann jedem mal passieren. 
b) Am liebsten würde ich gar nicht erst hingehen. 
c) Auf mich kann man sich einfach nicht verlassen. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
22. Sie gehen zu Ihrem Auto und bemerken, daß ein Blatt 
Papier unter den Scheibenwischer geklemmt wurde. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Jemand versucht wohl, seine politische Meinung zu verbreiten. 
b) Jetzt habe ich bestimmt einen Strafzettel bekommen. 
c) Schon wieder Werbung für den Papierkorb. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
23. Sie denken an all die Dinge, die Sie noch erledigen müssen 
(z.B. Haushalt, Kinder, Arbeit, Wohnung). 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Das schaffe ich nicht, ich werde mal wieder versagen. 
b) Jetzt klappt gar nichts mehr, ich weiß überhaupt nicht, wo ich 
anfangen soll. 
c) Wenn ich mir die Arbeit gut einteile, werde ich es schon 
schaffen. 
 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
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Dieser  0 1  2 3 4 
Gedanke ist: unwahr- kaum wahr-  etwas wahr- ziemlich  sehr wahr- 
  scheinlich  scheinlich scheinlich  wahrscheinlich  scheinlich 
 
Wie wahrscheinlich sind 
diese Gedanken für Sie? 
24. In einem Seminar ist jeder dazu aufgefordert, zu einem 
bestimmten Thema seine Meinung zu sagen. Als Sie an der 
Reihe sind, entsteht eine Pause. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Ich werde mich verhaspeln und blamieren, deshalb ist es 
sicherer, wenn ich nichts sage. 
b) Ich muß noch einen Moment überlegen, wie ich meine 
Gedanken am besten ausdrücke. 
c) Ich hätte besser aufpassen sollen, jetzt habe ich vergessen, was 
ich eigentlich sagen wollte. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
25. Sie wollen mit dem Zug in den Urlaub fahren. Auf dem 
Weg zum Bahnhof geraten Sie in einen Stau. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Das fängt ja gut an, mein Urlaub wird wohl ein Reinfall 
werden. 
b) Es wird bestimmt gleich weitergehen, so daß ich meinen Zug 
noch schaffe. 
c) Wenn es ganz dumm kommt, muß ich den nächsten Zug 
nehmen. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
26. Sie kommen bei einer Sache nicht weiter und brauchen 
Hilfe von anderen. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Ich bin eine richtige Niete, ich kann gar nichts alleine. 
b) Man kann nicht alles können, Hilfe braucht jeder mal. 
c) Die anderen werden merken, daß ich unfähig bin. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
27. Sie kommen nach Hause und sehen von weitem, daß ein 
Fenster offensteht. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Eine Windböe hat das Fenster aufgedrückt. 
b) In meine Wohnung wurde eingebrochen. 
c) Ich habe beim Weggehen vergessen, das Fenster zu schließen. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
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Dieser  0 1  2 3 4 
Gedanke ist: unwahr- kaum wahr-  etwas wahr- ziemlich  sehr wahr- 
  scheinlich  scheinlich scheinlich  wahrscheinlich  scheinlich 
 
Wie wahrscheinlich sind 
diese Gedanken für Sie? 
28. Sie wollen sich etwas kaufen und merken, daß die 
Verkäuferin ungeduldig wird. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Es ist mein gutes Recht, mich in Ruhe zu entscheiden. 
b) Sie will mir nur irgendetwas andrehen, mit mir kann man´s ja 
machen. 
c) Ich muß mich beeilen, sie hält mich sicher für eine lahme 
Schnecke. 
 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
29. Ihre Hände zittern und Sie haben weiche Knie, während Sie 
eine Gästegruppe begrüßen. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Ich fühle mich heute so schwach, ich bin wahrscheinlich krank 
und sollte mich ins Bett legen. 
b) Ich werde meinen Text vergessen und vor den Leuten wie ein 
Trottel dastehen. 
c) Ich habe heute noch gar keine ordentliche Mahlzeit zu mir 
genommen, das muß ich anschließend gleich nachholen. 
 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
30. Sie haben einen Fehler bei Ihrer Arbeit gemacht. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Wenn ich Fehler mache, akzeptiert mich keiner. 
b) Aus meinen Fehlern kann ich nur lernen. 
c) Ich kann überhaupt nichts, ich werde niemals gut genug sein. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
31. Sie erhalten einen Brief mit dem Verweis „Eilt“. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Das ist bestimmt irgendein billiger Werbetrick. 
b) Ich habe vergessen, eine Rechnung zu bezahlen. 
c) Ein Bekannter ist gestorben oder ernsthaft erkrankt. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
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Dieser  0 1  2 3 4 
Gedanke ist: unwahr- kaum wahr-  etwas wahr- ziemlich  sehr wahr- 
  scheinlich  scheinlich scheinlich  wahrscheinlich  scheinlich 
 
Wie wahrscheinlich sind 
diese Gedanken für Sie? 
32. Sie haben einen leichten Autounfall verursacht. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Immer bin ich Schuld. 
b) Ich bin selbst zum Autofahren zu dumm. 
c) Das kann jedem passieren, zum Glück ist nichts Schlimmeres 
geschehen. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
33. Sie stehen im Supermarkt in der Schlange vor der Kasse. Die 
beiden Personen hinter Ihnen lachen leise. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Sie machen sich über mein unsicheres Verhalten lustig. 
b) Einer von ihnen hat eine witzige Bemerkung gemacht. 
c) Sie sind einfach vergnügt und ausgelassen. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
34. Sie liegen seit Stunden auf dem Sofa. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Niemand denkt an mich. 
b) Es kann ja nichts aus mir werden, wenn ich nur rumliege und 
nichts tue. 
c) Wie schön, so ungestört zu sein und endlich mal Zeit für mich 
selbst zu haben. 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
35. Sie drehen den Zündschlüssel um, aber Ihr Auto springt 
nicht an. 
Welche Gedanken löst das in Ihnen aus? 
a) Der Motor ist noch zu kalt. 
b) Ich muß mehr Gas geben. 
c) Der Anlasser ist kaputt. 
 
 
 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  0        1        2        3        4 
  
 
Bitte kontrollieren Sie noch einmal, ob Sie wirklich jede Situation mit jeweils drei 
Wahrscheinlichkeitsangaben versehen haben.  
Herzlichen Dank! 
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Appendix IX:  Probability-Cost Questionnaire (PCQ) 
 
Schätzen Sie bitte ein, wie wahrscheinlich es ist, daß Ihnen die folgenden Ereignisse zustoßen.  
Wählen Sie dazu bitte auf der unten abgebildeten Skala die Zahl, die am ehesten auf Sie 
zutrifft.  Die Zahlen haben folgende Bedeutung: 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 gar nicht ein wenig mäßig sehr extrem  wahrscheinlich 
 
Bitte schreiben Sie die entsprechende Zahl auf den dafür vorgesehenen Strich neben jede Situation! 
Wie wahrscheinlich ist es, daß Ihnen folgendes passiert: 
  1. Ihr Fahrrad wird gestohlen.  
  
  2. Sie verhaspeln sich beim Sprechen oder geraten ins Stottern.   
  3. Sie fühlen sich am Morgen so niedergeschlagen, daß Sie nicht aufstehen können.   
  4. Ihr Fernseher geht kaputt (wenn Sie keinen Fernseher haben: Ihre Stereoanlage).   
  5. Sie wachen mitten in der Nacht auf und können nicht wieder einschlafen.   
  6. Auf einer Party bemerken andere Gäste, daß Sie sehr nervös sind.   
  7. Sie verlieren die Freude an fast allen Ihren Hobbies.   
  8. Während Ihnen beim Schreiben jemand zusieht, zittert Ihre Hand.   
  9. Sie verlieren Ihren Geldbeutel.   
10. Ihnen ist scheinbar grundlos zum Heulen zumute.   
11. Sie blamieren sich vor jemandem.   
12. Sie fühlen sich einsam und von aller Welt verlassen.   
13. Sie verstauchen sich den Fuß.   
14. Sie erröten, während Sie einem jungen Mann vorgestellt werden.   
15. Sie stecken für über eine Stunde im Stau.   
16. Sie können in ihrem Leben keine Freude entdecken.   
17. Beim Reden vor einer kleinen Gruppe zittern Ihre Hände ganz stark.   
18. Sie können sich selbst bei einfachen Aufgaben nicht richtig konzentrieren.   
19. Sie wollen etwas sagen, bringen aber keinen Ton heraus.   
20. Sie haben in ihrer Wohnung eine kleine Überschwemmung.   
21. Sie werden von einer fremden Person angestarrt.   
22. Sie vergessen Ihren Wohnungsschlüssel zu Hause.   
23. Sie fühlen sich für etwas schuldig, das Sie gar nicht beeinflussen konnten.    
24. Während eines Vortrags verlieren Sie den Faden.   
25. Sie fühlen sich wertlos.   
26. Sie verpassen den Zug.    
27. Die Welt erscheint Ihnen grau und leer.   
28. Sie haben einen Schweißausbruch, während Sie vor einer Gruppe sprechen.   
29. Sie fühlen sich erschöpft und ausgelaugt, ohne viel getan zu haben.   
30. Sie werden in einen kleineren Unfall verwickelt.   
31. Ihnen fällt eine teure Vase aus der Hand und zerbricht.   
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Schätzen Sie bitte ein, wie schlimm oder belastend die folgenden Situationen für 
Sie sein würden.  Wählen Sie dazu bitte auf der unten abgebildeten Skala die Zahl, 
die am ehesten auf Sie zutrifft. Die Zahlen haben folgende Bedeutung: 
 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 gar ein mäßig sehr extrem  
 nicht wenig
 schlimm/belastend 
 
Bitte schreiben Sie die entsprechende Zahl auf den dafür vorgesehenen Strich neben jede Situation! 
 
Wie schlimm wäre es für Sie, wenn Ihnen folgendes passieren würde: 
  1. Ihr Fahrrad wird gestohlen.  
  
  2. Sie verhaspeln sich beim Sprechen oder geraten ins Stottern.   
  3. Sie fühlen sich am Morgen so niedergeschlagen, daß Sie nicht aufstehen können.   
  4. Ihr Fernseher geht kaputt (wenn Sie keinen Fernseher haben: Ihre Stereoanlage).   
  5. Sie wachen mitten in der Nacht auf und können nicht wieder einschlafen.   
  6. Auf einer Party bemerken andere Gäste, daß Sie sehr nervös sind.   
  7. Sie verlieren die Freude an fast allen Ihren Hobbies.   
  8. Während Ihnen beim Schreiben jemand zusieht, zittert Ihre Hand.   
  9. Sie verlieren Ihren Geldbeutel.   
10. Ihnen ist scheinbar grundlos zum Heulen zumute.   
11. Sie blamieren sich vor jemandem.   
12. Sie fühlen sich einsam und von aller Welt verlassen.   
13. Sie verstauchen sich den Fuß.   
14. Sie erröten, während Sie einem jungen Mann vorgestellt werden.   
15. Sie stecken für über eine Stunde im Stau.   
16. Sie können in ihrem Leben keine Freude entdecken.   
17. Beim Reden vor einer kleinen Gruppe zittern Ihre Hände ganz stark.   
18. Sie können sich selbst bei einfachen Aufgaben nicht richtig konzentrieren.   
19. Sie wollen etwas sagen, bringen aber keinen Ton heraus.   
20. Sie haben in ihrer Wohnung eine kleine Überschwemmung.   
21. Sie werden von einer fremden Person angestarrt.   
22. Sie vergessen Ihren Wohnungsschlüssel zu Hause.   
23. Sie fühlen sich für etwas schuldig, das Sie gar nicht beeinflussen konnten.    
24. Während eines Vortrags verlieren Sie den Faden.   
25. Sie fühlen sich wertlos.   
26. Sie verpassen den Zug.    
27. Die Welt erscheint Ihnen grau und leer.   
28. Sie haben einen Schweißausbruch, während Sie vor einer Gruppe sprechen.   
29. Sie fühlen sich erschöpft und ausgelaugt, ohne viel getan zu haben.   
30. Sie werden in einen kleineren Unfall verwickelt.   
31. Ihnen fällt eine teure Vase aus der Hand und zerbricht.    
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Appendix X:  Instruction for the Interpretation Experiment of Study 2 
 
In diesem Teil der Untersuchung werden wir Ihnen 55 Mini-Episoden 
darbieten. Jede Episode besteht aus einer Überschrift und zwei Sätzen. Die 
Überschrift ist entweder ein einzelnes Wort oder fünf Fragezeichen. Ihre Aufgabe 
besteht zunächst darin, anhand der Überschrift eine möglichst genaue Erwartung zu 
bilden, wovon die folgende Episode wahrscheinlich handelt. Dies wird Ihnen 
natürlich nicht möglich sein, wenn die Überschrift aus Fragezeichen besteht. Wenn 
Sie die Überschrift gelesen und die Erwartung gebildet haben, drücken Sie bitte die 
lange Leerzeichen-Taste. Als nächstes werden Sie dann den ersten Satz der Episode 
dargeboten bekommen. Bitte lesen Sie den Satz sorgfältig, bis Sie ihn verstanden 
haben, und drücken Sie dann wiederum die Leertaste. Daraufhin wird Ihnen der 
zweite Satz der Episode dargeboten. Lesen Sie auch diesen, bis Sie ihn verstanden 
haben, und drücken Sie dann nochmal die Leertaste.  
Nach jedem Satzpaar folgt eine einfache Frage, die sich auf die soeben 
gelesene Episode bezieht. Diese Frage beantworten Sie bitte mit den beiden durch 
Aufkleber markierten Tasten "J" und "N" des Keyboards. "J" steht dabei für "Ja, das 
stimmt" und "N" für "Nein, das stimmt nicht". Der Computer wird einen Warnton 
abgeben, wenn Sie eine Frage falsch beantwortet haben. Außerdem wird der 
Computer Ihre Fehler mitzählen. Bitte beantworten Sie die Fragen zügig aber 
gewissenhaft. Mit diesem Leseexperiment wollen wir untersuchen, wie sich die 
Ausrichtung auf ein bestimmtes Thema auf Ihre Fähigkeit auswirkt, Fragen zu dem 
Gelesenen zu beantworten. Die Ausrichtung auf das Thema wird dabei durch die 
Überschrift erreicht. 
Das satzweise Lesen sowie das Beantworten der Fragen können Sie 
zunächst an zwei Übungsepisoden erproben. Sollten dabei Schwierigkeiten 
auftreten, wenden Sie sich bitte sofort an die Versuchsleiterin. 
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Appendix XI:  Interpretation Experiment Textual Stimuli of Study 2 
 
Schlüssel: 
1xxx störungsunspezifische Situation 
2xxx depressive Situation 
3xxx sozialphobische Situation 
x01x...x18x fortlaufende Nummer 
xxx0 kein Prime 
xxx1 negativer/störungsbezogener Prime 
xxx2 neutraler/positiver Prime 
xxx3 mehrdeutiger Satz 
xxx4 negative/störungsbezogene Fortsetzung 
xxx5 neutrale/positive Fortsetzung 
xxx6 Frage 
xxx7 korrekte Antwort 
(xx)  Silbenzahl  
n       eher neutral 
p       eher positiv 
 
 
1010 ????? 
1011 Verletzung (3/10) 
1012 Nähen (2/5) 
1013 Anne trat ans Fenster, um bei Licht den Schnitt genauer zu betrachten. (18) 
1014 Die Wunde an ihrem linken Daumen war glücklicherweise nicht sehr tief. (19) 
1015 Die vielen Linien erschwerten es, das richtige Modell zu finden. (19) n 
1016 Schaltete Anne das Licht ein, um besser sehen zu können? 
1017 Nein 
 
1020 ????? 
1021 Terrorist (3/9) 
1022 Geburtstag (3/10) 
1023 Der Mann stellte das Paket vor die Tür und verschwand. (13) 
1024 Die Bombe blieb mehrere Stunden unentdeckt, bevor sie gefunden wurde. (20) 
1025 Das Geschenk blieb mehrere Stunden unentdeckt, bevor es gefunden wurde. (20) p 
1026 Wurde das Paket sofort bemerkt? 
1027 Nein 
 
1030 ????? 
1031 Karies (3/6) 
1032 Handwerker (3/10) 
1033 Das Dröhnen des Bohrers schien eine Ewigkeit anzudauern. (16) 
1034 Endlich hörte der Arzt auf, das Loch im Zahn weiter zu bearbeiten. (18) 
1035 Endlich hörte der Maurer auf, das Loch in der Wand zu bearbeiten. (18) n 
1036 Ging das Bohren endlos weiter? 
1037 Nein 
 
1040 ????? 
1041 verdorben (3/9) 
1042 exotisch (3/8) 
1043 Das Fleisch, das Maria aß, hatte einen ungewöhnlichen Geschmack. (18) 
1044 Obwohl sie sich sofort den Mund ausspülte, war ihr kurze Zeit übel. (18) 
1045 Obwohl sie schon beim Inder gegessen hatte, war ihr das Gewürz neu. (18) n 
1046 Hatte Maria Fleisch gegessen? 
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1047 Ja 
 
1050 ????? 
1151 Nachzahlung (3/11) 
1152 Guthaben (3/8) 
1153 Barbara erhielt die Stromabrechnung für die vergangenen 12 Monate. (20) 
1154 Sie hatte deutlich mehr Strom verbraucht als bisher und mußte weitere 150 DM überweisen. (28) 
1155 Sie hatte deutlich weniger Strom verbraucht als bisher und bekam 150 DM zurückgezahlt. (27) p 
1156 Hatte sich Barbaras Stromverbrauch seit dem letzten Abrechnungszeitraum verändert? 
1157 Ja 
 
1060 ????? 
1061 Beschwerde (3/10) 
1062 Kompliment (3/10) 
1063 Nach dem Essen im Restaurant rief das Paar den Chef zu sich an den Tisch. (18) 
1064 Sie wollten sich bei ihm über das miserable Essen beschweren. (18) 
1065 Sie wollten sich bei ihm für das hervorragende Essen bedanken. (18) p 
1066 Wollte das Paar dem Chef mittteilen, wie ihnen das Essen geschmeckt hatte? 
1067 Ja 
 
1070 ????? 
1071 Minus (2/5) 
1072 Plus (1/4) 
1073 Simone war erstaunt, als sie ihren Kontoauszug betrachtete. (18) 
1074 Sie hatte nicht erwartet, so weit in den Miesen zu sein. (15) 
1075 Sie hatte nicht erwartet, noch so viel Geld zu haben. (14) p 
1076 Hatte Simone mit dem Betrag gerechnet, den ihr Kontoauszug aufwies? 
1077 Nein 
 
1080 ????? 
1081 ertrinken (3/9) 
1082 Badespaß (3/8) 
1083 Karin hörte nicht, daß ihr kleiner Sohn im Wasser nach ihr rief. (16) 
1084 Sonst wäre sie sofort in den See gesprungen, um ihn zu retten. (17) 
1085 Sonst wäre sie gleich in den See gesprungen, um mit ihm zu plantschen. (17) n 
1086 War Karin von ihrem kleinen Sohn gerufen worden? 
1087 Ja 
 
1090 ????? 
1091 brennen (2/7) 
1092 Tabak (2/5) 
1093 Die Kinder wurden aus dem verqualmten Zimmer gebracht. (14) 
1094 Sie durften erst zurückkehren, als das Feuer gelöscht und das Zimmer gelüftet war. (22) 
1095 Sie durften erst zurückkehren, als die Zigarre geraucht und das Zimmer gelüftet war. (23) n 
1096 Durften die Kinder sofort in das Zimmer zurückkehren? 
1097 Nein 
 
1100 ????? 
1101 Feuer (2/5) 
1102 Lampe (2/5) 
1103 Mitten in der Nacht drang ein Lichtschein durch das Dickicht des Waldes. (16) 
1104 Das kleine Haus in der Mitte der Lichtung brannte lichterloh. (16) 
1105 Das kleine Haus in der Mitte der Lichtung war hell erleuchtet. (16) n 
1106 Stand das kleine Haus in der Mitte einer Lichtung? 
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1107 Ja 
 
1110 ????? 
1111 Glatteisgefahr (4/14) 
1112 Eisschnellauf (3/13) 
1113 Veronika schlitterte über das spiegelglatte Eis. (15) 
1114 Regen und Nachtfrost hatten die Fahrbahn in eine Todesfalle verwandelt. (20) 
1115 Sie war eine der schnellsten Schlittschuhläuferinnen im heimatlichen Stadion. (21) p 
1116 War das Eis, über das Veronika schlitterte, spiegelglatt? 
1117 Ja 
 
1120 ????? 
1121 Unfall (2/6) 
1122 Transport (2/9) 
1123 Der alte Mann schaute in die entgegengesetzte Richtung, als sich das Taxi näherte. (23) 
1124 Der Fahrer bemerkte ihn erst, als es zum Bremsen längst zu spät war. (17)   
1125 Der Fahrer mußte erst laut hupen, um sich bemerkbar zu machen. (17) n 
1126 Sah der alte Mann das Taxi an, als es sich näherte? 
1127 Nein 
 
1130 ????? 
1131 Überfall (3/8) 
1132 Auszahlung (3/10) 
1133 Die Bankangestellte händigte dem Mann das Geld aus. (14) 
1134 Der Räuber steckte das Geld hastig in seine schwarze Tasche und verschwand. (19) 
1135 Der Kunde zählte noch einmal nach und steckte das Geld in die Brieftasche. (19) n 
1136 Steckte der Mann das Geld in einen braunen Aktenkoffer? 
1137 Nein 
 
1140 ????? 
1141 krank (1/5) 
1142 schwanger (2/9) 
1143 Carmen war überrascht, als ihr der Arzt das Untersuchungsergebnis mitteilte. (21) 
1144 Sie hatte nicht gewußt, daß sie Diabetes hatte. (14) 
1145 Sie hatte nicht gewußt, daß sie ein Baby erwartet. (14) n 
1146 Hatte Carmen mit dem Untersuchungsergebnis gerechnet? 
1147 Nein 
 
1150 ????? 
1151 Trauer (2/6) 
1152 Weihnachten (3/11) 
1153 Als eine Angestellte des Blumenladens den Kranz lieferte, schneite es in dichten Flocken. (25) 
1154 Die Nachbarn beobachteten, wie er zum Schmuck auf dem Sarg befestigt wurde. (20) 
1155 Die Nachbarn beobachteten, wie er zum Schmuck an der Tür befestigt wurde. (20) n 
1156 Sah jemand zu, als der Kranz angebracht wurde? 
1157 Ja 
 
1160 ????? 
1161 verachten (3/9) 
1162 verlieben (3/9) 
1163 Andrea hatte große Schwierigkeiten, ihre Gefühle vor Peter zu verbergen. (23) 
1164 Sie haßte es schon seit langem, so herablassend von ihm behandelt zu werden. (21) 
1165 Sie hatte schon seit langem bemerkt, wie stark sie sich zu ihm hingezogen fühlte. (21) p 
1166 Fiel es Andrea schwer, sich nicht anmerken zu lassen, was sie für Peter empfand? 
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1167 Ja 
 
1170 ????? 
1171 Operation (4/9) 
1172 Tischlerei (3/10) 
1173 Nach eingehender Untersuchung mußten sie feststellen, daß das Bein irreparabel war. (24) 
1174 Schweren Herzens mußte der Arzt die Amputation anordnen. (16) 
1175 Ein dunkles Aststück mußte gedrechselt und eingesetzt werden. (16) n 
1176 Wurde das Bein zunächst sorgfältig untersucht? 
1177 Ja 
 
1180 ????? 
1181 abgelehnt (3/9) 
1182 genehmigt (3/9) 
1183 Johanna erhielt einen Anruf von ihrer Bank, daß über ihren Kreditantrag entschieden wurde. (27) 
1184 Sie hatte keine Sicherheiten und konnte die beantragte Geldmenge deshalb nicht erhalten. (26)  
1185 Sie hatte gute Sicherheiten und bekam deshalb die beantragte Geldmenge zugesagt. (25) p 
1186 Benötigte die Bank weitere Informationen, um über Johannas Kreditantrag entscheiden zu 
können? 
1187 Nein 
 
2010 ????? 
2011 überfordert (4/11) 
2012 pausieren (3/9) 
2013 Obwohl Sophie heute sehr viel zu tun hatte, konnte sie sich zu nichts aufraffen. (21) 
2014 Sie dachte, daß ihr alles viel zu viel wird, und wurde noch mutloser. (18) 
2015 Sie dachte, daß sie sich endlich mal einen freien Tag gönnen sollte. (18) p 
2016 Ging Sophie schwungvoll an die Erledigung ihrer Aufgaben? 
2017 Nein 
 
2020 ????? 
2021 unkonzentriert (4/14) 
2022 Feierabend (4/10) 
2023 Jana klappte das Lehrbuch zu, mit dem sie für die Prüfung gelernt hatte. (19) 
2024 Sie war einfach nicht in der Lage, den Inhalt wirklich aufzunehmen. (18) 
2025 Sie war der Meinung, für den heutigen Tag genug studiert zu haben. (18) p 
2026 Hatte Jana einen spannenden Roman gelesen? 
2027 Nein 
 
2030 ????? 
2031 Pessimist (3/9) 
2032 Optimist (3/8) 
2033 Elvira wollte ihren Plan noch einmal kritisch prüfen. (15) 
2034 Sie hatte starke Zweifel, daß er in dieser Form realisierbar war. (19) 
2035 Sie war zuversichtlich, daß er in geraumer Zeit realisierbar war. (19) p 
2036 Dachte Elvira über die Ausführbarkeit ihres Planes nach? 
2037 Ja 
 
2040 ????? 
2041 deprimiert (3/10) 
2042 verkatert (3/9) 
2043 Manja fühlte sich an diesem Morgen besonders elend. (15) 
2044 Sie war tieftraurig und konnte sich kaum zum Aufstehen durchringen. (17) 
2045 Sie hatte gestern auf der Party wohl etwas zu viel getrunken. (17) n 
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2046 Fühlte sich Manja am Morgen ausgeschlafen und frisch? 
2047 Nein 
 
2050 ????? 
2051 Schlafstörung (3/13) 
2052 Toilette (3/8) 
2053 Saskia wachte mitten in der Nacht auf. (10) 
2054 Sie lag oft viele Stunden wach im Bett und konnte einfach nicht schlafen. (18) 
2055 Sie hatte am Abend viel Tee getrunken und mußte dringend aufs Klo. (18) n 
2056 Wurde Saskia in der Nacht munter? 
2057 Ja 
 
2060 ????? 
2061 schuldig (2/8) 
2062 verblüfft (2/9) 
2063 Anja arbeitete in einer Boutique, als in der Kasse eine Differenz von 20 DM auftrat. (28) 
2064 Sie machte sich Vorwürfe, daß ihr dieser Fehler passiert war. (16) 
2065 Sie wunderte sich darüber, wie das wohl passiert sein konnte. (16) n 
2066 Machte sich Anja Gedanken über das verschwundene Geld? 
2067 Ja 
 
2070 ????? 
2071 Sorgen (2/6) 
2072 Hoffnung (2/8) 
2073 Bettina machte sich Gedanken über ihre Zukunft. (15) 
2074 Sie glaubte nicht, daß ihr Leben jemals erfüllt und glücklich sein würde. (18) 
2075 Sie malte sich aus, daß ihr Leben zufrieden und glücklich sein würde. (18) p 
2076 Stellte sich Bettina vor, wie ihr Leben in Zukunft aussehen würde? 
2077 Ja 
 
2080 ????? 
2081 lebensmüde (4/10) 
2082 sportlich (2/9) 
2083 Angelika sprang von der Brücke. (9) 
2084 Sie wußte einfach keinen Ausweg mehr und wollte sich deshalb umbringen. (19) 
2085 Sie liebte Herausforderungen und nahm deshalb am Bungeejumping teil. (19) p 
2086 Sprang Angelika in die Tiefe? 
2087 Ja 
 
2090 ????? 
2091 Trübsal (2/7) 
2092 Kino (2/4) 
2093 Katrin kramte in ihrer Handtasche nach einem Taschentuch, um sich die Augen zu trocknen. 
(24) 
2094 Sie konnte sich nicht erklären, warum ihr so traurig zumute war. (18) 
2095 Sie war überwältigt, als sich die Filmhelden in den Armen lagen. (18) p 
2096 Hatte Katrin ihr Taschentuch bereits griffbereit in der Hand? 
2097 Nein 
 
2100 ????? 
2101 teilnahmslos (3/12) 
2102 Alternativplan (5/14) 
2103 Franziska hatte keine Lust, mit ihrer Freundin ins Kino zu gehen. (19) 
2104 Sie hatte in ihrem Leben an fast nichts mehr Interesse. (16) 
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2105 Sie wollte viel lieber zum Tanzen in die Disco gehen. (15) n 
2106 War Franziska begeistert, mit ihrer Freundin ins Kino zu gehen? 
2107 Nein 
 
2110 ????? 
2111 antriebslos (3/11) 
2112 Eitelkeit (3/9) 
2113 Ursel brauchte wieder sehr lange, bis sie morgens aus dem Haus kam. (17) 
2114 Jeder Handgriff fiel ihr unendlich schwer und kostete sie viel Zeit und Energie. (21) 
2115 Die Frisur mußte perfekt sitzen, bis sie mit ihrem Aussehen zufrieden war. (21) n 
2116 Benötigte Ursel viel Zeit, um sich am Morgen zurecht zu machen? 
2117 Ja 
 
2120 ????? 
2121 Entscheidungsprobleme (6/21) 
2122 Partychaos (4/10) 
2123 Paula sah sich in ihrer Wohnung um und wußte nicht, wo sie mit dem Saubermachen beginnen 
sollte. (27) 
2124 Sie hatte selbst bei den einfachsten Dingen große Schwierigkeiten, sich zu entscheiden. (22) 
2125 Sie hatte viel Spaß beim Feiern gehabt, aber jetzt glich ihre Wohnung einem Schlachtfeld. 
(22) n 
2126 Betrachtete Paula stolz ihre saubere Wohnung? 
2127 Nein 
 
2130 ????? 
2131 appetitlos (4/10) 
2132 gesättigt (3/9) 
2133 Tina konnte zum Abendbrot kaum einen Bissen essen. (15) 
2134 Sie hatte schon seit längerer Zeit keinen rechten Appetit mehr. (17) 
2135 Sie hatte erst kurz zuvor einen großen Eisbecher gegessen. (17) p 
2136 Hatte Tina zum Abendbrot großen Hunger? 
2137 Nein 
 
2140 ????? 
2141 schwermütig (3/11) 
2142 Erkrankung (3/10) 
2143 Christine fühlte sich sehr schlapp. (8) 
2144 Sie war so niedergedrückt, daß sie sich völlig ausgelaugt fühlte. (17) 
2145 Sie hatte eine Grippe, durch die sie sich ganz ausgelaugt fühlte. (17) n 
2146 Fühlte sich Christine schlapp und ausgelaugt? 
2147 Ja 
 
2150 ????? 
2151 melancholisch (4/13) 
2152 schwärmerisch (3/13) 
2153 Rita lag auf dem Bett und hörte Musik, die genau ihrer Stimmung entsprach. (20) 
2154 Die Lieder klangen wehmütig und handelten von Trauer und Enttäuschung. (19) 
2155 Die Lieder klangen verträumt und handelten von Liebe, Glück und Harmonie. (19) p 
2156 Hörte Rita Lieder, die von Freiheit und Abenteuer handelten? 
2157 Nein 
 
2160 ????? 
2161 Einsamkeit (3/10) 
2162 Harmonie (3/8) 
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2163 Irene ging an einem lauen Frühlingstag allein im Park spazieren. (19) 
2164 Sie fühlte sich verlassen und konnte die Leere in ihrem Leben kaum noch ertragen. (23) 
2165 Sie fühlte sich sehr wohl und genoß die friedliche Natur und den süßen Duft der Blumen. (23) 
p 
2166 Wurde Irene bei ihrem Spaziergang im Park von einer Freundin begleitet? 
2167 Nein 
 
2170 ????? 
2171 grübeln (2/7) 
2172 lesen (2/5) 
2173 Henriette saß seit Stunden allein in ihrem Zimmer. (15) 
2174 Sie überlegte verzweifelt, wie sinnlos ihr momentan alles erschien. (19) 
2175 Das neue Buch war so spannend, daß sie einfach nicht mehr davon loskam. (18) p 
2176 War Henriette länger als eine Stunde in ihrem Zimmer? 
2177 Ja 
 
2180 ????? 
2181 resigniert (3/10) 
2182 zufrieden (3/9) 
2183 Nadine dachte über ihre momentane Situation nach. (17) 
2184 Sie konnte ihrem Leben nicht mehr viel Freude abgewinnen. (16) 
2185 Sie konnte ihrem Leben viel Spaß und Freude abgewinnen. (16) p 
2186 Machte sich Nadine darüber Gedanken, wieviel Freude sie momentan in ihrem Leben hatte? 
2187 Ja 
 
3010 ????? 
3011 Scham (1/5) 
3012 Zorn (1/4) 
3013 Regina spürte, wie ihr die Röte ins Gesicht stieg, als ihr Kollege mit ihr sprach. (22) 
3014 Ihre Reaktion war ihr sehr peinlich und sie bemühte sich, ihr Erröten zu verbergen. (24) 
3015 Seine Worte machten sie sehr wütend und sie bemühte sich, ihren Ärger zu verbergen. (24) n 
3016 Gab sich Regina Mühe, ihre Gefühle vor ihrem Kollegen zu verstecken? 
3017 Ja 
 
3020 ????? 
3021 Peinlichkeit (3/12) 
3022 Begeisterung (4/12) 
3023 Sandra spürte ihr Herz bis zum Hals schlagen, als ihr attraktiver Nachbar sie zum Essen 
einlud. (25) 
3024 Sie hatte große Angst, sich vor ihrem Nachbarn zu blamieren. (16) 
3025 Sie war überglücklich, daß ihr Nachbar sie eingeladen hatte. (17) n 
3026 War Sandra die Einladung des Nachbars egal? 
3027 Nein 
 
3030 ????? 
3031 Lampenfieber (4/12) 
3032 Bewunderung (4/11) 
3033 Als Vera vor die Klasse trat, um ihr Gedicht vorzutragen, waren aller Augen auf sie gerichtet. 
(27) 
3034 Die Aufmerksamkeit ihrer Mitschüler machte ihr furchtbare Angst, so daß sie das Gedicht 
vergaß und steckenblieb. (29) 
3035 Die Aufmerksamkeit ihrer Mitschüler machte sie stolz, so daß sie das Gedicht ganz besonders 
ausdrucksvoll vortrug. (29) p 
3036 Wurde Vera bei ihrem Gedichtvortrag durch ihre Mitschüler beeinflußt? 
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3037 Ja 
 
3040 ????? 
3041 Furcht (1/6) 
3042 Kälte (2/5) 
3043 Carola zitterten auf der Gartenparty so stark die Hände, daß sie fast ihr Getränk verschüttete. 
(27) 
3044 Sie hatte schreckliche Angst vor den vielen unbekannten Leuten. (17) 
3045 Sie hatte ihre Jacke zu Hause vergessen, und jetzt fror sie. (17) n 
3046 Beschmutzte Carola ihre Kleidung mit einem Rotweinfleck? 
3047 Nein 
 
3050 ????? 
3051 anstarren (3/9) 
3052 flirten (2/7) 
3053 Dorothea stand mit einem attraktiven jungen Mann allein im Fahrstuhl. (20) 
3054 Er beobachtete sie und bemerkte, wie nervös sie war. (17) 
3055 Er lächelte freundlich und zwinkerte ihr sogar vielsagend zu. (17) p 
3056 Schenkte der junge Mann Dorothea irgend welche Beachtung? 
3057 Ja 
 
3060 ????? 
3061 Vortrag (2/7) 
3062 Virus (2/5) 
3063 Sabrina fühlte sich zittrig auf den Beinen, so daß sie sich unbedingt setzen mußte. (23) 
3064 Sie hatte schreckliche Angst, ihre Präsentation zu vermasseln. (17) 
3065 Sie hatte wahrscheinlich die Grippe, da sie sich auch fiebrig fühlte. (17) n 
3066 Fühlte sich Sabrina zittrig auf den Beinen, weil sie an diesem Tag noch nichts gegessen hatte? 
3067 Nein 
 
3070 ????? 
3071 unerwünscht (3/11) 
3072 überrascht (3/10) 
3073 Als Katja unerwartet auf der Party erschien, verstummten die Gäste für einen Moment. (24) 
3074 Katja fürchtete ganz stark, daß sich niemand über ihr Kommen freute. (18) 
3075 Sie waren erstaunt, daß Katja ihr Kommen doch ermöglichen konnte. (18) n 
3076 Traf Katja auf der Party ein, ohne von den Gästen bemerkt zu werden? 
3077 Nein 
 
3080 ????? 
3081 Stottern (2/8) 
3082 Irrtum (2/6) 
3083 Ein fremder Mann sprach Alexandra auf der Straße höflich an. (14) 
3084 Sie merkte beschämt, wie sie beim Antworten ins Stammeln geriet. (16) 
3085 Sie überlegte, mit welcher Person er sie wohl verwechselte. (17) n 
3086 Begegnete Alexandra auf der Straße einem alten Bekannten? 
3087 Nein 
 
3090 ????? 
3091 dumm (1/4) 
3092 witzig (2/6) 
3093 Als Rebecca ihren Vortrag hielt, hörte sie unterdrücktes Kichern unter den Mitschülern. (24) 
3094 In ihrer Ausdrucksweise spiegelte sich ihre Unwissenheit wider. (19) 
3095 In ihrer Ausdrucksweise spiegelte sich ihr bissiger Humor wider. (19) p 
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3096 Amüsierten sich die Mitschüler über Rebeccas Ausdrucksweise? 
3097 Ja 
 
3100 ????? 
3101 unqualifiziert (5/14) 
3102 hochqualifiziert (5/16) 
3103 Susanne hatte bisher nur vermuten können, was ihre Kollegen von ihrer Arbeit hielten. (26) 
3104 Die Kritik war zuvor nie in ihrer Gegenwart ausgesprochen worden. (19) 
3105 Das Lob war zuvor niemals in ihrer Gegenwart ausgesprochen worden. (19) p 
3106 Hatte Susanne zum ersten Mal von ihren Kollegen erfahren, was sie von ihrer Arbeit hielten? 
3107 Ja 
 
3110 ????? 
3111 auslachen (3/9) 
3112 unterhaltsam (4/12) 
3113 Die Zuhörer brachen in lautes Gelächter aus, als Gisela von ihrer Reise erzählte. (25) 
3114 Bei ihrer Erzählung unterliefen ihr lächerliche Versprecher. (18) 
3115 Sie baute viele lustige Episoden in die Erzählung ein. (18) p 
3116 Rief Giselas Reisebericht starke Belustigung unter den Zuhörern hervor? 
3117 Ja 
 
3120 ????? 
3121 schüchtern (2/10) 
3122 amüsieren (4/9) 
3123 Linda stellte fest, daß ihre Erwartungen an die Party bestätigt wurden. (21) 
3124 Sie war zu befangen, um sich mit einem der Gäste unterhalten zu können. (21) 
3125 Sie war richtig glücklich, weil sie sich mit den Gästen so gut unterhalten konnte. (21) p 
3126 Trafen Lindas Vermutungen zu, wie ihr die Party gefallen würde? 
3127 Ja 
 
3130 ????? 
3131 verärgert (3/9) 
3132 dankbar (2/7) 
3133 Alle Teilnehmer schauten zur Tür, als Doris 5 Minuten zu spät zum Seminar kam. (23) 
3134 Ihre Gesichter waren abweisend, weil sie über die Störung sehr erbost waren. (22) 
3135 Ihre Gesichter waren freundlich, weil ihnen die Unterbrechung sehr gelegen kam. (22) p 
3136 Konnte Doris an den Gesichtern ablesen, was ihre Mitschüler von ihrer Verspätung hielten? 
3137 Ja 
 
3140 ????? 
3141 Zurückweisung (4/13) 
3142 Arbeitsstreß (3/12) 
3143 Ulrike wurde auf dem Einwohnermeldeamt sehr unfreundlich behandelt. (20) 
3144 Der Angestellte war über ihre zögernden Fragen sehr verärgert. (19) 
3145 Der Angestellte war über seine vielen Aufgaben sehr verärgert. (19) n 
3146 Verhielt sich der Angestellte des Einwohnermeldeamtes freundlich gegenüber Ulrike? 
3147 Nein 
 
3150 ????? 
3151 durchfallen (3/11) 
3152 feiern (2/6) 
3153 Tanja wartete auf das Ergebnis ihrer Abschlußprüfung. (16) 
3154 Wegen ihrer Prüfungsangst war sie sicher, nicht bestanden zu haben. (18) 
3155 In Gedanken bereitete sie bereits die Examensfete vor. (18) p 
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3156 Hatte Tanja das Ergebnis ihrer Abschlußprüfung bereits gesagt bekommen? 
3157 Nein 
 
3160 ????? 
3161 Bewertung (3/9) 
3162 Hektik (2/6) 
3163 Sybille fühlte sich sehr angespannt. (10) 
3164 Sie mußte gleich ihrem Vorgesetzten die Arbeitsergebnisse erläutern. (20) 
3165 Sie hatte einfach zu viele Termine und Aufgaben zu erledigen. (20) n 
3166 Fühlte sich Sybille ausgeruht und erleichtert? 
3167 Nein 
 
3170 ????? 
3171 ängstlich (2/9) 
3172 Abwasch (2/7) 
3173 Babett hatte ganz feuchte Hände, als die Gäste eintrafen. (16) 
3174 Sie fürchtete, den Erwartungen der Gäste nicht entsprechen zu können. (19) 
3175 Sie hatte vor dem Eintreffen der Gäste noch schnell das Geschirr abgespült. (19) n 
3176 Hatte sich Babett gerade die Hände gewaschen, als die Gäste eintrafen? 
3177 Nein 
 
3180 ????? 
3181 abwertend (3/9) 
3182 interessiert (4/12) 
3183 Ein Gast musterte Friederike intensiv, als sie das Restaurant betrat. (21) 
3184 Sie sah seinen herablassenden Blick, weil sie nicht elegant genug gekleidet war. (22) 
3185 Sie sah seinen neugierigen und fragenden Blick, weil sie allein in das Lokal kam. (22) 
3186 Wurde Friederike von einem Gast angestarrt, als sie das Restaurant betrat? 
3187 Ja  
 
 
 
  
276
Appendix XII:  Debriefing for Participants of Study 2 
 
Informationen über die durchgeführten Untersuchungen 
Unsere Projektgruppe unter Leitung von Dr. Eni Becker und Dr. Mike 
Rinck beschäftigt sich damit, wie sich Stimmungen und Gefühle auf das Denken 
und die Wahrnehmung auswirken. Dabei interessieren wir uns besonders für die 
Aufmerksamkeit, die Wahrnehmungsgeschwindigkeit, das Gedächtnis und die Inter-
pretation mehrdeutiger Alltagssituationen. Für unsere Untersuchung haben wir uns 
zwei Gefühle ausgesucht, nämlich Ängste (in sozialen Situationen) und Niede-
rgeschlagenheit.  
Es gibt viele Menschen, die sich im Beisein anderer Personen unsicher 
und ängstlich fühlen oder befürchten, sich zu blamieren und abgelehnt zu werden. 
Darüber hinaus fühlen wir uns alle manchmal niedergeschlagen. An unserer Unter-
suchung nehmen Personen teil, die solche Gefühle zur Zeit stärker empfinden, aber 
auch andere, die davon nur wenig oder gar nicht betroffen sind.  
Die eingesetzten Fragebögen gehören alle den beiden großen Bereichen 
„körperliches und seelisches Befinden“ und „Denkprozesse“ an. Sie sollen den 
Untersuchungsablauf dokumentieren (wie Sie sich über die lange Zeit von zweimal 
ca. 2 Stunden gefühlt haben). Leider ist es uns nicht möglich, die vielen Fragebögen 
individuell auszuwerten und Ihnen Ihre persönlichen Ergebnisse mitzuteilen, da es 
nur sinnvoll ist, mit den Fragebögen Aussagen über Gruppen zu machen. 
Die Leseaufgabe untersucht, wie mehrdeutige Situationen interpretiert 
werden. Täglich erleben wir viele Dinge, die nicht eindeutig sind. Wenn ein Freund 
grußlos an Ihnen vorbeigeht, kann das z.B. bedeuten, daß er Sie nicht mehr mag 
oder daß er Sie nicht gesehen hat. Die kleinen Episoden, die Sie am Computer 
gelesen haben, waren zunächst ebenfalls mehrdeutig (z.B. „Als Astrid nach der 
Operation das Nachthemd wechselte, platzte die Naht auf“). Erst der zweite Satz hat 
die Bedeutung aufgeklärt („Sie setzte sich erschrocken auf das Bett und untersuchte 
die Wunde“). Die Überschrift, anhand derer Sie sich eine Erwartung bilden sollten, 
paßte manchmal zu der Bedeutungsauflösung (Verletzung), oder sie war unpassend 
(Stoff). Wir erwarten, daß Sie zum Verständnis des zweiten Satzes länger gebraucht 
haben, wenn die Überschrift unpassend war. In diesem Fall sollten Sie eine andere 
Bedeutung des mehrdeutigen Satzes erwartet haben und deshalb während des 
Lesens des zweiten Satzes umgedacht haben. 
Die Suchaufgabe soll Aufmerksamkeitsprozesse erfassen. Hier wurden 
Ihnen viele Wörter über den gesamten Bildschirm verteilt dargeboten, und Sie 
sollten entscheiden, ob ein bestimmter Begriff, z.B. „kariert“, darin enthalten war. 
Dabei wurden Sie wahrscheinlich von den übrigen Wörtern abgelenkt. Diese Ablen-
kung könnte dann besonders groß gewesen sein, wenn es angenehme Begriffe wie 
Schönheit, Waldesstille oder Harmonie waren. Diese Wörter laden eher zum Ver-
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weilen ein als Wörter wie Dachluke, Marmelade, handwarm. Umgekehrt könnten 
Ihnen die angenehmen Wörter als Suchbegriffe eher ins Auge gestochen sein, wenn 
die umgebenden Wörter einen unangenehmeren Charakter hatten (wie Trauer, 
zittern, versagen). 
Mit der Erkennungsaufgabe soll die Wahrnehmungsgeschwindigkeit für 
Figuren und Silben untersucht werden. Dafür wurden Ihnen eine erste Silbe/Figur 
für einen kurzen Moment seitlich und danach eine zweite Silbe/Figur in der Mitte 
des Bildschirms präsentiert. Sie sollten die schwierige Entscheidung treffen, ob die 
erste Silbe/Figur und die zweite Silbe/Figur identisch waren. Für Silben erwarten 
wir, daß sich Rechtshänder immer dann schneller entscheiden und die entsprechen-
den Tasten drücken, wenn die erste Silbe rechts dargeboten wurde; bzw. umgekehrt, 
daß sie für die Entscheidung mehr Zeit benötigen, wenn die erste Silbe links darge-
boten wurde. Im Gegensatz dazu sollte die Entscheidung für die Figuren bei 
Rechtshändern dann schneller getroffen werden, wenn die erste Figur links gezeigt 
wurde. Das hängt damit zusammen, daß das Gehirn aus zwei Hälften besteht, die 
unterschiedliche Spezialisierungen besitzen. Die linke Hälfte ist bei Rechtshändern 
auf die Verarbeitung von Sprache  (z. B. Silben) spezialisiert, während die rechte 
Hälfte auf die Verarbeitung von Bildern (z. B. Figuren) spezialisiert ist. 
Die Vorstellungsaufgabe war die Lernphase für die beiden anschließen-
den Gedächtnistests. Zum einen wurden Sie gebeten, alle Wörter aufzuschreiben, 
an die Sie sich noch erinnern konnten. Hier nehmen wir an, daß Sie sich besonders 
gut für Sie persönlich relevante Begriffe merken konnten, also etwa „Geselligkeit“, 
wenn Sie gern unter Freunden sind. Die Buchstabensalataufgabe war ebenfalls ein 
Gedächtnistest. Unter den Wörtern, die Sie aus den verdrehten Buchstaben bilden 
konnten, waren zahlreiche Begriffe, die Sie in der Vorstellungsaufgabe bereits dar-
geboten bekommen hatten. Wir erwarten, daß Sie diese Wörter schneller zusam-
mensetzen konnten als ganz neue Begriffe, die Ihnen in der Untersuchung nicht da-
rgeboten wurden. 
Das Puzzle wurde schließlich zur Ablenkung und Entspannung eingesetzt. 
Bei so vielen doch recht anstrengenden Aufgaben am Bildschirm und auf Papier 
wollten wir Sie eine andere Tätigkeit ausüben lassen, die den meisten Menschen 
Spaß macht und die sie in ihrer Freizeit durchführen. 
Wir möchten uns noch einmal ganz herzlich für Ihre Teilnahme und Ihr 
Durchhaltevermögen bedanken. Sollten Sie noch Fragen zur Untersuchung haben, 
beantworten wir sie selbstverständlich gern. Hier noch eine wichtige Bitte, die uns 
sehr am Herzen liegt:  
Bitte sprechen Sie mit anderen Personen, die möglicherweise ebenfalls 
von uns eingeladen wurden, nicht über die Zielsetzung der Untersuchung!  
Herzlichen Dank! 
Rückfragen an: Frau Dipl.-Psych. Andrea Hähnel, BZW A 313, Tel.: 463 3275, 
email: ahaehnel@rcs.urz.tu-dresden.de 
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